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OBJECTIVE 
With the emergence of increasing numbers of aircraft systems involving human operators 
interacting with "intelligent" automation, concerns have been raised regarding the trustworthiness 
of the Human-Electronic Crew Team's decisions. Many of the decisions that the Team is required 
to make occur in an imprecise world in which the judgements may be made based on such vague 
concepts as high, low, near or far. The most effective decision aids in this type of environment 
may be those which can interpret inexact data and still achieve sound solutions, such as fuzzy logic 
decision aiding systems. Essentially, the problem comes down to the level of confidence that 
higher authorities should have in the decisions, and in the resulting actions, of the Team. The 
Human-Electronic Crew needs to be successfully developed and integrated such that it can function 
effectively as a trustworthy Team in this inexact, real world. The specific purpose of this 
workshop was to examine these concerns. 
This workshop was a follow-up to two previously successful meetings (1988 and 1990) co- 
sponsored by the RAF and USAF. It provided a timely forum for experts of several countries to 
measure progress in this critical technical area. It allowed for the exchange of new ideas, concepts 
and data relative to hardware and software capabilities that can be included in aircraft system 
design, to aid the human operator perform the mission. Attendance at the workshop was by 
invitation only. The numbers of persons attending was restricted to 60. All invited attendees were 
expected to contribute through active participation in the meeting discussions. It brought together 
experts representing cockpit design disciplines including hardware and software technologists, as 
well as human factors specialists and pilots to address such questions as: 
(1) Do current development activities address the teaming issues? 
(2) Are there some types or categories of decisions or actions that the Human-Electronic 
Team should never be trusted with? 
(3) What oversight checks should be placed on the Team? 
(4) How does the Team communicate with the higher authorities? 
(5) Are there other issues besides teaming which are crucial to the operational application 
of the Electronic Crewmember concept? 
The workshop comprised formal paper sessions and structured small group discussions. The 
proceedings are published as reports of the sponsoring laboratories. 
ORGANISING COMMITTEE 
CO-CHAIRS 
John Reising, PhD. 
WL/FIPA 
Wright-Patterson AFB. 
Dayton, Ohio 45433 
United States 
Robert Taylor 
DRA Centre for Human Sciences 
CHS 3 
F131,Rm43 
Farnborough, Hants, GU14 6SZ 
United Kingdom. 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 
George Brander, Maritime Command & Control Division, DRA Portsdown, UK. 
Jeremy Clare, Cambridge Consultants Ltd., Cambridge, UK. 
Terry Emerson, Joint Cockpit Office, USAF WPAFB, Dayton, Ohio, USA. 
Howard Howells, Man Machine Integration Department, DRA Farnborough, UK. 
MEETING ADMINISTRATION 
Jill Haugh, DRA Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough, UK. 
Joanne Rainey, DRA Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough, UK. 
SPONSORS 
US Department of the Air Force 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFMC) 
European Office of Aerospace Research and Development 
223/231 Old Marylebone Road, London, NW1 5TH. UK. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The Organising Committee wishes to express thanks to the following: the sponsors USAF EOARD, the USAF Wright 
Laboratory, and the UK DRA Centre for Human Sciences, for their support for this meeting; Cambridge Consultants Ltd., for 
hosting the Technical Tour; Cambridge Tourist Information, and in particular Conference Organiser Wendy Morris, for host 
location guidance and co-ordination; King's College Cambridge for hosting the workshop Reception; the management and staff 
of the Royal Cambridge Hotel for hosting the meeting and associated social functions. In addition the organisers wish to 
acknowledge the contributions of Michael Reinccke and the German Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine in hosting the first 
two workshops in this series in 1988 and 1990. The success of their efforts laid firm foundations for this third workshop on 
Human-Electronic Crew Teamwork. 
HI 
WORKSHOP BACKGROUND 
Ever since the movie Star Wars showed Luke 
Sky walker and R2D2 teaming up to destroy 
Death   Star,   there   has   been   considerable 
speculation as to how an efficient pilot-robot 
team could be created.    Since weight is a 
critical design factor in airborne systems, the 
literal building of a pilot-robot team has not 
been   undertaken;   rather,  the  emphasis  has 
shifted to incorporating the intelligence of the 
robot.   As work in this area progressed, such 
terms as "electronic crewmember" and "black 
box back seater" began to enter the vocabulary 
of both the crewstation design and computer 
software communities.  While the use of these 
titles served to stimulate thinking in the area of 
human computer teamwork, a major program 
was     required     to     build     an     electronic 
crewmember (EC); in the US this took the 
form of the Pilot's Associate (PA) Program. 
The establishment of the PA Program in 1985 
gave credence to the idea that the building of 
the brain of R2D2, in some very simplified 
form, might be possible.   Some of the results 
of this program have been transitioned to the 
US Army's Rotocraft Pilot's Associate Program 
which continues to strive for the same goal. In 
Europe,  AI  efforts  have centred  around  a 
number  of  programs.     These  include   the 
French "Co-pilote Electronique", the British 
Mission Management Aid (MMA), and the 
German CAMA and CASSY Cockpit Assistant 
Systems.   They too have tried to achieve the 
goal  of human  computer teamwork in  the 
cockpit. 
continued, in 1987 an event occurred which 
demonstrated the definite need for a workshop. 
In April of 1987, USAF representatives gave a 
paper at a meeting of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society in London, and again at a meeting of 
the Ergonomics Society in Swansea, Wales. 
The subject of the paper was "Workload and 
Situational Awareness in Future Aircraft", and 
a section of the paper discussed workload 
sharing between the pilot and the EC. During 
both meetings the same kinds of questions 
were asked: Is the pilot always in charge? Can 
the pilot and EC really be called a team? Why 
do we need a pilot at all? 
These thought provoking questions resulted in 
continued discussions with technical personnel 
in the US, UK and FRG, and the result was the 
1988 workshop entitled, "The Human- 
Electronic Crew: Can They Work Together?" 
(RAF IAM BSD-DR-G4 Dec 88; WRDC-TR- 
89-7008). Following the 1988 workshop, 
interest was expressed in holding an additional 
meeting on the topic of human-electronic crew 
teamwork. .The result was a 1990 workshop 
entitled, "The Human-Electronic Crew: Is the 
Team Maturing" (RAF IAM PD-DR-P5, April 
1991; WL-TR-92-3078, July 1992). Both the 
1988 and 1990 workshops were sponsored by 
the USAF European Office of Aerospace 
Research and Devlopment (EOARD), and 
hosted very generously by the German Air 
Force. 
In the next two years, numerous discussions 
were held to explore some of the cockpit 
ramifications created by the use of a pilot-EC 
team within the aircraft. These discussions 
occurred in various technical meetings within 
the US and Europe. In one of the meetings 
held in the US, attended by representatives of 
the Air Force of the then Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), as well as UK and US 
representatives, the idea of the initial workshop 
was born. Although progress on the idea of a 
workshop    on     human-computer    teamwork 
There was a four year hiatus between the 
second workshop and the present one. Events 
relating to the end of the Cold War caused a 
very dynamic environment, with many 
governmental reorganisations occurring on 
both sides of the Atlantic. After these events 
were sorted out, plans began to convene the 
third workshop. Once again, EOARD 
sponsorship was obtained, and as a result the 
present Workshop, which the Royal Air Force 
and DRA Centre for Human Sciences 
graciously agreed to host, became a reality. 
IV 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The meeting was divided into two sections: 
formal presentations (papers) and workshop. 
The 27 papers covered five major categories: 
mission descriptions, knowledge engineering 
methodology, trust development, interface 
design, and systems integration. A summary 
of the ideas from the papers is given below. 
Papers 
One of the key points made by the 
representatives of the aircrew community was 
that decision aids should help them make a 
decision by offering information related to 
their decision making criteria. The essence of 
the idea is that aircrew do not want to be tag 
along button pushers who are relegated to a 
secondary role. However, the missions are 
getting so complex and the crew sizes so small 
that some automated decision assistance, 
besides criteria presentation, is likely to be 
needed. 
Another interesting comment came from the 
human factors community. Their impression is 
that the technology already exists to give us the 
displays, controls, and decision aids that are 
projected for current upgrades and future 
aircraft. The automation community replied 
that, while this may be true superficially, there 
were many problems still needing to be solved. 
Such issues as logistical supportability are key, 
for instance, to the selection of decision 
support methods. Other issues involve real- 
time and on-time processing. 
Workshop 
After the presentation of the papers, the second 
half of the meeting consisted of a workshop. 
Its purpose was to form six teams to deal with 
AI technology and cockpit implications of the 
technology. The teams were composed of 
three technical disciplines represented at the 
conference - aircrew, crew station designers, 
and artificial intelligence experts. At the end 
of the workshop, each of the six team leaders 
presented the results of their deliberations. 
The details are documented in the workshop 
section of these proceedings; a summary is 
presented below. 
There was a consistent message from the 
aircrew to keep them involved at the earliest 
stage possible. It is interesting that they were 
not against the incorporation of the EC into 
their cockpits so long as they received no 
surprises from the intelligent computer, and the 
aircrew was always in charge. The key point 
from the software designers was that many 
different portions of an EC exist but have not 
been integrated. Another issue raised is 
whether the integrated EC can run in real time. 
The human factors specialists were concerned 
with the specific means of building trust 
between the aircrew and the EC. Specific 
guidelines for successful teambuilding between 
the aircrew and the EC were given in a number 
of papers, and the consensus was that some 
real progress had been made in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
The overall worth of the meeting can be 
summed up in the comments of one of the 
team leaders who stated that there is no 
question of the worth of the EC. The main 
issue now is to detail which of the components 
are mature and which deserve further effort. 
His team produced a preliminary attempt at a 
structure (Figure 2 in the Report of Group 
Discussions) which can serve as a framework. 
Besides the technical information gathered, 
one of the major accomplishments was the 
positive interchange among the participants. 
There was a genuine sharing of information 
and ideas in order to attack the. common 
problem of information overload in the 
cockpit. The participating countries are striving 
to reach a common goal, and the ideas 
exchanged in the meeting should prove 
beneficial to all of them. 
CONTENTS 
Page 
OBJECTIVE ü 
ORGANISING COMMITTEE iii 
WORKSHOP BACKGROUND iv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY v 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS. 
by Gp Capt G.A. Miller, Operational Requirements (Air), Ministry of Defence, UK. 
SESSION I - MISSION SYSTEMS 
SYNOPSIS 5 
1. Development and Evaluation of the AH - 1W Supercockpit. 7 
by Holley, CD. and Busbridge, M.L. 
2. Intelligent System Operational Support Requirements. 17 
by Aldern, T.D. 
3. Assistance to the Human Management of Target Trackers in Airborne Maritime Operations. 23 
by MacLeod I. 
4. Aiding Weapon Delivery. 29 
by Hall, D.B. 
5. CAMA: Some Aspects of a Military Crew Assistant System. 35 
by Brugger E. and Hertweck H. 
6. Battle Suitable, Electronically Provided Information. 41 
by Seaman J.S. and Metzler T.R. 
SESSION n - KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 
SYNOPSIS 47 
7. Trust-Enhancing Sensor and Information Fusion for Knowledge-Based Cockpit Decision Aids. 49 
by Raeth, P.G. 
8. Case-based Reasoning and Aircraft Systems Troubleshooting: New Solutions from Old. 55 
by Magaldi R.V. 
9. Structured and Analytical Knowledge Acquisition Methods for Tactical KBS Decision Aids. 63 
by Ellis R.D., Hepworth R., Howells H., and Bickerton R., Lt RN. 
10. Designing Real-Time Decision-Support for Future Systems and Scenarios. 69 
by Clare J., Peden C, and Smith R. 
VI 
SESSION DDE - TRUST DEVELOPMENT 
SYNOPSIS 75 
11. Seaworthy Trust: Confidence in Automated Data Fusion. 77 
by Simpson A., and Brander G.N. 
12. Trust and Warnings. °3 
by Ovenden C.R. and Starr A.F. 
13. Trust and Adaptation Failure: An Experimental Study of Unco-operation Awareness. 93 
by Taylor R.M., Shadrake R. and Haugh J. 
14. Communication in the Human - Electronic Crew: What can we learn from human teams? 99 
by Lucas A.T., Selcon S.J., Coxell A.W., Dudfield HJ. and O'Clarey N. 
15. Improving Communication and Trust with Memory Techniques. 106 
by Bekarian D.A. and Dennett J.L. 
16. In Order to Build-Up Trust, Must the H-E Team Pass the Turing Test? Ill 
by Reising, J.R. 
SESSION IV - CO-OPERATIVE INTERFACE DESIGN 
SYNOPSIS 117 
17. Improving the Reliability of Interactions in Human Computer Team Work. 119 
by Ricketts I., Cairns A., and Newell A. University of Dundee, Dundee, UK. 
18. Towards an Expert System for the Analysis of Computer Aided Human Performance. 125 
by Greatorix G. and Clark T. 
19. MIDAS in the Control Room: Applying a Flight Deck Modelling Design Tool to Another Domain. 133 
by Hoecker D.G. and Roth E.M. 
20. Interface Design for Adaptive Automation Technologies. 139 
by Hancock P.A., Scallen, S.F., and Duley, J.A. 
21. Displays and Controls for the Pilot - Electronic Crewmember Team. 147 
by Olson, J.L. and Lynch, R. 
22. Standards for Trustworthy H/E Teamwork. I53 
by Sherwood-Jones B. 
SESSION V - SYSTEMS INTEGRATION LESSONS 
SYNOPSIS 157 
23. CASSY - The Electronic Part of the Human-Electronic Crew. 159 
by Gerlach M. and Onken R. 
24. Modelling the Information Flow - Development of a Mission Management Aid for Future Offensive Aircraft. 165 
by Davies J. 
25. Achieving the Associate Relationship: Lessons from 10 Years of Research and Design. 174 
by Miller C.A. and Riley V. 
26. Principles of Interaction for Intelligent Systems. 181 
by Hammer J.T, Small R.L., and Zenyuh J.P. 
27. The "Copilote Electronique" Project: First Lessons as Exploratory Development Starts. 187 
by Joubert T., Salle S.E., Champigneux G., Grau, J.Y., Sassus P., and Le Doeuff H. 
GROUP DISCUSSIONS 193 
LIST OF ATTENDEES 203 
vii 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
by 
Group Captain G A Miller RAF 
Operational Requirements (Air) 
Ministry of Defence 
I would like to thank the co-chairs, Bob Taylor 
and John Reising, for inviting me to give this 
keynote address to the International Workshop 
on Human-Computer Teamwork. Two aspects 
of the workshop are, to me, particularly 
significant. First, the international flavour will, 
I hope, provide a good cross-fertilisation of 
ideas. With the current scarcity of money and 
expertise, we must do all we can to improve 
cooperation in human-centered design as in 
other areas of research. Second, I think the 
broad spectrum of backgrounds represented 
here is essential. Without a dialogue between 
the research community, industry and the 
operators we could all too easily waste our 
resources searching for answers to altogether 
the wrong questions. Therefore, I see this is an 
important forum in which to share our views 
and develop ideas on the way ahead. As the 
MOD sponsor for human factors research, this 
is a process in which I am very pleased to be 
involved. Having been given the opportunity to 
open the debate, I will take a few minutes to 
outline my views on the significance of the 
teamwork approach to system design, and offer 
my thoughts on some of the many difficult 
issues that have to be resolved. 
With the ever-increasing sophistication of 
avionic systems, we are fast approaching the 
situation in which the aeronautical industry can 
offer systems that are technically capable of 
meeting our operational requirements but which 
the aircrew cannot fully exploit; perhaps we are 
already there. Part of the problem is 
procedural. The procurement process brings 
with it a tendency to design avionic sub-systems 
before fully considering how they will be 
integrated into the cockpit and, because of the 
high cost of retrospective updates, we operators 
normally have to live with the result. The 
original Jaguar Navigation and Attack System is 
a good example of this weakness. The system 
was so poorly integrated that it is thought to 
have contributed to a number of fatal accidents, 
but it was almost 10 years before a more 
satisfactory upgrade was eventually installed. 
In the UK, we have made some progress in this 
area, by putting human factors issues at the 
front end of the procurement process, and I 
know that other nations are making similar 
procedural changes. Unfortunately, there is a 
more fundamental problem that cannot be 
solved by the same method. The problem is 
that integration only ensures that elements of a 
system function with each other, which is not 
enough. We need to develop systems that will 
work for the aircrew to keep the pressures on 
them to a manageable level. In essence, future 
aircraft systems must share the intellectual 
workload, not just minimise their contribution 
to the overall task. As an operator myself, I can 
intuitively accept that this could be achieved by 
designing systems around a cooperative 
teamwork model but the concept raises many 
fundamental issues. Time prevents me from 
introducing all of them, so I will concentrate on 
the few which I feel are the more important. 
Who should be the team leader - the mission 
computer or the human? What types of teams 
should the system emulate? How do we ensure 
that the team samples we experiment on are 
representative? What human characteristics 
should we allow for in our team? How many 
humans should there be in the aircraft? How 
much should the team members trust each 
other? And finally of course, can we trust the 
team? It is this last issue that we will be 
concentrating on this week but, of course, the 
issues are very much inter-related so I would 
like to provide a starting point for a wide 
ranging discussion. 
Let me deal with the easy issue first - why 
aircrew must be in command. The argument is 
essentially the same as that for having a human 
in   the  cockpit  at  all.     Modern  computers, 
particularly knowledge-based systems, offer a 
quite remarkable leap in the decision-making 
capability of the overall human-electronic 
system, but we cannot directly compare these 
machines with the human brain. We cannot 
even agree on a model of human intelligence 
yet, so we have no way of producing an 
electronic equivalent. (An alternative perhaps, 
but not an equivalent). Therefore, I believe it 
will be some considerable time, if indeed ever, 
before knowledge-based systems are capable of 
taking the intellectual lead in aircraft cockpits 
and, until then, I think we should be 
concentrating on the decision-support available 
from knowledge-based systems. 
For those of you who are not convinced by this 
argument, there is another important area in 
which electronic systems are found wanting. 
Computers cannot replicate the ingenuity of the 
human mind that enables us to respond to 
unexpected situations in novel and 
unpredictable ways. I do not mean the ability to 
act in a random manner - my office computer 
seems to do that whenever I'm working to a 
tight deadline! I mean our ability spontaneously 
to grasp an opportunity, apply our imagination 
and creativity, and determine a course of action 
unique to the individual and the situation - a 
course of action that a computer might consider 
illogical. This is not a weakness but a great 
strength as it allows us to surprise the enemy, 
which is one of the key principles of war at all 
levels from grand strategy down to a brief air 
combat skirmish. Only when this unique 
characteristic is achieved in a computer do I feel 
that we should entertain any thoughts of 
replacing the human in the cockpit. In the 
meantime, I see the computer carrying out the 
more mundane task of flying the aircraft while 
the human, using his or her inherent insight, 
inference and intuition, fights the battle. 
Hopefully that provides a starting position for 
any debate on the intellectual pre-emminence of 
the human. Let me move on to some of the 
other questions I raised. 
Firstly, what type of team should the human- 
electronic crew emulate? An obvious starting 
point would be the crew of a multi-seat aircraft, 
but this can be a strictly heirarchical 
organisation working within a narrow set of 
teamwork principles. The crew structure has its 
roots in centuries of military tradition and 
allows officers to exercise command, control 
and leadership over their men. This may not be 
the best structure for a human-electronic crew 
so we may need to look elsewhere for a 
complete picture of the way in which our crew 
ought to operate. On the other hand, the more 
successful multi-seat crews often put aside the 
rigid structure of rank and position when they 
enter their aircraft and their overall performance 
benefits from a combination of the unique 
strengths of each individual. Operating in this 
manner, the performance of a crew will 
invariably exceed the sum of each individual's 
abilities. 
We may have much to learn from non- 
heirarchical organisations, in which elements 
form ad-hoc groups to solve problems, each 
element being involved in different problems on 
a time-share basis. The overall aim of the 
mission is provided by higher authority, in this 
case by the Operational Commander. The crew 
leader then determines the best strategy to 
achieve this aim and directs the rest of the team 
accordingly but does not get embroiled in the 
detailed work of the groups. Of course, this 
approach brings its own issues, not least of 
which being the need to keep the aircrew 
informed in order to maintain situational 
awareness, the need for effective 2-way 
communication, the need for the behaviour of 
the machine to be predictable and, most 
importantly, the ultimate need to maintain the 
pilot's authority. These issues will be difficult 
to solve but it does illustrate the point that we 
need to cast the net wide in our research. 
The follow-on question is about how to ensure 
that we use representative samples of teams 
during research. I note that one of the papers to 
be presented this week calls on an experiment 
using an experienced flight-crew in a simulator 
environment. This raises an interesting area for 
discussion. In my experience and as I 
mentioned earlier, the composition of a crew 
has a marked affect on the way it operates, from 
routine tasks such as inter-cockpit 
communication, right up to major tactical 
decision-making. Essentially, each member of 
the crew adapts his technique, and his degree of 
trust, to suit the experience and capabilities of 
the other crew-member or members. Also, even 
a constituted crew (that is to say a crew who 
routinely and frequently operate together) can 
function very differently from one mission to 
the next depending on fatigue, distraction, 
motivation, and so on. Indeed, there were some 
genuine surprises amongst our constituted crews 
during the Gulf War due to the presence fear 
and in most cases it resulted in an even greater 
level of achievement. Therefore, later in the 
week you may wish to discuss how we will 
ensure that the teams used in our experiments 
are valid. Perhaps this discussion could be 
extended to address wider issues: should, 
perhaps, the electronic crew-member be 
optimised for a mythical standard aviator, or 
should we develop systems that can adapt to 
individuals? In either case, to what extent 
should the electronics cater for the vast array of 
human foibles? 
Another major question is how many humans 
we will have in the aircraft. This topic could be 
the subject of a workshop in its own right so I 
will not attempt to cover it in any detail. 
However, I would like to make a couple of 
observations. Having flown operational tours 
on both single-seat and 2-seat aircraft, I have no 
doubt about the benefits of 2-man crews. I have 
found navigators to be invaluable for buying the 
beer and carrying your bags on detachment. 
Actually, there is a serious point here. The 
comradeship which develops in a constituted 
crew cannot be replaced by electronic systems. 
Again, the Gulf War reminded us that going 
into battle is a very daunting experience and the 
Tornado crews drew great strength from the fact 
that they had another human on board during 
the first few nights of action over Baghdad - the 
crews of the single-seat aircraft deserve even 
greater respect. There are problems with multi- 
crew operations, not least being communication, 
but there are also many operational benefits 
which can all be boiled down to the one over- 
riding point that the workload is shared in a 
multi-crew environment. 
The debate on crew numbers has a direct 
relevance to this workshop. Firstly, human 
factors work has an important contribution to 
make in determining how many seats we should 
have in future aircraft. Secondly, 1 am quite 
sure that team dynamics varies with different 
numbers of humans so our research may have to 
follow 2 separate paths at some stage. Finally, 
the number of humans will have a marked affect 
on the degree of trust that will be conferred on 
the team as a whole. This is the case now, and I 
see no reason for it to change significantly when 
electronics also form an integral part of the 
crew in the future. 
This leads me on to the issue of trust. The first 
point is that we should not under-estimate the 
capabilities and needs of the human in the 
human-electronic crew. As a Tornado squadron 
commander, I was happy to authorise my crews 
to fly at low level through poor weather using 
the Terrain Following Radar because the pilot 
could monitor the system and over-ride it if 
necessary. I would not have trusted the 
electronics alone to conduct this critical task. 
More importantly, I did not need to - the 
aircrew were well trained with a highly 
developed survival instinct. In other words, my 
trust was earned by the combination of man 
and machine, not by the machine, or the man, 
alone. 
On the other hand, if future electronic systems 
are to share the workload, we will have to 
reduce the pilot's involvement in the control 
loop for some tasks. This will require a detailed 
knowledge of the risks involved, coupled with 
some difficult decisions about the consequences 
that we are prepared to accept. One thing is 
certain and that is that we cannot expect to 
achieve absolute trust - neither the human nor 
the electronics will ever be totally infallible. As 
a general rule we operators will expect a very 
high level of confidence in potentially life- 
threatening situations, so we would expect to 
exploit the capabilities of both man and 
machine. Conversely, for routine tasks, in 
which the consequences of mistakes are 
tolerable, we will allow the machine to make 
decisions autonomously. Between these 
extremes, we may need to develop a range of 
predictable automation levels. We will also 
have to resist the temptation to err on the safe 
side as this will overload the pilot and prevent 
us from meeting our objective of cooperatively 
sharing the workload. This also raises 
questions about aircrew training in the context 
of when to trust and when not to trust the 
aircraft's automatic systems.   Thirty years ago, 
pilots got airborne clear in their minds that if it 
all went pear-shaped, they could trust their own 
judgement, were able to take over, and I believe 
that they genuinely expected the unexpected and 
were well-able to cope. Today's young men are, 
understandably, somewhat confused. Rather 
than expecting the unexpected and being 
prepared to take it on, many now simply fear 
that the unexpected will occur and are unsure 
how they will, or should, react. They have been 
taught to trust the automatic systems to the 
point in some cases that the automatics are more 
reliable than their own judgement. This 
reinforces the need for a dialogue between the 
operators and the research community if we are 
not to continue developing systems which leave 
the pilot guessing at a time when his thoughts 
should be clearly focussed on either fighting or 
problem solving. 
The final point I would like to make is about the 
affect that increased trust will have on the way 
we operate. Currently, Commanders often feel 
unable to trust computers and other electronic 
systems sufficiently to allow them to act 
autonomously. As a result, restrictive rules of 
engagement are applied which can prevent 
systems being used to their full potential. For 
example, pilots may have to identify a target 
visually before attacking, to check that the 
sensors have correctly predicted that the target 
is hostile. However, the rules do not just reflect 
the Commander's confidence in his weapon 
systems. They are also the politician's final 
means of controlling events on the battlefield. 
Thus, even if we develop intelligent, predictable 
and trustworthy systems, this progress is more 
likely to translate into an increased confidence 
of success, rather than greater freedom of 
operation, and we cannot expect a sudden 
change in the way we go about our business. 
In conclusion, I hope I have given you some 
food for thought, both over the next few days 
and afterwards, when you return to your normal 
work. I am very concious that I have provided 
more questions than answers, but I feel that this 
reflects the current situation quite accurately. 
For my part, I have an open mind about the 
issues raised by the human-electronic crew 
concept, apart from my views about keeping 
humans in an overall position of authority in the 
cockpit. I am looking forward to hearing your 
views on these issues and others that will arise 
this week. As a customer, I also look forward 
to reading the workshop report. 
I very much regret that I'll be unable to stay for 
the whole week to join in the debate but I'm 
sure the other operators will be more than happy 
to offer their views. A word of caution though: 
it is an established fact that the number of 
opinions held by a group of aircrew is an 
exponential function, where 'x' is the number of 
wings on their chests. Thank you for your 
attention -1 hope you have a rewarding week. 
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SYNOPSIS 
The papers in this section describe HE-C systems and requirements for different missions. Operational roles and tasks covered in 
this section include the following: nap-of- the-earth attack helicopter (Paper 1); pre-mission planning and support for future 
tactical aircraft missions (Paper 2); target tracking in airborne maritime operations (Paper 3); planning, prediction, and target 
designation for precision guided munitions in battlefield air interdiction (Paper 4); dual pilot fixed-wing military transport 
aircraft (Paper 5); and high-level battlefield command, control and communication (Paper 6). Paper 1 describes the latest 
techniques in "glass cockpit" design. The authors describe the design rationale for their attack helicopter cockpit, and they 
discuss the tools used to create and validate the system, from initial conception, through to fully manned mission simulation. 
Typical control display formats are described and illustrated. They report how human information processing principles of 
schemata and chunking have influenced the design of the cockpit management system. This paper demonstrates how prudent, 
mission-oriented application of automation can provide practical solutions to many current mission system problems, and sets the 
context in which applications of artificial intelligence technology will need to make a difference. The other papers argue that 
intelligent, knowledge-based systems have potential for technology to go further, and to provide assistance to the human 
operator, by aiding human decision-making, across a wide range of missions and tasks. Papers 2,3, and 4 describe the different 
kinds of assistance required for relatively specific, mission critical tasks involving planning, prediction and information 
management. Paper 2 describes how future intelligent mission support systems will be required to be re-configurable in 
accordance with mission specific information. They will need to provide satisfaction of co-ordination requirements with other 
flight elements and co-operating intelligent systems, and they will need the ability to adapt to individual operator preferences for 
their intelligent system activities. Paper 3 describes the requirement in target trackers for assistance in management of the 
sonics sensor environment to capture high quality target data, for assistance in the adoption or rejection of target data, for aid in 
the management of the information used by the tracker, and for assistance in the evaluation of tracker performance. Paper 4 
describes how tactical pilots need assistance in determining weapon delivery outcomes with stand-off weapons, including 
consideration of stringent collateral damage requirements, of pre-planned mission survivability data, and of cockpit imagery for 
manual target designation. Paper 5 describes the nature of this intelligent assistance in an airborne system, and emphasises that 
the computer does not make autonomous decisions, and that it does not make weapons system interventions without orders from 
the pilot. Paper 6 discusses inherent human decision-making limitations in the context of battlefield command systems, and 
anticipating the prospect of improving computer decision-making performance, it poses the controversial possibility of a totally 
automated battlefield. In general, at present the operational community want systems which provide assistance and advice in 
decision-making, but not second-guessing. They do not want EC to try to do better than, or to over-rule, the human decision- 
maker. They want EC to accept and to assist the decisions of the human operator; i.e. to help the operator make better (timely 
and tactically correct) decisions. Whether or not computers can out-perform human decision-making is a hypothetical question. 
At the present, and for the foreseeable future, when dealing with novel situations and decisions that are non-procedural, not 
planned, unpredictable and unexpected, it seems necessary to have human creativity, ingenuity, and flexibility in combat tactics 
to keep the winning edge. 
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ABSTRACT 
GEC-Marconi Avionics Ltd., and Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc. have proposed an extensively 
modified AH-1W SupeiCobra for the British 
Army's new attack helicopter. Called Venom, the 
aircraft features an advanced technology mission 
equipment package (MEP) integrated at the 
human/machine level by the AH-1W 
SuperCockpitTM. This cockpit is one of the 
world's most capable and integrated attack 
helicopter crewstations, incorporating the latest 
techniques in "glass cockpit design." These 
techniques include liberal yet prudent mission 
oriented application of automation, enhanced data 
management that makes the right information 
available to the crew at the right time with 
improved geometric accommodation. The design 
rationale.in the creation of the SuperCockpit,to 
reduce crew workload and enhance mission 
effectivity at the same time as maintaining crew 
trust in the advanced mission orientated 
automation,are described herein.In addition the tools 
used to create and validate the SuperCockpit,from 
initial conception through to fully manned mission 
simulation, are also discussed;together with 
examples of typical control display formats. 
INTRODUCTION 
GEC-Avionics (GEC) and Bell Helicopter Textron 
Inc. (Bell) have proposed an extensively modified 
AH-1W SuperCobra for the British Army's new 
attack helicopter. Called Venom, the aircraft 
features an advanced technology mission equipment 
package (MEP) integrated at the human-machine 
level by the AH-1W SuperCockpitTM. Jointly 
designed by Bell and GEC, this cockpit represents 
one of the world's most capable and integrated 
attack helicopter crewstations, incorporating the 
latest techniques in "glass cockpit design." These 
techniques include liberal yet prudent mission- 
oriented application of automation, enhanced data 
management that makes the right information 
available to the crew at the right time, improved 
geometric accommodation, and usability testing to 
reduce crew workload and enhance mission 
effectiveness. 
The AH-1 W Super-CockpitTM embodies a number 
of desirable physical attributes to facilitate mission 
success and safety. It has tandem crewstations that 
are configured in such a manner that duty functions 
are inter-changeable between fore and aft cockpits. 
While the preferred crew roles are pilot in front and 
copilot/gunner (CP/G) or commander in the rear, 
either crewmember can perform his duties from 
either crewstation. With some minor exceptions, 
controls and displays are functionally and 
physically identical in both cockpits, thereby 
improving logistics support, transfer of training, 
and mission effectiveness. Differences in between- 
cockpit arrangement of controls and displays have 
been minimized to the extent possible. Control 
display formats on the MFDs are straightforward 
and easily accessible. Flight control grips and 
mission grips are flight and mission oriented with 
hands-on access to critical functions. The cockpit 
geometry has been reworked for improved 
anthropometric accommodation for the targeted 
population. Crew vision has been emphasized, 
both out-the-window and sensor aided. External 
visibility is now considered superior to that of any 
other attack helicopter, with the SuperCockpitTM 
achieving approximately a 20% improvement over 
the current AH-1 W. The Stability and Control 
Augmentation System (SCAS) provides proven 
aircraft handling qualities and will receive additional 
pilot-aiding functions. Mission and flight 
coordination between crewmembers is direct, 
simple, and positive with the SuperCockpitTM. 
Crew performance is improved through an overall 
design philosophy that encompasses augmented 
flight controls, pushbutton annunciators (PBA) for 
discrete control-display inputs, full alphanumeric 
keyboards with integral function keys and switches, 
and enhanced situational awareness via a digital 
map subsystem. A state of the art targeting system 
is displayed on an advanced technology display 
suite together with the use of wide FOV fully 
binocular helmet mounted displays. Standby flight 
instruments in both cockpits ensure that the crew is 
never without the necessary information for safely 
flying the aircraft should a major failure of both 
dual redundant mission systems occur. 
Extensive cockpit automation and an exceptionally 
user-friendly interface give the crew the time 
required to attend to mission requirements rather 
than spending critical time dealing with system 
operations. For example, consider the situation 
where the pilot, flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE), 
spots a target of opportunity and designates it to 
the CP/G. The CP/G, who has been 
communicating and replanning the route, presses 
the LOS ACQ switch (line-of-sight acquire) on his 
mission grip to slave the targeting system to the 
pilot's LOS, and with the target displayed on one of 
the two MFDs (TGT page) and with full "hands- 
on" control of the targeting system and weapons 
system engages the target.Crew coordination is 
efficient and effortless. Together, the crew collects 
and acts on information required to successfully 
complete the mission. 
SUPERCOCKPIT 
Mission  Equipment  Package 
The UK attack helicopter is required to perform the 
following missions: anti-tank (primary), anti- 
personnel, air-to-air, ferry, instrument flight, 
training, reconnaissance, artillery observation, 
suppression of air defense, and limited search and 
rescue. Performing these missions includes the 
capability for day/night, adverse weather operations 
and nap-of-the-earth (NOE) tactics. 
To support these requirements, the MEP includes: a 
head steered piloting FLIR system: a targeting 
system inclusive of TV/FLIR, laser 
ranger/designator, laser spot tracker, auto search and 
multiple target tracking; a data loader; an advanced 
aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) suite; and a 
fully integrated stores management system 
controlling a versatile weapons suite that includes a 
gun, air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles, and 
rockets. 
The primary control-display package is comprised 
of alphanumeric keyboards with collocated liquid 
crystal displays (LCD), mission and flight grips for 
hands-on functions, LCD MFDs, and helmet- 
mounted displays (HMD) with integral image 
intensification (12). Touch screen and interactive 
voice technologies were excluded on the basis of 
cost and risk The system is integrated together 
with two dual redundant mission computers,each 
machine driving a MFD in both cockpits, a HMD, 
a LFD and associated keyboard together with the 
capability of generating a digital moving map 
display from data derived from the mission loader 
cartridge. 
SuperCockpitTM   Configuration 
The SuperCockpitTM configuration is shown in 3- 
dimensional form in Fig. 1 and in two-dimensional 
layouts in Figs. 2 (forward cockpit) and 3 (aft 
cockpit). In addition each crewmember is equipped 
with an HMD inclusive of night vision intensiver 
capability with electro-mechanical head tracking. 
Each HMD thus being capable of steering either the 
piloting or targeting systems and displaying either 
sensor or the NVI imagary in conjunction with 
superimposed Heads-up symbology.This 
symbology is tailored to the flight regime and 
includes flight, weapons, systems, and CWA 
information. 
SuperCockpitTM  Display  Theory 
From a human factors engineering (HFE) 
perspective, glass cockpits present a tremendous 
challenge for designing a system that deals 
effectively with managing the vast amount of 
information potentially available to the crew 
displays via the onboard computers and sensors. 
Having all these data available does not facilitate 
mission success and safety unless the crew has easy 
access to the correct information in a timely 
manner (Ref. 1). Either too much or too little data 
at the wrong time can be equally disastrous. 
Established models of human information 
processing (e.g., Refs. 2,3) were used throughout 
the SuperCockpitTM development to provide a 
"road map" for design decisions related to the 
human-machine interface. Two principles of 
human information processing were particularly 
relied on for assisting with the information 
management aspect of the SuperCockpitTM design 
and cockpit management system: schemata and 
chunking. 
The concept of schemata originated with Kant in 
the 19th century and was introduced into 
psychology by Bartlett in 1932 (Ref. 4). 
Essentially a schema is an abstract, generic 
representation in human memory of an object, idea, 
process, or procedure. This abstraction contains 
slots or placekeepers that get filled (instantiated) 
when the schema is invoked (Refs. 2, 3). If an 
individual has developed an appropriate schema for 
a particular situation, then processing of the 
information associated with that situation can be 
facilitated by ensuring that instantiations coincide 
with preexisting slots. Standardization of formats 
between multifunction display (MFD) pages and 
access procedures for different MFDs (which are 
identical) represent two examples of the way the 
SuperCockpitTM design capitalizes on the schema 
approach. 
The control logic for accessing the MFDs was also 
supplemented by the psychological principle of 
chunking. This concept was introduced by G.A. 
Miller in 1956 in his classic paper, "The Magical 
Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two" (Ref. 5). In 
essence, he demonstrated that short-term memory 
has a limited processing capacity that ranges from 
five to nine one-syllable words (the range also 
varies with differing stimuli in accordance with the 
limited capacity proposition). Miller further 
demonstrated that this processing limitation can be 
"overridden" by cognitive restructuring of 
information to make it compatible with the limited 
capacity. In other words the information can be 
organized into representative superordinate "chunks" 
that provide cues for retrieval of subordinate data by 
long-term memory. This is somewhat analogous 
to using an acronym as a mnemonic aid for 
retrieving a word phrase. Miller's initial work has 
been verified and expanded by a number of 
researchers (Ref. 6). Other researchers have 
determined that failing to provide an obvious 
organization to the information creates inefficiency, 
as subjects spend unnecessary time trying to create 
one (e.g., Ref. 7). One example of chunking and 
organization applied to the SuperCockpitTM design 
was in canalizing MFD access via eight 
subsystems, further organized into two major 
subgroups (Fig 4). 
One of the underlying philosophies associated with 
the SuperCockpitTM design was to avoid re- 
placing or redesigning an existing cockpit 
component unless such redesign was necessary to 
enhance mission effectiveness or safety, or to 
comply with system specifications or other 
customer requirements. 
For example, the existing cockpit lighting control 
panels did not provide full functionality between 
cockpits and used magnetic toggle switches that 
experience had shown to be cumbersome in 
operation. For the SuperCockpitTM, the panels 
were redesigned to provide the same panel in both 
cockpits (there are minor sizing differences to 
accommodate installation requirements) and lighted 
PBAs are used for shared functions so that switches 
on both panels always indicate the correct lighting 
status. 
Within the redesign constraints, maximum 
attention has been directed towards eliminating 
clutter in the crewstations. A primary goal in this 
regard has been to keep the instrument panels and 
all other vision blockages as small as possible, 
thereby maximizing external visibility and 
enhancing mission effectiveness and safety. 
Another goal was to implement panel controls and 
displays via MFD integration, as opposed to 
traditional dedicated panels/switches. 
SuperCockpitTM   Equipmements 
1.  Two high-resolution, color LCD MFDs are 
mounted side by side directly in front of each 
crewmember. They are approximately 27 
inches forward of the design eye point (DEP) 
and symmetrical around the center line. The 
MFDs have a 8 x 6 inch display surface 
surrounded by a bezel that contains 26 switches 
for control-display interface locatedwithin Zone- 
1 reach. Eight of these are 
dedicated,engraved,"hard-key"switches, organized 
in two groups of four along the bottom of the 
display. Each of these switches corresponds to 
a control-display subsystem as identified by its 
legend and when selected provides all the 
pertinant display and control for that sub- 
system. This is provided by "hands-on" controls 
(cyclic and collective for the pilot functions.and 
mission grips for the CP/G) together with the 
remaining 18 pushbutton switches which are 
"soft-keys" orline-addressable control switches 
wherein their function and label is specific to 
each display page. All normal fly and fight 
functions performed routinely by both operators 
can be observed and controlled from the top 
eight display pages. Individual display sub- 
pages accessable from the top pages being used 
to set up the various sub-systems in the event 
of the mission loader being unavailable, a 
change to the pre-planned data cartridge loaded 
mission, a more detailed display required, or for 
maintainance crew use. The normal display 
controls of brightness, contrast etcare located at 
each corner of the bezel. 
Figures 5 to 9 inclusive are examples of 5 of 
the 8 top pages currently designed and presently 
being evaluated on the respective BHTI and 
GEC simulators. 
2. The limited function display (LFD) is an LCD 
that is collocated with the keyboard. It is used 
to display four types of data: keyboard input, 
CWA messages, inter-cockpit status, and 
subsystem status. Information display is 
organized as follows: 
a. The bottom line serves as scratch pad for 
the keyboard. 
b. The next 3 lines are used as part of the 
CWA alerting system. 
c. The next line provides inter-cockpit status, 
toggling between weapons and 
communications subsystems. 
d. The remaining 75% of the display is used to 
toggle between a Remote Frequency 
Display (RFD) for communications status 
and a pictorial display of armament status. 
3. The keyboard selected for the SuperCockpitTM 
has extensive and favorable military experience 
onboard the OH-58D. While collocated, it is 
not integral with the LFD. In addition to a full 
set of alphanumeric keys, it also contains three 
toggle switches and five pushbutton switches 
for implementing selected dedicated functions 
such as CWA and emergency communications 
interactions. 
4. The forward cockpit's cyclic control stick is 
located on the right console. The cyclic grip 
contains nine switches to provide hands-on 
control of the following functions: 
radio/intercom transmit, force trim, weapons 
select, SCAS disengage, HMD video 
(FLIR/I2), weapons action/steer.missile 
cage/uncage, display select and weapons fire 
(trigger). The shape of the cyclic grip and the 
location of switches is currently being defined 
using man-in-the-loop (MIL) simulation. The 
aft cockpit uses the same grip mounted on a 
kneeling, center-stick. The kneeled position 
provides clearance for using the mission grips 
in their non-stowed position. 
5. The collective control stick is located on the 
left side of the crew station and contains two 
twist-grip throttles for engine power 
management. A conformal (shaped in 
accordance with human engineering 
considerations) collective grip is located on the 
end of the collective stick. This grip contains 
eight switches to provide the operator with 
hands-on control of the following functions: 
radio frequency select, radio select, idle stop 
release, emergency jettison, countermeasures, 
search light control, search light slew and hover 
hold. As with the cyclic grip, the shape of the 
collective grip and the location of switches is 
currently being defined using MIL simulation. 
6. Each cockpit contains two mission grips, 
located below the MFDs, that are installed on 
telescoping platforms. The grips pivot and 
rotate to an upright orientation when moved 
from the stowed to the operational position. In 
addition, the telescoping mount provides five 
lock-type positions for accommodating fore and 
aft adjustment The left mission grip has nine 
switches for controlling the following 
functions: TV/FLIR focus, TV/FLIR gain and 
level control, laser fire (trigger), LOS acquire, 
FLIR polarity, track box size adjust,sensor 
select,action steer and FOV select The right 
mission grip has nine switches for controlling 
the following functions: weapons fire 
(trigger), weapons select, turret/cursor slew, 
track function select,gun targeting select, FLIR 
Auto initiate/manual,HMD video, missile 
cage/uncage and weapons action/steer. 
7. The forward cockpit contains four integrally 
illuminated standby flight instruments that, 
with the exception of being powered via the 
battery bus, function independently from all 
other aircraft subsystems and sensors. These 
instruments are barometric altimeter, airspeed 
indicator, attitude indicator, and magnetic 
compass. The first three of these instruments 
are duplicated in the rear crewstation; the 
instruments are located on the right side of the 
instrument panel in each cockpit and are easily 
viewable from the design eye position. The 
magnetic compass is located on the left side 
canopy rail in the forward cockpit and is 
viewable by either crewmember. 
Other features of the SuperCockpifTM design 
include dual rearview mirrors in each crewstation, 
instrument panels moved closer to the design eye 
position, and an improved SCAS that includes 
attitude, altitude, and hover hold modes. The rear 
cockpit houses the data transfer module (DTM). In 
addition, geometric accommodation of the target 
population has been significantly increased by 
incorporating a four-way adjustable seat in the aft 
crewstation. The forward cockpit takes advantage 
of a recent modification to the canopy that, among 
other things, improves head clearance. 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
When fielded, the SuperCockpitTM will likely 
represent the most advanced attack helicopter 
cockpit in production.The development of the 
design in the timescales acheived would not have 
been possible without the capabilty of the 
interactive use of the GEC/BHTI simulators with 
their respective rapid prototyping capabilities. 
A rapid prototyping capability is such an important 
tool that the design of a glass cockpit should not be 
undertaken without one. (This also applies to the 
capability for performing high fidelity MIL 
simulation.) In addition to the direct facilitation of 
the work of the design team, the rapid prototyping 
tool also serves as a device for improving 
communication and documentation outside the 
team. For example, control-display formats were 
down loaded as graphics files from the SG 
workstations and directly imported into PC-based 
desktop publishing software for producing program 
documentation. This communications capability is 
particularly beneficial when all members of the 
design team are not colocated. 
The authors also acknowledge the major 
contribution made by the many USA and UK 
service personel who have "flown" in the various 
configurations of the respective simulators whose 
observations and feedback have validated the 
SuperCockpit design. 
SuperCockpitTM is a trademark of Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc. 
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SUMMARY 
Next generation mission support 
systems are being designed to 
satisfy such conventional 
premission planning requirements 
as route planning, threat and 
countermeasures analysis, tactics 
planning, visual familiarization, 
combat folder preparation and 
aircraft computer and weapons 
initialization support. As 
intelligent systems technology 
matures and is embedded in 
current or next generation 
aircraft, additional premission 
operational support requirements 
will have to be satisfied. These 
include providing aircrew the 
ability to configure an 
intelligent system in accordance 
with mission-specific 
information, defining 
coordination requirements with 
other flight elements and 
cooperating intelligent systems, 
and establishing individual 
preferences for their own 
intelligent system activities. 
These capabilities will be 
critical to aircrew acceptance of 
their electronic crewmember as it 
allows the intelligent system and 
other aircraft avionics systems 
to be "tuned" to individual 
aircrew implementation of 
specific mission requirements and 
employment doctrine. This paper 
describes a premission planning 
system that supports these unique 
requirements as demonstrated in 
the Lockheed Pilot's Associate 
program. 
INTRODUCTION 
Early success in development of 
the Pilot's Associate (PA) 
Program's complex knowledge- 
based, pilot aiding system has 
provided the opportunity to 
integrate near-term embedded 
avionics applications of this 
"associate" systems technology. 
The PA (figure 1) has developed 
as a set of cooperating, 
knowledge-based subsystems: two 
planner, two assessor, and one 
Pilot Vehicle Interface (PVI) 
subsystem.  The program has 
served as a framework for 
demonstrating what associate 
systems technology requires in 
the way of new approaches for 
design, development, 
implementation and evaluation of 
cognitive-like functionality in 
avionics.  This has led 
researchers in human factors to 
focus on the issues of pilot 
acceptance, trust, and human- 
electronic crewmember teamwork. 
As the associate system concept 
took form and pilots began to 
examine the more critical aspects 
of PA operation, the question of 
associate system control versus 
pilot-in-command became a key 
issue.  Thus, developers adapted 
a pilot-centered operational 
philosophy which asserted "The 
pilot is in charge" and "The 
effort required to command the PA 
must be less than the effort 
saved by the PA" (Lockheed 1990). 
This set the stage for debating 
pilot acceptance of the PA's 
aiding functionality because "the 
value of an aid is likely to be 
judged relative to unaided 
performance" (Rouse 1988), is not 
enough for the pilot.  Merely 
implementing functionality within 
the framework of this operational 
philosophy lacks a certain 
sufficiency from the pilot's 
perspective.  The pilot still 
needed the mechanism to assert 
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his command over the PA. 
Previous research in this area 
(Morris & Rouse 1986) concluded 
that task performance can be 
significantly improved if users 
are in charge of their decision 
aids.  Separate research (Rouse 
1988) subsequently indicated 
"perceived ease of use of an aid 
is also affected by the multi- 
task nature of complex systems. 
At the points in time when an aid 
is most needed, it is likely that 
pilots will have few resources to 
devote to interacting with the 
aid."  In other words, if pilots 
had the resources to direct and 
monitor the associate system 
during a critical mission task, 
they would probably not need the 
associate system to perform that 
task anyway. This challenge is 
pertinent to adaptive aiding 
functionality in the PA PVI as 
well as adapting or tailoring the 
PA off-line and prior to the 
mission. 
Pilots perceive and react to the 
Pilot's Associate system 
differently from other "avionic 
systems", and attribute the human 
characteristics of skill and 
knowledge to its performance 
(Smith 1990) .  It is intuitively 
obvious, that if the PA and the 
pilot are to be successful they 
must form a team.  Early in the 
PA program Reising (1985) 
described the ideal team as 
having, "such intimate knowledge 
of how to work with each other 
that they function as smoothly as 
an Olympic figure skating pair, 
each anticipating the moves of 
the other while striving for the 
same goal".  Implications for 
associate systems which provide 
embedded skills and knowledge are 
for the inclusion of friendly 
human attributes to support pilot 
acceptance of the system. 
Therefore, to ensure mission 
effectiveness and well 
orchestrated teamwork between the 
pilot and the associate system, 
the pilots need a mechanism to 
communicate team goals to the PA. 
Domain experts recognized the 
importance of the detailed 
briefings that occur between a 
pilot and backseater and this 
evolved into the Mission Support 
Tool (MST)  subsystem of the 
Pilot's Associate.  This paper 
discusses the MST development and 
implementation in Phase II of the 
PA Program.  It emphasizes the 
pilot's ability to partition, 
allocate, and authorize tasks 
which tailor the associate 
system's functionality to improve 
situation awareness and mission 
effectiveness. 
THESIS 
The Mission Support Tool is a 
mechanism necessary to 
successfully team and interface 
the human pilot with the 
electronic crewmember (PA).  The 
MST (figure 2) is a ground-based, 
pre-mission interface between the 
fighter pilot, a larger global 
mission planning system, and the 
associate system.  As depicted in 
figure 3, the primary function of 
the MST is to furnish pilots with 
a means for tailoring the PA to 
their individual preferences for 
air-to-air combat missions.  The 
MST keeps the pilot in command, 
which domain experts agree will 
pay high dividends in pilot 
acceptance, trust, and human- 
electronic crewmember teamwork. 
Pilot acceptance and trust is 
achieved only through the 
repeated use of that aircraft and 
weapon system element in as many 
of the demanding circumstances in 
the operating environment as 
possible.  In the case of 
conventional avionics systems, 
that means direct, hands-on 
evaluation of the utility of the 
system by the pilot.  In the case 
of another crewmember that shares 
some of the mission workload, it 
means the continuous development 
of personal work relationships 
with that person.  In the case of 
the associate system and other 
intelligent systems, it means a 
combination of both approaches. 
In developing pilot acceptance 
and trust regarding the 
associate's capabilities as a 
"supporting" crewmember, pilots 
need to be in command - 
physically and psychologically. 
A pilot can never afford to be 
surprised by what any other 
crewmember, including an 
"intelligent" associate system, 
will do.  Further, the associate 
system must adapt to the pilot's 
personality for optimum crew 
coordination and maximum tactical 
effectiveness.  And that means 
adapting to each individual 
pilot.  Pilots need to know that 
associate systems will adapt to 
their own preferences, not the 
other way around. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The MST achieves three 
objectives:  (1)  It provides the 
pilot authorized access to all 
controllable actions and 
functions of the PA subsystems 
for the purpose of setting 
desired authority limits.  (2) 
It permits the pilot to develop 
or modify plans used by the PA 
during the mission.  (3)  It 
correlates and integrates 
information from critical sources 
and presents them to the pilot in 
intuitive form. The MST does not 
interfere with the PA inference 
mechanisms, and the PA will 
operate without it.  However, 
just as a human crewmember's 
effectiveness will be enhanced by 
briefing him prior to flight, so 
will PA operation be more 
"skillful" with MST providing 
tailoring and specialization of 
the associate system prior to its 
use on any specific mission. 
The MST subsystem overview 
(figure 2) shows the primary 
inputs to and outputs from the 
MST.  The inputs are used to 
initialize the subsystem for a 
pilot planning/briefing session. 
At the end of the session the 
selected outputs are used during 
PA initialization. A user 
interface allows the pilot to 
perform engagement planning and 
preference selection functions, 
including specialization of 
engagement plans, setting plan 
authority levels, reviewing 
mission plans, simulation of 
specialized plans and aircraft 
data transfer control. 
FINDINGS 
Future avionics that employ 
intelligent or associate systems 
technology will have major impact 
on the human interface aspects of 
a total aircraft weapon system, 
whether it has a direct man- 
machine interface or not.  Human 
factors will become an important 
part of the design of components 
and subsystems that traditionally 
have not required them because of 
no direct man-machine interface. 
These systems will require the 
inclusion of "friendly" human 
attributes and other human 
factors to support pilot 
acceptance of the system. 
It is essential that human 
standards be considered in 
associate system design 
iterations to meet a different 
set of acceptability criteria - 
traditional system performance 
criteria and specifications are 
insufficient.  Operational and 
tactical considerations have a 
more direct and continuing 
influence on associate system 
designs. With the PA for 
example, it is as if a "nugget" 
pilot is being trained and molded 
as he proceeds through the 
training pipeline on his way to 
earning his wings.  In the PA 
program, developers established 
an operational task force that 
meets regularly with the systems 
and design engineers to review PA 
progress from the pilot's 
perspective, with notable 
success. 
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Pilots need to be in command of 
an associate system, therefore a 
means is provided for them to 
"tell" their intelligent 
system(s) what they want done, 
how, when, and to what extent it 
is to operate "independently". 
Associate systems must adapt to 
the personality and preferences 
of the pilot, therefore, a 
mechanism must be included with 
the system to allow this. 
Associate system adaptability has 
been addressed in the PA program 
partially through the evolution 
of a Mission Support Tool that 
allows the pilot to "reach into" 
the various subsystems of the PA 
and tailor various aspects of its 
operational software to provide 
for: 
(1) Tailored engagement plans. 
(2) Specialized avionics and 
weapons employment plans. 
(3) Extensive authorization 
levels, actions and priorities. 
This planning collectively 
culminates in the establishment 
of a "personality" that matches 
the preferences of individual 
pilots. 
The concept is analogous to a 
pilot conducting a face-to-face 
pre-mission briefing with a 
backseat crewmember before 
flight.  All coordination is 
discussed and "contracts" made, 
workload assignments delegated, 
potential or preferred engagement 
options are identified, and 
priorities established.  A 
McDonnell Aircraft Company study 
(1989) of operational pilots, 
indicated that there is a large 
variation between the views of 
experienced and less experienced 
pilots regarding use of such 
cockpit decision aids.   Although 
not part of the original PA 
program, the MST is now an 
integral part of the approach to 
dealing with the "intelligent" 
aspects of the associate system 
and the pilot's need to have the 
system adapt to him or her. 
A major realization within the PA 
program is the impact of 
intelligent systems "behavior" 
and other human attributes that 
will be embedded in aircraft 
avionics systems with associate 
systems technology.  This will 
require an increased and 
continuing role for human factors 
engineers and operationally 
experienced personnel beginning 
very early in the design phase of 
those systems. 
nTSCUSSION 
The MST Phase II prototype has 
addressed the preliminary issues 
of configuring intelligent 
mission software (PA) through a 
ground based, pre-mission 
specialization tool, therefore 
providing pilots with system 
predictability.  Although, a 
rapid prototyping methodology and 
object-oriented approach were key 
factors contributing to its 
initial success, the MST's true 
payoff - pilot acceptance, trust 
and teamwork - was achieved 
during the PA manned system 
evaluation. 
Smith (1990) points out that, 
"the only thing that can be said 
with certainty about the PA is^ 
that if the PA makes its home in 
a military airplane, then someday 
both the pilot and the PA will be 
in combat together".  And 
further, "the challenge to 
builders of intelligent avionics 
systems is to ensure that the 
pilot and his PA-like system are 
not in combat with each other, 
but rather are on the same side 
and against the common adversary 
outside of the cockpit". 
It appears that the challenge in 
achieving pilot acceptance of PA- 
like systems may be in the 
recognition of the "cultural" 
differences between the human, 
cognitive-like functionality of 
the system and pilots with 
varying experience.  The MST is a 
tool that effectively deals with 
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these individual differences and 
preferences of pilots. 
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Figure 1 - Pilot Associate Overview 
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Figure 2 - Mission Support Tool 
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Associate and Advanced 
Avionics Systems Should 
Support Mission and Personal 
Preference Specialization 
Operational Flight Program and 
Associate System Software Should 
be "Missionized" to Force-wide 
Tasking and Planning Data 
Associate System Software Should 
be "Electronically Briefed'on Flight 
Element Contracts and Mission 
Specific Tactical Gameplans 
Associate System Aiding Functions 
Should be Allocated, Partitioned and 
Authorized by the Pilot 
Associate System Software Should 
be Robust Enough to Function 
Without Pre-mlssion Specialization 
The Pilot Controls the 
Length and Depth of a 
MST Planning Session - Not 
the Other Way Around 
The Pilot Can Manage and Interact 
With Single or Multiple Planning 
Functions Driven From a Single 
Top-Level Menu 
The MST Will Automatically Load 
Pre-defined, Individual Pilot Default 
Preferences 
An Pre-defined DTU File Load Can be 
Accomplished by Two Pilot Actions or 
Quickly Modified 
Current AFMSS Mission Data Is 
Automatically Loaded During MST 
Start-up 
The Pilot Is (Still) In Chargel 
Figure 3 - MST Concept of Operations 
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Assistance to the Human Management of Target Trackers in 
Airborne Maritime Operations 
I. S. MacLeod 
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SUMMARY 
The human management of Target Trackers (TT), 
as applied in airborne maritime operations, is 
onerous and incurs a high operator workload, 
often at the most inopportune times. The 
majority of TT management tasks are highly 
structured with explicit rules making them suitable 
for assistance through the use of KBS techniques. 
The paper argues that this management area is 
highly suited to the application of Knowledge 
Based Systems (KBS) to assist the human. 
Introduction 
Airborne maritime operations consist of military 
operations over the sea that can encompass search 
for targets, target tracking and their attack.  Target 
Trackers (TT) are engineered aids to assist 
maritime tacticians in the accurate tracking of 
targets. TT have been in use in airborne maritime 
operations for at least forty years and their 
engineering design has become more and more 
sophisticated during that period. 
The burgeoning sophistication of TT is usually 
argued as necessary to equate improved target 
performance capabilities and to cater for the 
greater accuracy and data rates of the sensors used 
to detect and follow targets. In addition, it is 
argued that sophisticated TT are required to allow 
the accurate and timely fusion of data from 
diverse sensors into target tracking information 
and the amelioration of tactical uncertainties 
caused by target deception strategies such as 
manoeuvre and the use of decoys. 
These arguments will not be disputed by this 
paper. What will be disputed is the amount of 
assistance that the engineered sophistication of TT 
has provided to the tactician considering the 
operating management overheads that they incur. 
The use of KBS will be discussed as a means of 
decreasing the tactician's TT management 
overheads, largely incurred by the need to searcli 
many lengthy lists and cross-refer the findings - 
the tactician's skills are best developed and 
employed elsewhere. 
The intention is not to suggest means of directly 
assisting (he tactician in (lie performance of 
tactical decisions or in (he tactical control of (he 
aircraft; if such assistance could be easily and 
meaningfully achieved, the tactician's cognitive 
processes would have already been successfully 
mirrored in engineered system design. The 
intention is to suggest means of assisting or 
relieving the tactician of onerous but structured 
tasks, tasks that can place high cognitive 
workloads on the tactician at the most 
inappropriate times and thus adversely effect their 
tactical appreciation and situational awareness (as 
the author can confirm). However, the properties 
of these tasks will support the application of a 
KBS approach to provide assistance to the 
tactician. 
The approach suggested here is a requirements 
driven approach suggesting that KBS application 
might fulfil the requirement. It is not technology 
driven where the suggestion is that KBS 
technology is a panacea for all ills (discussion on 
the difference see Ref 1). 
The subject is the management of TT. Such 
management encompasses the use and 
management of sensors, and sensor data, as well as 
the management of the actual TT in use. 
Sensor Management 
In maritime operations, the simultaneous 
employment of sensors to cater for surface and 
sub surface targets has always been a problem 
because of the difference in the optimum aircraft 
heights for the use of each type of sensor and the 
difference in the form and quality of data 
obtained from each sensor. This is a problem in 
the tactical employment of the aircraft that is 
acknowledged but will not be discussed further in 
this paper. 
This paper will concentrate on TT management 
and data fusion problems considering the primary 
use of one form of sensor; in this case the use of 
sonobuoys and a sonics sensor to track 
underwater targets by sound. However, the basic 
problems associated with the use of sonics are 
highly similar to the problems associated with the 
use of other sensors e.g., use of Dipping Sonar or 
Radar whether singly or in combination. 
Management of Sonics 
Management of data derived through sonics 
equipment is essential to ensure thai suitable data 
is produced for use by the TT.   Unfortunately, 
this management frequently has to he performed 
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at the same time as the management of the TT and 
whilst the tactician is under stress e.g., time 
pressures and rapid performance of decisions 
associated with (he tactical direction and control 
of the air platform and the deployment of aircraft 
stores and weapons. 
To track a target with sonics requires that the 
appropriate types of sonobuoys are accurately 
placed in the water in order to glean data on the 
target. Target related data is then used to 
determine target identity, a line of bearing on the 
target, a fix on the target or data related to target 
performance.  This sonics data is then filtered and 
fed to the TT which then converts that data to 
tracking information in the form of target course 
and speed, depth and indications of rates of 
change / accuracy of that information. 
Aircraft with 
Sonics 
Equipment 
^T^ Aerial 
Sonobuoy 
I Other 
Hi        Sonobuoys 
1 
Sea Surface 
Rf 
Number I?£. 
Shipping 
NOISE ,  Cable 
Hydrophone 
i Target Submarine 
Target Noise Pattern 
Figure One - A Basic Maritime Scenario 
The operator must continually assess the accuracy 
of TT performance against cognitive derived but 
skill mediated assessments on sonics evidence. 
This assessment is necessary as tracker derived 
information is not only used to indicate the 
probable present position of a target, it is also 
used in the estimation of future target position in 
order that weapons and stores may be optimally 
employed and target tracking maintained.   If the 
tracker has an accuracy bias, the operator must 
correct for it in their tactical appreciation of target 
movement and intentions. 
There are many tactical implications that have to 
be considered in the use of sonics e.g. detection 
ranges on the target, appreciation of meaning and 
quality of target data, oceanographic conditions, 
target speed etc. However, there are in addition 
four main problem areas of management 
associated with the sonics tracking of an 
underwater target as aided by a TT, namely: 
i. The management problem of 
correctly selecting, preparing for drop and 
dropping of sonobuoy(s) - Sonobuoy Stores 
Management. 
ii.        The management of informal ion 
obtained from the sonobuoy(s). 
iii.        The management of (lie information 
utilised by the tracker. 
iv.        The assessment of tracker 
performance. 
Each of these problems areas will be considered in 
turn. 
Sonics - Problem Areas in Management 
of Target Trackers 
1      Sonobuoy Stores Management 
A sonobuoy is a store that is positioned on the 
surface of the sea as a means of obtaining and 
relaying data on targets to a surface or airborne 
platform.  Buoys can be used for the acoustical 
detection of sub surface and surface targets (both 
actively and passively), determining the sea 
ambient noise and temperature structure and for 
communication between units above and below 
the sea surface. Regardless of the type of buoy, 
the relay of data is achieved through the use of a 
set of radio or RF channels. 
The problem with the management of sonobuoys 
resides in the many different parameters that have 
to be considered by the tactician prior to any 
sonobuoy deployment. 
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These parameters include (Ref 2): 
a. Currenlly almost K'X) RF channels in 
use; 
b. Over 10 types of sonobuoys in 
current use in the 'western world', with the 
possible type utilisation per aircraft sortie 
reaching up to seven; 
c. A variety of settings for each 
sonobuoy depending on type and intended 
usage (e.g. life, hydrophone depth); 
d. Aircraft sonobuoy load variations 
(total numbers, types, RF channels, launcher 
capabilities); 
e. Sonobuoys in water / sonobuoys in 
aircraft?; 
f. Restrictions on the use of certain 
channels; 
g. RF channel Artefact and Conflicts; 
h.        The mixture of buoys required to 
perfom a specific tactic; 
i. Plans and changes to plan; 
j. Buoys loaded in launchers / buoys 
required in launchers. 
All the above parameters have to be considered 
prior to any sonobuoy drop and with relation to 
the target tracking requirements and the expected 
sonobuoy performance.   Current sonobuoy stores 
management aids are based on lists; lists of stores 
in water, lists of stores in aircraft. lists of stores in 
buoy launchers. Usually, the lists give some 
indication of any inter list conflicts but none fully 
consider all the parameters listed above. 
Moreover, lists are difficult to search if the 
tactician is under time pressure to complete a set 
of tasks. 
The consideration of the sonobuoy parameters 
listed above involves the tactician in unwanted 
'mental arithmetic' at a knowledge based level (Ref 
3). The result of the above is that sonobuoy 
management is often only easily and effectively 
performed pre mission, with changes required by 
actual mission performance being managed with 
difficulty.  Frequently, 'home made' china graph 
boards are used to assist the tactician in this 
management process. 
2       The Management of Sonics Information 
The data obtained from sonobuoys is a mixture of 
good and bad target associated signals, signals 
emanating from other contacts both sub surface 
and surface, noise (e.g. produced by marine life, 
seismic disturbances, surface weather) and 
machine artefacts.  The main role of the Sonics 
operator is to filter out the identified target related 
data from the rest. To assist the sonics operator 
and the tactician, machine related assessments of 
the quality and accuracy of the data are also used. 
Unfortunately, a second filter on the sonics data is 
required as: 
Some sonics data is hard to associate 
with a particular target and requires 
corroboration from other sonics data or from 
its association with target information 
obtained by other means; 
Some sonics data may appear to be of 
high quality but may have an inherent bias 
degrading its accuracy; 
Machine related assessments of the 
quality and accuracy of sonics data are 
variable because of inherent difficulties in the 
engineering specification of the strong but 
variable influences of target and 
environmental based effects. 
The above second filter is provided by the 
maritime tactician and is not effectively aided by 
current tactical systems. 
3 The Management, of Information Utilised 
by the Tracker 
All engineered TT are limited in the data that they 
can handle at any one time. This limitation is 
usually coped with by replacing the oldest 
information with the newest. However, frequently 
the most accurate and pertinent data will have 
update rates and biases that are different from 
other data in use. To prevent the loss or 
degradation of best data requires careful 
management of what data is in use by the tracker. 
Further, as sonobuoys are deployed, new data 
from these sonobuoys has to be appreciated by 
the tactician prior to managing the incorporation 
of that data into the tracker, frequently when there 
is little time available for that management or for 
tactical appreciation. 
The assessment of best data is as a result of tactical 
appreciation of the available evidence. However, 
to force the tracker to appreciate that best 
evidence is usually associated with a high 
management workload by the tactician. The 
tactician is continually having to remove and add 
data obtained from particular sonobuoys as the 
target manoeuvres and target related sonobuoy 
data changes in form and quality.  He is given 
little assistance by the engineered system. 
4 The Assessment of Tracker Performance 
It has been argued that the management of 
sonobuoy derived data by the tactician, in the 
assistance of tracker performance, incurs high 
management overheads. What has then to be 
considered is whether the payoff of these 
overheads is worthwhile. 
Unfortunately, the drive to produce sophisticated 
TT in airborne maritime tactical systems has 
approached the target tracking problem from a 
predominately engineering standpoint assuming 
dial a greater tracking accuracy will result and that 
this will be of obvious benefit to the human 
operator.   Whilst (lie increased sophistication of 
TT has been manifest in their ability to use diverse 
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forms of sensor derived dala, the accuracy and 
quality ofthat data is assessed by machine 
algorithms and takes little account of any 
characteristics associated with the operating 
environment and the particular target. 
Furthermore, the high workload overheads 
involved in the tactician's management of target 
related data, data needed by the TT to efficiently 
operate, must promote (he probability of data 
being mishandled and the tracker operating well 
below its optimum performance.  It must be 
emphasised that the TT is primarily intended as a 
tool to assist the tactical appreciation of the 
tactician. 
If the management of that tool involves a large 
proportion of the tacticians available time, the 
tactician may end up 'fighting the machine' rather 
than the enemy.  Add to a degraded tracker 
performance the unbounded effects from real 
world uncertainties, and the result is that the 
human operator's trust in the TT is not fostered. 
In particular, the following will be readily 
apparent to the operator: 
The limitations of the tracker's 
handling and following of target manoeuvre at 
the expense of the tracker's benefits; 
Overall tracker performance indices 
failing to live up to operator's expectations 
when compared to the tracker performance in 
reality: 
The high workload incurred in the 
tracker associated management for a perceived 
low value return; 
• An obvious detraction in the operators 
appreciation of the tactical environment and 
situation seen as caused by the workload 
overheads incurred by tracker associated 
management. 
To foster the tactician's trust in the tracker 
performance, it must be possible to tune and 
improve the tracker with relation to the 
performance it achieves in reality. It must be 
possible to determine and ameliorate tracker bias. 
This determination of tracker bias, and its 
management, can be approached in two ways: 1) 
through a study of overall tracker performance 
through analysis of trials results and through 
simulated assessment of tracker performance 
using data derived from actual operations; 2) 
through allowing the tactician to tune the target 
tracker during actual operations to remove the 
majority of apparent tracker bias.  This latter bias 
determined by considering tracker derived 
information on the target (e.g. target position, 
course and speed) with target related information 
acliieved by other means (e.g. aural determined 
close pass on a sonobuoy, high quality manual 
fixing by doppler, course and speed as 
determined by the penetration of several 
sonobuoy barriers, mast sighting). 
What is Really Wrong with Methods of 
Current Tracker Management? 
The following is a list of some of the problems 
associated with the methods used in the 
management of sonics data for current target 
trackers. Unlike the extensive lists associated with 
the management of TT in airborne systems, it can 
be perused at the reader's leisure. 
1) TT design has not adequately 
considered the usability of TT by the human. 
2) Onerous and structured management 
tasks, associated with TT, place high cognitive 
workloads on the tactician. 
3) The burgeoning sophistication and 
complexity of TT has been associated with 
increasing cognitive loads on the operating 
tactician. 
4) The increased sophistication of the 
engineered design of the TT has not been 
accompanied by a parallel improvement to its 
efficacy in practice. 
5) Currently, TT is poor in its handling of 
noisy data and uncertainty. This is partly due 
to the engineered solution ignoring the 
sources of the problem in reality. 
Suggested Solutions to Ameliorate 
Management Overheads 
The following are suggested solutions to 
ameliorate the management overheads in the use 
of TT. 
Buoy Load Management A id 
An KBS could be constructed to assist the 
tactician in buoy load management as die rules on 
the settings and use of sonobuoy types, both 
singly and in combination, are well defined. 
However, for the human load management 
involves many repeated and time consuming 
simple calculations, sorts and comparisons of 
results. 
The KBS would have to utilise the following: 
a.        Knowledge of buoy load (e.g. 
bathythermal, sonobuoy etc.), any type 
conflicts and the details of the aircraft buoy 
load; 
. ' b.        Knowledge of mission requirements / 
restrictions on buoy usage; 
c. Knowledge of buoy types / numbers 
required for specific tactics; 
d. Knowledge of current and future 
sonobuoy environment and associated 
sonohuoy settings; 
e. Preload of rules / buoy usage plan; 
f. Knowledge of current and required 
launcher load; 
g. Ability to easily change plans and rules 
of aid; 
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h. An up to date knowledge of RF 
channels occupancy; 
i. Priorities in buoy usage and type 
allocation to tactics; 
k. Simple inputs indicating the tactician's 
intentions (e.g. Tactics A, B, C etc.). 
The system would be designed to provide the 
tactician with up to date advice on buoy type / RF 
channel availability (current and against plan), 
launcher load and any load changes required to 
satisfy tactical requirements. The system would 
also indicate the order of buoy drop. 
The Management of Sonics Information 
The management of Sonics information would be 
simplified if graphical or colour indicators were 
given to selectively assist in at least the following: 
•      Indication of information incorporated in the 
TT; 
Indication of information not associated with 
the target; 
Indication of accuracy of information when 
requested; 
Indication of 'stale' information. 
Much of the above could be handled by an KBS 
using rules: 1) assigned and subsequently tuned 
by the tactician in the 'light of reality' and 
assessment of TT performance; 2) associated with 
the management of information utilised by the 
tracker. 
The Management ofTT Utilised Information 
The main problems associated with the 
management of TT utilised sonics data, and 
derived information, are associated with the 
adding of new sonics followers (sonics system 
related aids to keep track of designated sonics 
signals and associated data / information) into the 
TT and the deletion of old or rogue followers. 
The exercise involves the examination of the 
inevitable lists and the selection of list information 
- a time consuming exercise for the tactician. 
Often the indication (hat a list needs attention is 
given by graphical indicators of sonobuoy fixing 
or TT performance. 
Simple rules could be devised to allow the 
automatic incorporation and removal of followers 
from a TT utilising KBS techniques. The rules 
would consider such as current TT position and 
performance, assigned accuracy of followers and 
correlation of the follower performance with that 
of the TT. 
It is envisaged that the tactician would still need to 
tune the KBS.  However, a work required to tune a 
system would often save the tactician unwanled 
workload at limes of stress e.g. the few minutes 
before an attack on (he target is performed. 
The Assessment ofTT Performance 
The tactician will be continually assessing TT 
performance in practice.   The problem with 
current assessments is that they are time 
consuming and demanding on the operator.  The 
performance indicators of the TT are frequently 
difficult to interpret and even more difficult to 
equate to the reality of the tracking accuracy of 
theTT. 
The above problems feed back to affect decisions 
on how many buoys to use, what tactics to 
adopt, what sonobuoys to load into launchers 
and what can be managed in the time available 
(identify, delete or add) to improve TT 
performance - (the positioning and orientation 
of the sonobuoy pattern is another but related 
topic). 
Moreover, the perceived difference between the 
TT tracking accuracy and reality varies with the 
relative positions of the target and sonobuoys and 
any changes in target performance.  This is 
mainly due to definable errors that can be related 
to either buoy positioning, buoy type or target 
sound radiation patterns. Thus, KBS could be 
sensibly applied to alleviate the problem of TT 
performance assessment. 
Furthermore, improvements to standard graphical 
depictions of the TT, to assist the tactician in 
accuracy assessment and indications of methods 
of amelioration, are not difficult. Figure Two 
illustrates one method of graphical assistance. 
There follows a brief discussion on the form of 
two possible KBS solutions to the assist in the 
continual determination of best target position. 
Tracker Selector KBS 
This system would compare and select the 
optimum TT from several trackers working under 
differing interpretations of sonobuoy data but 
using appropriate rules concerning their efficacy 
considering target performance and sonobuoy 
relative positioning to the target. 
The system would elicit information from the 
tactician when required (e.g. initialisation or on 
the approach to rule boundaries) and give plain 
language and graphical depictions of the system's 
conclusions, and where applicable and requested, 
(he reasoning used. 
Tracker Tuning KBS 
This KBS approach would allow the internal 
assessment and tuning of the rules employed in an 
associated set of (rackers forming a TT.  A KBS 
solution would be used to compare inputs of 'real 
world' target object (from operator inputs or 
through simulation on the ground) against each 
trackers distorted view of the world.  The system 
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would heuristically explore the set of the trackers' 
rules in search for optimal performance. 
The method could he used to: 1) progressively 
refine the set of algorithm rules used in the 
trackers; 2) Produce an intimate knowledge of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the trackers operating 
under optimal rule sets. 
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Figure Two - Possible set of TT Symbols Showing Fixing Error Forms and Accuracy of Information 
(Darkly shaded circle to right given to indicate that TT information is too inaccurate to support an attack 
with the selected weapon) 
What Should be Achievable through 
Effective Adoption of KBS Solutions to 
this Problem Area 
The following should he achievahle: 
i. The operator must be led to believe 
that known TT performance limitations are 
minor considering the uncertainties of the 
environment. 
ii.        The management of sonobuoy usage 
and associated TT data must be assisted and 
incur little unwanted workload. 
iii.       The TT should be capable of 
automatically adopting its assessed best 
tracking mode. The tactician should have an 
option to manually select a tracking mode. 
iv.       The presented results of the tracker 
must allow easy and unambiguous 
appreciation by the tactician. 
v.        Tactician's queries on tracker 
reasoning should be met by answers 
requiring little interpretation and 
commensurate with expected operator skill. 
vi.       The tactician should be allowed to 
tune the TT, possibly through a series of real 
world 'fixes. These fixes should be accepted 
by the KBS considering (he TT rules evoked 
at the period of (he fix. 
Final Comment 
Most of the suggested areas thai could he 
improved with the aid of KDS are areas where Hie 
work is easily definable hut very time consuming 
and onerous to a human.   It is a wonder (hat sonic 
form of'rule based' assistance has not been 
applied before in this area, excluding the use of 
home made china graph boards.  The 
amelioration of workload is essential to allow the 
maritime tactician as much time as possible to 
cogitate on his working environment, the possible 
target intentions and the optimum tactics to be 
adopted. 
The suggestions for improving the trackers are 
slightly more complicated, but not much more. 
The main adverse effects on tracker performance 
can be easily determined by considering the form 
of information available, the positioning and type 
of sources of information (sonobuoys) with 
relation to the tracked target and the target 
performance. 
The uncertainties produced through the nature of 
(he environment will always be with us. The aim 
with TTs should be to strive for a performance 
thai is nearly up to the tracking performance 
possible from a skilled human.  Only then will the 
skilled human believe that the assistance is 
worthwhile. 
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Summary 
In the restrictive rules of engagement 
inherent in the post cold war climate, 
tactical pilots must meet stringent collateral 
damage constraints during the delivery of 
air-to-surface     weapons. This     is 
exacerbated by the effect of employing 
sophisticated standoff weapons, many of 
which incorporate complex lock on after 
launch avionics. Determination of weapon 
delivery outcomes as a function of pre- 
planned mission data, captive carry air 
crew interactions and freeflight Man-in- 
the-loop control is an area where the 
electronic crewman plays a significant role. 
Further, while standoff weapons enhance 
aircraft survivability, it has restricted the 
use of traditional own aircraft sensors in 
pilot weapon release decisions. Programs 
such as TALON SWORD and TALON 
LANCE are demonstrating the ability to 
bring third party and national asset 
targeting information into the cockpit for 
pilot use, at the expense of significantly 
increased processing and information 
assimilation workload. How can we best 
incorporate aircraft avionics to digest the 
volume of available information, update 
standoff weapon mission planning data, 
and determine target acquisition probability 
for these complex weapon systems? What 
amount of further sophistication should be 
pursued as we define the next generation 
of aircraft, avionics and weapons? 
1. Introduction: Aspects of the 
Current Situation which Affect the Role 
of Aircraft Avionics with Regard to 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) 
Delivery 
Military pilots today in performing the war 
fighting mission are faced with several 
factors that combine to create a significant 
rise in pilot workload.   These include: 
• An operational environment with 
restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
that prohibit collateral damage in the target 
area and exclude engagement of 
unintended targets. Damage to non- 
military targets and casualties to civilian 
personnel are often career ending errors. 
These ROE exist largely because of public 
and political perception that "high tech" 
weapon systems have the capability to 
prevent undesirable outcomes if properly 
used. Observe both the media treatment of 
weapon bulls-eye imagery from Desert 
Storm and the punishment of "operator 
errors" such as the shootdown of the 
Iranian Airliner by AEGIS and the recent 
F-15E shootdown of the Blackhawk 
helicopters in Iraq. There is an expectation 
that the men ana machines are capable of 
surgical strike in virtually all circumstances, 
if the weapon systems are properly 
employed. This undoubtedly contributes to 
pilot stress during peak workload events 
such as weapon targeting and release 
sequences. 
• Recent events in the 
international arms sales market. This 
results in a substantial increase in the "Gray 
Threat" as many more countries purchase 
western or ex-Soviet technology air-to-air (AAM) and surface-to-air (SAM) weapon 
systems. There will be in an increasing 
level of lethal air defenses that the pilot will 
have to contend with. If Desert Storm had 
been conducted in 1998, it is perfectly 
possible that the air defenses could have 
included SA-10 or later SAMs. The effect 
of an increased threat environment directly 
adds to pilot workload in the management 
of countermeasure systems, out of cockpit 
scan, and avoidance maneuvering 
requirements. 
• The increasing sophistication of 
the current generation and projected 
PGMs. This increased sophistication has 
added accuracy, standoff and flexibility at 
the cost of increased Command and 
Launch System (CLS) complexity and 
large data processing / data management 
requirements. Intensive mission planning 
requirements now exist for operational 
systems such as the Standoff Land Attack 
Missile (SLAM)1, and developmental 
systems such as Conventional Standoff 
Attack Missile (CASOM)2, Arme de 
Precision Tres Grande Portee (APTGP)3 
, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)4 and 
others. Aircrew are being required to 
understand and effectively use weapons 
that do not lend themselves to simple or 
intuitive launch processes. Further, while 
standoff weapons enhance aircraft 
survivability as the launch platform shoots 
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farther from the point defense systems of 
the target area, it has restricted the use of 
traditional own aircraft sensors in pilot 
weapon release decisions. Many of these 
weapons require the pilot to serve as a 
primary or back-up source of target 
identification through imagery transmitted 
by the weapon. This task is mission 
critical, time limited, and workload 
intensive. 
• A  significant   shift  in  the 
operational concept to integrate off-board 
sensor system data from ELINT, imaging 
satellites, targeting and control platforms 
such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack 
Radar Systems (Joint STARS), with 
onboard aircraft sensors. Programs under 
the Tactical Exploitation of National 
Capabilities (TENCAP) such as TALON 
SHOOTER and TALON VISION are 
engaged in the research and development 
of systems and processes that place this 
here-to-fore highly restricted information 
directly in the hands of the warfighter.5 
This near real time satellite and third party 
targeting data, when integrated into the 
cockpit, will provide to the pilot an order 
of magnitude leap in the quality of data 
needed to increase situational awareness, 
with the expense of unprecedented 
increases in the the data processing and 
information assimilation workload. 
How can we best incorporate aircraft 
avionics to digest the volume of available 
information and update PGM mission 
planning data? How do we structure the 
role of the electronic crewman to reduce 
pilot stress, tasking, and workload, while 
improving the predictability of weapon 
delivery and reducing undesirable 
outcomes such as collateral damage? The 
military aircraft industry stands at the brink 
of a revolution in the capability of aircraft 
avionics to undertake new roles, especially 
regarding the potential for an order of 
magnitude increase aircraft mission 
computer and stores management system 
processor power and memory capacity. It 
is sobering to consider that current 
generation tactical aircraft have, on 
average, processor power of approximately 
1 Million instructions per second (MIPS) 
with a nominal 1 megabyte of memory, 
while off the shelf processors of 300 MIPS 
and 1 Gigabyte memory capacity can be 
obtained in a portable personal computer. 
The remainder of this discussion will 
examine three areas where the electronic 
crewman is under utilized, but where it can 
have a significant effect on reducing pilot 
workload and increasing weapon delivery 
effectiveness. 
2. PGM Mission Data 
Manipulation   in   a   Changing   Threat 
Environment 
Aircrews today have limited access to real 
time changes in the threat environment that 
formed the basis for mission planning. 
With current systems, even if the aircrew is 
provided with timely, accurate real time 
threat data, he is left to intuitive processes 
to effectively react to the new information. 
Current generation aircraft do not 
automatically integrate new threat data into 
the aircraft or weapon mission plan 
resident in the aircraft avionics. Further 
current generation PGMs do not lend 
themselves to optimized delivery through 
intuitive processes. Many PGMs require 
precise, well-defined launch envelopes and 
extensive, data-intensive mission plans that 
cannot be derived intuitively. With current 
CLS designs, reacting to real time threat 
updates requires tedious and time 
consuming manual keypad inputs of new 
launch point and weapon route of flight 
data within the mission plan. Very often 
this type of manual PGM mission re- 
planning is not possible in a fluid, high 
threat environment where time-on-target 
(TOT) and other mission constraints may 
limit the time available for re-planning to 
only a few minutes or less. 
Even with PGMs, such as HARM, that do 
not require extensive mission planning 
inputs, the aircrew must still determine 
how to best position the aircraft for launch 
in a high threat environment.6 Currently, 
when he receives a new threat target, the 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
(SEAD) aircrew must intuitively determine 
the most survivable area from which to 
launch with respect to the threat and how 
to best navigate his aircraft to that launch 
envelope. 
The often strict limitations on employment 
of PGMs make it very difficult for the 
aircrew to effectively react to new 
information. Because ne cannot manually 
re-plan his weapons' delivery, or simply 
because he cannot intuitively determine a 
survivable route to a new launch point, the 
aircrew currently has the poor choices of 
sacrificing survivability in an unplanned 
threat environment, delivering his ordnance 
in a degraded mode, or aborting the 
mission    altogether. These    tactical 
employment constraints result from 
limitations in aircraft tactical 
communications,  computer memory, and 
Erocessor speed.  Advances in these areas, 
owever, now make it possible to store and 
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process real time threat data, and to apply 
that data to update aircraft and weapon 
mission plans for increased survivability 
and effectiveness. An approach to fulfilling 
the needed capability is the integration of 
an onboard mission planning or replanning 
module. Describe below is a concept for 
operation (see Figure 1) for such a system. 
• Mission Planning. Aircrew plan 
the tactical mission using systems such as 
the U.S. Navy Tactical Mission Planning 
System (TAMPS) or Air Force Mission 
Support System (AFMSS). During the 
planning phase, a database including 
current threat beddown data, Digital 
Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), weapon 
characteristics such as turn and climb rates, 
aircraft characteristics and weapon delivery 
parameters is created. This database will 
then be inserted into the aircraft's data 
transfer device (DTD) along with the 
aircraft and weapon mission plans. Table 
1 is a listing of the projected data 
generated during mission planning. 
Table 1 Mission Planning Data 
Data Descnption 
Aircraft Data 
Weapon Data 
Area Data 
Threat Data 
Signature Data 
Aircraft ECM 
Characteristics 
Route Lat/Lon/Alt, 
fuel projection, event 
descnption, mission 
timing, etc. 
Route Lat/Lon/Alt, 
fuel projection, event 
description, mission 
timing, etc. 
DTED, Probability 
Vertical Obstruction 
Data (PVOD), no fly 
zones, etc. 
Location, Threat 
Identification Number 
(TIN), threat status, 
uncertainty, CM 
(time), etc. 
RCS, threat effects 
ECM and ESM cueing 
data, ECM 
effectiveness data 
AFMSS MISSION 
PLANNING 
FUSION OF 
OFFBOARD/ONBOARO 
SITUATION 
AWARENESS DATA 
ROUTE 
PLANNER 
I UPDATES A/C 
I AND WEAPON 
'ROUTES, AND 
CUES 
AIRCREW 
FOR 
SELECTION 
AIRCRAFT 
AVIONICS 
FORMATS NEW 
ROUTES AND 
SENDS THEM TO 
WEAPON !> A/C 
AIRCREW 
EXECUTES 
WEAPON 
RELEASE AT NEW 
LAUNCH POINT 
DDOD 
PREFUGHT INFLIGHT 
Figure 1 Inflight Route Replanning Operational Concept 
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• Preflight Phase. In the preflight 
phase the aircrew will load the mission 
data for the aircraft and weapon in a single 
data transfer operation using the aircraft 
DTD. 
• Employment Phase. In the 
employment phase, the aircraft enroute to 
the target receives offboard threat updates 
through an aircraft data link such as the 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
System (JTIDS), Tactical Data 
Information Link - J (TADEL-JY7 or some 
other dedicated link capable 01 providing 
real-time updates to the threat beddown. 
The aircraft avionics merges offboard and 
onboard (own sensor) data8 and uses the 
resulting data in a route evaluation process. 
In this process the new threat beddown 
information is used to assess the resulting 
impact on the aircraft route of flight, 
weapon launch envelope and weapon route 
of flight. If the outcome of this assessment 
is a determination that survivability along 
the pre-planned route of flight is 
jeopardized beyond a reasonable threshold, 
it will cue the aircrew that the mission 
route may no longer be viable. 
The aircrew then may request a display of 
the resulting aircraft route of flight options, 
PGM launch envelope options, and 
weapon route of flight options appropriate 
to the updated threat beddown. The 
options are based upon threat data, 
aircraft/weapon performance data, 
signature characteristics such as radar 
cross section (RCS), airspeed, and ECM 
suite data. The generated route and launch 
zone options are optimized for aircraft and 
weapon survivability, ("within constraints 
set during the mission planning phase such 
as minimum altitude, no-fly zones, time on 
target, and fuel on-board), offering the 
aircrew several aircraft route, launch point, 
and weapon route options as appropriate 
to the updated threat situation. 
When the aircrew selects an option, aircraft 
route and launch point data is formatted 
and output as a change to the mission plan 
in the aircraft mission computer. The 
aircrew will then receive new steering and 
navigation cues through the normal flight 
director functions in the aircraft OFP. If a 
new PGM weapon route of flight or launch 
point is required, then the electronic 
crewman formats the data as required for 
the weapon and passes the updated 
weapon mission plan to the weapon 
through the weapon data bus such as the 
MEL-STD-1553 bus interface. This system 
can also offer the aircrew other selectable 
options such as a survivable route of flight 
from the threat zone to either home base, a 
tanker track, or other designated point. 
This capability will greatly improve current 
and future weapon system effectiveness by 
providing increased aircraft and weapon 
survivability, and weapon delivery 
optimization. Mission flexibility also 
increases with the capability to redirect 
airborne aircraft to new high priority 
targets. For example, an aircraft on a 
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAT) mission 
employing JSOW could be redirected to a 
high priority SEAD mission by passing the 
new threat coordinates to the aircraft and 
allowing the electronic crewmember to 
compute a new mission plan. Currently this 
task is done in an error prone manner 
requires an inordinate amount of time and 
computation on the part of the aircrew that 
is not generally feasible in fighter type 
aircraft. Aircraft and weapon survivability 
will be enhanced by redirecting their routes 
of flight around new threats not included in 
the original mission plan. The new routes 
of flight will maximize survivability 
allowing the aircrew to accomplish the 
mission with minimum threat exposure. 
This capability will be particularly effective 
in the SEAD role where target locations 
are often not known in advance. 
3.        Use   of   Aircraft   Avionics   to 
Predict Weapon Outcomes 
Lock on after launch weapons such as 
HARM and HARPOON9 select targets as a 
function of complex processes that are not 
intuitively obvious to the pilot. To further 
complicate the problem they have multiple 
modes of operation that vary the behavior 
of the weapon in the target selection 
process. For example, with HARPOON, 
the pilot designates a target location or 
bearing and the missile proceeds along a 
flight path, initiates a seeker search to 
acquire the target, and following detection, 
tracks the target to impact. Several 
options, including missile search mode, 
missile function during search the use or 
waypoints and the location or the missile 
targeting solution (target position), 
combine to determine which target the 
missile finds and ultimately impacts. For 
example there are tactical situations where 
multiple ships or land is in the target area, 
the pilot selection of missile mode and 
targeting solution are critical to the 
outcome of a HARPOON engagement. 
The above example also highlights another 
aspect of the problem; the use of complex 
weapons   in   scenarios  that   are  on   the 
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boundary of the design specifications. 
HARPOON, for example is designed to 
attack a single ship target in an open ocean 
environment, however, the missile has 
excellent capability in more complex 
scenarios, providing the pilot chooses the 
optimum targeting solution. 
One of the solutions used by command 
decision makers in setting ROE for use of 
weapons like HARPOON to ensure 
outcomes is to restrict standoff. It is 
noteworthy that the use of HARPOON in 
the Gulf of Sidra against Libyan Navy 
vessels required visual identification by 
over flight and launch ranges were 
minimized. 
For weapons such as HARM the seeker 
footprint is a function of mode and launch 
range. This is central to target selection, 
and is currently left to the ability of the 
pilot to intuitively determine the heart of 
the envelope". The ability of the pilot to 
effectively perform this task is related to 
how well he can recall complex charts from 
the Tactical Manual. 
A solution for this problem is to use an 
aircraft processor to evaluate the targeting 
alternatives and to present the pilot with 
optimum solutions. The type of weapon 
system modeling necessary is similar in 
nature to engineering and training 
simulations Delex Systems has produced 
This type of simulation requires detailed 
algorithms for weapon sensor performance, 
weapon flyout dynamics, and will most 
especially require a method of entering the 
current target environment to define the 
scenario for the simulation. The type of 
mission database and the activity discussed 
in section 2 above could perform this 
function. The output of the simulation is 
some numerical non-subjective 
determination of the weapon probability of 
acquisition (PaCq) of the intended target 
ana an assessment of the probability of 
engaging a non-combatant or unintended 
target. 
The effect of threat system performance on 
weapon probability of arrival would 
increase the fidelity of this process and 
could generate actual probability of arrival 
projections. 
4. Use of Weapon Imagery in the 
Cockpit for Man-in-the-Loop (MITL) 
Target Designation 
Weapon Systems such as WALLEYE, 
AGM-130, SLAM, CASOM and JSOW 
(P-'I) use a data link system which supports 
the weapon acquisition of the target during 
the terminal phase of weapon flight. This 
process, critical to the mission success, is 
one of the highest workload items a pilot 
undertakes. The best example of the 
difficulty of this task can be found from use 
of the SLAM in Desert Storm during a 
SLAM mission a pilot tried to complete the 
target designation task- while 
simultaneously maneuvering to avoid an 
incoming SAM and handle an illuminated 
master caution light1. 
Two aspects of the target designation task, 
where the electronic crewman is central to 
aiding in this mission critical process, are 
target recognition and hitpoint designation. 
The first phase of the task is target 
recognition. In this task the pilot views the 
target area image sent from the weapon 
and determines the location the target in 
the image. Several aspects of the current 
design of such systems can be improved 
with the application of current technology. 
Transition from the analog video link 
systems to the use of digital video will 
improve image quality and allow 
application of image enhancement 
algorithms. This    type    of    image 
enhancement will be especially useful for 
weapon systems applied under boundary 
conditions where sensor images are 
degraded due to weather, 
countermeasures, or image source 
limitations such as minimal target thermal 
variance for imaging infrared sensors. 
An obvious improvement would be the 
integration of a larger, high resolution 
display in the cockpit. However, space 
limitations makes this simple solution 
difficult to achieve. An alternative is to 
integrate a system that could allow image 
magnification. 
Target recognition can also be improved 
through the integration of target imagery 
into mission data so that the pilot can have 
a reference image for comparison with the 
weapon imagery. Such imagery in the 
cockpit is currently in hard copy form, 
which has obvious handling limitations. 
The ability to pass imagery and location 
data to the pilot for application of these 
imaging standoff weapons against mobile 
high value targets such as SCUD launchers 
is a fundamental aspiration of the TENCAP 
projects10. The role of the electronic 
crewman in automated processing and 
effective display of this data is essential. 
In   the    integration    process    of   these 
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capabilities the importance of target cueing 
must be central. 
The second phase of the target designation 
task involves the mechanics of executing 
the hitpoint designation procedure. In 
current data link design and aircraft 
integration, the weapon data link system 
are generally carried externally in 
conjunction with the weapon stores on a 
wing station. This integration mechanism 
results in a procedure that is generally as 
follows: 
• The pilot completes the target 
recognition process and initiates hitpoint 
designation with some cockpit switch 
• The initiation command is sent to 
the weapon where a cursor is inserted into 
the target imagery 
• The pilot sees the cursor and 
initiates some cursor slew mechanism 
• The aircraft avionics reads the 
slew commands, formats it for transmission 
to the data link pod 
• The data kink pod receives the 
slew information, changes the data into the 
command link format and transmits it to 
the weapon 
• The weapon data link receives 
the message and decodes it, and passes the 
command to the targeting sensor to move 
the cursor on the internal weapon data bus 
• The targeting sensor moves the 
cursor in the image 
• The image is passed to the 
weapon data link for transmission along an 
internal weapon video bus 
• The weapon data link transmits 
the image to the aircraft 
• The aircraft data link pod 
receives the video and sends it to the 
cockpit for display 
• The pilot sees the cursor move in 
the image and adjusts to bring the cursor 
over the desired hitpoint 
• The pilot hits a cockpit switch to 
"designate" the hitpoint. 
This type of multi-step process can cause 
significant time delays between pilot 
action and movement of the cursor in the 
display. A more direct integration of these 
systems with the aircraft avionics, where 
the hitpoint designation process involves 
fewer steps, data nand-offs and 
reformatting will greatly reduce these 
delays. 
In addition, in conjunction with the 
previous recommendation for integration 
of a larger display to support target 
recognition, the inclusion of a touch screen 
or other one step hitpoint designation is 
possible. 
5. Conclusion 
There are a number of areas where the 
electronic crewman can significantly 
improve the effectiveness of delivery of 
PGMs, and simultaneously reduce the 
pilot's workload. Especially important will 
be the approach that industry takes with 
respect to enhancements in aircraft 
capability regarding processor throughput 
and memory capacity, integration of 
offboard threat information and target 
imagery, and improvement in target 
recognition and designation processes for 
MITL weapons. 
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CAMA:      Some Aspects of a Military Crew Assistant System 
Brugger E. and Hertweck H. 
DASA-LM, LME-Friedrichshafen/Munich, Germany 
General 
CAMA, an acronym for Crew Assistant 
Military Aircraft, is a joint research and 
development program of the German 
Aerospace Industry and research 
establishments. 
The program CAMA, in principle foreseen 
for all type of aircraft, has currently a 
priority in a two pilot cockpit as it exists in 
a transport aircraft (fig.l). The system will 
assist the crew in an enhancement of the 
situation awareness in all mission phases 
from starting flight planning by the crew 
until to the debriefing after landing. It 
provides defined types of operational 
support, e. g. preparation and execution of 
tactical navigation or critical loading effects 
on a restart from an unprepared field. Basic 
services are available as check list routine 
work, fuel/load management and so on. 
One of the main task however is a 
comprehensive capability for alert and 
warnings in different way at the crew- 
aircraft-interface using ability of seeing, 
hearing and tactile sense. 
The worksharing in the program, which is 
currently under contract of the German 
BWB (Agency of Procurement) consists on 
the industrial side of the military aircraft 
division (LM) of the Deutsche Aerospace 
and the Electronik System Gesellschaft 
(ESG) München and on the research side of 
the Institute of System Dynamics and Flight 
Mechanics of the Universität der 
Bundeswehr München and the Flight Test 
Center of DLR (German Aerospace 
Establishment), at Braunschweig. 
This cooperation is seen as an excellent 
opportunity to combine the latest results of 
research and development on the field of 
cockpit assistant systems and the 
experience of military operational 
requirements in future air weapon systems. 
The question "why CAMA in current and 
future military crew stations" reflects the 
today situation in the cockpit of modern 
weapon, systems. A lot of R & D has been 
performed in this area. Therefore, only 
some spotlights will be given with respect 
to this complex. 
Facts are: 
• All pilot actions are canalized by a 
given MMI, which is a result of the 
chosen cockpit-layout 
• All decisions are made by the CREW as 
a result of mental (more or less routine) 
processes 
• Decisions effected faulty by the CREW 
are recapitulated by the system 
• During the decision process in the 
cockpit the critical point is the CREW 
• In a highly automated cockpit, the pilot 
can find again himself in a situation 
Out-of-the-Loop 
An approach to correct this situation is 
represented by CAMA. 
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What is CAMA doing? 
The system 
• Acquires continuously aircraft data, 
mission data, environment data and 
pilot's data 
• has access to stored data: static data 
base, dynamic data base and knowledge 
based data 
• generates situation dependend on 
recommendations for pilot actions 
• makes available knowledge based, static 
and dynamic data to the crew 
• executes planning tasks 
• does not make autonomous decisions 
and does not intervene to the weapon 
system without crew order 
• does not increase the automation level 
of the weapon system 
The program CAMA consists of a number 
of 16 separate modules for data acquisition 
and a further module for data control 
(fig-2). 
These are: 
Low Altitude Planner 
It provides a low altitude flight path to the 
target using the terrain profile in order to 
minimize threat; optimize flight parameters 
and fuel management 
Terrain Interpreter 
Comparison of flight performance envelope 
with obstacles in low level flight, 
recommends possible evading manoeuvres. 
Computer vision outside 
Interpretation of optical sequences to 
recognize the relative present position and 
obstacles. 
Computer Vision Inside 
Acquires sequences and interpretes the 
crew movement with respect to body, head 
and eye movement of the for identification 
of crew actions 
System Interpreter 
Determination of the status of the a/c- 
systems; data supply for other modules 
Environmental Interpreter 
Acquisition, monitoring and recording of 
meteorological data 
Tactical Situation Interpreter 
Acquisitio,presentation and recording of 
the tactical situation, threat during the 
whole mission 
Flight Situation - and Threat Interpreter 
Acquisition, recording and assessment of 
data, which will be interpreted as "conflict 
situation". Specifies a conflict situation 
Pilot Behaviour Reference 
Creating a crew model related on a 
"normative behaviour" of the crew during 
the whole mission 
Knowledge base with respect to the 
margins of allowable pilot behaviour 
Pilot Behaviour Deviation 
Creating a crew model for deviation of the 
reference behaviour 
Pilot Intention/Error recognition 
Continuous comparison of reference 
behaviour with factual crew behaviour. If 
there is a deviating from the mission plan, it 
will be examined, wether there is a true 
intention or a pilot error existing. 
Flight Status Interpreter 
Examination if and at which point an 
expected flight progress has been achieved 
Automatic Flight Planner 
Continuous updating of the mission plan on 
the basis of current change of tactical and 
operational situation 
Aircraft Interface 
The interface picks up all necessary data of 
the a/c systems (and feeds the a/c-systems 
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with CAMA data) (this part is under 
investigation, the data transfer from CAMA 
to the a/c has to be subject to a hazard 
assessment). 
Dialogue Manager 
It is the CAMA-CREW Interface 
established by display, direct voice input, 
direct voice output and manual control. 
External Communication Interface 
It is the input for all arriving, transceiving 
data via data link for mission relevant 
processing. 
The structure of CAMA interface foresees 
a core part for all CAMA-relevant 
computations. The communication with 
crew, aircraft, outside world occurs by 
interfaces for CAMA-specific sensor data, 
aircraft specific informations, data link 
informations and dialogue with the crew. 
They are embedded in the overall CAMA- 
structure. Fig. 3 shows this struture with 
respect to the tools used during this phase. 
It gives a functional overview on all 
CAMA modules and data sources 
including the data flow among them. 
The modules may be grouped into the 
following seven classes 
• the CAMA relevant aircraft systems 
• the situational data generation 
modules 
• a data pool describing the actual 
situation 
• a data pool for reference data 
• the modules for analysing, planning 
and conflict solving 
. the CAMA MMI 
• modules for pictoral data processing 
The basic functions of each module 
have been described above, however, 
a few words remain to be said about 
the data bases at the bottom of the 
figure. They contain the knowledge 
CAMA advices are based on. There 
are on one hand data describing 
physically existing outside world items 
such as navigation aids, terrain 
elevation and feature data, on the 
other hand modelling data for the 
simulation of a reference pilot and a 
reference aircraft. 
After this overview, for some of the 
modules under investigation at DASA 
their functions will be explained in 
more detail. 
Terrain Interpreter (Tl) 
The terrain interpreter monitors the 
CAMA aircraft's flight path and informs 
the pilot and the CAMA system 
whenever a risk of flying into terrain 
occurs. This is done by continuously 
calculating a three dimensional 
performance envelope of the aircraft 
(fig. 4) taking into account the current 
state of flight and the actual aircraft 
configuration. The performance 
envelope spans between the flight 
path at minimum turn radius for level 
flight and the flight path flyable with 
zero turn rate and maximum climb 
performance. Whenever this envelope 
collides with the terrain as defined by 
the digital data base the respective 
flight pathes are prohibited and 
depending on the urgency of action an 
immediate pilot activity is commanded 
or a replaning process is triggered. 
External Communication Interface 
(ECI) 
The  module  external  communication 
interface   simulates  digital   data-links 
between   the   CAMA-A/C    and   any 
possible outside world communication 
systems. 
The    operator    at    the    ECl-station 
initiates and change the scenario in 
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the operating area of a CAMA-mission. 
For a efficient work the EC I 
implements a graphical user interface 
based on the X-Windows- standard 
and OSF-motiv. Fig. 5 shows an 
example. 
Functions of the ECI are: 
• setting or changing elements 
of the tactical scenario such 
as threat or wepon 
engagement zone. 
• setting the status of an 
airport or navigation 
equipment. 
• setting or changing wether 
conditions in the operating 
area. 
• changing or preparing a new 
mission plan for the CAMA- 
A/C. 
The     Crew    Assistant     Graphical 
Interface Shell (CAGIS) 
This module allows manual crew 
inputs to the CAMA system via display 
and a designator (e.g. joystick, 
trackball). The CAGIS screen is 
devided into four sections: The lower 
part of the screen displays at all turns 
the basic menue, the right half portion 
above it offers submenues to the 
selected basic main functions, the 
upper line shows the status of the 
input and on the rest of the screen a 
map of variable size is displayed 
allowing e.g. selection of NAV stations, 
setting flight plan data, sending ATC 
commands, trigger service functions, 
operate aircraft systems. It is designed 
to avoid the requirement for any 
alphanumeric input device. A special 
purpose is seen in situations, where 
data are to be altered by the crew due 
to actual mission conditions which are 
not covered/updated by the CAMA 
missionplanner. 
Development Status 
Currently all modules are functionally 
specified and some of them are 
already coded and have underwent 
initial testing. Discussions between the 
partners have shown that refinement 
will be needed e.g. to avoid functional 
overlapping between the modules and 
already existing aircraft monitoring 
systems. Starting approximately in 
April '95 the modules will be partially 
integrated together and an overall 
CAMA simulation is envisaged 
beginning in 1996. 
The simulation shall test a basic 
CAMA-version. After successfull 
checks simulator flights by different 
pilots are planned. The system is 
foreseen to enter flight tests with the 
ATTAS (Advanced Technologies 
Testing Aircraft System) of the DLR in 
about two or three years. 
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Fig. 1: The System CAMA 
Fig. 2: CAMA Modules 
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SUMMARY 
This paper provides a user-based orientation 
useful to assist in understanding, organizing and 
designing future, responsive electronic-based 
decision-making aids. It argues that electronic 
decision-assisting systems, using fuzzy logic to 
overcome human limitations resulting from 
selective perception and risk minimization, may 
be more valuable to management of battlefield 
information (could provide more, quality data, or 
information) than currently thought It proposes 
that such systems be considered not only to 
support cognitive decision-aiding in future 
aircraft crew stations but also perhaps to 
autonomously make and implement the results of 
such decisions for all players, at all levels of the 
battlefield. 
L INTRODUCTION 
Current trends for the future battlefield appear to 
be leading toward proliferation of electronically 
provided information. The purpose of such 
information is to improve the effectiveness of 
combat operations. Much costly effort has, is 
being and will be expended to accomplish that 
purpose. Properly implemented, this 
technological advance can prove as powerful a 
factor to success in future battle operations as the 
introduction of gunpowder. 
This paper is an attempt at introduction of 
considerations which may bear upon the ultimate 
effectiveness of the electronic information 
management systems currently in development 
The fundamental approach taken here is that 
electronically provided information is likely to 
be useful to combatants to the extent that it 
contains advice or guidance relevant to their 
immediate needs. 
Several characteristics are believed to be 
important to the nature of the information 
intended to improve the effectiveness of such 
operations These include speed of response to 
changing events, recognition of options available 
for action, prediction of the implications (in 
terms of future capabilities of friend and enemy) 
of adoption of a particular option or option set 
and knowledge of the consequences of utilization 
of the available options. 
Relevance of information to immediate needs is a 
function of its accuracy and timeliness as well as 
its compatibility with the user's cognitive 
framework. Taking such considerations into 
account will result in providing information 
suitable to the user. Neglect of these factors will 
merely add to their response time lag. Selected 
approaches to improving information relevance 
for the various levels of information management 
within the battlefield, are discussed. 
2. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
2.1 Assumptions 
For purposes of this paper, factors relating to the 
collection and dissemination of information 
through electronic means are assumed to have 
been satisfactorily resolved. Thus, appropriate 
sensors, communications channels, 
communications covertness, range satisfaction, 
data fusion and validation, and verification of 
accuracy of data transmission are all considered 
to be in place and operating satisfactorily. 
Most data collected may appear to be certain, or 
non-probabilistic, but in most cases will be 
uncertain. Thus, data should be treated as 
probabilistic. If probabilistic data is forced into 
"binary certainty" format, it will become a 
constant source of unquannTiable error. 
It is also assumed that all the information on the 
battlefield is provided for application in as 
timely a fashion as possible. This is perhaps the 
one fundamentally most important factor to 
effective information use and known as 
significant challenge to the designers of the 
digitized battlefield. 
Further assumed is that available data will 
potentially be used by human operators at all 
levels involved in prosecution of the battle. 
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Available for their use will be the plethora of 
modern information including: Global 
Positioning System Data, Digital Maps, Weather 
Data, Intelligence from remote space, airborne 
and surface sources as well as data from less 
remote sources including proximal air and surface 
combatants as well as onboard sensor systems. 
2.2 Background 
For purposes of this paper, information users 
have been arbitrarily grouped into three major 
categories roughly corresponding with the 
organization expected during future battles. It is 
expected that the organization will include 
participants at essentially three levels: Theater 
Command Control and Communications 
(analogous to the Corporate Executive Level), 
users at the level of implementation (analogous 
to the Management Level and users at the action 
level (analogous to the Employee level). Unique 
information needs pertain to each level in the net 
The Executive Level requires data on trends of 
enemy and friendly activities to the extent that 
these relate to the accomplishment of established 
goals. 
The Management Level requires data on details 
of accomplishment of subsets (defined by time 
and/or location) of the mission objectives and the 
likelihood of trend continuance. 
The Employee Level requires data on the 
immediate objectives being pursued. 
Various methods of improving the value of 
information to each of these levels of operation 
have been proposed. Those approaches can be 
grouped as the "game theory" methods. They 
essentially attempt to predict future events and 
conceptually test the efficacy of alternatives. 
Then, from among the alternatives, they attempt 
to recommend one or more which appear to have 
value in winning the game. 
For use during battle, these approaches have not 
gained significant acceptance, probably because 
of human mistrust in their ability to 
appropriately take all relevant batdefield factors 
into account and also probably because of the 
belief that the safety of human lives in battle is 
best assured by human decision makers on the 
spot. 
History and psychology suggest that both of 
these positions is suspect. 
Historical evidence suggests that many battles 
have been lost because of information 
mismanagement by humans. Some battles almost 
certainly have been lost because some relevant 
available information was not taken into account. 
Conversely, some have been won because of 
human ingenuity and the willingness to accept 
greater risk. Unfortunately, it is a certainty that 
human decisions during battle don't always result 
in preservation of the lives and resources of 
friendly combatants. 
This state of affairs may be improved if humans 
recognize some of the major limitations which 
have repeatedly been pointed out by the field of 
psychology and try to overcome them through 
use of available technology. 
These limitations reflect human shortcomings in 
the capacity to accept all available information 
from the world and manage it with dispassionate 
certainty. With the increased quantities and 
uncertainties of data which will accrue on the 
future digital battlefield, it will become more 
difficult for humans to formulate and extract a 
unified concept of the existing and emerging 
state of the battle. Otherwise stated, it will 
become more likely that humans will be the 
source of more erroneous decisions on the future 
battlefield. 
Those human limitations which are expected to 
result in significant errors in judgment reflect the 
human characteristics of selective perception and 
predictive conservatism. 
Selective perception is the well known 
phenomenon (perhaps one of the truisms in 
psychology) which is thought to result from 
individual human experience and which results in 
attending to data congruent with preconceptions 
or strong habit patterns, while ignoring those 
data which are incongruent. During battle, the 
ability to attend to all data is further limited by 
the exigencies of the battle. An excellent 
anecdotal example of this proclivity is found in 
the Japanese story known as Rashamon in which 
a revealing account is provided of the accuracy ot 
eyewitness reports of a murderous attack. 
Time stress and the emotional consequences of 
drawing potentially incorrect conclusions from 
data can also affect selective perception. Time 
stress in human processing is thought to affect 
perception by reducing the amount of data 
perceived. Consequences of decision making 
also can result in tendencies to reduce the 
certainties of decisions made, or inferences drawn, 
from available data. 
Edwards, in the early to middle '60s, performed a 
series of experiments (summarized in Ref 1) 
using mathematical manipulations, based upon 
Bayesian probability theory, to make predictions 
of future real-world events. He compared these 
event predictions and their assigned confidence 
levels with event predictions made by humans 
using the same information provided for 
Bayesian analysis. His results can be said to 
have established that purely mathematical. 
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probability-based, methods can predict future 
events with greater associated certainty than 
humans. Unfortunately, these research data have 
not enjoyed wide dissemination. 
If Edwards' research was correct, and was 
accomplished without the extensive use of the 
powerful computational systems that we are now 
examining for installation on aircraft and mobile 
ground vehicles, the availability of the newer 
computational systems we are currently 
projecting for use in the battlefield might 
possibly benefit from the findings of thirty years 
ago with resulting improvements in the use of 
probabilistic data. 
Today, the U.S. Army is examining the potential 
combat advantages which might accrue if 
powerful airborne computers could assist in 
intelligently managing data currendy managed by 
crew members alone. This approach has been 
applied to fixed wing missions on programs such 
as the U.S. Air Force Pilot Associate (P.A.) 
program. Other programs such as the Day/Night 
Adverse Weather Pilotage Program (D/NAPS) 
and the more recent Rotor craft Pilots Associate 
(RPA) program are examining in detail various 
approaches to gaining combat advantages for 
rotary wing attack and reconnaissance aircraft 
Soon to come will be similar efforts to examine 
how computers might similarly assist tank crews. 
Additional efforts are directed at upper levels of 
command and the management of data for the 
Digital Battlefield. Further efforts are likely to 
be directed in all these areas toward increased and 
extended Battlefield Operational Capabilities. 
These are all directed toward improvements in 
"Combat Effectiveness". If successful, they can 
be expected to result in improving the speed and 
accuracy of coordination of diverse inter and 
intra-service intelligence and combat resources. If 
these resources can effectively be integrated, the 
longtime dream of many practitioners of warfare 
may be realized; that is, the ability to 
simultaneously project concerted, diverse forces 
against an enemy toward a decisive end. 
Historically this approach has been called 
"Blitzkrieg". In more recent times it has been 
referred to with the phrase "Massive First 
Strike". Normally, however, such a strategy is 
associated with aggressive postures. It may also 
be viewed as a special defensive posture, 
consistent with reduced willingness to accept 
battle losses in a crisis response situation as was 
seen in Operation Desert Storm. 
Preventing the achievement of this capability are 
numerous factors, not least of which are 
insufficient and stale data, erroneous data, and 
insufficient or unreliable communications These 
are the problems being addressed by 
developments in the digital battlefield as well as 
pilot associate programs. To the degree that the 
efforts are successful, these problems are likely to 
diminish in importance. 
These approaches are typical of those 
successfully undertaken in the past. They 
attempt to increase the quantity of precise, 
accurate data available for use by battle 
participants. This is today seen in information 
management thrusts intended to accomplish 
"horizontal integration" of information such that 
a "shared view" of the battle (situational 
awareness) is available to all management and 
combatant levels. While the horizontal 
integration approach of the impending digital 
battlefield is likely to improve the quality of data 
available for drawing inferences, it does not 
improve the quality or the speed of the inference- 
drawing process which we view as crucial. Not 
now being addressed by any existing program is 
how best to overcome the human limitations 
mentioned earlier. 
3. PROPOSAL 
It is desirable that these human limitations be 
surmounted at all battle levels: "Executive", 
"Management" and "Employee". While the 
fundamental techniques employed to overcome 
the human limitations mentioned earlier at each 
level of the battlefield hierarchy may be similar, 
differing products suitable for each level may be 
desirable. 
The goal of this proposal is to provide quality 
data, or information, to those who require it. 
Quality data, or information, is raw material 
which has been processed. Processing should 
accomplish at least two objectives. It should 
first take into account all verified data, and then 
attempt not merely representation of the current 
state of affairs but also rapid prediction of future 
states. A nicety would consist of the conversion 
of future-state knowledge into action 
terminology, or orders intended to make best use 
of resources and to communicate that terminology 
to those affected. 
It is perhaps appropriate to distinguish at this 
point between Data and Information. Data is 
defined as the raw material from which 
information is generated. Thus, data is the 
location of an enemy position or the type of 
weapon thought to be at that location. 
Information is the result of data manipulation, or 
processing, it results in unification of multiple 
data sources and provides guidance or direction 
for action. 
Thus, to a battle commander, enemy intentions 
(direction and rate of movement, size and type of 
force), likely intercept or observation points and 
friendly forces available to counter enemy 
activity are information. In an aircraft. SAM 
location and status are pieces of data.  Aircraft 
43 
response options (safest flight path, minimum 
signature attitude and countermeasures to be 
employed) in light of the threat activity is 
information. On the battlefield today humans are 
used to convert data into information. 
The usefulness of the distinction between data 
and information and its relationship to 
overcoming human limitations at all levels for 
the electronic battlefield will become clearer as 
we progress. 
Simply stated, during battle the Executive level 
attempts, through human reasoning, to interpret 
data available to it to discern and act upon trends 
(opportunities and hazards) toward 
accomplishment of established goals. The 
Management level, using its data sources and 
human reasoning, attempts to trade, anticipate and 
manage battle contingencies as they arise. The 
Employee level attempts to track, anticipate and 
respond to management directives while 
minimizing battle cost/benefit ratios. 
At each level, accuracy of data and speed of 
proper action are primary considerations. Yet, 
even if data is fresh and accurate, reliance upon 
the human in a data interpretation/decision- 
making role can be expected to be rife with error- 
from not taking all data into account and from 
drawing conservative or low risk conclusions. 
Additionally, the human decision-making process 
can be slow. 
If it is assumed that the emerging electronic or 
digital battlefield can be expected to provide 
more accurate and timely information to all 
levels, the goal should clearly be to reduce 
reliance upon human decision-making. 
What alternative to that process exists? The 
cavalier answer, of course is computers. A better 
answer is "smart" use of these computers to 
improve upon the process. 
Humans tend to arrive at probabilistic decisions 
using a process of probabilistic reasoning. Fuzzy 
Logic as described by Zadeh (Ref 2), in its 
broadest sense, attempts to convert reasoning 
with uncertainty into computer manageable data. 
Among its goals are development of improved 
methods or using human knowledge-based 
systems and use of data banks to answer human 
queries about real-world events. 
Use of approximate reasoning approaches to 
management of data on the battlefield offer the 
possibility of more powerful use of the available 
data. These methods, compared with human 
beings, are capable of rapidly dealing with all the 
data available using a technique approximating 
human reasoning, but without predictive 
conservatism. Thus, predictions resulting from 
their use should more accurately represent  future 
events (be associated with higher willingness to 
accept risk) than human predictions. 
Bhatnagar & Kanal, (Ref 3) suggest in their 
paper on methodologies useful in approximate 
reasoning that "...a battlefield planner may be 
interested in hypothesizing an enemy's plan of 
attack" which may be more useful than knowing 
the "probability of being attacked by the enemy." 
In Zadeh and Kacprzyk, (Ref 4), detailed papers 
are presented on available and emerging 
techniques of logically dealing with the 
extraction of information from uncertain data 
using purely probabilistic as well as hybrid 
methodologies. 
Such systems can be expected to solve the 
limitations of human processing and 
simultaneously extract more certain information 
from uncertain data. Fuzzy Logic can help in the 
conduct of both steps in the generation of 
information-unification and action guidance. 
However, fuzzy logic alone may be insufficient 
for resolution of all information management and 
decision-making problems. The primary 
limitation to fuzzy logic may be its reliance upon 
humans and the process of knowledge acquisition 
to devise the expert systems of which it will 
consist For fully responsive systems to evolve, 
it will perhaps be necessary to explore the 
construction of hybrid systems comprising fuzzy 
logic, purely binary as well as Bayesian 
algorithms. 
Some general and specific examples may help 
visualize the possibilities of such systems. 
Recall that it has been argued that at all 
battlefield levels the human is principally relied 
upon to integrate data and predict future events 
from current data. Once the events have been 
predicted it is of course necessary to convert 
knowledge of the events into a course of battle 
action, formulate and allocate orders and transmit 
these orders to implementers. 
At the "Executive" level, the improved digital 
battlefield data can be automatically formatted for 
processing by expert-fuzzy logic systems whose 
objective would be to identify and predict future 
battlefield trends, formulate plans to maximize 
friendly success probabilities, convert plans into 
suitable orders and allocate/disseminate orders to 
implementers. 
At the "Management" level, orders received from 
the Executive level could be immediately 
converted into orders specific to the Employee 
level, communications channels could be selected 
for covertness and/or intervisibility, sequentiality 
of transmittals could be established and orders 
transmitted. 
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It would of course be necessary (Or would it?) to 
somehow explain to those remaining 
"Executives" (personnel requirements would be 
diminished) what future events have been 
predicted, their probabilities, what the 
recommended course of action is, its probability 
of success, and the recommended timing for 
transmittal of orders to assure maintenance of 
maximum success probability. It might also be 
desirable for the system to identify additional 
data needs required to improve probabilistic 
predictions. 
Similarly, at the Management level, orders and 
their rationales might have to be explained to the 
remaining human participants. 
The parenthetical question in the above paragraph 
refers to an issue which is being dealt with in 
today's aircraft cockpit. It is becoming accepted 
practice today that nothing potentially requiring 
human judgment be allowed to occur 
automatically, or without pilot concurrence. This 
position is reflective of our current lack of 
confidence in cognitive-decision aiding systems 
and conservatism in the application of new 
technology to a traditionally human role. Such 
hesitancy has characterized most proposed 
innovations to aviation crew station information 
management such as the introduction of multi- 
function displays instead of "steam gauges" and 
the use of three dimensional display formats. 
Hesitancy has also no doubt attached to the 
adoption of newer technology in other 
applications as well. This too shall pass. 
These potential applications of newer data 
management technology are not unlike what are 
being considered for combat aviators. 
Information being considered and evaluated for 
implementation for aviators consists of 
recommended flight routes, automated 
formulation of attack plans, recommended 
observation and attack positions and timing and 
recommended communications channels. These 
systems can take into account threat data, threat 
and self position as well as the activities of 
cooperative forces and successes or failures of 
enemy force projections. Data is automatically 
selected for increased display prominence, or 
"conspicuity", to the crew to assure its timely 
perception. 
For the Tank crew member or commander, 
information could consist of probabilistic data on 
predicted enemy location and the success 
probability of one-on-one or combined forces 
attack. Platform/weapon selection as well as a 
recommended in-range intercept course and firing 
position could also be provided based upon 
somewhat aged sensor data on previous location 
and probabilistic vector of enemy movement, 
terrain characteristics, local weather, battlefield 
obscurants, known placement of mines and 
mobility characteristics of the firing platform(s). 
4. PROBLEMS AND THEIR RESOLUTION 
The above recommendations are only limited by 
our imagination and our willingness to entertain 
the possibility that our machines might be able 
to accomplish tasks traditionally undertaken by 
humans. 
Limitations of data on events transpiring in the 
battlefield are rapidly diminishing. The danger 
to be avoided is being overcome with data. 
But the achievement of useful systems for the 
battlefield is not without problems-problems 
quite similar to those we are facing in providing 
cognitive decision assisting systems for the 
aircraft operator. 
A vexing problem, elsewhere addressed during 
this workshop, is: Which responsibilities do we 
assign to men and which do we assign to the 
machine system? 
This paper can only contribute to answering that 
question by harking back to the human 
limitations (and approaches to their resolution) 
mentioned earlier. By restating the question in 
terms of which tasks require interpretation of 
quantities of data, discernment of probabilistic 
unifying characteristics within the data, 
dispassionate prediction of future relevant events 
and the development of information to guide 
action, we have the beginnings of a set of criteria 
which might be useful in task allocation. Those 
which meet these criteria should obviously be 
considered for allocation to machines. Those 
which don't are candidates for man. Others in 
this field would take the opposite approach. We 
disagree with the others. 
Another problem of concern to this meeting is 
whether there are some types of tasks which 
should never be entrusted to the Human- 
Electronic Team. The position taken by the 
authors of this paper is that any task meeting the 
above criteria should initially be entrusted to the 
team, with a larger proportion of them assigned 
to the electronic crew member, or machines. The 
logical alternatives include all tasks be assigned 
to man and man and machine share task 
responsibilities. By not talcing the initial 
position that all tasks be assigned to machines, 
we may be flagrantly displaying the limitation in 
our human ability to accept risk. Until it is 
convincingly demonstrated that the success 
probabilities predicted by our decision-aiding 
systems are unrealistic, our all too human 
tendencies should be recognized and resisted. 
In answer to the question 01" whether current 
development activities address the teaming 
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issues, we must say only partially. Recent 
evidence indicates that cognitive decision-aiding 
systems are being examined for application to 
rotor craft, tanks, and remotely operated vehicles. 
Applications of this technology to the upper 
command levels, where they are also potentially 
of great value, appear to be absent from current 
planning. It is also not apparent that any of 
these potential applications involve the 
application of fuzzy logic or are concerned with 
improvements in risk acceptance. 
Another serious problem which exists but has 
not been clearly stated as a concern of this 
conference is the question of how to develop 
expert systems through the process of knowledge 
acquisition when knowledge in the application of 
the systems projected for use on the battlefield 
does not reside in any experts today? Whom do 
we query for expert advice on how the systems 
should perform? This is a question which has 
been asked at the highest levels without 
satisfactory response. 
It is our belief that, as with any new technology, 
the answer to this question will come from 
experience in its use. Thus, its full potential will 
not be realized until experience has been gained 
with its capabilities. This does not mean that 
imaginative suggestions should be dismissed 
because they have not been proven. Rather, 
suggestions should be readily entertained in the 
laboratory or in the simulated environment where 
they can be thoroughly examined for their worth. 
Doing otherwise would be yet another example 
in which man is dominated by risk-reduction 
mechanisms. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this gathering is to consider 
several questions. Among them are what roles 
should be assigned to man and what roles should 
be assigned to machines; as well as how to 
establish criteria for role selection and 
assignment While that purpose is laudable for 
the aviation context, it is perhaps too limited. 
We have argued that the problems of decision- 
making in aircraft applications are not 
significantly dissimilar from decision-making 
problems in all other levels of battlefield 
information management. To help in answering 
these questions we have offered a conceptual 
framework and guidelines. We question the 
advisability of limiting the application of this 
emerging technology to aviators and tank 
crewmen and suggest that opportunities to 
exploit its possible contributions be extended to 
all combat operations in which human decision- 
making capabilities are employed. 
Thus we are recommending that the role of the 
combat aviator is not the only place that 
advanced technology encompassing fuzzy logic 
can and should be applied. Such technology may 
be useful in improving "cognitive decision 
making" for all players and at all levels in the 
modem electronic battlefield. 
We are also visualizing an unstated, but logically 
inescapable, possibility that has been entertained 
by writers of science fiction. That possibility is 
that if the technology of data management, 
decision making and the generation of 
information (as defined in this paper) progresses 
to one of its many logical conclusions, the time 
may come when man will be absent from the 
battlefield. That battlefield may be controlled 
and conducted by machines; only machines will 
be destroyed during warfare and man will 
discover which side won or lost when the 
machine announces the outcome and tells him 
what to do next 
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The growth in complexity of modern combat compares 
unfavorably with the decreasing cost-effectiveness of 
additional crew. Cost-effectiveness issues cause 
military planners to remove crewmembers from.the 
weapon system. However, reduced crew size means 
that the remaining crew must still survive to perform 
their missions successfully in combat situations that 
stress the mental and physical extremes of the best 
people. One way to resolve this dichotomy is to let 
the weapon system itself perform mundane chores 
while the human crew acts as a battle manager. (This 
is consistent with Sheridan [1] and Pawlowski & 
Mitchell [2].) At variance with this concept is the lack 
of trust humans tend to have for embedded automation. 
This lack of trust is typically based on several 
misperceptions about intelligent systems: 1) their 
unpredictability, 2) their inflexibility and slowness in 
realistic combat scenarios, and 3) the crew's loss of 
control over the weapon system when the automation 
is active. 
This paper proposes a framework for initiating tasks to 
be performed by intelligent systems based on raw data 
available in the weapon system. This data comes from 
sensors, instruments, or off-board platforms. Time- 
dependent raw data is used to determine the conditions 
evident in the weapon system, crew, and combat 
situation. Condition information is used as ground 
truth to determine the tasks to be initiated, either 
automatically or with crew consent. The automation 
is "programmed" as a knowledge-base developed by 
operational, mission, human factors, and weapon 
system experts. The nature of the automation does not 
change during operation. This ensures predictability. 
Speed is ensured by the underlying scalability of the 
inferencing techniques. Crew control is ensured by a 
task scheduling method that requires human consent 
for initiating and continuing tasks. Flexibility is 
ensured by inferencing paths that deconflict automation 
tasks and ensure on-time execution. 
BASIC EXPERT SYSTEMS FORMULATION The 
value-of expert systems to help solve a variety of 
diagnostic and advisory needs has been well- 
demonstrated over the last two decades. Sometimes, 
a large number of rules must be continuously checked 
in real-time due to stringent requirements imposed by 
the problem.   Because of this, the expert system must 
scale so that the timing demands can be met in spite of 
expanded knowledge volume. This paper presents 
expert systems techniques that meet this demand by 
scaling in a natural way for parallel processing 
architectures. 
Techniques for two expert systems will be introduced. 
Domain experts using simple wordprocessors can 
generate the knowledge bases for these expert systems. 
The result is automatically translated into appropriate 
discrimination networks and matrices for use by the 
inference engines. 
CONDITION ANALYSIS: observes raw data gathered 
over time from various sources to determine specific 
conditions evident in the aircraft, crew, and 
surrounding environment. 
ACTION DETERMINATION: selects actions based on 
the conditions evident in the aircraft, crew and 
surrounding environment. The conditions are decision 
criteria that, when satisfied, lead to action. 
Besides the information in this paper, related 
discussion may be found in Raeth [3,4] and Noyes 
[5,6]. Implementation details are in Raeth, 
Montecalvo, & Noyes [7] and Raeth, Noyes, & 
Motecalvo [8]. 
COLLECTING & ORGANIZING RAW DATA There 
are two types of raw data needed by the condition 
analysis inference engine, measured and derived. 
Measured data come directly from sampling various 
data sources. Each data source becomes a data matrix 
column. Derived data are the result of computations 
performed on measured data. Derived data are merged 
with measured data to create additional columns. The 
time stamps are the rows. The conditions are 
determined by observing the raw data available over 
time in the cockpit. 
CONDITIONS FROM RAW DATA Two things must 
happen to support the condition analysis phase. First, 
the knowledge of domain experts must be captured. 
Second, this knowledge must be used consistently, 
with the raw data, to determine when conditions are 
active. 
Based on extensive interviews with experienced 
domain experts, three basic categories of information 
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make up this knowledge base: 
CONDITIONS: internal/external aspects of the aircraft, 
mission, and human situation that are active for a 
given time. 
EVENTS: raw data correlations that must be observed 
in time sequence before a condition is determined to 
be active. 
SPECIFICATION SETS: triplets that identify a data 
source, its expected value, and a numerical comparison 
operator (entered as <, >, =, <=, =>, or o). A list of 
these sets makes up an event. The sets in an event 
must all be recognized simultaneously before the event 
is determined to have occurred. Specification sets are 
used to identify events, and events are used to identify 
conditions. 
this framework should scale well across multiple 
processors as more conditions are added to the 
knowledge base. The network shown in Figure 2 is 
traversed in a forward-chaining, depth-first fashion. 
Each data sample is compared to the specification sets 
of the current event of each condition on the active 
search list. Once a specification set is found that does 
not compare as it should, the comparison process for 
that condition stops and the comparisons for the next 
condition start. If all the specification sets compare 
correctly and their event's dwell and transition time 
factors are within range, the current event is passed 
and the next event is made the current event for 
comparison purposes on the next sample. Once all 
events for a particular condition are passed, that 
condition is identified and placed on the active 
condition list. Active conditions remain so until one 
of their anti-conditions is found. 
Besides the three categories mentioned above, two 
categories of related information that also must be 
collected: 
DWELL TIME: the minimum length of time an event 
must last. 
TRANSITION TIME: the maximum time between the 
start of one event and the beginning of the next event. 
It is very important to devise a mechanism oriented to 
the domain expert for the capture of these five 
categories of information. The mechanism chosen 
must use the language of the expert and be simple 
enough for that person to modify the knowledge base 
incrementally. The authors' personal experience is that 
a common spreadsheet does nicely when set up on a 
wordprocessor as illustrated in Figure 1. The inference 
engine's preprocessor transforms the spreadsheet 
shown in Figure 1 into a discrimination network. 
Notice that each row of the spreadsheet represents an 
event with that event's specification sets. The 
condition named at the beginning of the row is 
associated with the event on that row. If there is no 
condition name and the line is not totally blank, then 
the event on that row is the next sequential event for 
the previously named condition. Separate linked nodes 
are created in the computer's memory to associate each 
condition with its events and each event with its 
specification sets. 
Figure 2 shows the basic structure of the 
discrimination network developed from Figure 1. 
Physically, this network is implemented as a series of 
connected linked lists. The conditions are listed 
vertically, the events for each condition are listed 
horizontally, and the specification sets for each event 
are listed diagonally. There is no logical limit to the 
number of conditions, events, or specification sets. 
Each condition is evaluated independently.   Therefore, 
BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE BASE OF DECISIONS 
AND THEIR CRITERIA The bounding of the 
knowledge domain and the acquisition of knowledge 
are two classical bottlenecks in the development of 
expert systems. The knowledge acquisition method 
discussed here is designed to deal with these two 
bottlenecks. 
DOMAIN BOUNDING: Domain bounding is implied 
in the method of capturing the knowledge. A distinct 
boundary is drawn around each decision that could be 
made. This boundary encompasses the criteria 
corresponding to each decision captured in the 
knowledge base. Thus, the "domain boundary" (as 
understood in the classical sense) is actually composed 
of many minute boundaries. Later, you will see how 
these many small boundaries are kept from conflicting 
with each other, although some of them overlap. 
KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION: Two kinds of 
knowledge are captured. The first is composed of the 
decisions and their resulting tasks. The second is each 
decision's corresponding criteria. Overlapping criteria 
are resolved automatically by the inference engine's 
preprocessor. Decision criteria are derived from the 
existence of conditions. A list of criteria must be 
satisfied before its related recommendation or action is 
undertaken. A mechanism for capturing and 
organizing this type of knowledge can be constructed 
with a wordprocessor. There are several elements to 
a decision description: 
- DECISION NAME 
- ON TASKS: list of tasks to be performed when the 
decision is made 
- OFF TASKS: list of tasks to be performed when the 
decision is no longer appropriate 
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- CRITERIA LIST: what criteria must be met before 
the decision is appropriate, these are the conditions 
that must be active before the rule can be fired 
FORMULATING A DECISION/CRITERIA EXPERT 
SYSTEM The formulation for the evaluation of 
decision/criteria knowledge bases depends upon a 
criteria vector, a response (action) vector, and a set of 
relationships between criteria and responses. 
The criteria vector c is a vector of m Boolean (True or 
False) variables. These criteria are the conditions 
discovered by the condition analysis expert system 
discussed earlier. 
A set of n rules define a rule vector r, relating the 
criteria and response vectors, defines the on-board 
expert system that will advise the pilot and, with the 
pilot's consent, act on their behalf. Each rule can be 
formulated as a conjunction of simple Boolean criteria 
that lead to a set of actions. If all a given rule's 
criteria are true, a given action will result. (Note that 
an "action" could be composed of any number of 
activities.) AH possible actions define an action vector 
a of size p. Each rule is expected to involve only a 
relatively small number of m possible criteria. The 
rule-base is built off-line, and not modified during the 
evaluation process. 
In a typical rule-based expert system, the inference 
engine performs three standard operations: 
1) the match operation matches the criteria against the 
rules to see which actions could occur 
2) the resolve operation chooses which of these 
actions will actually occur 
3) the execute operation actually generates the 
appropriate actions and updates working memory 
Two methods for rule evaluation will now be 
introduced. Each rule is evaluated independently so 
the methods should scale well across parallel 
processors. If required, different levels of parallelism 
could be employed. If the processing time is not fast 
enough, then rules having the same priority could be 
grouped according to their number of criteria to 
equalize the work among the processors, as discussed 
by Tout and Evans [9]. 
DECISION/CRITERIA EVALUATION: METHOD-1 
The simplest method for this expert system evaluation 
assumes that the rules and their criteria are listed in 
priority order. This is equivalent to a priority-oriented 
backward chaining method. This is the obvious choice 
when n « m and no other assumptions arc made 
about available data. Because no OR-Iogic is present 
in a given rule. Method-1 stops with the first q = False 
(or first C; = True in the case of ~C;). If these rules 
were ranked and evaluated from highest to lowest 
priority, then the first action produced (if any) would 
be the most important from the pilot's point of view. 
The rules could be represented efficiently by using 
three vectors: the previously discussed action vector a 
whose elements each point to a specific task to be 
completed, a query vector q, identifying which criteria 
have to be checked, and an index vector End, that 
delimits the criteria that appear in each rule. Here q 
employs positive integers to indicate criteria indices. 
Negative indices indicate criteria complements (NOT- 
criteria). This allows for direct and very fast access to 
the c vector stored on the blackboard (only one 
internal integer multiplication and addition are needed 
to compute any cell address). If parallel processors are 
used, this Boolean criteria vector c can be accessed 
from the blackboard by all processors. If 
multicomputers are used, c would be communicated to 
the local memory of each processor and this 
communication time needs to be considered, according 
to Lester [10]. Each processor uses components from 
the query vector q. Note that the number of elements 
in vector q is equal to the total number of criteria in 
all of the rules. Vector End has n elements, the total 
number of rules. 
This method yields Algorithm-1. 
Forall i := 1 to n do in parallel 
begin 
if i = 1 
then j := 1 
else j := EndM + 1; 
Fired := TRUE; 
while j < End; and Fired do 
begin 
k := qj; 
if k > 0 and not ck 
then Fired := FALSE 
else if k < 0 and c^ 
then Fired := FALSE; 
j:=j+ 1 
end; 
if Fired then perform action ai 
end 
Algorithm-1.   Implements Method-1 
DECISION/CRITERIA EVALUATION: METHOD-2 
The previous method does not take advantage of 
searching in any informed way whenever the raw data 
(and hence a criterion) changes because the indexing 
is in the opposite direction from rule to criterion. A 
second, combined forward-backward chaining method, 
could be used to check only the rules whose criteria 
values have changed since the last evaluation of the 
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rule-base. To do this, one also could index in the 
opposite direction, checking only the rules having 
newly changed criteria. The forward phase identifies 
the changed criteria and rules that use these criteria. 
The backward phase is the same as before with 
presumably fewer rules to process. 
Assuming certain criteria were the only ones whose 
truth value changed, their NeedToCheck components 
would be set to True in the blackboard. NeedToCheck 
components are reset to False after their rules had been 
re-evaluated. The Last vector is similar to the End 
vector of Method-1. It's indices point to blocks of 
rules listed in vector v. The idea is for criteria to 
point to their rules. Then it is possible to re-evaluate 
only those rules for which criteria truth values have 
changed. Once these rules are identified, the actual 
criteria checking occurs as in Algorithm-1. 
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY In practice, one 
or more sensor failures may lead to undetermined 
(uncertain) components of the raw data source vector 
s, which may lead to one or more unknown truth 
values in the criteria vector c. For every rule, one of 
three situations must hold at time-step t^ 
1) the truth value of all its criteria are known 
2) there are criteria with unknown truth values, but at 
least one of the known criteria fails to be satisfied 
3) all of the known criteria are satisfied, but there are 
still criteria of unknown truth value 
The first two situations are easily addressed, since it 
can be exactly determined whether or not the rule will 
fire. In the first case, the rule will fire or not 
depending on the truth value of its criteria. In the 
second case it will not fire. In the third situation, 
criteria with unknown truth values determine whether 
the rule will fire or not. It is possible to report a 
possible action by simply keeping count of the number 
of criteria that are unknown for the given rule. A 
possible action occurs if a rule's criteria are either 
True or Unknown. A confidence ratio may be 
computed by dividing the number of unkown-value 
criteria by the total number of criteria in the rule. 
IMPACT ON TRUST In their study, Lee and Moray 
[11] derived the following equation for predicting the 
amount of trust a human operator will have in 
embedded automated assistants: 
trust(t) =  0.570*trust(t-l) + 0.062*performance(t) - 
0.062*0.210*performance(t-1)  - 
0.740*fault(t) + 0.740*0.400*fault(t-l) 
where:    t    = time index 
t-1 = previous time index 
performance = % of top performance 
fault = % response error (Ex: operator sets 10 
rpm, system delivers 10 +/- fault rpm) 
trust = % of absolute trust 
Figure 3 shows this equation plotted for degraded 
performance when there is no observable fault. Figure 
4 shows this equation plotted for a maximum 100% 
error gradually increasing as performance degrades. 
While there is no room to show other plots, the 
authors have noted the following impact of fault on 
trust, as computed via the equation: 
a) fault size is the primary driver of trust loss 
b) the higher the fault size, the slower trust is 
recovered 
c) trust recovers to 100% once performance is 
restored and faults are eliminated 
d) the faster faultsize increases, the faster trust is lost 
e) trust builds quickly from an initial 0% if there are 
no faults and the system operates as expected 
These computations appear to propose that if the 
knowledge-based system described here were used to 
monitor errors and failures and if it were to call for 
human or automated recovery, then the severity and 
impact of those errors could be minimized. Thus, if 
one accepts the equation, trust would be enhanced. 
CLOSING COMMENTS One might comment that the 
techniques described here sound a lot like AND/OR 
logic that could be implemented in hardware or via 
traditional sequential code. This is true for specific 
and unchanging condition and decision cases. 
However, the complexity of construction in hardware 
and sequential code increases with the complexity of 
the conditions' specifications, especially conditions 
that are time dependent and based on combinations of 
samples from several sensors. With expert systems 
techniques, one need only fill in a spreadsheet 
implemented on a wordprocessor. This permits going 
from concept to reality very quickly. Figure 5 shows 
a top-level view of how the decision support capability 
introduced in this paper might be integrated into an 
embedded processing environment. 
The methods discussed in this paper are predictable 
because the underlying knowledgebases do not change 
during operation and they directly reflect the flight 
operations manuals. Thus, they arc predicated on 
procedures and concepts of operations with which 
humans arc familiar. They operate in real-time due to 
their parallel nature.   This parallel nature exists at all 
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levels of the design. The methods are flexible because 
tasks are spawned, deconflicted, and scheduled as 
needed during operation for on-time execution. They 
make no assumptions about the sequence of activities 
in the observed environment. The crew retains control 
because they can negate a task at any time and because 
the rule-base supports pre-mission and during-mission 
tailoring. (Any rule can contain criteria for crew- 
permission given pre- and during-mission.) One use 
of the ideas presented in this paper is that if the pilot 
fails to react to traditional cockpit cautionary signals 
concerning failure modes, the automation will begin to 
react, giving additional warnings and suggestions. In 
the long ran, this reaction could become a dynamic 
allocation of the remedy procedure from pilot to 
computer.  
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As Harvey [12] observed after the V-22 Osprey 
Tiltrotor crash, the operator must have timely and 
pertinent information to be aware of, and recover from, 
system malfunctions. If the operator cannot cope with 
the situation, the aircraft computers need sufficient 
tasking capability to take charge. This paper has 
introduced a scalable expert systems framework for 
accomplishing that end in a manner that builds trust. 
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CASE-BASED REASONING AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TROUBLESHOOTING: NEW 
SOLUTIONS FROM OLD 
R V Magaldi 
Information Management Research, AI Unit, British Airways Pic, Heathrow Airport, England 
Summary 
Knowledge-based approaches to the solution of aircraft 
maintenance problems have begun to gain acceptance 
within the airline business. The industry began several years 
ago by using Artificial Intelligence (AT) to address complex 
mamtenan<»arKlschedalMgproblems.Morerecently,focus 
has shifted to other important areas of engineering, such as 
system condition monitoring and failure diagnostics. 
However, questions have been raised as to the degree of trust 
that can be, or should be placed on the solutions and advice 
given by such systems, particularly in an arena where 
complex legislative, social, professional and ethical factors 
have to be accounted for. 
Case-basedreasoning(CBR)has recently emerged asagood 
candidate second generation technology, both to support 
ccn^lexsystemdiagrK)stic^particulariywhenaklinghuman 
decision making within time constrained operations and to 
overcome some of the earlier criticisms made against AI 
based approaches. However, anumberof humanfactorand 
technical issues still remain tobe resolvedbefore the apparent 
potential of CBR technology can be both accepted, and 
exploited within the airline industry. This paperemphasises 
some of the findings and lessons learned during CBR based 
work at British Airways, and also describes some of the 
authors emerging views of how such systems must be 
planned and developed in the future. 
Keywords: semantic memory, episodic memory, learning, 
case-based reasoning. 
Introduction. The complex and dynamic environment in 
which aircraft system faultfinding takes place shouldprovide 
anideal areaforthe applicationof Altechnology.particularly 
for the employment of knowledge-based systems. The 
operational basis of these resting on the human expert 
knowledge contained within them, and the manipulation of 
this to solve problems. Systems employing such techniques 
have already demonstrated their potential within other areas 
of industry and commerce where significant claims of 
increased operational efficiency and cost saving have been 
made. 
Given that these benefits are transferable, then there exists 
great potential for supporting and increasing profitable 
aircraft operations within the airline industry, whilst 
maintaining high standards of passenger service and 
operationalsafety. Knowledge-basedorexpert systems should 
as key drivers of this process, be well positioned to provide 
a wide range of intelligent decision support facilities to 
aircraft maintenance staff. However, the reality is that 
operational deployment such systems within airline 
engineering, have with certain exceptions been confined to 
maintenance planning and scheduling tasks [ 1] [2). 
If Albasedengineering support systems are showing growth 
and usage within other sectors [3], why have they received 
little attention or acceptance from within the airline 
engineering community?, when there seem to be such clear 
organisational and business advantages tobe gained through 
their use. The phenomenon is a complex one, and contains 
as many psychological, organisational and legalistic 
components as it does technical ones. Such factors can 
include: 
o Reluctance of individuals to share knowledge and 
experience. 
o View that maintenance manuals should be the only 
authoritative source for diagnostic procedures. 
o Fear that knowledge-based systems could make 
recommendations that run countertoo authorised working 
practices. 
o Problems of system ownership, and responsibilities for 
system maintenance. 
o Accc^mtarÄÜty.whotakestbeWameforerrorsandfailures 
in system output? 
This list is not exhaustive, but serves to highlight some of the 
major concerns that airline maintenance staff commonly 
express. 
Itis clear from these examples that the various Al technologies 
that we might wish to propose as solutions to particular 
maintenance engineering requirements, have more than just 
a technical impact Clearly, there are organisational and 
procjeduralfartorsthatmustbeaccountedforinanyproposals 
made. Technical solutions being fielded must harmonise 
with both human and organisational expectations, or lie 
rejected. 
AI for Engineering at British Airways. Until quite 
recently, British Airways has been investigating and 
evaluating a broad spectrum of potential AI tedmology 
application areas [4], including avionics, engine condition 
[8] and aircraft performance monitoring, Ftg 1. Particular 
emphasis was made during this period, of isolating those 
areas of a high potential return on investment coupled with 
a similar likelihood of technology acceptance by the targeted 
user community. General organisational advantages to be 
55 
gained through the employment of AI based solutions were 
identified and communicated throughout the engineering 
community. These included: 
o Knowledge as an engineering-wide resource. 
o  Wicteravailabmtyofexpertknowledgetolesse3q)erienced 
staff. 
o   Less vulnerability of the company to fluctuations in 
expert availability. 
These concepts were widely supported by engineering 
management, andhavebeenattheheartofanyAItecbnoIogy 
initiatives to date. Initial study findings indicated great 
potential existed for the application of AI technology to 
aircraft system and component failure diagnostics. 
Vari<>usrOTgrarrmieshavesirK»beenc()nstiu<^dsmceaien 
to investigate the utility of particular AI approaches as aids 
to component fault finding and repair. Three diagnostic 
paradigms were considered and evaluated during this time. 
These were as follows: 
o Rule-based 
o Model-based 
o Case-based 
These alternatives werefoundtopossess various strengths as 
well as weaknesses, many of which were technology based 
For example, rule-based systems were recognised as being 
useful in situations where lots of reliable diagnostic 
information was available, and they offered a low cost 
approach to many engineering requirements. They were 
found to be good at representing the semantic content of a 
domain, but were poor at handling episodic features. 
In psychological terms, semantic memory can be described 
as staining those facts that we know about the world, with 
these an^gedmsomehieraKMcalmaririer.Ttieseiristances, 
although complied from experience do not however, have 
much to say about our actual experiences of the world. 
Life experiences, or scenarios are encoded in episodic 
memory. These consist of many facts or instances, which 
form relationships according to their co-occurrence in the 
same life episode, the use of facts varying according to 
particular stuational contexts. The inability of basic rale- 
basedsystemstomakeeffidentuseofoMitexWalinfc^mation 
was found to limit their potential as good decision support 
platforms within contextually rich decision making 
environments. 
Model-based approaches seemed to offer deeper ways of 
representing domain knowledge, andbecause of this, gave a 
muchricherenvironment forreasoningandproblem solving. 
However, it was quickly recognised that a large investment 
of both time and money would be necessary to model 
candidate components orsystems. Coupled with this was the 
uncertainty in many instances, of what system features to 
model, and to what level. For example, in the case of a jet 
engine, do you use a gas-path model, a vibrational model or 
a structural materials model ? Obviously, all of these could 
be used, either individually or in combination. However, 
suchmodels take time to develop and validate, althoughmay 
have the potential of high eventual return on investment 
when completed. 
Case-based reasoning, although fairly new as an established 
AI technology seemed to show promise as a candidate 
environment for the rapid development of engineering 
operations support systems. The technology seemedcapable 
of handling fuzzy queries, displaying rudimentary learning 
characteristics and having available, rich data indexing and 
search mechanisms. The potential to build realisable 
engineering decision support systems within short time 
scales was quickly appreciated, not just by AI development 
staff but also by engineering customers ! There were a 
number of reasons for this: 
o Technology was commercially available off-the-shelf. 
o Software was weU supported, and first class consultancy 
available. 
o Minimal knowledge engineering input required from 
engineering staff(when compared with other AI 
approaches). 
o No (lataAnformation/knowledge is thrown away. 
o Case-based reasoning has an intuitive appeal to most 
maintenance engineers, i.e., "have I seen this problem 
before r. 
o Data/mformaticn/knowled^eheldmacase-basechanges 
in step with the real world. 
Principal of all of the above was the minimal intrusion 
expected during knowledge engineering stage, as already 
suggested maintenance engineers seldom have the time to 
ctevotetoextensrvebwwledgeengineeringexercises. Access 
to experts is often a major difficulty when attempting 
systems development work in operational situations, and is 
madeimpossible by thehckofccmmitmeottothings outside 
established operational goals [5]. 
Tune and opportunity fordevelopment are rare commodities 
in dynamic business environments, particularly within the 
airlinebusiness. Windows of opportunilyhave tobe exploited 
without delay, whilst maintaining high standards of customer 
service and operational safety. Things that get in the way of 
these commitments are given little support. 
Forthese reasons it was decided to move forward with case- 
basedtechnologyasapossibleplatform for future engineering 
decision support, particularly in the areas of system, and 
component failure analysis rule andmodcl-based approaches 
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being reserved for nicbe applications. 
Rememberiny from F.Tnwience. When dealing with the 
real world we rarely have the opportunity to reason in any 
theoretical sense about the various possible ways that we 
could behave within given situations. Instead wesbort circuit 
this process, and instead rely on our previous experiences of 
the world to guide us. In this sense, we both adopt and adapt 
what wehave previously learned, andrefertothis knowledge 
when dealing with new circumstances. 
For example, airline operating schedules require that swift 
and efficient problem rectification takes place after aircraft 
defects are reported, if expensive delays are to be avoided. In 
such cases, the maintenance engineer is very likely in 
addition to the use of maintenance manuals, to apply deep 
insights gained from experience, and through this, gauge the 
utility of certain diagnostic approaches, or assess the merits 
ofparticularmaintenance actions. That person is likely to ask 
questions such as "have I seen this problem before 7", and "if 
I have, what did I do about it ?". 
However, the balance of this type of experience combined 
with good diagnostic ability within the engineering 
community can be extremely variable due to a variety of 
factors. Theseinclude, staff inexperience, theintroduction of 
new technology, shift rotations, holidays, etc. ft would be 
extremely helpful under these circumstances to be able to 
have a repository of positive experiences, good engineering 
fixes to problems, or recovery procedures. If a particular 
technology such as CBRis able to support theserequirements, 
then aircraft can be efficiently maintained, and departure 
delays due to engineering problems minimised. 
Case-Based Reasoning What is it?. CBR has a number 
of inspirational sources, including Machine Learning and 
Natural Language research. Much of the theoretical woric 
being laid down and carried out by R. Schänk, who's 
pioneering work on memory and learning has given rise to 
much of the vocabulary, and theoretical underpinning's of 
the subject [5] [6]. Agooddefinitionofcase-basedreasoning 
is as follows: 
" A Case-based reasoner solves new problems by adapting 
solutions mat were used to solve oldproblems" C Reisbeck 
&R. Schänk [6] 
As previously mentioned, human problem solvers often rely 
on previous experience to guide thinking and reasoning 
when encountering new or unfamiliar situations. The 
problem-solver recalls previously stored cases (events) and 
decides how similar or dissimilar these are to some current 
problem. If the previous case, or cases provide any insight 
then the problem solver tries to solve the present case using 
strategies known to have been effective in the past 
On the other hand, if in solving the new problem, the 
problem-solver finds that past cases are different thenlearning 
will take place by a process of adapting features of the old 
cases, and using these, construct a new case for problem 
solving. If the newly constructed case succeeds, then it is 
stored for future reference. 
From a computational point of view, CBR refers to a number 
of interacting concepts and techniques (e.g., statistical pattern 
recognition [Nearest Neighbour NN, Classification and 
Regression Trees CART] algorithms, and data structures I 
that can be used to record, sort, index and retrieve cases, fa 
addition, repair piocednres are available for case modification 
(equivalent of hypothesis testing). 
In summary, modem CBR theory is derived from research 
and understanding of certain human memory processes. and 
is based on the fo&owing assumptions: 
o Memory is episodic 
o Memory is dynamic 
o Memory is richry indexed 
o Learning is triggered by failure 
o Experience guides reasoning 
These memory features give way to higher level memory 
strategies that are used to deal with the various situational 
complexMesencxwnteredintbeworld. Strategiestodowith: 
o 'Lazy'model oftheDram-rXm'tdofundamentalproblem 
solving unless it is really necessary. 
o Reminding - "Have I seen this feature before?". 
o Reusing old solutions, perhaps with modification. 
Taking the above into account then we can fonualise CBR 
problem handing as a step by step process, with certain 
features being common to any CBR system, regardless of the 
technology base. Particular CBR technologies use different 
algorithms and types of data structure, but have similar ends 
in mind The essence of CBR can be expressed in the 
following steps: 
o Assess problem and locate key features. 
o Use key features to see if we can remember any similar 
situations. 
o Take the solution that was successful last time and try and 
re-apply it 
o If it works, fine. Take no further action 
o If procedure fetus, modify it and try again 
o When a modified solution works, store it as a new case. 
o After several experiences, generalise the case. 
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How to Find a Case. Various strategies can be adopted to 
index and through this retrieve cases. The following are 
fairly typical of those found in commercial CBR tools: 
o Nearest Neighbour or NN - Similarity scoring using 
weights. 
o Inductive-AmomaticaUygeiMratedbinary-treeirjdexmg. 
o Knowledge-Based - Causal model to guide binary-tree 
generatioa 
o Template - Discrimination network of database query- 
like filters. 
CBR System Development The steps concerned with CBR 
development are reasonably straight forward The largest 
overhead being that of the initial problem analyses, coupled 
with case construction and data entry. Initial case indexing 
being dependent on factors such as the number of cases, and 
the complexity of retrievals required. Tuning of the case- 
base is an iterative procedure that continues until satisfactory 
levels of matching and retrieval performances are gained. 
Generally, the more cases «hat are available the greater 
degree of accuracy that will be achieved on any retrieval 
request. As nTOrecasesbecwmeavaUabkstorageandretrieval 
strategies can be switched, say from a nearest neighbour 
approach to induction, if available in the particular CBR tool 
being used. Adaption or repair facilities also allow for the 
testing and storage of new cases. 
CompnrisonwirtiOrtwrTt'dinologies. Case-basedsvstems 
are often compared with relational database technology, and 
this often gives rise to suggestions about their similarities, 
and these give rise to comments such as " the technologies 
seem to be doing the same thing", or "I can do that with my 
relational database". These comments rest on particular 
features of the two technologies that are similar, but only to 
a point The following highlight some of those differences: 
o Case-Based Systems: 
- Support to fuzzy queries 
- Rich indexing, support to repair rules 
o Relational Databases: 
- No support for fuzzy queries 
- No support for repair rules 
- No induction based indexing 
When to Consider CBR. Clearly CBR isn't a panacea for 
all o f the ills of Al technology within the airline maintenance 
arena, there are situations whenothertechnologies are going 
to be more attractive as solution generators. Often several of 
these linked, are going to provide the basis for a robust 
solutioa Experience to date has shown that CBR is more 
clearly fitted to supporting certain engineering situations 
than others. Features that can guide assessment of CBR 
suitability are as follows: 
o Where you have a lot of historical data. 
o Where you need to extract order from complex data. 
o Where experts talk in examples. 
o Where there are lots ofexceptions to rules. 
o Where the organisation needs to deliver consistent 
decisions. 
o Where experience is as valuable as text book knowledge. 
CBR Tfchwoloyv! Conclusions. Initial technology 
assessment at British Airways has shown that CBR has a set 
of inbuilt capabilities that complement a specific range of 
engineering problems. These are by nature, often more than 
just technical in origin, and require an awareness of many 
competing human, organisational and operational factors 
when posing solutions. Benefits that CBR can bring to this 
arena can be summarised as follows: 
o Ihtutövefedandunderstarxlmgofthe 
developers and users. 
o Complements human thinking, reasoning and problem 
sorving styles. 
o Nothmgisölscardctdl-wejustirKfexondifierentpartsof 
what we store. 
Cnsrf in»; Hw-Biwil Engineering Diaynrntk*. Part of 
the British Airways case-based technology assessment 
programme has been concerned with Caseline, a first 
generation technology demonstrator.builttoexploresomeof 
the cjfjeratiooalperfbnnance requirements of an engineering 
diagnostic support system. The current system has the 
capabih^toaidBc«ng747-4(X)technicalsupporter^ttieers 
with aircraft fault diagnosis and rectification between 
aircraft arrival and departure. It can advise on past defects 
and associated recovery and repair procedures known from 
previous experience to be successful. 
Use of the faculty does not replace the obligation of the 
technical support engineer to referto maintenance manuals, 
or the obligation to work to authorised procedures. These 
being very important principles, and should be taken into 
account when considering any type of computerised decision 
support to aircraft maintenance. 
The Caseline system consists of a simple interface by which 
the user can input diagnostic information, and control the 
search for available repair and recovery information. At the 
core of the faculty are a number of defect cases «currently 
about 200), these describe previous failure instances and 
contain details of successful recovery actions. Cases are 
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constructed using a number of different infoimatioa fields, 
these having particular weight vectors which are used for 
case-matching during case retrieval. 
Three main search modes are available: 
o ATA chapter 
o EICAS Message 
o Reported Defect 
These can be used singularly or in concert to achieve a case 
retrieval, Information to be used can be entered as upper or 
lower case, and be alphanumeric or plain text Pure ATA 
searches being a simple two digit number, BECAS messages 
being precise, but variable length alphanumeric text, and 
Reported Defects being variable length word strings. 
Retrievals are guided by a number of internal mechanisms 
thatcontributeto anearestneighboarclasaficationinductive 
guided search for cases, or both. 
It is usual for either a single or a number of cases to be 
retrieved depending on whether "exact", or "partial" case 
matching has taken place. These can then be assessed and 
used according to their likely advantage. 
In operation, the system assists the Technical Support 
Engineer with the retrieval of known, but often obscure 
defects. These have a number of often complex underlying 
but inconsistent causes. Caseline aids the engineer in 
advising others, as to what procedures will have nie highest 
likelihoodofsuccesstarecth^garanlt 
obligated to use the aircraft maintenance manuals as a final 
authority, as well as following approved maintenance 
procedures, but can avoid costly delays by catting out less 
productive routes to fault analysis, and fault finding. 
Conclusion« f ***nn* 1 -earned. Primary lessons that have 
been learnedand assimilated during the British Airways AI 
for Engineering study are as follows: 
o First-line users of the technology as well as a manager 
must champion technology acceptance. 
o Individualchampionsoftechndogyhaveashorthfetime 
they move to other jobs, hence a need to act quickly and 
demonstrate success. 
o Need to recognise the background, organisational and 
human issues that impact on technology acceptance. 
o 'Trojan Horse" technologies are vital to the customer 
confidence building and acceptance process (e.g.. Case- 
based reasoning) if more radical technologies/solutions 
are to be understood and accepted by end users. 
o CBR technology has to integrate well with or via other 
technologies such as databases, local area networks, user 
interface design took and other operational systems. 
o Performance is a big issue, speed of case retrieval is vital 
in time-constrained situations. 
Clearly there must be a continuous champion from the user 
community of whatever technology solution is being fielded, 
if that person is absent then project support will wane unless 
there is widespread acceptance of the proposal and aims from 
toptobottomoftrjeuserorgamsationtthisisageneralLsation. 
there are obviously exceptions). The user must also see an 
obvious link between what is being proposed and the impact 
direcdyonjobsandoperatingefficiency. Technology should 
not intrude, or add additional tasks, andsbould not force the 
user adorXunfarniliar or uncomfortable procedures. Finally, 
the technology should as far as possible reflect and support 
the decision making styles of the users, and organisational 
dynamics. Compliance in these areas will give rise to greater 
receptiveness and acceptance of AI technologies such as 
CBR, particularly within the airline maintenance industry. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes the research undertaken by the 
KBS Group within Aircraft Sector at Defence 
Research Agency Farnborough, UK. The focus of 
activity is the development of tools and techniques 
required to design real-time airborne tactical Decision 
Support Systems based on KBS technology. 
Automated knowledge acquisition and design for 
KBS using the KADS methodology is presented, 
together with more analytical techniques aimed 
towards the elicitation of experts' tactical situation 
assessment. A generic top-level KBS design for real- 
time KBS decision aids is proposed, implemented in 
DMUSE, a KBS shell optimised for real-time 
performance and distributable across multiple 
processors. 
1       Introduction 
The definition used in this paper of a real-time tactical 
decision aid is something which improves the 
effectiveness of an expert in making decisions and 
performing tasks under time-pressured conditions. Such 
tasks are varied, from fire-fighting, process control, 
command and control to airborne tactical decision aids. 
The technologies that can be employed to improve 
decision making are also varied, including altering 
standard operating procedures, improving training and 
modifying the information presented to the expert 
decision-maker. One technology which can offer a large 
improvement to the decision-making process is that of 
expert systems, or the more widely defined Knowledge 
Based Systems (KBS). 
The important difference between Decision Support 
Systems (DSS) and conventional KBS is their emphasis 
on working with an expert operator, not just for them or 
without them. In many domains, some tasks performed by 
human experts cannot be emulated by software as 
effectively, due to the expert's skills, knowledge, 
experience, perception and flexibility, which by their 
nature are difficult to specify and encode. The role of a 
DSS is to aid the operator, acknowledging the limitations 
of KBS. whilst exploiting their properties. Such aid 
includes the reduction of operator workload by 
performing low-level tasks, improving the operator's 
situation assessment, monitoring task performance as well 
as proposing solutions. This requires an understanding of 
the working practices of the operator at a cognitive level 
and structuring the requirements for the DSS around a 
deep understanding of the operator's expertise. Such an 
understanding can only be achieved through the extensive 
use of Knowledge Acquisition (KA) methods, the classic 
bottle-neck of KBS. 
Knowledge Based Systems are an attempt to encapsulate 
and emulate on a computer, some aspects of the ability of 
a human expert to perform tasks. Expertise can be 
encoded in a number of ways in these systems, although 
they are most readily characterised by their use of rules 
and heuristics as knowledge representations. These 
systems can improve the decision-making process either 
by replacing or de-skilling the human operators or aiding 
them by proposing solutions. 
However, in many domains, some tasks performed by 
human experts cannot be emulated by software as 
effectively, due to experts' skills, knowledge, experience, 
perception and flexibility, which by their nature are 
difficult to specify and encode. The solution often adopted 
by KBS is to assume that a system working with the 
operator, producing imperfect advice is better than the 
operator performing tasks unaided. Such a result was 
reached by DRA in developing a prototype Airborne Anti- 
Submarine Warfare (ASW) KBS advisor. KBS is 
employed in the role of Decision Support Systems and the 
applications described are tactics advisors for use by the 
commander (Observer/TACCO) in a future ASW/ASuW 
aircraft. [Howells and Bickerton. 1994] 
This situation is far from ideal and experience in 
progressing the ASW advisor closer to an operational 
system, and the development of a prototype Airborne 
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) KBS advisor has led to the 
conclusion that effective operational KBS advisors will 
need to integrate the operator more fully into the KBS's 
own decision-making process and to provide aid to all of 
the cognitive activities involved in expert operator 
decision-making. Decision Support Systems are 
considered essential as the only means of ensuring the 
commander retains control of the proceedings rather than 
a total reliance on automated decision systems. 
This requirement brings together the Software 
Engineering disciplines of real-time software 
development and the psychological aspects of expert 
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operator decision making and modelling. Bridging (he 
traditionally wide gap between A.I. and Psychology. 
This paper describes the research undertaken by the KBS 
group at DRA Farnborough to improve real-time KBS 
decision aids, tackling the problem from three aspects: 
real-time KBS shell improvements, KBS application 
design developments and especially Knowledge 
Acquisition - the classical bottleneck of KBS and an 
increasingly important area if expert operator decision- 
making is to be understood and incorporated into 
operational KBS advisors. 
2       KBS Components 
The technologies behind a real-time KBS advisor can be 
split under three main headings: 
- The hardware and software infrastructure on which a 
KBS is built. 
- The structural design of the KBS application. 
- The knowledge acquisition and design process involved 
in producing the KBS application. 
One of the problems associated with real-time KBS is 
their comparatively slow execution speed, inherent in 
complex heuristic and knowledge representations like 
rules and frames. One way to overcome this, aside from 
converting systems from rule-based languages to high- 
level procedural languages like Ada, is to increase the 
number of processors used in the hardware architecture on 
which the KBS is based. Unfortunately KBS languages, 
shells or toolkits tend to be suited to single processor 
systems, allowing communication paths to other programs 
or other KBS but not directly employing the concept of a 
KBS distributed across several processors and networked 
computer platforms. This requirement formed the basis 
for the development of DMUSE, a distributed version of 
MUSE, a real-time KBS toolkit funded by the KBS group. 
There are a number of structural paradigms from which to 
design KBS. MUSE employs a blackboard architecture, 
providing a flexible way of organising rule structures into 
semi-autonomous processes, activating when relevant 
information becomes available. DMUSE uses the 
mirroring of blackboard databases, objects and object 
methods across a network to achieve the effect of a large 
single KBS. 
A particular design, involving separate Situation 
Assessment. Planning and Plan Execution modules is 
currently being developed which is well suited to real- 
time decision support. This design provides aid to an 
expert operator in both situation assessment and planning 
activities. It has been derived from a similar structure 
currently implemented in a prototype airborne ASuW 
Advisor, incorporating 9 processors on a network of 6 
computer workstations, all implemented in DMUSE. 
Detailed specifications for KBS Advisors are inherently 
difficult to generate due to the complex nature of expert 
knowledge and the open-ended requirements of decision 
aiding. The Knowledge Acquisition process has the task 
of both generating the requirements for a KBS and 
eliciting the expert knowledge to be embodied in the 
KBS. This is a complex and time-consuming process, 
often termed the classical bottleneck of KBS. and research 
has been undertaken to alleviate this bottleneck by 
developing automated techniques to formalise the process. 
Interactive real-time KBS requires a detailed 
understanding of expert operator decision-making under 
time pressure in order to function effectively and the 
incorporation of decision-making theories and their 
associated knowledge acquisition strategics should 
provide the depth of understanding necessary to both 
describe and encapsulate the information and processes 
involved. 
3       Real-Time KBS Decision Aid Structure 
Functional commonality exists between real-time tactical 
KBS decision aids for different application domains. A 
common top-level design for these systems has been 
sought, which would take advantage of DMUSE's multi- 
process structure, and provide an effective means of 
giving KBS support to operator decision-making. Figure 1 
shows the main elements of a proposed generic structure 
for a real-time KBS tactical decision aid: 
ENVIRONMENT 
Figure 1 
This structure contains two main processes; Situation 
Assessment (SA) and Plan Generation. Aid to an expert 
operator is provided by the activities of both of these 
processes. This is in contrast to many KBS decision aids 
which either concentrate on aiding operator situation 
assessment through automated data fusion, or aiding 
operator planning by suggesting viable plans. The 
problem with SA KBS is that the operator's own SA is 
coloured by their plans and goals, which may be difficult 
for the operator to input to the KBS and be appreciated 
only to a limited extent by the SA KBS. Thus a mismatch 
between operator and SA KBS will occur. The SA process 
in this structure overcomes this by having access to both 
the current plan and the expectations and assumptions 
inherent in the plan. This concept works most effectively 
when the KBS produces its own plans, incorporating 
expectations and assumptions within each plan action. 
Operator input to the system is by entering SA 
information, entering/modifying plans or by 
entering/modifying expectations and assumptions about 
the tactical situation. This design relies heavily on a 
detailed understanding of operator decision-making and 
effective knowledge acquisition. 
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This poses many design decisions best described by an 
example: 
Many KBS advisors provide aid to Ihe operator by 
attempting to solve the operator's tasks autonomously. 
These systems may cither generate plans when requested 
by the operator or automatically when the system deems 
another plan necessary. 
The Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare KBS Tactical Aid 
(ASW TACAID) currently under development by the 
KBS group is an example of a planning oriented system. 
It is typical in allowing operators to request a plan to be 
generated by the KBS, which produces a sequence of plan 
actions. The operator is given an explanation as to why 
the plan is applicable and is requested to 
accept/reject/modify the plan. In progressing TACAID 
closer to an operational system it was noted that 
performance improvements to the planning rule-base 
could only come from a better representation of the 
tactical situation, a representation closer to that used by an 
expert operator. The ASW domain, as represented on a 
graphical tactical display is spatial and highly complex. 
To interpret this spatial domain in a similar way to an 
expert operator requires access to all the information 
available to the operator. The tactical display information 
is available to the planning rule-base, but the operator's 
expectations and assumptions are not. 
The current ASW rule-base is structured procedurally, 
with rules arranged hierarchically under particular tactics, 
intermixing both situation assessment and planning rules. 
By using the proposed generic structure, splitting situation 
assessment away from planning, and including explicit 
representations of expectations and assumptions as input 
information to SA, together with their incorporation in 
generated plans, it is hoped that this KBS can be 
developed into an effective decision support system. 
However, this process relies on a detailed knowledge 
acquisition effort to elicit the situation assessment and 
planning activities of an expert ASW operator, how these 
can be represented in KBS form, what role in decision- 
making the KBS will play and how the operator will 
interact with the final system. Greater emphasis has been 
placed on knowledge acquisition for the SA component of 
the system, since improvements to planning can only 
proceed with a tactical representation nearer to that used 
by an expert operator. 
The ASW KBS knowledge acquisition effort has 
benefited from the use of the earlier version of TACAID 
as a data gathering and interviewing tool. This has 
enabled the use of analytical techniques to examine 
operator SA within this complex spatial environment. 
An initial prototype Airborne Anti-Surface Warfare KBS 
Tactical Aid is currently being developed, based around a 
design similar to that of the generic real-time KBS 
structure. It did not benefit from an earlier prototype, 
making analytical techniques difficult to apply. Instead, 
formal methods based on the European KADS design 
methodology have been used, and early indications are 
that knowledge elicited from the domain experts transfers 
well into both SA and planning processes. 
4       Knowledge Acquisition 
This section describes three different approaches to 
knowledge acquisition, linked by the common goal of 
producing a real-time KBS of the structure described 
earlier. Each attempts to bridge the gap between the 
software engineering concerns of producing a software 
system which aids expert operators, and the psychological 
concerns of how expert operators perform tasks and thus 
how best to support them with KBS technology. 
4.1      Tool Supported Knowledge Acquisition using 
KADS KA Methodology 
In order to reduce the considerable amount of time taken 
in the KA process for complex real-time KBS, one of the 
solutions was to automate the process of knowledge 
elicitation, assimilation and implementation into KBS 
software. An automated KA toolkit was chosen, called 
ProtoKEW, which was based on the ESPRIT funded 
KADS (Knowledge Acquisition and Documentation 
Structuring) [Wielinga et al.. 1992] KBS knowledge 
acquisition and design methodology. This was interfaced, 
via a translator, into the MUSE KBS toolkit - as a target 
implementation environment. This method was evaluated 
through the design and implementation of the ASuW KBS 
advisor project. The KADS KBS design methodology 
advocates the use of 'Interpretation Models' to describe 
expert decision making. These models attempt to 
represent the processes involved in certain types of 
problem-solving, such as diagnosis or classification. 
These models guide the knowledge acquisition process to 
populate and instantiate the relevant interpretation model. 
The ASuW KBS uses two directive models. Situation 
Assessment and Planning. KADS also divides expert 
knowledge into 4 separate types or layers, further 
partitioning and structuring the knowledge acquisition 
process. These layers are:- 
Domain Layer, which describes entities in the 
expert's environment. 
Inference Layer, which describes simple inferences 
which can be made about entities. 
Task Layer, which groups the inferences into 
structures which tackle the various activities performed by 
the expert 
Strategy Layer, which determines when a switch in 
task ordering should be made to adapt to changes in the 
situation. 
4.2    Analytical Methods for Situation Assessment KA 
The formal methods used to develop the prototype ASuW 
KBS Advisor were sufficient to produce an initial KBS. 
Experience in progressing an ASW KBS Advisor from 
this prototype stage has shown the need for a more 
analytical approach to KA. The ASW domain, as 
presented to an expert operator, is a complex spatial 
environment from which time-pressured decisions are 
made. Expert operators' perception of tactical situations in 
this domain is key to determining correct plan actions, but 
experts find the expression of this perception in the detail 
necessary for a KBS implementation difficult, if not 
impossible. It was found that most of the deficiencies of 
the prototype ASW KBS Advisor were attributable to a 
poor representation of the tactical situation. In order to 
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remedy this, and to increase integration between expert 
operator and KBS decision aiding, analytical KA 
techniques were used to elicit the properties of an ASW 
expert's perception of tactical situations, through the 
performance of an easily measurable task. The following 
analytical techniques were used, namely Repertory Grid 
(Tor analysis more than clicitalion). Machine Learning 
(Induction) and Principal Component Analysis. 
At present, output from these analytical techniques has 
been used to refine the parameter measurements used to 
describe the ASW tactical environment. Several revisions 
of these parameters have been made, each followed by a 
number of trial sorties with expert operators. Increased 
understanding of the ASW operators' interpretation of 
tactical situations has resulted in additional methods of 
providing aid from the Situation Assessment activity of 
the ASW Advisor system, not exclusively tied to using 
KBS techniques. It is hoped that these analytical methods 
will generalise to progress other decision aids, such as the 
ASuW Advisor beyond the initial prototype stage. 
4.2.1   Repertory Grid and Principal Component 
Analysis for Situation Assessment KA 
Repertory grids are derived from personal construct 
theory [Kelly, 1955]. This technique is a free-form recall 
and rating session in which the Knowledge Engineer 
makes inferences about the relationships among objects or 
elements, and the dimensions or constructs that the expert 
uses when describing the objects. 
It should be noted that Repertory Grid as described here 
has been used for multi-dimensional scaling and grouping, 
rather than for its primary role as an attribute elicitation 
and entity differentiation tool [Fransella and Bannister, 
1977]. 
Several snapshots were taken during a simulated ASW 
sortie and various parameters were recorded for each 
sonobuoy within these snapshots, together with the 
operator's decision to monitor them (a reflection of their 
tactical importance to the operator at a particular instant). 
Each sonobuoy (of 2 types, L and D) is labelled by a 
number, which is used to identify them on a hardcopy of 
the tactical display visible to the operator at the time of 
the snapshot. 
Repertory Grid uses this data to group related parameters 
and similar sonobuoys. displaying this information as 
dendrograms. Figure 2 shows the parameter dendrogram. 
This shows (for instance) the close relationship between 
the Cone of Courses - 'Inside coc?". and the monitoring 
decision 'Monitored'. 
The dendrogram of elements is shown in Figure 3. This 
visualisation of the analysis was presented to the expert, 
together with the relevant scenario snapshot. From this, 
further knowledge was acquired. For example, the expert 
saw a strong correlation between the groups of elements 
(buoys) shown on the dendrograms, which corresponded 
to their positions relative to one another. This connection 
had not been apparent from the numerical data. These 
connections are illustrated by the groupings shown in an 
extract of the relevant snapshot (Figure 4). 
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Extract from a Scenario Snapshot 
(Annotated to show buoy groupings from clement 
dendrogram) 
Shows the perceptual structure within a tactical sonobuoy 
barrier, highlighted by Repertory Grid 
Centre 
Group 
Edge Group 
Figure 4 
Principal Component Analysis is a numerical technique 
which takes the measured parameters, describing each 
sonobuoy in an N dimensional space, and collapses them 
down into two dimensions chosen such that the sonobuoys 
are widely spread within those dimensions. This has the 
effect of highlighting regularities within the sonobuoys, 
grouping some and differentiating others. The technique 
takes the same type of data as Repertory Grid, giving 
comparable results. Figure 5 shows an annotated diagram 
of the sonobuoys from the Repertory Grid data. 
Monitored sonobuoys are shown in larger text. The 
monitored yes/no parameter has been removed - otherwise 
sonobuoy monitoring status would be very easy to 
differentiate in the diagram! 
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Difficulties in separating monitored from not-monitored 
sonobuoys in the diagram are a reflection of the 
inadequacy of the spatial representation described by the 
parameters to predict expert monitoring decisions. 
4.3      KA Interview Technique 
KA technique is differentiated from KA methodology. 
Methodology provides organisation and structure for the 
process of knowledge acquisition. However, in any 
subjective process like KA. the skills and experience of 
the practitioner, in this case the knowledge engineer, are 
of direct importance. Although methods such as KADS 
provide guidance on what types of information are 
required to instantiate a developing knowledge base, this 
guidance may not be enough to acquire the cognitively 
deep reasoning behind expert behaviour which is so 
necessary to complex decision aids such as the envisaged 
operational ASuW and ASW systems. 
One technique in particular has been used successfully to 
produce or improve non-KBS decision aids. Gary Klein 
has developed a model of time-pressured expert decision 
making, called Recognition Primed Decision Theory 
(RPD) [Klein and Calderwood, 1991]. It stresses the roles 
of areas such as situation assessment, mental simulation 
of earlier events and future event expectancies in expert 
decisions. It emphasises the recognition component of 
expert decision making in which experts recognise 
situations as being similar to past situations and remember 
the associated solution. While the whole RPD model is 
described by a flowchart-like representation of activities, 
much like a KADS Directive Model, it hides a complexity 
within these activities (such as 'Mental Simulation') 
which makes it a difficult model to use as a basis for a 
KBS implementation. One aspect of the model, that of the 
recognition component, has been used as the basis of 
Case-Based Reasoning KBS, since the act of recognition 
and associating a solution is similar to that of matching 
previously stored cases to situations, associating particular 
solutions or types of aid to the operator. Such a system 
has been developed by Noble [1989]. 
However, Cased-Based KBS techniques are limited in 
scope and may not be directly applicable to all the 
activities required of a KBS decision aid. Instead, the 
model's use of expectations and assumptions, together 
with an emphasis towards expert situation assessment 
make it applicable to the generic real-time KBS structure 
described earlier. Klein has developed an interview 
technique based around the RPD view of decision 
making, called Critical Decision Method (CDM). It is 
proposed that this, or other related critical incident-based 
interview methods could be used to increase 
understanding of expert situation assessment and problem 
solving beyond that achievable through the use of KADS. 
CDM uses critical incidents in an expert's experience to 
understand expert decision making. The technique 
facilitates the acquisition of the cognitive requirements of 
a task or skill, rather than just the expert's resultant 
behaviour. CDM takes an expert back through a critical 
incident, outlining decision points, information available, 
expectations and assumptions. By asking particular probe 
questions within this detailed description of the incident, 
the  expert  finds  it  easier  to  express  the   implicit 
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information behind their decisions. The hypothesis is that 
the results can be generalised to explain expert behaviour 
in more common, perhaps less critical scenarios. 
It is the ability of CDM to bring out this implicit 
information that makes it applicable as a technique for the 
further development of KBS decision aids. Unfortunately, 
neither RPD or CDM are directly aimed at KA for KBS, 
but it should be possible to adapt CDM for the generic 
real-time KBS structure, to elicit the knowledge required 
for the Situation Assessment module, the expectations and 
assumptions represented within the structure, and perhaps 
more importantly to determine how the resulting KBS can 
best provide aid to the operator. 
5       Conclusion 
The research reported to date has gone a long way to 
redressing the imbalance between the comprehensive 
means of representing expertise by the use of the DMUSE 
real-time distributed software toolkit and the limited 
capability of the means of capturing the requisite 
knowledge and expertise. The ASuW KBS Advisor 
project has proven the concept of using a knowledge 
acquisition toolkit to design and partially implement (via a 
translator) a real-time KBS, reducing the knowledge 
acquisition bottleneck of KBS development. The KADS 
methodology has been used successfully to structure both 
the knowledge acquisition activity and the elicited 
knowledge, using the Directive Models paradigm and the 
four layer knowledge structure. Whilst this technique is 
capable of producing initial prototypes, decision aid 
applications of the complexity envisaged for operational 
ASuW and ASW systems necessitate the additional use of 
analytical techniques to more completely understand and 
encapsulate an operator's situation assessment and 
decision-making behaviour. 
Use of the KADS methodology and automated tools needs 
to be supplemented by interview techniques such as 
CDM, which should be adaptable to the KBS 
development process. 
A generalised form of the design of the ASuW KBS 
Advisor is proposed as a generic structure for real-time 
KBS decision aids. It provides aid to the operator from 
both Planning and Situation Assessment activities. The 
current ASW Advisor (TACAID) is being redesigned 
using the generic structure. Expansion of its situation 
assessment has progressed using analytical techniques, 
producing results which were not apparent from the 
earlier use of conventional expert interviews. 
Importance is placed on developing an accurate 
representation of operator Situation Assessment, to allow 
a closer integration between decision aid and operator, 
and to supply well structured information to KBS 
planning activities. 
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1 SUMMARY 
Future decision support systems will require more intelligent 
processing capabilities to increase their effectiveness. Knowledge 
Based Systems offer an attractive solution to meet these decision 
support roles however, two fundamental problems exist in the 
knowledge acquisition process which is a key element in their 
design. The first concerns making best use of contact time with 
experts, the second relates to the lack of direct expertise in the 
operation of future, non-mature systems. 
REKAP, a knowledge acquisition methodology, offers a solution 
to these problems through the use of structured analysis and pre- 
defined models of problem solving inferences. The methodology 
is discussed in this paper, in particular its value in overcoming 
the lack of direct knowledge of future system capabilities. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
Real time decision support systems (RTDS) of the future will be 
characterised by the following trends which highlight the need for 
more intelligent processing: 
increasing quantities of data will be provided by sensors and 
other sources. 
this data will require more involved and detailed interpretation, 
there will be reduced time available in which to respond to 
incoming data. 
Such RTDS will be required to deliver greater throughput, quality 
and consistency than existing systems. This performance 
improvement from RTDS will be accompanied by improved or 
new sensors to meet less well defined operational scenarios. 
In order to prevent an increase in operator workload, indeed to 
reduce workload to a more acceptable level, and to achieve the 
required levels of system performance increasingly sophisticated 
Decision Support will be required. 
In developing an RTDS to support the human crew a key 
element will be to ensure that the human and machine elements 
of the overall system act in harmony. Thus it is critical that the 
decision making process are complimentary. In order to achieve 
the appropriate harmony we must use development tools which 
allow an understanding of the relevant roles of the human and the 
machine. 
One of the most promising approaches for providing decision 
support is the use of Knowledge Based Systems (KBS). KBS 
technology provides scope for supporting the uncertainty of data 
and incomplete knowledge of the situation. In addition, KBS 
applications can be constructed to provide explanation and 
context which help the individual to reach decisions. However, 
when we consider the application of KBS to future RTDS, two 
major areas have to be addressed. Firstly, there is the issue of 
real time. For a RTDS to function effectively, decisions have to 
be made in a timely manner. To achieve this, processing must 
be capable of producing the results when required. In addition, it 
has to be possible to change the priorities of processing as 
circumstances change. The second area that has to be addressed is 
that of acquiring the relevant knowledge needed to build the 
system. Historically, the Knowledge Acquisition (KA) process 
has been a bottleneck in development due to the requirement for 
extensive expert contact time. 
In this paper the specific issues of knowledge acquisition for Real 
Time Decision Support are addressed. Associated work (Martin et 
al, 1993) has been carried out to enable the development of real 
time KBS applications which has lead to the development of the 
experimental D-Muse tool kit. In addressing the KA problem two 
principal issues have needed to be addressed. Firstly, how to make 
best use of expert availability and, secondly, how to deal with the 
limitation in experts' knowledge of how future systems will be 
used. 
In order to address these two fundamental issues of KA a project 
has been carried out by Cambridge Consultants Limited and the 
University of Nottingham on behalf of DRA Farnborough. This 
project has developed the REKAP methodology (Cupit et al, 1993) 
which seeks to build on the best practice in KA methods and 
software development methods. To test this methodology, a 
demonstration application is being developed. In the following 
sections we discuss the special issues of KA for CIS, outline the 
REKAP methodology and the tools developed to support it, the 
discussion of the methodology is illustrated by consideration of a 
demonstration application. 
3 KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION FOR FUTURE CIS 
APPLICATIONS 
The process of knowledge acquisition has long been regarded as 
one of the more difficult aspects in the development of operational 
KBS applications. A key part of the problem has been the 
significant amount of time needed to be spent with domain 
experts. The number of sessions with the domain expert becomes 
extensive when there is a need to ensure that the application is 
complete. This is one of the major differences between the 
development of illustrative or prototype KBS's and the full blown 
operational application. To address the problem of extensive 
contact time a number of major research programmes have been 
carried out. A key development has been the KADS methodology 
(Wielinga et al, 1992) which has developed an understanding of 
how expert knowledge is structured and utilised. This has led to 
the development of tools to aid the KA process. These are      ! 
discussed in some detail below. 
In the current project the use of a highly structured approach to KA 
has highlighted the second issue of building future systems. When 
a future application is being considered then the domain expert 
faces an additional problem. This is that in some respects he is 
not a domain expert in the operational function of the system of 
the future. This means that the domain expert has to reason about 
how he would utilise the system to solve problems within the 
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context of the new system operations. This situation inevitably 
leads to a problem, that different aspects of expertise are elicited 
with respect to different parts of the problem domain without any 
necessary internal consistency between the parts. 
The reality is that for any future system various sources of 
expertise needs to be integrated into a coherent whole. The 
principal sources of expertise are: 
• domain experts' knowledge of how tasks and task elements will 
be performed. 
• development experts - knowledge of how system components 
will perform and how they will interact. 
• Operational Requirements experts - knowledge of the roles and 
operational scenarios in which the system will be deployed. 
In the following section we discuss the REKAP methodology 
and how the structured approach that is adopted helps to integrate 
the various sources of knowledge. 
4 BACKGROUND 
The REKAP methodology was developed to facilitate the 
building of KBS for real-time applications. The methodology 
builds on two earlier developments in the areas of knowledge 
engineering (the KADS acquisition methodology) and software 
engineering (real-time structured analysis (SA/RT)). When 
employed in conjunction these two methodologies complement 
each other. 
4.1 The  KADS  Methodology 
Within KADS the central concern of acquisition is the 
construction of a conceptual model, a description of knowledge 
possessed by domain experts as opposed to the technical design 
model, which is a description of the desired KBS. 
REKAP is based around extensions to KADS methodology and 
work arising from the ACKNOWLEDGE (Anjewierden et al, 
1992) and VITAL (Shadbolt et al, 1993) projects. 
KADS proposes a four layer structure to "the knowledge level" 
(Newell, 1982), which is free from any implementational 
concerns: 
• The domain layer. Knowledge within this layer is specific to 
the problem domain, such as a knowledge of Ideologically 
relevant concepts and relations between such concepts. 
• The inference layer. This contains knowledge of the basic 
inferences involved in problem solving. This is seen as using 
"meta-classes" of domain knowledge which are independent of 
the specific domain. 
• The task layer. Contains knowledge of the relationship 
between inferences and tasks. The task layer may be thought 
of as providing default control flow for inferences. 
• The strategic layer. Here meta-control knowledge provides 
information of how problem solving should be sequenced 
according to different environmental circumstances. 
KADS promotes the idea of 'interpretation models' (Breuker et 
al, 1987)) during the acquisition process. These are abstract, pre- 
defined models of the inferences of certain types of knowledge, 
such as situation assessment or diagnosis. Such models also act 
as abstract templates for expertise (O'Hara, 1993), providing 
guidance on the types of knowledge required. 
A key problem associated with the use of interpretation models is 
that of initial model selection. More than one model may be 
applicable to a given function (O'Hara & Shadbolt, 1993a) and, 
after re-description, generic functions may become equivalent 
(O'Hara & Shadbolt, 1993b). To overcome this problem, the 
ACKNOWLEDGE and VITAL projects introduced the idea of 
generalised directive models (GDM) (Terpstra et al, 1993; Van 
Heijst etal, 1992). These GDM's are progressively refined during 
acquisition to meet the specific domain needs. 
4.2 Real  Time Structured Analysis  (SA/RT) 
The CONSENSUS methodology (Bokma et al, 1993) was 
developed to assist in identifying the requirements for KBS 
applications. CONSENSUS adopts the view of a system 
specification comprising a requirements model, containing the 
functionality of the system, and an architecture model, describing 
how the system will be structured to achieve the functionality. 
Within CONSENSUS requirements models are constructed by 
employing SA/RT techniques, CASE tools can be used to 
support this process. These provide guidance in the construction 
of large conventional software systems (Hatley & Pirbhai, 1988) 
and allow the user to produce hierarchies of data diagrams and 
process specifications, supplemented by control flow diagrams and 
specifications. 
4.3 Demonstration   Application 
During the REKAP research programme an application was chosen 
around which to develop and trial the methodology. This 
application involves providing Decision Support to the crew of a 
maritime helicopter engaged in Anti-Surface unit Warfare (ASuW). 
The target aircraft is not expected to have such a DSS facility in 
the near future, the scenario has thus been set beyond the year 
2000. 
The application was chosen since it met the real-time and level of 
complexity criteria needed to test the methodology. 
The application scenario, involving the maritime helicopter in the 
co-ordination of a number of co-operating aircraft, requires that 
surface contacts are found and monitored while minimising the 
threat experienced by friendly forces. The surface picture will be 
complicated by the presence of merchant and other shipping in 
addition to the hostile forces expected. 
The scenario is complex and multi-threaded, involving the 
assessment and control of a variety of different and dispersed data 
sources, it also requires reactive actions from the helicopter in 
order to adjust to the rapidly changing situation. 
Knowledge acquisition for the application is complicated, in 
common with the design of DSS for other future systems, since 
the mission system in question is not yet in existence. The 
potential of the platform can only be based on the system 
specification. In addition, the sensors and systems to be supported 
will have evolved significantly by the time the DSS may be 
installed. 
5 THE REKAP APPROACH 
REKAP involves the design of two models; the conceptual model 
which contains the functional decomposition of the system and is 
independent of any implementation concerns. The second model, 
the architectural model, is derived from the conceptual description 
to meet any specific implementation issues associated with the 
target software toolkit. 
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5.1 The Conceptual  Model 
In the identification of the conceptual model a functional 
description of the CIS is used. This functional description will 
provide details of the key processes within the system; for 
example: 
• situation assessment, 
data fusion, 
planning, 
• mission monitoring. 
The identification of a functional description of the system may 
require the expertise of operational requirements staff rather than 
system operators. The key is to produce a description of 
functional roles rather than problem solving and domain 
knowledge. It is beneficial at this stage to identify which 
functional areas are best served by the addition of decision 
support, system operators expertise will be necessary in 
determining this. 
The process of functional description can be illustrated by 
considering the top level data flow diagram (DFD) produced for 
the ASuW application in figure 1. 
This functional representation now provides the context in which 
to identify the data needs associated with meeting the various 
functional goals. With the situation assessment process it will 
be necessary to have details of the 'fused-picture' and the 'current 
plan' etc. 
The use of this form of structured analysis, supported by CASE 
tools (in this instance TurboCASE), offers many benefits as the 
KA activities evolve. Use of TurboCASE offers the means of 
visualising the complete system, relating the various 
components and provides consistency checking once more 
detailed decomposition is achieved. 
Here tracks are selected to be classified. Three major parameters 
are required; behaviour, identity and group membership. The 
GDM is used to model the three individual processes. A track is 
compared with the pre-defined object models and matches recorded. 
Due to the nature of the domain, matches are never considered 
absolute, the model tries to refute each possibility rather than 
confirm. This avoids a contact being classified as friendly where 
there is even a small possibility of it being hostile. 
Expert knowledge is of primary importance in creating the 
attribute structures of the various objects within the domain. This 
knowledge evolves in stages, eliciting what is currently possible 
and eventually accounting for the future potential of the CIS. The 
final stages involves experts' in some conjecture. 
The KA process is focused upon identifying the data requirements 
of the various processes at all levels in the DFD representation. 
Within the REKAP method data flows represent objects within the 
architectural model. These must be structured during the KA 
activity to provide the object definitions in the final system. 
Various methods are provided within REKAP to aid this process; 
laddering, carding sorting, repertory grid construction and analysis, 
and a rule induction algorithm (CNN). These are available as part 
of ProtoKEW (Shadbolt, 1992), an automated KA toolset which 
also offers a means to aid the initial construction of 
interpretational models. 
Within the situation assessment process knowledge was elicitated 
which allowed various objects to be discriminated, based on 
different sensor data. This involved experts in providing 
assessments of future sensor performance however, due to the 
nature of the REKAP processes such conjecture is constrained. 
This provides a useful means of considering future system 
enhancements within the framework of existing capabilities. 
Having identified the functional description of the system KADS 
GDM's can be identified which can represent the inference- and 
task-layer knowledge within the various functions. GDM 
selection will be influenced by initial KA with experts which 
will characterise the nature of the problem solving used in the 
domain. As an example, the GDM in figure 2 was used to model 
the situation assessment function within the target application. 
The GDM provides a means of describing the task structure at 
subsequent levels in the DFD. The model can be seen to offer a 
means for representing problem solving knowledge. 
Domain experts suggested that situation assessment is based 
upon the notion of matching the known features of a particular 
contact (track) with domain specific models of actual objects 
(schemata). For example, a contact with a speed in excess of 30 
knots would be thought unlikely to be a fishing boat or, under 
most wind conditions, a yacht. However, it may be a warship or 
a modern merchant ship. 
Such reasoning is represented in the GDM where track 
observables are compared with object definitions to identify 
matches. The identification of such knowledge is achieved 
without consideration of the capabilities of the actual system, it 
is a generic model for solving such problems. The situation 
assessment GDM is represented within the TurboCASE structure 
as shown in figures 3 and 4. 
The track object produced for the ASuW application is shown in 
figure 5. The following areas would provide the means for 
scoping the structure of the object. 
• what are the basic attributes of a track? 
• how do experts differentiate between tracks? 
- on individual sensors? 
- with integrated data? 
• how might they be able to differentiate given a particular new 
capability or sensor? 
Having elicited these various knowledge areas KADS allows the 
construction of a complete knowledge model. The four layers 
provide the means of integrating the knowledge: 
• data specifications are allocated to the domain layer 
• data flows to the task layer 
• process specifications to the inference layer 
• control to the strategy layer 
• control specifications divided between domain, inference and 
strategy layers. 
The relationship between the various knowledge types elicited, 
when re-created in a target language, provides a complete task and 
object structure with inference rules and control data as the core of 
an executable KBS. 
5.2Tool   Support 
The REKAP methodology is supported by a number of software 
tools. TurboCASE is used to build the functional description of 
the system. This aids the construction of the task structure 
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together with creation of the data and control flows within the 
system. ProtoKEW has already been discussed. This toolset is 
used to construct the detailed conceptual model. 
The use of these tools to support the KA activity provides a 
means of describing and representing expert knowledge. This 
offers a powerful aid to visualise the knowledge as it is elicited, 
both for the knowledge engineer and the expert. The 
representations within ProtoKEW and TurboCASE provide a 
common language for discussing the KA requirements. 
Providing this additional visual aid within the KA process allows 
greater participation of experts. This aids the exploration of 
future system capabilities since consistency of information can 
be monitored during the KA session. 
The tools and the use of the GDM's also provides more focused 
KA sessions, exploring specific areas of the knowledge model 
seen as weak or incomplete. The tools also provide traceability 
of knowledge updates during the evolution of the model. 
The final key feature of the REKAP methodology, not discussed 
in detail in this paper, is the translation of the conceptual model 
into run-time implementation code. REKAP achieves this via a 
translator tool which automatically takes the conceptual model 
and maps it, using the KADS four layer model, into the Muse 
real-time AI software toolkit. 
6 CONCLUDING   REMARKS 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate how REKAP, through 
the use of Generalised Directive Models and structured analysis, 
offers a powerful methodology to overcome the difficulties 
associated with designing KBS decision support tools. In 
adopting a functional approach to the design of the KBS 
architecture the refinement, during the knowledge acquisition 
phase of design, of the GDMs provides a means for incorporating 
the supposition of experts regarding future system potential. 
In support of the REKAP approach it is necessary to: 
• Provide a functional description of the system, either directly 
from specifications and requirements studies, or from 
knowledge acquisition with Operational Requirements staff. 
• Identify problem solving models applicable to the key 
functions to be supported by the DSS through KA with 
operators. 
• Employ principled knowledge acquisition methods to identify 
the structure and content of knowledge at each of the KADS 
four levels. 
• Gradually refine the knowledge acquired to include theoretical 
information regarding future sensor and system enhanced 
capabilities. 
REKAP, and the tools which support it, provide a framework in 
which to visualise and maintain the acquired knowledge during 
the initial KA phase of design, providing consistency checking 
and other housekeeping functions. The tool support has also 
been seen to improve the productivity of KA sessions by 
providing the expert and knowledge engineer a means by which 
both can view and understand the data acquired. 
We believe these benefits, together with the automatic translation 
of captured knowledge to the Muse AI toolkit make the REKAP 
approach a powerful and valuable method of designing decision 
support tools for future CIS. 
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Figure 1   - 1st level data flow decomposition of the ASuW DSS 
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Figure 2 - The GDM for situation assessment 
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SYNOPSIS 
This section comprises papers on the trustworthiness of HE-C decisions. Papers 11 and 12 discuss trust from experience with 
technology demonstration systems; Papers 13 and 14 report the results of psychological investigations into human-human and 
HE-C trust, with reference to a teamwork model; Paper 15 reviews the role of memory in trust development; and Paper 16 
discusses EC intelligence, and proposes guidelines for building trust. Paper 11 is based on trials with a KBS system for naval 
command and control. Measures of trust point to the importance of the system's accuracy and predictability. To be trusted, the 
system must demonstrate competent role performance, and provide facilities that enable operators to predict its accuracy. To 
accept a DSS hypothesis, operators need to understand and agree with the DSS reasoning process, with easily comprehended 
explanation. Paper 12 discusses an AI warning system for civil aircraft. In emergencies, the need to trust information is raised 
by time pressure, and by the complexity of simultaneous multiple failures. Trust is achieved by basing the design on user models 
of the system operation using Model-Based Reasoning (MBR), and by producing information that reflects the goals and 
expectations of the user. Primary causes of failure are isolated using understandable fuzzy reasoning logic. Other trust 
enhancing features include: a goal hierarchy for the generation of logical prioritised actions; a minimal set of ordered actions 
consistent with checklist procedures; and anticipation of action consequences to indicate that the system is responding 
intelligently. Paper 13 reports a study of simulated aircraft adaptive automation (i.e. EC) using the Multi-Attribute Task (MAT) 
battery. Failures were introduced in the ability of the EC to provide levels of aiding in a timely and appropriate manner. Subjects 
compensated for poor EC performance without awareness of adaptation failure. Trust ratings were related to perceptions of EC 
competence, but not adaptation failure. Performance was associated with rated situation awareness. Procedural safeguards, such 
as prime directive protocols, are needed against the consequences of inappropriate task allocations and undetected adaptation 
failures, and to prevent false trust being engendered in imperfect adaptive aiding. Audit data of teamwork quality are presented 
based on a model of teamwork goals, resources, structure and processes. Paper 14 reports the results of a communications 
analysis of recordings from Tornado aircraft simulator missions. Communications were categorised as statements, assertions, 
questions, confirmations or discussions. More unprompted statements were made than any other form of vocal communication, 
particularly by the navigator, to maintain common knowledge and situation awareness. The data show a two-way flow of 
information and initiative taking. The absence of contradictions and the small number of questions are indicative of a high degree 
of trust. Conclusions are drawn for HE-C communication with reference to the above teamwork model. For EC to take over the 
navigator's functions, this pattern of bi-lateral communication will need to be reproduced, with intent inferencing and common 
knowledge to support shared initiative taking. Paper 15 considers how communication, considered as the sharing of knowledge, 
involves remembering. It reports psychological data on memory enhancing techniques, in particular the Cognitive Interview 
(CI). CI is a proven communication aid in a range of contexts, including market research and trauma victim interviews. The 
authors consider how features of communication, such as trust and rapport building, can be improved, say during HE-C mission 
debriefing, by the application of memory techniques such as CI. Paper 16 considers if the HE-C team would engender more 
trust if both team members appeared human. The Turing test is described which determines whether an interrogator can tell the 
difference between human and machine answers to questions. If not, the machine possesses the qualities of intelligence, and can 
be trusted. Weaknesses of the test are identified. Guidelines are proposed for building trust, based on the need for consistency 
and correctness in team decisions. These include prime directives, levels of autonomy, conformance with the pilot's mental 
model, transparent interfaces, and summarised information. A manager-staff relationship is proposed as the ideal team structure. 
Internal trust will lead to efficient, consistently correct performance, which will engender trust in the team from others. 
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1 . SUMMARY 
If the Human-Electronic Crew is to function effectively as a 
trustworthy team, an issue of great importance is the degree 
to which the Human component of the Team trusts the 
Electronic one. In the context of a Knowledge Based 
System (KBS), the operator may constantly check the 
system's output, or he may always accept it without any 
basis for so doing. In either case, the Team is not 
functioning effectively. 
Trust in a KBS was examined in a study of users of the Data 
Fusion Technology Demonstrator System (DFTDS). This is 
a prototype Command and Control (C2) system intended to 
explore the capabilities of Knowledge Based System 
techniques in picture compilation at sea through the 
automated presentation of fused information. 
The results of the study indicated that the system's accuracy 
and predictability were important. Predictability is 
influenced by operators' comprehension of the DFTDS, 
which is affected by the relationship between the decision- 
making process employed by the system and the operator, 
its ability to provide explanations of this process, the 
content and format of the explanations, and the way in 
which the DFTDS deals with the uncertainty inherent in its 
hypotheses. In order that a system can be trusted, it must 
both demonstrate technically competent role performance 
and provide its operators with facilities that enable them to 
predict the pattern of its accuracy. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
In an interaction with a KBS, there are two possible 
extremes of response by the operator: he always accepts 
the system's hypotheses with or without any basis for 
doing so (blind trust), or he questions all of them, with or 
without any basis for doing so. The former is obviously 
undesirable, as we do not have infallible systems, and so 
the operator needs to be kept 'in the loop' to cope with 
those situations which the system is unable to cope with 
(perhaps because they have not been foreseen). 
Questioning all of the system's hypotheses is equally 
undesirable, and may actually increase the operator's 
workload or degrade his performance in comparison to that 
attained when not using the KBS. Overconfidcncc may be 
less desirable than underconfidcncc, as the consequences 
are potentially more harmful. 
It is therefore important that operators should have an 
appropriate level of trust in a KBS (Rcf 1). This might be 
interpreted as a willingness to accept its hypothesis 
without question in situations/for functions which it is 
known to be capable of handling at least as well as (if not 
better than) the operator himself, and questioning the 
system in situations/for functions which it cannot handle 
as well as the operator. 
Factors which may influence the operator's trust in a KBS 
include the perceived accuracy of the system, its 
predictability, the provision of explanation facilities, the 
decision-making model used by the system and the way in 
which it deals with uncertainty. The provision of 
explanation facilities, the decision-making model used by 
the system and the way in which it deals with uncertainty 
affect the operator's trust in the system because they 
influence the degree to which he is able to understand and 
evaluate the reasons for the system's actions and determine 
whether or not it presents a true picture of the situation. 
2.1 Trust in the DFTDS 
The role of automated support within a C2 system is to 
provide the right information, at the right time, to the 
right user, and in a form that can be assimilated and acted 
upon, especially in time-critical situations. In present 
Operations Room procedures, the operator has to trust 
those above and below him for providing information in 
the chain of Command. A critical issue, therefore, is an 
operator's trust in the outcome of the DFTDS's data fusion 
process. 
2.2 Explanation    Facilities 
It is generally agreed that explanation facilities are a 
distinguishing feature of KBSs (Ref 2). They are perhaps 
especially important during early usage of the system, 
when the operator may build up trust in the system and 
determine its limits. If the operator finds that the system's 
conclusions are well-supported and comparable with, or 
better than, his own mental processing, then he is more 
likely to come to believe the system without asking for 
justification. Explanation facilities may also allow the 
operator to query the system during periods of low activity 
or training exercises, so generating trust in it for time- 
critical situations in which there is no opportunity for 
querying the system's hypothesis. 
Buchanan and Shortliffe (Ref 2) consider that explanation 
facilities are crucial to the success of a KBS, and perform 
the following functions: assisting users and system 
builders in understanding the contents of the system's 
knowledge base and reasoning processes; facilitating the 
debugging of the system during development; educating 
users about the domain and capabilities of the system; and 
persuading users that the system's conclusions are correct, 
so that they can ultimately accept these conclusions and 
trust the system's reasoning powers. 
According to Abu-Hakima and Oppacher (Ref 3), genuine 
explanations show why an action is reasonable in the light 
of available information, heuristics and domain principles, 
and why an alternative action was not performed. The 
authors contrast genuine explanations with the type of 
explanation in which the system merely provides a trace of 
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the rules used in order to arrive at a hypothesis. As Kidd 
(Ref 4) points out, the latter may be sufficient for system 
debugging by the knowledge engineer, but it does not 
necessarily provide the operator with the kind of 
information that he is seeking in order to judge whether or 
not to accept the system's hypothesis. 
Although there is some evidence that explanation facilities 
are under-used and perhaps not even necessary in some 
systems (Ref 5), this may be because the explanations 
provided by the system do not meet the user's needs. 
Alternatively, explanations may only be required for 
certain tasks. At present, little is known about what 
constitutes an acceptable explanation for users of real-time 
KBSs. 
The extent to which operators access the explanation 
facilities provided by the DFTDS may be an indication of 
the degree to which they trust the system, i.e., do they 
accept its hypotheses without question? The type of 
information being sought by operators may include: 
why/why-not/how evidence was used; why/why-not a 
conclusion was reached; how a solution was arrived at. 
However, this is a complex issue, in that the extent to 
which the explanation facilities are used may be influenced 
by their content, the way in which this is presented to the 
operator, and the ease with which it can be accessed. 
In the software vesion used during the two trials periods, 
there were eight types of explanation provided by the 
DFTDS, on separate "pages" arranged in a hierarchy within 
the explanation window. In the light of experience the 
explanation facility is being redesigned for the next 
software release. 
When the DFTDS was initially designed, it was envisaged 
that the explanations would be mainly accessed by the 
Command. They were also intended to provide the system 
designers with feedback concerning the performance of the 
data fusion module within the DFTDS. The present study 
attempted to determine the extent to which the 
explanations were accessed by operators, the type of 
information that operators were seeking, and whether all of 
the information that they required was available. 
2.3        Decision   Making   Model 
Another important factor is the decision-making model 
employed   by   a   KBS,   as   this   influences   the   user's 
understanding of the system, and hence his trust in it. 
The operator will only be confident in the system's 
hypotheses if the reasoning processes it employs arc 
readily intelligible to him. This docs not necessarily mean 
that the system has to possess a psychological model 
which exactly imitates the human's reasoning process, but 
it does mean that the representation must be able to capture 
the range and power of the human expert's knowledge in 
the particular domain. 
Thus if the expert uses or recognises key features in the 
information environment, the system should also make use 
of these in the same way and in the same order. 
If a KBS does 'reason' in the same way as the operator, then 
it is more readily able to produce an explanation which the 
user can understand. In addition, it is more likely that the 
information available from the system is that which the 
operator would use to make a decision for himself, and for it 
to be presented in the required order. This means that it is 
easier and quicker for him to verify a decision if required. 
The counterargument is that a KBS is intended to enhance 
overall system performance, but in order to accomplish 
this aim, it may well be that tasks have to be performed in a 
different way to that used by operators at present. It is not 
as yet known whether it is necessary for the system to 
perform a task in the same way as the operator would, or if 
it is only the outcome which is important. 
Most of the research to date has focussed on medical 
diagnosis systems, but there is a critical difference between 
these and Naval C2 Systems, in that the pace is real-time in 
the latter. 
The present study attempted to determine whether there 
were any differences between the reasoning processes used 
by operators and the DFTDS. 
2.4        Representation   of   Uncertainty 
The hypotheses produced by the DFTDS have varying 
degrees of uncertainty associated with them. This is due to 
attributes of the sensor data used by the DFTDS, and the 
fusion process itself. The system only displays its best 
hypothesis, but others are constructed in the machine. 
The way in which the DFTDS represents and conveys the 
uncertainty inherent in its hypotheses may influence 
operators' trust in the system, in that it affects their 
comprehension of its reasoning process. 
A critical issue is whether the operator should be, or needs 
to be, aware of this uncertainty. It has been proposed (Ref 
6) that an awareness that uncertainty exists is crucial for an 
accurate understanding of the situation, and there is some 
evidence that the provision of probability information 
increases the operator's confidence in a system (Ref 7). If 
this is the case, then there is a need to determine how this 
uncertainly should be represented to the operator. 
Uncertainty is represented in the DFTDS in two ways (i) the 
degree of certainty with which the system determines the 
Standard Identity of a platform is displayed numerically by 
the allocation of penalty points, which can be seen in one 
of the explanation windows, and (ii) limited information is 
shown on the tactical display in the form of a single letter 
in the Track Label. The latter provides information such as 
when there is an ambiguous correlation associated with a 
vehicle. 
The present study attempted to determine whether operators 
required to know the degree of certainty with which the 
DFTDS held a hypothesis, and if this was represented in a 
readily comprehensible format. 
3 . METHOD 
The DFTDS was not designed to support specific job-related 
tasks - the intention was to see what operators used the 
available technology for. Consequently, the study focussed 
on the ways in which the DFTDS was used, rather than 
examining it during a set of predetermined user tasks. 
There were two main trials periods: June 1992 (Trial 1) and 
February 1993 (Trial 2). The most important set of data was 
that obtained in Trial 2. This was the longest exercise in 
which the DFTDS was used, and operators were more 
experienced in using the DFTDS than they had been during 
previous exercises. 
Data was collected by means of questionnaires, semi- 
structured interviews, video recordings, and software logs. 
4 . RESULTS  AND  DISCUSSION 
In Section 2, it was proposed that operators' trust in a KBS 
may be influenced by its perceived accuracy, the 
predictability of the system and factors which affect 
operators' comprehension of the system. The latter include 
the provision and content of explanation facilities, the 
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relationship between the decision-making model it 
employs and that used by the operator, and the way in 
which the system deals with uncertainty. 
4.1       Trust 
Operators' trust in the DFTDS was measured by the analysis 
of subjective data obtained from questionnaires and 
interviews and objective data from software logs. 
4.1.1      Subjective measures 
Responses to questionnaires completed after Trial 1 
indicated that 50% of operators trusted the DFTDS, 25% did 
not and the other 25% did not know whether they trusted it 
or not. After Trial 2, 40% of operators trusted the DFTDS, 
20% did not trust it, and the remaining 40% were unsure if 
they trusted the system or not. The general trend was for 
operators to become more unsure over lime as to whether or 
not they trusted the system. 
Sheridan and Hennessey (Ref 8) found that operators, 
particularly novices, were biased towards distrust in a 
supervisory control environment, but the present data is 
not in agreement with this. One possible reason is that 
operators of the DFTDS, although relatively new to the 
system, were not novices in their jobs. 
During interviews conducted after Trial 1, operators made a 
number of comments concerning factors which they 
considered to influence their trust in the DFTDS. 
Some operators said that they were taught not to trust a 
computer, but if they had access to an explanation of its 
decision-making process, they could sec whether they 
agreed with the process or not. This implies that operators 
feel it is important to see the way in which the system 
arrives at a hypothesis, and also to agree with the 
reasoning process it uses in order to reach this hypothesis. 
One operator said that as long as he knew why the DFTDS 
was wrong, then he trusted it. This again points to the 
importance of the operator understanding the decision- 
making process employed by the DFTDS. However, in 
section 2.3, it was stated that it is not known whether the 
decision-making process is important, or merely the 
outcome of this process. The above comment would appear 
to suggest that it is the process which is the most 
important factor, not its outcome. 
Collins (Ref 9) refers to two types of explanations: 
felicitous and refutable. The former merely makes the 
operator feel happy about a system's hypothesis, but the 
latter places him in a position whereby he is able to agree 
with the decision-making process or not. The opinion that 
the system is acceptable if an explanation is available, 
regardless of whether the DFTDS is correct or not, suggests 
that it is the ability of the operator to refute a hypothesis 
that is important, and is therefore linked to the question of 
what information should be contained in explanations 
provided by the DFTDS. 
The DFTDS was compared to existing systems and 
equipment, for example, one operator said that he saw no 
reason to question the DFTDS when he accepted what other 
Systems told him - he was not able to question them. This 
may be one reason why operators did not access the 
explanations available in the DFTDS: they were not used to 
having the information available. One the other hand, it 
may be that other systems do not require such a facility 
because they do not perform any Knowledge Based 
functions. 
Operators' initial expectations were that the system would 
work, but it was emphasised that if these expectations were 
not fulfilled, then distrust would quickly occur, thus 
implying that trust is dependent upon accuracy. 
In summary, operators considered the following factors to 
be important, and to influence their trust in the DFTDS: 
prior expectations, the decision-making process it 
employs, the accuracy of the system, its predictability and 
the provision of explanations. However, none of these 
factors were found to be related to the subjective measure of 
trust. It is recommended that this question be further 
examined in a controlled setting, because factors such as 
changes in personnel, differences in operator training and 
poor sensor performance (which affected the data fusion 
process) also influenced operators' interactions with the 
DFTDS. 
4.1.2      Objective measures 
It was proposed that the type and frequency of operators' 
contributions to the data fusion process would indicate 
their degree of trust in the hypotheses provided by the 
DFTDS. An analysis of the software log files for Trial 2 
showed that manual correlations and decorrelations were 
indeed made by operators. 
The two main reasons given by operators for making 
manual correlations were (i) because the operator had access 
to information that the DFTDS did not, and (ii) the operator 
was forcing correlations in order to clear up the tactical 
display. Decorrelations were mainly made on the basis of 
information which was available to operators, but not to 
the DFTDS. 
Operators did not accept the hypothesis proposed by the 
DFTDS on all occasions. Disagreement with the DFTDS's 
hypothesis is mainly represented by the changes made to 
Standard Identity (i.e., hostility) and Platform Identity 
(i.e., type): 818 attempts were made to change Standard 
Identity, and 648 to change Platform Identity. 
All users for both trials said that they would change a 
hypothesis made by the DFTDS although, in general, 
operators said that they would need to be very certain that 
the DFTDS was wrong before they would make any change. 
Reasons given by operators for changing the DFTDS's 
hypotheses fell into two main categories (i) operators cited 
specific instances of when they did not agree with the 
DFTDS's reasoning (e.g., platforms travelling at a speed of 
25 knots being labelled as aircraft rather than surface 
ships), or (ii) more general, ill-defined, reasons (e.g., if the 
operator "knew" that the DFTDS was wrong). 
A number of operators said that they had access to more 
information than the DFTDS (e.g., Officer of the Watch, 
GDP, voice, or visual sightings). One operator expressed 
the opinion that there arc almost always factors which are 
not taken into account by the DFTDS in its decision- 
making process, because there is no way that they can be 
represented in the DFTDS. 
However, the majority of operators were unable to specify 
why they would change a DFTDS's hypothesis, beyond 
saying that it was because of a 'gut feeling' or similar 
expression. This is considered likely to be due to the 
reliance of human operators on contextual information. 
In summary, operators contributed to the data fusion 
process because they had access to information that the 
DFTDS did not, they applied different rules to the data (e.g., 
different weightings), or their experience lead them to 
believe that the DFTDS was incorrect. An important point 
was made by those operators who said that they would make 
changes to the DFTDS as a result of their own knowledge of 
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the history of the current situation and their experience of 
how situations had typically developed before and how the 
tactical picture had built up. 
4.2 Accuracy 
Responses to questionnaires completed after Trial 1 
indicated that 50% of operators thought that they knew 
how accurate the DFTDS was, and the other 50% did not. 
After Trial 2, 90% of users thought that they knew how 
accurate the DFTDS was, and only 10% did not. This result 
was to be expected - increased usage of the system enabled 
operators to build up a model of the system's performance 
in terms of its accuracy. However, subjective knowledge of 
its accuracy did not appear to significantly increase or 
decrease operators' trust in the system: the more sure they 
were that they knew how accurate the DFTDS was, the more 
unsure operators were whether or not they trusted it. This 
suggests that factors other than knowledge of a system's 
accuracy influence operators' trust in the system. 
4.3 Predictability 
After Trial 1, 75% of operators were unsure whether the 
DFTDS was predictable or not, and the other 25% thought 
that it was predictable most of the time. After Trial 2, 80% 
of operators were unsure if the DFTDS was predictable and 
the other 20% considered that it was not always so. 
It would appear that increased usage enabled operators to 
form a clearer picture of the system's accuracy, but not the 
pattern of this accuracy - operators claimed that they knew 
how accurate the DFTDS was, but they were unable to 
predict the occasions on which it would not be accurate. 
Increased judgements of unpredictability may rcflccra more 
accurate model of the system - it has been shown that the 
DFTDS will not always arrive at the same hypothesis given 
the same input data. 
According to Muir (Ref 1), in the early stages of an 
interaction, trust is based on predictability. The latter is 
assessed by recurrent behaviours, and trust develops when 
the operator is able to estimate the system's predictability. 
The author also speaks of an operator's ability to calibrate 
his trust in a system, and thus it may not be accuracy per se 
which is the important factor, but the ability of the 
operator to predict when the DFTDS will, and will not, be 
correct. The fact that operators were unable to do this 
means that they do not have calibrated tnisl in the system. 
The concept of predictability does not in itself imply 
performance accuracy - a system could be predictably 
incorrect. If operators were equating trust with 
predictability, then it may be that a system can be thought 
to be trustworthy even if it produces an incorrect 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is proposed that to trust a KBS 
means that it must be considered to produce an acceptable 
output, and so a system that produces an incorrect 
hypothesis does not fulfil the criterion for trustworthiness. 
This proposition is in agreement with Muir's (Ref 1) 
opinion that technically competent role performance is the 
most influential factor in the development of trust. He 
further suggests that each person has a 'criterion of 
competence', below which a system will be judged 
untrustworthy. This has important implications for the use 
of Knowledge Based technology in Naval C2 Systems, in 
that the criterion of competence, and hence trust, may vary 
between individual operators. 
4.4 Explanation     Facilities 
Subjective data concerning the usage of the DFTDS's 
explanation facilities was obtained from questionnaires and 
interviews, and objective data by the analysis of software 
logs and video recordings. 
After Trial 1, 75% of operators said that they often asked 
for an explanation of the DFTDS's decisions, and the other 
25% did not do so very often. In the post Trial 2 
questionnaires, explanations were said to be used very 
often by 40% of operators, often by 50%, and not very 
often by the other 10%. 
In section 4.1, it was noted that operators considered that 
the availability of explanations was an important influence 
on their trust in the DFTDS. However, an analysis of the 
software log files and video recordings showed that, in 
contrast with their subjective opinions, the explanations 
provided by the DFTDS were rarely accessed by operators. 
There are several possible reasons for this: operators 
experience difficulty in accessing the explanations; there 
is insufficient time to obtain an explanation from the 
system; the explanations do not contain the information 
they require; they just "know" that a hypothesis is 
incorrect, and are not interested in questioning the 
reasoning used by the system to find out why it is wrong; 
the information is not presented in a form that is readily 
comprehended by the operator. 
Subjective data does not appear to support the first 
possible reason. After Trial 1, 25% of operators felt that 
obtaining the information that they required from the 
explanations was very easy and 75% felt that it was alright. 
Responses to post Trial 2 questionnaires indicated that 
accessing the information contained in the explanations 
was thought to be easy by 30% of operators, alright by 
60%, and difficult by 10%. However, operators did remark 
that it took a long time to get to information at lower 
levels of the hierarchy of explanation pages. 
The second possible reason why the explanations provided 
by the DFTDS were rarely accessed is to some extent 
supported by operators' comments in interviews and 
questionnaires. Indeed, when the system was designed, it 
was anticipated that there would not always be sufficient 
time for operators to access the explanations in a time- 
critical situation, and that they may be used to build up trust 
during periods of low activity. 
After Trial 1, none of the operators thought that there was 
any information they would use to make a decision, that 
was not provided by the DFTDS's explanations. However, 
after Trial 2, information not contained in the explanation 
facilities was said to be required by 38% of respondents. 
Very few operators responded when they were asked what 
additional information they would use to make a decision. 
The majority of them said that they would use their own 
instinct, built up through experience. 
The way in which information is presented in the 
explanations provided by the DFTDS may influence the 
frequency with which operators access them. If the 
information is not presented in a form which is easily and 
quickly comprehended, then operators will be less likely to 
access the explanations. Operators' comments in 
interviews conducted in June 1993 provide some support 
for this proposition, particularly in relation to the way in 
which the DFTDS represents the uncertainty associated 
with its hypotheses (sec section 4.6). 
In summary, the data obtained indicates that the 
explanations provided by the DFTDS were rarely accessed 
during Trial 2. It is proposed that this may be because the 
explanations do not contain the information that operators 
require, it is not presented in a form that they can readily 
comprehend, or operators just 'know' that a hypothesis is 
incorrect and arc not interested in the reasons why. It is 
likely that the present data represents a combination of 
these reasons, and more research is needed in order to 
80 
clarify the issue. A major problem would seem lo be that 
the explanations were primarily intended to assist 
developers in examining the performance of the data fusion 
components of the system, rather than for operators use. 
4.5        Decision   Making   Model 
Subjective data concerning possible differences between 
the reasoning processes used by operators and the DFTDS 
was obtained from interviews and questionnaires. 
After Trial 1, 75% of operators considered that the DFTDS 
sometimes "thought" in the same way as ihey did, and the 
other 25% considered that it never did. After Trial 2, 70% of 
operators said that the DFTDS sometimes "thought" in the 
same way as they did, and the other 30% said that it never 
did. Increased usage did not, therefore, alter operators' 
responses to this question, and it would appear that the 
decision-making process employed by the DFTDS does not 
accurately reflect that used by the operators for all 
situations. 
After Trial 1, 50% of operators said that they would 
sometimes accept a hypothesis if they did not agree with 
the reasoning behind it, and the other 50% never would. 
After Trial 2, 60% of operators would sometimes accept a 
hypothesis if they did not agree with the reasoning used by 
the DFTDS to arrive at that hypothesis, while the other 
40% would never do so. 
One operator made an important point when he said that the 
tactical situation and the possible consequences of an 
incorrect hypothesis would strongly influence his 
willingness to accept a hypothesis made by the DFTDS if 
he did not agree with the reasoning behind it. This opinion 
would seem to support Muir's (Ref 1) proposition that 
KBSs have an element of risk associated with them, and 
hence tend to be initially mistrusted. There is not usually 
much risk associated with human-human relationships, and 
so the initial tendency is for trust. 
When asked to give examples of times when there was a 
mismatch between they way in which they would reason 
and the way in which the DFTDS did so, operators cither 
cited specific instances relating to the speed of objects on 
the display, or gave examples of when they would have a 
different hypothesis (e.g., 2050 contacts always being 
shown as "unknown" by the DFTDS, whereas the operator 
would rather that they were displayed as "suspect" unless 
proved otherwise). 
Differences between the way in which the DFTDS performs 
data fusion and the way in which operators carry out the 
process were found by Sherwood-Jones and Northcotc (Ref 
10). Operators may use different criteria than those used by 
the DFTDS or give the criteria different weightings, which 
may vary according to the situation (which they do not in 
the DFTDS). They also have access to richer information, 
from a wider range of sources, than the DFTDS docs. 
In conclusion, the data suggests that the decision-making 
process employed by the DFTDS is not the same as that 
used by its operators, and nearly half of those questioned 
stated that they would never accept a hypothesis proposed 
by the DFTDS if they did not agree with the system's 
reasoning process. This issue requires further examination, 
in order to determine the nature and extent of differences 
between the decision-making processes used by the DFTDS 
and its operators, and their impact on operators' trust in the 
system and acceptance of its output. Shcrwood-Joncs and 
Northcotc consider that the DFTDS's decision-making 
should be based on that used by the operator. This 
proposition must obviously be investigated in future 
studies. 
4.6        Representation   of   Uncertainty 
Subjective   data   was   obtained   from   interviews   and 
questionnaires, and objective data from the analysis of 
software logs and video recordings. 
It was found that the "explanation" window showing the 
penalty points associated with a hypothesis was not 
accessed at all during those periods of Trial 2 when 
operators' interactions with the DFTDS were recorded. In 
interviews, operators expressed a requirement for a more 
comprehensible representation of the degree of certainty 
held by the system, preferably in a graphical format. There 
is some evidence that although numerical probability 
levels may provide a sophisticated tool for system 
designers to reason with uncertainty, they are not 
meaningful to the users of a KBS (Ref 11). 
Operators also considered that it was important to show not 
only the parameters used and the total "penalty points" for 
possible identities, but also the numerical contribution 
made by each parameter to the total number of points. This 
was seen to be of assistance in an appreciation of their 
relative weighting factors. One operator remarked that both 
the inputs to the DFTDS and his own valuations 
incorporate weighting factors. His are built up through 
experience, knowledge and prejudice, but he has no 
visibility of weighting factors used by the DFTDS. 
It would therefore appear that there are questions to be 
answered in relation to the way in which uncertainty is 
represented in a KBS, how it is explained to the operator, 
and the relationship between the way in which the system 
and its operators deal with with that uncertainty. For 
example, it is not known under what circumstances the 
operator may be able to cope with multiple hypotheses, or 
how these and their associated degrees of uncertainty 
should be represented. Such questions must be addressed in 
future research. 
5 . CONCLUSION 
The data obtained suggested that users of the DFTDS had 
neither blind trust in the system nor questioned all of its 
hypotheses. Its reasoning was sometimes questioned 
through the use of the explanation facilities provided by 
the DFTDS (although they were not accessed as much as 
operators' subjective opinions would suggest), and 
operators made manual inputs to the data fusion process, 
thereby changing the hypothesis produced by the system. 
Manual inputs were made because operators had access to 
information that the DFTDS did not, they applied different 
rules to the data, or their experience lead them to believe 
that the DFTDS was incorrect. There would appear to be 
differences between the decision-making processes 
employed by the system and its operators, especially in the 
way in which they deal with uncertainty. 
The results of the study indicated that accuracy and 
predictability were the most important factors. 
Predictability is influenced by operators* comprehension 
of the DFTDS, which, in turn, is affected by the 
relationship between the decision-making process 
employed by the system and the operator, its ability to 
provide explanations of this process, the content and 
format of the explanations, and the way in which the 
DFTDS deals with the uncertainty inherent in its 
hypotheses. In order that a system can be trusted, it must 
both demonstrate technically competent role performance 
and provide its operators with facilities that enable them to 
predict the pattern of its accuracy (c/. Muir (Ref 1)). 
It is interesting to note that Muir and Moray (Ref 12) found 
that a small variable error had the same effect on operators' 
trust in a system as did a large constant one. The first 
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affects the system's predictability and the second its 
accuracy. 
6 . FUTURE RESEARCH 
The effectiveness of the Human-Electronic crew is 
influenced by the degree to which the human component of 
the team trusts the electronic one. 
The data obtained from the present study suggests that if 
the operator is to trust a KBS, then it must not only 
demonstrate a level of performance that satisfies the 
operator's criterion of competence, but also provide the 
necessary facilities for him to predict those occasions 
when the system will, and will not be correct. 
It is therefore proposed that future research should address 
the HCI issues that influence operators' ability to predict 
the performance of a KBS. If they arc to be able to predict a 
system's performance, operators need to understand its 
decision-making process and, in particular, the way m 
which it deals with, and represents, uncertainty. The 
system must be able to explain its reasoning process to the 
operator, providing him with the information he requires in 
an easily comprehended format. 
Operators also need to understand the reasoning process 
employed by a KBS in order to make inputs to the data 
fusion process. These will be required for the forseeable 
future, as we do not have the technology to build infallible 
systems. If the operator is to understand the process used 
by the system, he must be provided with explanations 
which give him the information that he needs in a format 
he can readily comprehend and access quickly. 
If such explanations are to be provided, the way in which 
the system represents and reasons with uncertainty is 
important, and also the relationship between the way in 
which the operator and the system reason about the 
information available to them - the decision-making 
process used in order to arrive at a hypothesis. 
The data obtained suggests that the decision-making 
process employed by the DFTDS is not the same as that 
used by its operators. Further work is required in order to 
determine the nature and extent of the differences, and their 
impact on operators' trust in the system and acceptance of 
its output. This may be particularly important in view of 
the fact that many operators said that they would never 
accept a hypothesis proposed by the DFTDS if they did not 
agree with its reasoning process. In addition, it is not 
known how much decision-making processes vary between 
individual operators. 
Further examination of the way in which uncertainty is 
dealt with and represented in a KBS is also required. Under 
what circumstances is the operator able to cope with 
multiple hypotheses, how many alternatives should be 
shown, and how should these and their associated degrees 
of uncertainty should be represented to the user? 
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Abstract 
For any relationship to work there is a need for trust. 
The relationship between man and systems must 
evoke feelings of trust in the user otherwise the 
operation of the whole system (man with machine) 
will not be effective or efficient. Thus designers 
must ensure that systems are built in a way which 
allows the development of a trusting relationship. 
One area where this is of special significance is in 
the production of information for use in emergency 
situations. Here interactions must be swift and 
smooth; there will be times when there is no room 
for questioning of the information and instructions 
which the system is providing.  This is particularly 
true in the world of aviation where action is often 
needed within a short period of time, where actions 
taken by the crew can be irreversible, and where 
there is little room for error. 
One method of achieving trust in the system is to 
base design on user models of the system's operation 
and produce information and instructions that reflect 
the goals and expectations of the user. This paper 
outlines an approach to the design of a warning 
system for use on civil aircraft which incorporates 
this concept. The approach is based on models of 
system operations which are compared to the real 
world by model based reasoning and other AI 
techniques. The paper also discusses the current 
limitations of the model so far produced and the 
elements that are required to produce a more 
trustworthy system covering all aspects of the 
aircraft operation. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Flying was initially an uncomfortable, difficult and 
hazardous experience. Early aviators soon found 
that the addition of a few basic aids helped them to 
achieve an acceptable and safe level of control, this 
heralded the development of aircraft 
instrumentation. As the functionality of aircraft 
instrumentation became more complex issues 
surrounding the interaction between user and system 
became more prominent. Current design guidelines 
indicate that the needs of the user must be met in 
terms of type and presentation of information 
provided, and that the design should allow for an 
interactive relationship to develop between user and 
machine. In order that this relationship operates 
effectively a level of trust in the system has to be 
arrived at and maintained. One way of seeing if this 
relationship has been working is to consider aircraft 
accidents and investigate the degree to which they 
can be attributed to a breakdown in this 
man-machine relationship and thus to see if system 
design is meeting requirements. An analysis of 
major accidents over the past ten years finds pilot 
error cited as the cause in 75% [1]. This explanation 
of "pilot error" is frequently used, but it does not 
always give the full story of how and why an 
accident occurred; it is just where the buck stops. 
However, it does indicate that at times the 
relationship may have broken down. It is in these 
high stress, abnormal situations, that trust in the 
system is most required especially as: 
• Time is limited. Information and actions must be 
carried out in a timely manner and there is no 
room for error, 
• Multiple warnings can cause confusion. There 
are two types of situation on an aircraft where 
multiple warnings are flagged simultaneously. 
The first is the genuine, although rare, case of 
simultaneous multiple failures. The second, more 
common case, is that of cascade warnings where 
failure in one system causes apparent failure in 
dependent systems; 
• More information is available. Increased 
numbers and complexity of systems and 
increased measurement of system parameters has 
produced an increase in the amount of 
information available; 
• Aircraft systems are not independent The 
activity of one aircraft system is interlinked with 
other systems, therefore a change in one system 
is likely to lead to changes in other systems or 
flight parameters. These interrelations are 
currently not considered in most abnormal 
procedures and checklists. 
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This paper reports on the results of a project set up to 
investigate the application of Model-Based 
Reasoning (MBR) to warning systems with a view to 
providing trustworthy, integrated, user-orientated 
information about system malfunctions, 
abnormalities and failures. 
2. AN INCREASING NEED FOR TRUST 
On the flight deck there are both specific warnings, 
lights/lit legends or message directly related to an 
abnormal event; and indirect warnings, information 
such as the presentation of limits of single or 
multiple parameters. The development of warning 
and caution systems for aircraft is inextricably linked 
with the development of aircraft instruments, and 
with the growth of the capability of technology 
available to the aircraft and flight deck designer. 
Indirect Warnings and Historic Development 
Instruments on the Wright Flyer in 1903 were not 
fitted for the benefit of the pilot but for recording the 
performance of the machine for engineers to make a 
comparison with theoretical predictions. 1909 
cine-film appears to show a Wright brother aircraft 
with the first instrument 'designed' to help the pilot, 
a piece of string in front of him, giving an indication 
of the angle at which the air was hitting the aircraft 
[2 & 3]; a warning of possible slip. Speed and 
attitude indicators were added to the flight deck by 
the first world war, but it was a technological break 
through, the usable gyroscope, that allowed the 
development of an artificial horizon which 
significantly moved instrumentation design forward. 
As instrumentation increased the need for the crew 
to develop tmst in the information presented also 
increased, without this the information would not be 
used. An early example of this need for faith and 
trust in the instrumentation was demonstrated by 
James Dootlittle who flew on instruments alone in 
September 1929. When the automatic pilot, the first 
flight deck automation, was added in the 1930's the 
pilot had begun to share tasks with the machine and 
systems. As automation has increased pilot trust in 
the information provided, and the system 
performance has become even more significant. 
During the 1950s a second major development 
occurred when electronic servo-driven instruments 
became possible. Now sensors could be placed 
remotely from the instrument, thus many new 
parameters could be brought onto the flight deck. 
Remote sourcing however removed the pilot's ability 
to check up on the system directly. Faith in 
instrument readings became increasingly necessary. 
Over the next few decades, systems design was 
consolidated until the third major technology 
change occurred; the introduction, in the 1980's, of 
what are known as integrated multi-function 
displays. These displays were initially based on 
Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT), but now there is a shift to 
Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD). Integrated displays 
have created significant changes in the opportunities 
for displaying and controlling information on the 
flight deck. For example the crew can now be 
presented with information sets tailored to their 
needs at any given time. However although these 
displays are known as "integrated" the information 
displayed is not truly integrated, formats consist of 
information elements displayed together on a 
common surface, it is not combined in anyway, the 
parameters shown are generally related to individual 
sources of data.  This approach is designed to cut 
down scanning, and save of flight deck panel space, 
allowing the time sharing of high priority panel 
space [4). 
Aircraft Warning Systems - Direct Information 
As indicated above a great deal of information 
associated with warnings and diagnosis is available 
indirectly from instruments on the flight deck used 
primarily for normal flying tasks. Warnings 
themselves must get the crew attention quickly, 
irrespective of current eye position or workload and 
must facilitate the right corrective action quickly. 
Specific warning systems began initially with a fire 
bell and a couple of warning lights. As the number 
and complexity of systems on the aircraft have 
increased and the ability to measure system 
parameters has improved, so the requirement for 
alarms and warnings has also increased. e.g. from 
the Boeing 707, 188 warnings to the Boeing 747 
with 455. Early aircraft had numerous warning 
lights spread around the flight deck (e.g. Buccaneer) 
[5 ], with increased numbers of systems and 
associated warnings, the central/master 
warning/caution feature was developed. This groups 
together warnings in the central field of view for 
both pilots. These system [6 1 were initially a group 
of lights mounted in the glareshield, some of which 
have an associated audio warning. These grouped 
warning functions together by system e.g. electrics. 
The Lightning was the first military aircraft to have 
this feature [5 ]. Specific coding for warnings was 
also developed using colour to represent urgency; red 
for those requiring immediate action; amber for 
those requiring immediate attention but not 
necessarily immediate actions. However, on most 
aircraft these are only single legends and additional 
information is required from other sources such as 
other instruments, manuals, and aircraft behaviour 
to diagnose the situation. 
These technology developments have provoked and 
accompanied a change in operational philosophies. 
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The move to multi-function displays enabled all 
information to be provided to the flight crew 
enabling the move to two crew operations, the 
increased reliability of aircraft systems invited the 
introduction of a 'need to know' approach to the 
provision of system information [7] first used in the 
A300 in the 1970's. The main elements of the 
modern approach to warning systems are; 
crew must now have faith in their system's ability. 
This faith is a fundamental element in the 
construction of a trusting relationship. The 
techniques applied to central warning systems which 
this paper describes have been used with a view to 
instilling faith and trust in the information and 
advice which the system provides. 
Quiet & Dark. The absence of visual indications   3. BUILDING TRUST THROUGH USER 
of normal conditions; ORIENTED SYSTEMS DESIGN 
• Simplification. Simplification of failure 
information (systems displays) and presentation 
of corrective actions (warning displays); 
• Decreasing Discretes. Reduction in the number 
of different attensons, using a basic attention 
getter to alert the crew to the presence of warning 
messages; 
• Phase of Flight Sensitivity. Warning displays 
adapted for the requirements of different phase of 
flight, with suppression of warnings for safety 
reasons at the most critical periods (e.g.. take-off 
and landing). 
The A3 20 is probably the most advanced system in 
use [6 ] which employs this philosophy. It provides 
primary engine instrumentation, the warning and 
alerting functions, together with synoptic displays 
and checklists of necessary actions on two CRT 
displays. 
Limitations 
There are, however, unforeseen side-effects of this 
development process.   Hand in hand with the 
increased automation and reduced crew size, has 
come a decrease in direct access to information about 
the status and activity of the aircraft systems. There 
is a loss of constant availability of many sensed 
readings, which can provide trend information that 
could be used to predict problems prior to their 
onset. Many systems now only call the crew's 
attention when parameters pass out of limits i.e. 
beyond pre-determined fixed thresholds. There is 
increasing concern that in unusual circumstances the 
crew no longer have the information, experience and 
skill to solve the problems that may arise. It is the 
crew's capacity to analyse, seek novel solutions and 
extrapolate beyond the immediate situation that is 
required. 
Accident/incident investigations have shown that 
automated systems can adversely affect crew 
communications and decision making as a result of 
the crew's reliance on the systems fostered by the 
reduced requirement for systems monitoring. The 
One indication that a relationship between the 
system and the user is sound is that the user is able 
to follow implicitly the reasoning of the system. If 
the underlying logic of the system is alien to that of 
the user misunderstandings, breakdowns in 
communications etc. will occur, and the user's 
confidence and trust in the system will be eroded. 
Artificial Intelligence techniques such as expert 
systems are intended to replicate human reasoning 
about problems. 
In recent years research has been carried out on 
expert systems to aid the performance of the operator 
in fault finding and diagnosis. The resulting systems 
might advise unskilled operators; help overloaded 
skilled operators; or perform some functions 
automatically where operators are highly overloaded. 
Many of the systems produced have been based on 
rules which are matched to a set of conditions. 
However, this approach means that the ways in 
which the system can fail and the symptoms 
associated with that failure are pre-determined Thus 
the system is apriori in nature [8] and any symptoms 
or failure modes which are not included within the 
rule set at system design can not be handled. This 
apriori approach would not be suitable to the 
warning system application because of complexity 
of the interaction of the various aircraft systems 
creates a considerable number of failure modes and 
an even greater number of possible indications of 
incipient failures. An alternative approach, namely 
model-based reasoning (MBR) has been adopted as 
it operates on an 'understanding', or model, of the 
underlying system; an understanding which is built 
on an idea of how the individual systems work, and 
how they interrelate. 
In general terms the MBR approach uses models to 
represent and 'understand' situations, events and 
systems. A set of models monitor system response at 
a local level, at the lowest level receiving 
information from the aircraft systems assessing the 
status and trends of the output parameters of the 
aircraft system it represents. The purpose of these 
models is to monitor the health, status and 
configuration of the associated aircraft systems. 
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reporting any faults or abnormalities in behaviour. 
The models are interconnected in a network with the 
links representing the interaction between system 
components (the model network).   The nodes report 
system status to an executive function, the Network 
Executive, which converts the information it is 
receiving forming a view of the overall situation. 
From this view the executive forms a plan, an 
ordered set of actions; derived from the standard 
operating procedures to ameliorate the effects of 
abnormalities, rectify the effects of malfunctions and 
maintain the safe operation of the aircraft. 
The models within the system use parameter values 
which are available to the crew and the actions 
which can be recommended are based upon Standard 
Operating Procedures and are therefore the same as 
those the crew would take if they had sufficient time 
to diagnose the problem and compose the action list. 
The crew and the system therefore have access to the 
same information and are constrained by the same 
operating rules; the system behaves as though it had 
the same training as the crew. 
3.1      Matching Models To User Understanding 
The models of system operation used in this 
approach are based on details of the aircraft systems. 
The level of detail within the models was 
constrained in two ways in order to match their 
operation and the data provided to the needs of the 
user and the avionics environment. The first 
constraint is that when a system fails or gives 
problems in-flight the ways in which aircrew can 
respond are restricted by their ability to access the 
systems. Normally they can either reduce usage of 
the system; use an alternative system to achieve the 
same functionality or lose the functionality [9]; most 
problems can not be fixed until the aircraft is on the 
ground. Therefore only certain information is of use 
to the crew. The models used have been designed to 
meet the needs of the crew and expanded a little to 
provide the additional information required to 
achieve a degree of diagnostic functionality that 
could be used on the ground. The second constraint 
on the level of detail necessary within a model is 
related to the level of information available on the 
aircraft. A model can only use and monitor 
parameter values that it has access to thereby 
reducing the complexity necessary. However, the 
aircrew will have access to the same range and detail 
of parameters and so the model is constrained to 
interpret that data which is available to the aircrew. 
This match of the models to the needs of the user 
and what they can achieve in the operation of their 
task and the use by the models of data available to 
the user are a design features which can help to build 
trust in the system's capability. Provision of 
information that did not meet the crew's needs would 
tend to increase workload and undermine any 
relationship. Also presenting information at a level 
of detail that is beyond the needs of the user or that 
is of no use to the user will increase workload, serve 
to confuse, and give the user a poor view of the 
system's ability to make a positive contribution, 
again jeopardising any trust. 
Operation of the Models 
With these constraints in mind the modelling 
technique which appeared most appropriate to the 
problem was the use of fuzzy logic models as used in 
fuzzy logic controllers currently being evaluated for 
a wide range of applications in which human 
expertise is applied to optimise the control function 
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At the core of such a model is a description of the 
correct operation of the system being modelled rather 
than a list of the ways in which the system can fail. 
Any discrepancy between expected correct operation 
and observed operation is then a fault or a 
malfunction. The description of the system being 
modelled can be derived from a number of sources 
including operator experience, design definition etc. 
As an example consider the model of a fuel pump in 
Figure 1. This model is being used to monitor the 
health of the pump without having any direct 
sensing of the pump. In this application interest in 
the health of the pump is confined to an assessment 
of the quality of its operation i.e. its fuel flow 
delivery pressure. A simple descriptive model of the 
pump would be: 
IF there is sufficient fuel in the tank AND the pump 
is switched on AND the pump is connected to a 
powered bus THEN the pump pressure will be 
NORMAL OTHERWISE it will be LOW. 
This model contains a number of descriptive 
elements. Those concerning the fuel level, the switch 
position and the power supply can be considered as 
binary. The others, NORMAL and LOW, applied to 
the pump pressure would be adequate and usable for 
the human operator but are not amenable to machine 
manipulation unless they can be defined more 
rigorously. The use of fuzzy sets allows this 
definition. 
Essentially the use of fuzzy sets is the mapping of a 
numerical value onto a set distribution. In the 
example of pump pressure three sets are considered 
suitable for a description of the value. The sets used 
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are illustrated in Figure 2 where a value can have a 
degree of membership between 0 and 1 of any two 
sets. Thus a pump pressure value can be represented 
as a vector (x, y, z) where x, y, and z all lie between 
0 and 1. When the pump pressure is NORMAL then 
the vector will read (0, 1,0) and when the pump 
pressure is LOW the vector will read (1,0,0). The 
model then states that: 
IF there is sufficient fuel in the tank AND the pump 
is switched on AND the pump is connected to a 
powered bus THEN the pump pressure is (0, 1,0) 
OTHERWISE it is (I, 0, 0). 
The sensed value of the actual pump pressure is 
then mapped onto these sets and comparison is made 
between the expected i.e. model, distribution and the 
actual distribution. Mismatches in this comparison 
process provides a fault detection mechanism. 
The threshold value used to give the conventional 
low pressure warning is set at the point in the 
distribution where the vector takes the value (1,0, 
0). It is therefore possible to detect an incipient 
malfunction in the pump's performance and monitor 
the progress of the malfunction, is it deteriorating, 
improving or stable, before failure occurs. This can 
be used to attract attention to an emerging situation 
and thereby provide additional time for crew 
response [10]. 
The interlinking of a large set of these simple models 
provides the means of fault isolation i.e. identifying 
where the fault has occurred rather than where the 
symptoms become evident. In the example used 
above the pump model required a number of 
conditions to be met in order that the delivery 
pressure would be within the NORMAL range. 
These conditions included fuel level in the relevant 
tank and power supply from the relevant electrical 
bus. This information would be derived from models 
of the fuel tank and power bus. Thus the pump 
model would determine that, if there were no power 
coming from the bus to which it is connected then 
the pump pressure should be LOW. If the actual 
pump pressure is found to be LOW the system will 
consider the pump to be operating properly and that 
the loss of delivery pressure is caused by the lack of 
electrical power on the bus. 
This process of fault isolation allows the system to 
identify the primary causes of a failure and avoids 
the problems presented to the user when indications 
of malfunction cascade through the aircraft systems. 
This approach appears to be readily understandable 
and cognitively accessible to the user. Use of fuzzy 
logic allows the system to reason in a manner that 
reflects that utilised by humans and provides 
information about trends and relative values. Use of 
knowledge of human information processing as 
incorporated in these models, leads to the design of 
systems that will reason about problems in a manner 
similar to that of the operator and therefore will be 
understandable and aid the generation of trust. 
M     Providing Output That The User Will Use 
User Expectations and Goals 
An indication that the relationship between the 
system and the user is working is whether or not the 
user will following instructions given by the system. 
If the outputs are not, or do not appear to be, correct 
the user will not undertake them, possibly leaving 
the aircraft in an unsafe configuration. The 
perceived correctness of the instructions is 
dependent upon an alignment between the user's and 
the system's understandings of the situation. The 
provision of trend information as described above 
enables the user and system to share a common view 
of the situation. Also the information provided must 
be sufficient for the user to understand the situation, 
but must not be at a level of detail that will serve to 
confuse or introduce work overload. This is 
achieved by various design features implemented in 
the system to assist the user. 
The configuration of the aircraft could be described 
by the position of individual switches controlling the 
systems and failure states. It is this configuration 
that has to be controlled in response to the 
information provided by the warning system. The 
purpose of the control task is to maximise the safety 
of the aircraft in abnormal failure conditions. The 
position of any one switch or state of any one system 
cannot be viewed in isolation since each makes a 
contribution to the overall configuration of the 
aircraft, and one system state can influence the state 
of another. The actions advised by a warning system 
such as the model-based reasoning system described 
here are concerned with reconfiguring the aircraft 
systems. 
Currently when single system failures occur the crew 
relies on the procedures laid down in the aircraft's 
Quick Reference Handbook for the optimum 
solution. However, these procedures do not cover 
multiple failures and unusual configurations. In 
these cases use of them could drive the crew to place 
the aircraft into an unsafe configuration, for several 
reasons: 
•    Contradictory Actions. Some of the actions 
specified by single procedures to solve different 
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elements of the overall problem may be 
contradictory; 
• Combined Failures. Two required procedures 
may specify actions which when combined 
remove essential facilities; 
• Consequential Failures. Loss of system 
functionality can occur because a supplying 
system is switched off. This form of failure is 
difficult to identify as consequences of system 
changes can spread throughout the aircraft, it is 
particularly hard to anticipate when systems are 
in unusual configurations due to other failures. 
When the crew are confronted with these problems 
they must use their knowledge of the aircraft, the 
limited procedure information available and their 
understanding of the situation to invent solutions 
which are compatible with their operating 
procedures. Coping with these type of problem is 
fundamental to the operation of the Network 
Executive. 
In single failure situations the Network Executive is 
required to produce the standard procedure as set out 
in the Quick Reference Handbook. However, when 
multiple failures occur the isolated fault procedures 
may not be the optimum solution.   The Network 
Executive uses the concepts of a goal hierarchy and 
constraint satisfaction methods to generate sequences 
of recommended actions. These are managed and 
integrated into user checklists for complex or 
multiple failure situation. 
The crew have a number of goals to meet which arise 
from their task to get the aircraft to its planned 
destination, ensure the safety of the operation and 
maintain passenger comfort.   Each of the goals will 
have different priorities that may vary with phase of 
flight and other events. Also goals are rarely 
independent of each other thus decisions about one 
involve the consideration of others. For example, 
switching off an engine will involve the loss of any 
generator run by that engine and consequently, at 
least temporarily, any systems run by the electrics 
associated with that generator. The crew must take 
the information that is available, their knowledge 
and experience and decide on the best course of 
action. The best action being that which will 
achieve the highest number of goal 'points' possible, 
(given that higher priority would have a higher 
'score' associated with it); e.g. if the engine is on fire 
loosing the generator to make the situation safe 
would be small price to pay. 
The system must understand the interrelationships 
and the values associated with different actions and 
outcomes to provide the aircrew with the best advice 
and suggested actions that will optimise the solution. 
If the system cannot achieve this and suggests 
apparently inappropriate actions to the user it will 
appear not to understand the interrelationship of 
systems and the consequences of the actions. Hence 
the user will not have faith in the systems ability to 
assist in decision making process. Under these 
circumstances trust would break down and efficient 
use of the man-machine system would cease. The 
advice provided by the warning system must 
therefore be orientated towards achieving the user's 
goals. 
Keeney and Raiffa [13] advocated an approach that 
was initially thought to be a possible solution to this 
issue. In their theory each of the goals of a system 
(or objectives) is given a weight value which can be 
used as a measure of the success of a particular 
solution. However there are difficulties with this 
approach within this application since the weights 
must be obtained through extensive interviews with 
experts in the total system. The difficulties of 
detailed knowledge elicitation is notoriously, and it 
is difficult to find an expert with a sufficiently global 
view covering the aircraft operations, the 
complexity of failures and the interaction of aircraft 
systems. A more simplistic approach is to order the 
objectives and use fixed lexicographical ordering of 
possible solutions. Such an ordering is much easier 
to develop and the solutions reached by it are easily 
explicable to the crew who can appreciate the 
reasoning, even if they disagree with it. 
Solving the problem of multiple levels of goals alone 
will not solve the total problem of configuration 
management, because of the interrelated nature of 
the action of the systems. There are multiple ways of 
satisfying each of the goals, therefore some form of 
representation of states that could achieve the goals 
is required, checking that all the required goals have 
been achieved.   The approach selected for the design 
of this system was based on Goal Tree-Search Trees 
(GTST) [14 ]. This approach involves the 
decomposition of goals into subgoals and the 
equipment states that they rely on. Each goal is 
functionally decomposed into contributing states to 
build a rule-based tree ultimately linking equipment 
states to goal states by many intermediate levels. 
The tree structure can be based on the knowledge of 
domain specialists or from the systems design rather 
than from a global expert. Unlike rule-based 
systems, which require heuristics and underlying 
rules from experts, the knowledge required is easily 
specified and obtainable. The nature of aircraft 
systems means that the resulting tree is intertwined, 
a network which makes the search for optimum 
solutions difficult. The network is in fact a form of 
model-based system itself. It models how the 
systems states contribute to the high level gaols, not 
to the individual systems. 
Using this approach the Network Executive also 
prioritises the actions required and separates them 
into logical groups. This is achieved through a 
multiple objective representation of the problem. 
These objectives, or goals, are obtained from 
discussion with pilots and analysis of the aircraft 
systems, and are prioritised in order of importance. 
When a failure occurs the optimum solution is 
calculated, any system state changes identified are 
related to the goal that requires them and prioritised 
in accordance with the goal's position in the fixed 
hierarchy of objectives. Thus what appears to be a 
complex single procedure is broken into several 
meaningful sub-procedures related to individual 
objectives thereby aiding understanding and 
situational awareness. This checklist information 
can be grouped under 'why' an action is required, say 
to stabilise an engine or reconfigure electrics; giving 
the user further information about what is happening 
and why the actions are recommended. . 
Text for Instructions and Integrated Checklists 
The system must produce an output which covers all 
failures and abnormal situations and produce 
optimal corrective actions across the aircraft 
configuration. After the identification of actions 
required, outlined above, the next stage is to produce 
a list of actions for the user. User's require actions 
which are familiar, which they can do, and which 
must take account of the whole aircraft 
configuration. Information presented to the crew 
must be logically ordered from a system and user 
viewpoints. The reasoning behind the information 
provided must be implicit, so that the user can follow 
what is going on. If this is not included in the 
design the user will not have faith in the ability of 
the warning system to meet their needs and the 
system will not be used. The MBR approach tackles 
this issue by the use of the goal hierarchy and 
procedural elements to solve each of the individual 
elements of the control of systems configuration. 
The warning system contains a set of minimal 
actions, e.g. switch off, in an actions table. These 
elements can be constructed in language, and a 
dialogue structure similar (if not identical to) the 
individual checklist items currently available on the 
flight deck. This means that instructions will be 
familiar and the meaning of these elements will be 
consistent at all times. This consistency and 
familiarisation allows the user to build up trust and 
faith in the system. 
For single failure situations these checklist would 
look, and contain actions, identical to those in the 
Quick Reference Handbook. When multiple failures 
occur the new procedures will be required. Each 
individual procedure generated is associated with a 
goal in the network structure. As these goals are 
prioritised in order of importance the procedures can 
be prioritised under the same mechanism. These are 
then grouped under logical headings of actions to 
attain a goal rather than the current systems 
orientated which does not work in the multiple 
failure case. Examples of these goals are Making 
Engine Safe or Resetting The Electrics. If the crew 
take action other than that advised the system will 
continue to generate advisory actions based on the 
current configuration of the aircraft 
3.3     Additional Features 
To operate as effectively as possible the user needs a 
complete picture of the situation, including the final 
status of the aircraft and its capabilities after a 
reconfiguration event. Providing this information 
will enhance the users view of the warning system's 
capability and ability to help them. The MBR system 
aims to achieve this complete picture with the 
capability to provide a variety of information not 
provided by current systems. 
Consequence Anticipation 
When a failure occurs the algorithm searches for an 
optimum solution, this solution does not only include 
the procedure to deal with the warning, but also 
advises of all other actions necessary to achieve the 
optimum state. These secondary actions will be 
responses to the effects of applying the initial 
procedure. For instance, when an engine fire occurs 
the engine must be switched off. In order that the 
electrical supply is maintained it may be advisable 
to switch on the APU and re-route the electrical 
supply by closing various bus ties. These actions are 
anticipated and presented before the initial action of 
switching off the engine is taken. The provision of 
advice in this manner allows the crew to see that the 
system has considered the impact of the 
recommended actions and that it is responding to the 
situation intelligently i.e. as the crew would if they 
had sufficient time to consider all options. This will 
increase the level of trust which the crew will place 
in the system. 
False Warnings 
In addition to providing correct data the system must 
not provide incorrect data. The production of false 
or nuisance warnings is a feature of a system that 
will rapidly undermined user trust. Discussing the 
development of Airbus ECAM approach Potocki De 
Montalk [11| sees timely and appropriate alerts as a 
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major factor in successful design. Guidance as to 
actions to be taken and information about how the 
situation will affect subsequent operations are 
important. Reliability and integrity are increasingly 
important factors in the design of warning systems. 
There are problems with both unwanted alerts and 
failures to alert (12]. Warning systems must 
eliminate events in the areas B and D in Figure 1. 
The fault detection and isolation process described is 
independent of fixed thresholds and thus has the 
potential to detect sensor failures and help eliminate 
numbers of false warnings. 
4.  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Aircraft Operations 
The current system has no knowledge of the aircraft 
operational goals; its destination; operational 
constraints etc. The advice which the system 
produces needs to be modified by the crew's use of 
this knowledge For example, if the aircraft has a 
slow leak in one of the hydraulic systems the impact 
of this will differ depending on the position of the 
aircraft within its operational plan. If the aircraft is 
flying long distance the fault will have more of an 
impact on the actions required than if it is only 
flying a short distance or it is close to its destination 
when it occurs. Much of this information may be 
available to the system through the Flight 
Management System and the navigation systems. 
Dynamic Goal Hierarchy 
The current system works with a fixed hierarchy of 
goals, however the ordering should be dynamically 
based on the different phases of flight. In future 
work these different hierarchies will be identified 
and the transition between them managed. 
5.  CONCULSION/SUMMARY 
The operational features required of the warning 
system to met the needs of the user in abnormal 
conditions on the flight deck are achieved by the 
model-based approach. The features of this 
approach are: 
• Early detection. Detection of abnormal 
condition development before action is required, 
giving early warning, enhancing situational 
awareness and maintaining a common 
understanding between system and crew; 
• Isolation of primary causc(s) of failure 
conditions. Sorting information into a flight 
related priority list for action, helping the crews 
to effectively process the larger quantity of 
information effectively and inviting the crew to 
trust the system; 
• Ordering actions. Provision of ordered action 
checklists in the event of single and multiple 
failures based upon standard procedures giving 
the appearance of common training.  This helps 
direct the crew to the correct actions, even if the 
individual actions for multiple failures would 
conflict, thereby assisting the crew in novel 
situations. 
• Indication of consequences of actions and 
inaction. Currently the crew are provided with 
little or no information about the consequences of 
their actions or inaction. In some cases actions 
once taken cannot be reversed; knowledge of this 
in advance may effect the most appropriate 
actions, especially in multiple failure situations. 
This encourages confidence that the system 
knows what it is doing. 
• Awareness. Continuous awareness of system's 
configuration, and enhanced awareness of health 
and status of aircraft systems. Situational.. 
awareness for the crew, the ground (for planning) 
and maintenance. 
The quality of the information provided can be 
increased and a potential reduction in crew workload 
could be achieved by the introduction of the MBR 
approach to warning systems. This in turn would 
lead to an improvement in the quality of decision 
making. This would increase operational 
effectiveness and safety. This will, for example, be 
through the system's; 
• ability to automatically prioritise warnings in 
multiple failure situations, in relation to the 
needs of the flight. 
• giving advanced warning of potential problems 
allowing for greater planning and more possible 
options to be available. 
• providing advice on decreasing the use of a 
system to maintenance capability for more 
critical phases of the flight. 
• reducing nuisance and false warnings. This is 
achieved by the application of reasoning logic to 
the situation. This will decrease workload and 
reduce the chance of the crews being mislead by 
them. 
The design approach adopted is user-orientated 
employing models which replicate the user's model 
of the aircraft system and which operate on the same 
data that is available to the user. The advice which 
the system provides is built up from the procedures 
which the user has been trained to undertake, the 
system should, and has, provoked the response, "It 
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thinks like I do", and thereby encourage confidence 
and trust in the information and advice which it 
provides. With the production of the capability at the 
user interface to develop a man-machine relationship 
that has its foundation in trust the man-machine 
system can perform more effectively. 
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Trust and Adaptation Failure: An Experimental Study of Unco-operation Awareness 
Taylor, R.M., Shadrake, R. and Haugh, J. 
DRA Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough. UK. 
1. SUMMARY 
The effects of variations in the adaptation performance of 
automation were investigated using a computer 
simulation of aircraft tasks, with levels of automation 
aiding under experimental control. Failures were 
introduced in the ability of the automation to intervene in 
a timely and appropriate manner, with regard to the 
prevailing tasks demands. Measures of performance and 
subjective assessments were recorded. Compensation for 
performance occurred without awareness of automation 
failure. The implications for the design of safeguards 
against adaptation failure are discussed. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Building  safeguards  against  automation  failure  is  a 
primary  concern  for  designers  of highly automated, 
mission critical, and safety critical aviation systems. 
While totally fail-safe flight systems are impossible to 
engineer, the designer must rely on operator intervention 
and manual control as default to maintain safety, with 
appropriate  margins  for human  error.     In  advanced 
automated systems employing Human-Electronic Crew 
(H-EC)   concepts   such   as   teamwork,   co-operative 
functioning, and adaptive aiding, functions seem likely to 
be shared increasingly between human operators and 
computers. In such H-EC systems, trust seems likely to 
be the psychological glue which  holds  together the 
functioning of the human system components. However, 
over-trust can adversely affect reactiveness to automation 
failure. Also, loss of trust, arising from unreliable or 
inaccurate machine or computer performance, can be the 
cause of operator unwillingness to utilise automation 
functions. Such reluctance, if unwarranted or misplaced, 
can lead to inefficient system operation and ineffective 
human-system performance. Thus, safeguards are needed 
against automation failure that ensure that operator trust 
in automation functioning is maintained at realistically 
appropriate levels.   Sources of automation failures can 
arise from  breakdowns at different levels of system 
functioning. Advanced    H-EC    systems    involve 
increasingly high levels of human-computer functional 
integration and interaction. There is a need to develop 
understanding of how humans might react to, and cope 
with, high level functional failures, and to develop 
appropriate high level functional safeguards. 
2.1 Trust 
Concern about under-reliance on automation, and 
undesirable manual intervention has led to interest in the 
social dynamics of trust between humans and machines. 
Investigations of the quality of teamwork in RAF aircraft 
tactical missions show that teamwork performance is 
affected by trust (1). Trust was a significant factor in 
distinguishing between good and poor " teamwork 
performance. Trust was rated at a significantly lower 
level in single-scat RAF Harrier operations (i.e. human- 
computer teamwork) than in two-scat RAF Tornado 
aircraft tactical operations (i.e. both human-human and 
human-computer teamwork).  Experimental evidence has 
verified that unexpected automation failure leads to a 
breakdown of trust, and to difficulty in the recovery of 
trust with a loss of faith in future teamwork performance 
(2,3). As trust declines, manual intervention increases. 
Other research has investigated how when workload is 
increased, over-trust or complacency develops with 
automatic systems (4). Complacency, coupled with 
vigilance problems, is likely to lead to failure to detect 
performance deviations and decrements in automation 
performance. People generally distrust computers. Trust 
between humans is engendered by continuous, repetitive, 
and reciprocating actions. In the same way, it is 
plausible that H-EC trust will build-up when automation 
performance conforms consistently and predictably to 
expectations, in accordance with agreed mission goals. 
Understanding the factors that affect trust could help 
design safeguards.  At the 1st HE-C Workshop in 1988, 
an investigation was reported of trust in two-seat RAF 
Tornado aircraft tactical operations (5). Tactical decision- 
making   scenarios   were   elicited   and   rated   for   the 
importance of factors associated with trust in the events 
described. These subjective ratings   showed  that  the 
demand for trust was associated with the perceived risk 
and the probability of negative consequences, whereas the 
supply of trust was  related  to  the  requirement  for 
judgement and awareness, and the uncertainty and doubt 
in making the decisions. Thus, relying on others to make 
risky decisions calls for a large amount of trust But if the 
decision requires another person exercising a high degree 
of   awareness   and  judgement,   and   there   is   much 
uncertainty and doubt in the decision provided, then the 
actual trust engineered by the decision will be low.   At 
the 2nd HE-C Workshop in 1990, a model was proposed 
of the relationships between trust, operator skill level, 
task complexity, workload, risk, self-confidence, and EC 
reliability (6).   Subsequent studies, in which workload 
and automation reliability were varied, led to refinement 
of the model to include the factors of    fatigue and 
learning about system states (7).    Other research has 
shown how trust can be modelled as  a function of 
parameters such as recent performance, and the presence 
and   magnitude   of   a   fault   (8).       Intervention   and 
automation use are influenced by the combination of trust 
and self-confidence in operators' abilities to perform the 
task by manual control. Operators will allow automation 
to have control if they trust it; and they will take control 
themselves if they distrust it, providing self-confidence is 
sufficiently great However, high self- confidence often 
produces a bias in favour of manual control. 
2.2 Adaptive Aiding 
The concept of adaptive aiding introduces complex 
demands for trust of computers. Adaptive automation is 
an approach to human-systems automation in which the 
control of the onset, offset and form of automation for a 
specific task or function is mutually shared between the 
human and the adaptive automation systems. 
Responsibility for performance or execution of tasks can 
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be solely that of the human or the machine, or can be 
shared between those entities depending on the particular 
strategy of automation used. In a recent review, Rouse 
(9) describes how early experiments with an artificially 
intelligent decision aiding system prompted conflicting 
intelligence, where the human and computer 
independently chose reasonable but conflicting courses of 
action. Co-operative rather than conflicting intelligence 
was needed so that the human and computer could 
complement each other to yield improved performance 
and safety. This human-centred approach was predicated 
by the condition that the* default between automatic and 
manual control should be manual. Humans should be 
able to perform any tasks they choose to perform; 
automation or aiding should be available in the event that 
humans choose to delegate authority to perform tasks. 
Human judgement should be the ultimate authority and 
the operator should be able to take charge. The idea that 
computers could take tasks, but not give them to humans, 
is called the First Law of Adaptive Aiding. 
In considering how to create co-operative intelligence, it 
became apparent that it was inefficient to strictly allocate 
functions and tasks to one performer. A queuing model of 
human-computer interaction predicted the advantages of 
a flexible, dynamic allocation of tasks among two servers 
over a strict, static allocation. System initiated 
automation, with either explicit or implied pilot consent, 
could help in situations of unexpected high workload. It 
followed that the nature of computer assistance should 
vary with the situation, including the state of the tasks, 
the environment, and the humans in the system. From 
this emerged the concept of adaptive aiding, with 
allocation, partitioning, and transformation of tasks in 
response to current and impending situations. 
2.3 Automation Risks 
Adaptive automation introduces new risks for successful 
system functioning, and along with it, the need for 
safeguards. Dynamic task and function allocation, with 
a manual default allows the possibility of unnecessary 
and inefficient manual intervention. With adaptive 
automation, different roles and responsibilities may be 
assigned for the same tasks at different times depending 
on the particular automation strategy being invoked. But 
this variability could easily lead to an appearance of total 
unpredictability unless care is taken in the design and 
implementation of adaptive automation. Dynamic 
allocation of tasks only makes sense if all the performers 
are aware of what each other is doing (i.e. both human 
and computer task awareness). Otherwise, tasks might be 
overlooked or task contention might occur. 
Sharing tasks and functions between humans and the 
computer introduces the risk of over-reliance and 
dependency on computer aiding. Reliance and 
dependency lead to reduced system awareness and 
degradation of manual skills. This becomes a problem in 
the event of automation failure requiring manual 
intervention as the default. In dynamic systems, when 
the information relevant for decision making changes 
over time, and is not static, a dynamic internal model of 
the task is needed to guide decision-making. An 
appropriate dynamic internal model of the important 
changing relationships will be difficult to maintain for 
regaining manual control following automation (10). 
Another problem is that operator detection of automation 
failure is degraded with a static allocation fixed over a 
period of time (11). Monitoring automation performance 
for failures is inefficient, due to a natural tendency 
towards complacency, and because of difficulty 
maintaining vigilance without active task involvement. 
Because of problems with failure detection and manual 
skill degradation, manual task «allocation has been 
proposed as a countermeasure to monitoring inefficiency 
and complacency. It has been shown that short periods of 
intermittent manual task «allocation, or cycling between 
manual and automation control, reduces failures of 
monitoring (11). By maintaining manual skill levels, and 
enhancing situational awareness, manual task re- 
allocation helps in the event that intervention is needed 
following automation failure. However, automatic re- 
allocation of tasks to manual seems close to a violation of 
the First Law of Adaptive Aiding, that the computer 
should not give tasks to humans. Also, as referred to 
earlier, without careful consideration of the procedures 
needed for implementation of dynamic task allocation 
and re-allocation, such variable assistance and allocation 
could lead to unacceptable unpredictability. 
2.4 Issues 
The following questions arise from consideration of the 
possibility of adaptation failure. They are indicative of 
areas of uncertainty for further research: 
a. Trust. What happens when the computer fails to 
intervene appropriately, or if there is an automatic 
reallocation to manual during a period of high workload? 
How does variability in the adaptive strategy affect trust 
and other attitudes that are likely to affect automation 
use? To the extent that trust is an attitude, does misplaced 
trust create cognitive dissonance, and if so, how is the 
dissonance resolved? If trust in adaptive functioning is 
lost, can the appropriate level of trust be recovered? 
c. Awareness. Awareness of task performance is 
important for dynamic function allocation. In human 
teams, there can be awareness of other individuals 
performance, i.e. someone not pulling their weight. In 
working with an adaptive co-operative system, variations 
in task demands will arise from the external situation, and 
from the EC's contribution to the team's performance. Is 
awareness of adaptation failure, or of changes in the 
adaptive strategy, a system design problem? 
d. Compensation. Human teams naturally compensate 
for variations in the performance of individual team 
members. Can the operator compensate for the computer 
by picking up the extra work? Is awareness of the 
variations in automation performance necessary for 
compensation to occur? If the same compensation were 
to occur bidirectionally in the H-EC team, could this be 
one mechanism which might engender trust in the team 
by others outside the team? 
3. EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Aims of Experiment 
An experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of 
variations in automation adaptation performance on 
operator performance, and on attitudes that might affect 
automation  use.     In   particular,   the   intention   was   to 
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discover the sensitivity of task performance measures, 
and of subjective rating scale dimensions, to automation 
adaptation failure, and to examine the structure of the 
relationships between these dependent variables. 
3.2 Experimental Method 
a. Subjects. Twelve non-aircrew subjects participated in 
the experiment All were staff at DRA CHS. 
b. Task. The Multi Attribute Task (MAT) battery 
developed by Comstock and Arnegard (12) provided the 
task environment. The MAT battery comprises a 
computer simulation of three tasks, namely tracking, 
monitoring and resource management, presented 
simultaneously. A diagram of the screen format is shown 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. MAT Screen Format 
The tracking task was a two dimensional compensatory 
tracking task that required subjects to keep a target in the 
centre of the tracking window. The monitoring task 
required subjects to monitor and correct deviations on 
four gauges. The resource management task was 
complex, and required subjects to maintain the fuel level 
of two main tanks at a specified level by transferring fuel 
from several supply tanks. All three tasks could be 
operated manually, via a joy stick and keyboard, and both 
the system monitoring and resource management tasks 
also could be operated either aided or fully automatic. In 
the aided mode, parts of the tasks were automated, 
leaving the subjects to monitor the automation 
performance and to complete the tasks. The tracking task 
was always manually operated. 
c. Scenarios. On the experimental trials, subjects were 
presented with four scenarios. The independent variable 
was the manipulation of co-operation given by the 
adaptive aiding. In all four scenarios, the invocation of 
the automation occurred automatically, i.e. changes in the 
automation level were initiated by the computer, and not 
by the operator/subject. Co-operation was experimentally 
manipulated by providing two co-operative and two unco- 
operative scenarios. In all four scenarios, the frequency 
of events requiring action, and the resultant task 
demands, increased as the scenarios progressed. In the 
co-operative scenarios, the level of aiding provided by 
the automation increased appropriately with the event 
frequency and level of task demand. In one co-operative 
scenario, the system monitoring task went aided and 
remained so; the resource management went aided, and 
then fully automated (Co-op /). In a second co-operative 
scenario, the resource management task went aided, and 
remained so; the system monitoring went aided, and then 
fully automated (Co-op 2). In the unco-operative 
scenarios, the level of aiding initially increased 
appropriately, but then shortly after the onset of a period 
of particularly high event frequency and task demand, the 
aiding automatically re-allocated to manual. In one unco- 
operative scenario, the system monitoring task switched 
to, and remained at aided; the resource management task 
also went aided, then warned to go fully automated, but 
then reverted to manual (Unco-op I). In the other unco- 
operative scenario, the resource management task 
switched to, and remained at aided; the system 
monitoring task also went aided, then warned to go fully 
automated, but then reverted to manual (Unco-op 2). 
Each experimental scenario was of five minutes duration. 
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Event Sequence 
d. Design. All the subjects were presented with the four 
experimental scenarios. Subjects received a 5 minute 
practice session before each experimental session, which 
included combinations of automation and manual 
operation of the three tasks. All subjects received the 
same amount of practice on the task, including manual, 
aided and fully automated modes. Subjects were 
instructed that the computer would attempt to give the 
appropriate level of aiding, but that accuracy of the 
computer's judgement was imperfect and that 
compensation may be required if the aiding failed to be 
appropriate. The order in which the scenarios were 
presented was balanced to prevent order / sequence 
effects, using the four sequences described below: 
Subjects Order of Scenarios 
1.5.9 Uncc-opl Co-opt Co-op2 Unec-op2 
2.6.10 Co-opt Unco-op2 Unco-opl Co-op2 
3.7.11 Co-op2 Unco-op] Unco-op2 Co-opl 
4.8.12 Unco-op2 Co-op2 Co-opl Uoco-opl 
e. Dependent Variables. Dependent variables comprised 
computer measures of task performance and subjective 
ratings. The following MAT task variables were 
recorded: root mean square (RMS) error on the tracking 
task; the number of correct resets, incorrect resets, and 
mean reset time on the system monitoring task; tank 1 
deviations, tank 2 deviations, and the number of pump 
activations on the resources management task. After 
each scenario, subjects provided subjective assessments 
on 7-point Likert rating scales of the timeliness and 
appropriateness of the computer aiding on dimensions 
(low to high) of 17 constructs related to trust and 
awareness. Situational awareness (SA) was rated using 3- 
d SART dimensions (13).The constructs for ratings were 
defined as follows: 
Confidence - Confidence in own ability to successfully complete (lie tasks with tlie aid 
of tic adajitive automation; SelfConfidence - Confidence ill own ability to successfully 
compete die tasks; Accuracy ■ Accuracy of own performance on tic usks with tic aid 
of (IK adaptive automation; Self Accuracy • Accuracy of own performance on tasks; 
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Automation Confidence-Confidence in ability of uV machine to support successful 
completion of ÜK tasks; Automation Accuracy - Accuracy of machinu in supporting 
successful completion of tasks; Automation Dependability - To what extent can you 
count on the machine to provide the appropriate support to the tasks; Automation 
Reliability - To what extent can you rely on die machine to consistently support cite 
tasks; Automation Predictability - Extent to which you can anticipate and expect the 
machine to support the tasks; Risk - The probability of negative consequences of relying 
on the machine to support successful completion of the tasks; ImpactlSurvivability - The 
severity and criticality of adverse or negative consequences of relying on the machine to 
support successful completion of the tasks; Decision Complexity - The extent to which 
the machines' decision on when and how to intervene and support the task can be 
regarded as a simple and obvious choice; Uncertainty/Doubt - The extent to which you 
have confidence in the machines' decision on when and how to intervene and support 
the task; JudgementlAwareness - The extent to which the machines decision on when 
«nd bow to intervene and support the task requires assessment, knowledge, and 
understanding of the task; Faith - To what extent you believe that the machine will be 
able to intervene and support the tasks in other systems states in the future; Demand for 
Trust - Level of trust required from you when the machine intervenes and supports the 
task; Supply of Trust - Level of trust actually provided by you when the machine 
intervenes and supports task; SART Demands on Attenlional Resources (D) - How 
demanding is the task on your aUcntional resources ? Is it excessively demanding (high) 
or minimally demanding (low) ?; SAHT Supply of Attenlional Resources (S) - How much 
of your attenlional resources are you supplying to the situation? Are you making the 
greatest, possible effort (high) or giving very little attention (low) 7; SART 
Understanding of the Situation (U)- How well do you understand the situation? Do you 
understand almost everything (high) or virtually nothing flow) ? (NJB. SA(c). is 
calculated from the SART ratings using the formula SA(c)= U - (D-S)). 
At the end of the experimental session, subjects 
completed ratings of the system on 21 dimensions of 
human-computer teamwork, based on the model proposed 
by Taylor and Selcon (1). 
3.3 Results 
a. Analysis of Variance. ANOVAs on the dependent 
variables showed no clear pattern of effects arising from 
the manipulation of computer co-operation. Significant 
differences were found between the scenarios on 
Resource Management tank level 1 and 2 deviations 
(p<0.001). Newman Keuls tests showed significantly 
more deviations in the Co-op2 scenario than in the other 
three scenarios (p<0.01). There was a small but 
significant difference between the subject groups on 
ratings of the supply of trust (p<0.05). There were no 
significant subject group/scenario condition interactions, 
and thus no proof of order or transfer effects between the 
scenario conditions. 
b. Correlations. Correlation analysis was performed on 
the performance and ratings data. This analysis revealed 
significant correlations between the many of the 
variables. A schematic representation of the significant 
correlations is provided in Figure 3, following the style 
used by Riley (6,7). In Figure 3, variables with 
significant correlations (r> 0.40) are linked by lines, with 
the strength of association indicated by the line width. 
c. Factor Analysis. Factor analysis of the subjective 
ratings found that four factors accounted for 62% of the 
total variance in the data. The results are summarised in 
Table 1, with ratings variables that obtained significant 
loadings on the four factors (> 0.45) shown in order of 
reducing weight, with positive or negative values (+/-ve). 
Factor 1 (-vc) Factor 2 (-vc) Factor 3 (+ve) Factor A (-ve) 
21.55% Variance. 17.65 ft Variance. 11.97 ft Var. 10.95 ft Var. 
Auto. Reliability Self Accuracy Impact (-ve) Uncertainty/ Doubt 
Auto. Confidence Confidence Supply of Trust Faith 
Auto. Dependability SA(c) Supply of Attcnt'l Decision Complexity 
Auto. Accuracy Self Confidence Resources Demands on Attcntl 
Auto. Predictability Accuracy Demand for Trust Resources 
Stiffly of Attcnt'l Understanding of 
Resources Situation 
SupHy of Trust (+ve)     1 
d. Teamwork Ratings. Factor analysis of the ratings 
indicated that the eigen values were too small to warrant 
further consideration. Mean ratings on the teamwork 
model dimensions are illustrated in Figure 4, relative to 
the benchmarks for good and poor teamwork reported by 
Taylor and Selcon (1). This shows that the ratings fall 
between the values obtained previously, with the 
exception of heterogeneity of Resources, and 
cohesiveness of Structure, which score below then- 
respective poor teamwork benchmarks. In general, the 
ratings for the Goals dimensions are relatively high, 
indicating good teamwork, whereas the ratings for 
Structure and Processes dimensions are relatively low, 
indicating the converse. 
LOW                                          HIGH 
GOALS: 
Clarity - defined performance objectives ♦             T     ♦ 
Common structure - shared understanding ♦              T     ♦ 
Tracking - awareness of changing objectives ♦        T      ♦ 
Impact • critical for mission success ♦      T           ♦ 
Achievement - high probability of success ♦               T     ♦ 
RESOURCES: 
Sufficiency - enough expertise & ability ♦     T        ♦ 
Availability - readiness for application ♦  T     ♦ 
Heterogeneity - variabk^inique expertise T4            ♦ 
Compatibility • ability to combine & integrate ♦ T                  ♦ 
Enhancement • ability to add expertise ♦  T         ♦ 
STRUCTURE: 
Goal driven - governed bv performance ♦  T       ♦ 
Accessibility - facilitates access to resources ♦ T         ♦ 
Cohesiveness - attracts conformity to norms T4              ♦ 
DFA - real-time role & task distribution ♦   T               ♦ 
LOA • degrees of independent functioning ♦      T      ♦ 
PROCESSES: 
Wide bandwidth -many comm. modes ♦ T      ♦ 
Bidirectionality • two way information flow ♦ T                      ♦ 
Shared initiative - leadership turn-taking ♦ T                ♦ 
Common knowledge-shared understanding ♦    T                  ♦ 
Trust - wQItng to accept others' judgements ♦     T          ♦ 
Table I. Factor Analysis of Ratings 
Key :T  = MAT ratings; ♦   ♦ = Benchmarks 
Figure 4. Teamwork Ratings 
4. Discussion 
The MAT data indicate that the subjects successfully 
compensated for the variability in the computer aiding 
performance, but with little effect on their assessments 
and attitudes to the automation. The high error rates on 
the resource management task in the Co-op 2 scenario, 
where the task remained fully automated, indicates that 
manual control was capable of producing better 
performance. Indeed, some subjects reported that the 
automation performance seemed relatively poor 
compared to manual. This raises questions about the 
validity of the MAT automation software. In contrast, 
despite clear inslructions to monitor the imperfect aiding 
invocation, with regard to timeliness and the level of 
aiding provided, most subjects seemed unaware of the 
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Figure 3. Schematic Structure of the Correlated Variables 
experimental manipulation of computer co-operation. 
Only 3 subjects noticed the computer warning to go fully 
automated, and then failing to do so, which raises 
questions about the adequacy of the MAT screen format. 
Mean ratings tended to be higher on four out of five 
automation performance dimensions (automation 
accuracy, dependability, reliability, predictability) 
following the co-operation scenarios, but none 
significantly so. Trust ratings varied about the middle of 
the rating scale (mean = 4.23; SD = 1.15). Mean trust 
supply ratings were higher, and SA(c) means were lower, 
following the co-operation scenarios, but again the 
differences did not achieve statistical significance. 
Despite the apparent insensitivity of the dependent 
variables to the experimental conditions, the correlation 
and factor analysis present a reasonably coherent picture 
of the relationships between the variables through the 
course of the experiment The co-operation manipulation 
probably exerted little influence over the picture that 
emerges. Considering first the correlations, the supply of 
trust was related to confidence in automation 
performance and to its perceived accuracy, reliability, 
and     dependability. An     associated     automation 
performance factor in the factor analysis (Factor 1) 
accounted for the largest proportion (21.55%) of the 
variance in the ratings data. The correlations show trust 
was inversely associated with impact/survivability, or the 
negative consequences of relying on computer to support 
the task, i.e. the more adverse the consequences were 
perceived to be, the less trust was supplied. A similar 
trust related factor (Factor 3) accounted for 11.97% of the 
ratings variance. Faith, referring to future performance, 
was more associated with the requirement for judgement 
and awareness in the computers decisions, with weak 
associations with decision uncertainty and doubt, and 
with perceived automation reliability. A similar, 
relatively weak uncertainty/faith related factor (Factor 4) 
accounted for 10.95% of the ratings variance. Self- 
confidence was linked to assessments of the accuracy of 
own performance, and to awareness and understanding of 
the situation. Self confidence/accuracy was associated 
with a strong factor (Factor 2), which accounted for 
17.65% of the ratings data. Understanding of the 
situation was associated with the MAT performance data. 
Thus,    consistent    with    the    evidence   of   successful 
compensation, performance was associated with 
awareness and understanding of the task, rather than with 
the apparent performance of the automation. 
Several points follow from the above. It seems likely 
that subjects experienced difficulty in distinguishing 
between tasks demands arising from the external 
situation, and demands associated with variability in the 
performance of the adaptive aiding. The subjective 
assessments were surprisingly uncritical of the unco- 
operation scenarios. There was no substantial loss or 
gain in trust, and consequently no basis for assessing trust 
recovery following unco-operative scenarios. Equally, 
there was no evidence of misplaced trust or of attitude 
changes to resolve cognitive dissonance. But then initial 
levels of trust would need to be high for awareness of an 
inappropriate reallocation to cause a revision of attitudes. 
It seems likely that the appropriateness of aiding 
invocation, level of assistance, and reallocation strategy 
are difficult to judge in a dynamic situation. The 
demands associated with the automation performance 
were communicated through a common interface, and 
shared a common representation with the external task 
demands. Variations due to the automation could be 
distinguished only by inference from differences between 
expected and actual automation performance. It seems 
likely that the expectations for automation performance 
were not clearly formulated, and that the compensation 
occurred smoothly and naturally, without a reluctant 
hand-over. Subjects appear to have maintained 
throughout a reasonably high level of confidence in their 
own ability, and in the computer's assistance, to perform 
the task. While self confidence is maintained, and 
compensation occurs without awareness, deviations are 
likely to be attributed to own, rather than computer, 
performance. Confidence in adaptive aiding seems 
dissociated from adaptation performance. Sen and Boe 
(14) report a similar dissociation between confidence and 
accuracy in computer-aided decision making. The 
teamwork benchmarks and ratings indicate that the MAT 
provides a reasonably representative environment for 
investigating human-computer teamwork. However, the 
profile falls considerably short of providing many of the 
qualities of good human-human teamwork. A more 
demanding and risky task, performed over a longer 
duration, with more complex scenarios than used in the 
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present study, may be needed for a more complete picture 
of what happens to trust following adaptation failure. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The First Law of Adaptive Aiding, that computers should 
be able to take tasks, but not give them, seems sound. 
Awareness of the current task allocation strategy is an 
important factor for system effectiveness, but this may 
not easily be achieved with adaptive aiding. Awareness 
is needed to avoid task contention, and to ensure that 
tasks are not overlooked or performed incorrectly. Trust 
is built on awareness of proven performance. Bi- 
directional compensation without awareness might 
engender false trust by others outside the team. 
Conflicting or unco-operative intelligence could arise 
from poor design, such as inappropriate adaptive logic. 
For this reason, adaptive strategies, such as manual 
reallocation, will need careful adaptive logic to ensure 
their appropriateness. Alternative forms of adaptive logic 
have been proposed based on either critical events, pilot 
performance measurement, pilot physiological 
assessment, and pilot modelling. The validity of the 
threshold criteria for triggering allocation and re- 
allocation will be critical. Predictions of pilot workload 
would seem to be the logical candidate for a model-based 
adaptive logic, particularly for manual task re-allocation. 
However, sufficiently reliable individual workload 
threshold criteria will be difficult to obtain from currently 
available generic workload models and measurement 
tools. Given the low predictive validity of human 
performance and workload models, the possibility of an 
inappropriate re-allocation from an operator model-based 
logic, or any other logic, will need to be anticipated in the 
design of adaptive systems. Measures will need to be 
taken to guard against the consequences of inappropriate 
allocation, adaptation breakdown or failure, or of what 
might otherwise appear to be unco-operative automation. 
As a safeguard, the system will need to establish operator 
willingness and readiness to accept tasks before 
reallocation. In addition, safeguards will need to be built 
into the human-computer interface to ensure that the 
operator has the necessary awareness and control of the 
current functional and task configuration. It may not be 
sufficient to provide legends for automation status; 
pictorial representations or dialogue may be needed for 
comparing the pilot's expectations with EC's plans and 
intentions. Poor co-operation could lead to mistrust, or 
be perceived as systematic and intentional, engendering a 
sense of paranoia. Safeguards may be needed to ensure 
that the H-EC share a common understanding of all the 
system meta- and sub-goals underlying co-operative 
functioning, i.e. the prime directives. It may be time to 
start considering how to implement the sentiment, if not 
the substance, of Asimov's Law's of Robotics(lS)1. 
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LA robot may not injure a human bcui^. or, tlu-ouf.li inaction allow a liuman being to 
cotiK (o lianit. 
2. A robot must obey Ütc orders Riven it by human beings except wliere such orders 
would conflict witli UV First Law. 
3. A robot must frotcct its own existence as lonr-, as such (votcctioii docs not conflict 
witli (lie l:irs( <t Second Law. 
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Abstract 
This paper reports findings from studies addressing the communication 
requirements of aircrew in current operational two-seat aircraft, in an attempt to 
identify issues relating to future single-seat operations. A communications 
analysis was conducted on video-taped air-to-ground training missions flown 
by experienced aircrew in a Tornado flight simulator. The analysis categorised 
the communications as Statements, Assertions, Questions, Confirmations, and 
Discussions, allowing a quantitative assessment of the data; it was supported, 
where appropriate, by findings from an information requirements analysis 
conducted through semi-structured interviews with RAF aircrew. 
The results are evaluated within the teamwork model of Taylor and 
Selcon (1993), who identified communication processes as the primary area of 
concern in the development of human-electronic teams, and their implications 
are discussed for issues of bi-directionality of communication, shared 
initiative, common knowledge, and trust. The data showed that more 
communication was initiated by the navigator, with the content of that 
communication comprising mainly statements to maintain current and common 
knowledge and situational awareness. They also showed a high degree of 
two-way information flow and initiative-taking. Further, the absence of 
contradictions, and the relatively small number of questions and discussions, 
implied that a high degree of trust existed between the crew. Recommendations 
for designing systems to support successful communications between human 
and electronic crewmembers are drawn. 
i Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr Steve Selcon, Human Factors Group, MMI Dept., 
Aircraft Sector, Defence Research Agency, Famborough, Hants GUI4 6TD. 
Introduction 
The trend towards single-seat crewing 
for future military aircraft has required 
consideration to be given to the use of an 
Electronic Crewmember (EC) to replace the 
functions of a second human crewmember. 
The concept of man and machine working as 
an intelligent, co-operative team is considered 
by many as being central to the production of 
an effective EC (1; 2). One potential solution 
to designing systems that will facilitate 
human-machine teamwork is to use expert or 
Knowledge Based Systems (KBS). The 
implementation of expert systems in such a 
way as to produce a synergistic relationship 
with the human operator raises a number of 
Human-Computer Interface (HCI) issues, the 
resolution of which is likely to be crucial in 
any successful system. Communication via 
the HCI is considered to be paramount in the 
design of interactive computer systems. The 
use of KBS technology in the cockpit allows 
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the system, or the designer through the 
system, to use knowledge of the user's 
information requirements to structure the 
interface to meet the needs of the operator 
most adequately. One method of achieving 
this is to employ an expert system containing 
knowledge about goals, actions available, 
etc. This method would support the 
interaction of the operator with both his 
expert and non-expert systems, by providing 
dynamic sensor-fused and information-fused 
displays. The embedded knowledge the 
expert system contains allows the display of 
information relevant to the task being 
performed, thus providing the information 
when, and in the form, required. An 
example of such an interface is the Pilot 
Vehicle Interface (PVI) described by Shellnut 
(3). 
To identify in more detail the 
communication needed for effective 
teamwork, a model of teamwork is required. 
Such a model was proposed by Selcon & 
Taylor (4) and is shown in Figure 1. An 
attempt to validate the model was conducted 
by Taylor & Selcon (5), who used a 
teamwork audit technique requiring 
subjective estimates on 20 teamwork 
dimensions, to identify which areas of 
teamwork were relevant and important in 
successful teaming for both two-seat human- 
human (pilot-navigator) and single-seat 
human-machine (pilot-avionics systems) 
crews. Although 15 of the audit constructs 
were sensitive to differences in realistic 
mission teamwork scenarios across the two 
types of team, only four showed significant 
differences between the single- and two-seat 
crews. The four constructs, which all lay 
within the Processes stage of the Selcon & 
Taylor (4) model, were: Bidirectionality of 
communication; Shared Initiative; Common 
Knowledge; and Trust. Since these 
constructs indicate the shortfall in current 
human-machine teamwork, and are all 
dependent to some extent at least on 
communication, the results of the present 
study will be used to attempt to identify 
possible solutions to such shortfalls and to 
suggest how such solutions could be made 
relevant to designing an effective human- 
electronic team. The approach taken here is to 
examine how communication is carried out in 
effective human teams (in this case military 
pilot-navigator teams) and to attempt to draw 
inferences from the findings for the 
communication requirements which would be 
needed to allow successful human-electronic 
teamwork to take place. 
Figure 1 - Teamwork Model 
1 
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TEAM RESOURCES 
1 
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Method 
Ten RAF Tornado aircrew (five pilots 
and five navigators) were used in the study. 
Data were collected by the post-hoc analysis 
of video-taped missions flown in a realistic 
Tornado simulator. Subjects were not 
aware,when performing the missions, that 
analysis of their communications would be 
conducted. Each mission consisted of two 
separate ground attack scenarios performed 
by a pilot-navigator team.. Enroute threats 
appeared on course to targets. Each mission 
was terminated by the introduction of an 
emergency situation. Thus, although the 
missions could not be made identical (since 
each team would approach the task slightly 
differently), all contained equivalent 
tasks/task difficulty. 
To quantify the communication 
between crew members during the mission, 
each vocal output was categorised under one 
of five headings: 
i)  Statement - an unprompted report of 
current situation, status, or data. 
ii) Confirmation - a response to a request for 
data/information. 
iii) Assertion - an unprompted declaration that 
an action is being or should be taken. 
iv) Question - a request for information. 
v) Discussion - a verbal interchange to 
examine or debate a problem. 
Communication was analysed by 
means of a cumulative total of the number of 
each type of output, for each crewmember, 
through the mission. 
Results 
The total numbers of each type of 
output, split by crewmember, can be seen in 
Figure 2. Statistical analysis was conducted 
on the scores using a two-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with a between-subjects 
factor of crew type (two levels: Pilot and 
Navigator) and a within-subjects factor of 
communication type (five levels: Statements, 
Confirmations, Assertions, Discussions, 
Questions). Post-hoc analysis carried out 
using t tests, adjusted using the Bonneferroni 
inequality to produce an experimentwise error 
of less than 5%. 
The main effect of crew type 
approached significance (Fj. 8 = 5.3, p = 
0.0505), with navigators (mean = 11.9) 
producing more vocal outputs than pilots 
(mean = 5.8). The failure quite to reach 
significance at the 5% level is likely to be a 
result of the low power of the test available 
from such a small sample size (n = 10). 
There was a highly significant main effect of 
communication type (F4i32 = 16.6, p < 
0.001). Post-hoc tests showed that the 
difference was produced by the higher mean 
for Statements (p < 0.001) than for the other 
four types of communication. There were no 
reliable differences between Confirmations, 
Assertions, Discussions, and Questions, and 
the interaction between crew type and 
communication type was not significant (F4< 
32 = 2.1, p > 0.05). 
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Figure 2 - Total number of each type of vocal output for pilots and navigators 
Discussion 
It can be seen from the above results 
that significantly more statements are made 
than any other form of vocal output. Further, 
the absence of an interaction effect implies 
that this is true of each crew member. Figure 
2 shows that statements account for more of 
the outputs than all the other categories 
combined. This finding has implications for 
the design of an EC. Since statements are 
merely reports of factual occurrences, they 
are amenable to generation by an EC. 
However, they are context dependent, and 
reflect intent inferencing on the part of the 
speaker. 
The results also imply that a much 
greater amount of communication is initiated 
by the navigator than the pilot. This in turn 
implies that, if the EC is to take over the 
functional responsibilities of the navigator, 
great emphasis must be placed on the 
communication abilities of the EC, 
particularly since the majority of 
communication is unprompted. Thus for an 
EC to become a successful team member, it 
must be able to initiate appropriate 
communication on a regular basis. Care must 
be taken, however, in drawing such 
conclusions, since the main effect of crew 
type narrowly failed to reach significance in 
this study. Also, it should be borne in mind 
that this finding may reflect the way 
information is displayed in the Tornado, 
rather than a generalisable trend across all 
two-seat aircraft. If certain information is 
displayed only to the pilot or the navigator, 
then communication is being forced to occur. 
If all information were available to both team 
members, then a different communication 
pattern might be observed. 
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The results of this study can also be 
used to examine the findings of Taylor & 
Selcon (1993) on teamwork differences 
between human-human and human-machine 
crews. Each of the four dimensions of 
teamwork found to be sensitive in the Taylor 
& Selcon study will be evaluated separately. 
The first of these dimensions was 
bidirectionality of communication. In other 
words, for a team to be effective, 
communication must be a two-way process. 
Current human-machine teams failed to show 
such bidirectionality. The results of the 
present study support the requirement for 
information flow from both team members. 
The high number of vocal outputs from the 
navigator underlines this, since, if the EC is 
to replace primarily the navigator's functions, 
it must be able to produce such regular 
communication to support the pilot's current 
mental model of the situation and hence his 
situational awareness. 
A second dimension where current 
human-machine teams showed weaknesses 
was in shared initiative. The results of this 
study show that, since the majority of 
communication was both unprompted and 
instigated by the navigator, the EC must be 
able to take the initiative in providing 
information when and where appropriate. As 
mentioned previously, this is likely to require 
the ability to assess the actions being taken by 
the pilot, and to infer from them his current 
intent, to maintain the relevance of the EC- 
generated communication. Such intent 
inferencing will be dependent on the third 
dimension discussed by Taylor & Selcon, 
namely common knowledge. If common 
knowledge is not designed into an EC, the 
implementation of current human-human 
communication patterns is likely to be 
difficult to achieve. Navigators have, through 
training and operational experience, a good 
understanding of the mission tasks being 
performed by the pilot. Such understanding 
is critical in allowing autonomously generated 
communication to be both effective and 
minimal. Thus, for the EC to achieve the type 
of communication patterns found in this 
study, knowledge of what the human needs 
to know at a given stage of the mission will 
be needed. 
The fourth dimension on which 
single- and two-seat crews differed was trust. 
Although trust per se is related only 
tangentially to communication, the results of 
this study do have some relevance to the 
consideration of human-EC trust. The 
absence of negations and the very limited 
numbers of discussions within the human 
team members in this study imply that a high 
level of trust must exist (at least in terms of 
verbal communication). Without such trust, 
communication will be much less efficient 
since checking/querying of information being 
conveyed will be required. Similarly, without 
effective and regular communication, 
appropriate levels of trust will be less likely 
to develop since each team member will have 
less understanding of what the other team 
member knows and is doing. Thus trust and 
communication must be considered together 
in the design of a successful EC. 
Conclusions 
The above discussion has identified a 
number of lessons that can be learnt from 
human-human communication, relevant to the 
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design of an effective EC. For example, 
communication must be available in both 
directions, but with emphasis on that 
provided by the EC. The EC must be able to 
take the initiative in providing information 
without being asked for it Further, there will 
be a requirement for intent inferencing in the 
EC, through common knowledge with the 
human, to maintain the appropriateness of 
such communication. Finally, the design of 
an EC that is able to communicate effectively 
will have benefits in producing trust between 
human and electronic team members.The 
results of the present study also indicate the 
potential utility of the approach of examining 
human communication as a means of 
identifying communication requirements for 
human-electronic teamwork. Future areas 
where such an approach could possibly be 
used would include analysis of the common 
knowledge required to allow intent 
inferencing, and investigation of other factors 
affecting trust between human-electronic 
crews. 
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1. SUMMARY 
Communication is one of the most essential ingredients for 
successful team work. Sharing knowledge, that is 
communicating to other team members what you know, is 
critical. When communication involves remembering a 
specific event, or details that happened during the 
execution of some procedure, psychological data on 
memory-enhancing techniques can be of great use. The 
discussion presented here considers one very successful 
memory technique, known as the Cognitive Interview 
technique(CI). CI has already proven itself, in the United 
States, Continental Europe and Great Britain, as a powerful 
communication aid. in contexts ranging from evidential 
interviews with trauma victims to marketing research on 
people's shopping habits. CI, it would seem, improves 
communication. We provide some background information 
about CI, its basic memory techniques, and also discuss 
how other features of communication, like trust or rapport 
building, can be improved through the application of 
memory techniques like CI. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Failures in communicating information — particularly in 
the context of team operations — lead to difficulties. 
Consequently, any technique that can enhance the 
successful communication of information between team 
members may become very important as communication 
tools. In some situations (for example, debriefing 
procedures) a person may be required to communicate 
details about specific events, or specific procedures 
executed, for example personal experiences regarding the 
execution of some operations. Although many of these 
details might be recorded, through technological 
procedures , the technological evidence may be absent or 
faulty, so accurate recall becomes essential. Under these 
circumstances,, cognitive psychology can function as a 
source of information for techniques that can be used to 
enhance memory, and thereby enhance communication. 
Today, we will be providing you with information 
concerning one particularly successful approach, that called 
the Cognitive Interview technique (Bekerian & Dennett, 
1992). 
3. THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE 
The Cognitive Interview technique (which wc will refer to 
as CI) has been one of the most effective applications of 
memory theory to real world problems, particularly when a 
person is attempting to remember details from a specific 
event. 
Cl is used widely by police forces both here in the States 
and also  in Great   Britain  and  Europe.    The technique, 
originally devised by Ed Geiselman (UCLA) and Ron 
Fisher (Florida), has been extensively researched, across 
different paradigms, materials, retention intervals and 
subject populations — to name only a few of the variables 
that have been studied. The general finding, although there 
are exceptions, is that CI increases the amount of correct 
recall without simultaneously increasing the number of 
errors. CI is distinguished from other interview techniques 
by its emphasis on four cognitive mnemonics. We present 
a brief description of each. 
4. THE COGNITIVE MNEMONICS OF CI 
4.1 Reinstate the context. 
The individual is asked to try and reinstate (or recreate) as 
much of the surrounding context that occurred during the 
event, including emotional/internal states. 
Generally, context reinstatement gives the person to 
additional cues that will enhance their ability to remember 
details. This is a phenomenon that has had extensive 
experimental investigation in the psychological literature 
on memory (e.g., Tulving and Thomson, 1973; Cutler, 
Penrod & Martens, 1987; Malpass & Devine, 1981; Smith, 
1979; see also Davies & Thomson, 1988). Generally, the 
effects are particularly notable when someone is being 
asked to produce a narrative report, such as when someone 
is asked to report an incident, or say what happened, 
including details of people, actions and objects. 
There are any number of ways that features of the original 
context might be reinstated. For example, a person can be 
asked to image, mentally, the surroundings before 
recounting an event; they can be asked to recreate any 
feelings or reactions that they had at the time; they can be 
asked to form images of objects, or of actions done, before 
they attempt to report details; they can be asked to 
remember the order of a sequence of actions (e.g., 
Eldridge, Barnard & Bekerian, 1993); or they can be taken 
back to the scene of an incident (e.g.. Bowers & Bekerian, 
1984). As of yet, there has been no systematic study that 
has determined which type of technique is more effective 
overall, or when specific technique might be more effective 
than others. However, as wc have already mentioned, the 
effects arc particularly noticeable when someone is being 
asked to produce a narrative report. 
4.2 Report Everything. 
The individual is encouraged to report as much as si lie can 
remember, irrespective of the level of subjective confidence 
associated with the information, or the perceived 
importance of the information. 
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Many people believe that confidence is a reliable indicator 
of the accuracy of information (see Noon & Hollin, 1987). 
As a consequence, people may edit what they report 
because they feel uncertain about a piece of information 
(see Loftus, 1978). However, the empirical work suggests 
that the relationship between confidence and accuracy is 
unreliable (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, 1989, Wells & 
Lindsay, 1985). Consequently, it is important to try and 
force individuals to disregard the confidence with which 
they recall a piece of information, and to report everything 
even if they feel uncertain. Oftentimes, they might be 
correct, but not terribly confident. 
Additionally, many people will fail to report a detail 
because they think that it is irrelevant or unimportant Of 
course, it is often the case that seemingly irrelevant details 
can, in fact, be extremely useful and important. 
Consequently, it is critical that the person be encouraged to 
report all details, irrespective of the perceived importance 
of the information. 
The theoretical rationale for the use of this strategy is 
compatible with the work on Signal Detection Theory, 
which was originally devised for modelling signal/noise 
detection. (Signal Detection Theory suggests that a 
person's willingness to report an event will depend upon the 
particular response bias (or confidence level) that is 
adopted.) 
4.3 Recall Events in Different Order. 
The individual is asked to recall the event in more than one 
sequential order, that is, recall the event from the end to 
the beginning, or from the middle, etc. This strategy can 
also be applied to lower level details, as in the scanning of 
images. 
According to memory theory, a change in the order of 
recall results in the person remembering the event from 
different mental perspectives; as these perspectives change, 
the nature of the information available for the report also 
changes, resulting in the recalling of new information. 
Empirical evidence has shown that changes in recall order 
can influence memory for information from different 
sequential positions, for example memory of actions 
occurring during'the middle of an event is enhanced if 
backward serial probing is used (e.g., Geiselman & Callot, 
1990; Mingay, Dennett & Bekerian, 1984). 
4.4 Repeated Recall Attempts. 
The person is asked to recall the event more than once, 
with some short delays between recall attempts. . The 
person is encouraged to disregard what they previously 
remembered, and try and remember the event itself 
The assumption is that repeated recall will enable the 
person to adopt if you will different mental perspectives, 
(hereby increasing the chances that new information will be 
reported Empirical   and   field   studies   support   this 
assumption (e.g., Shaw and Bekerian, 1992). It is essential, 
though, that the person is encouraged to remember the 
event itself, rather that what was previously said, otherwise 
the person simply attempts to be consistent with previous 
recall attempts and nothing is gained. 
S. RELATIVE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT 
MNEMONICS 
There have been investigations that have attempted to 
examine the relative effectiveness of the four CI 
mnemonics. Geiselman et al. (1986a) reasoned that if 
individual strategies were as effective as the complete CI 
procedure, CI could be modified or shortened, thereby 
saving considerable time for professional investigators. 
They found that context reinstatement or instructions to be 
complete were more effective than standard interview 
instructions; but, that neither were as effective as the 
combined CI procedure (see also Bekerian, Dennett, Hill & 
Hitchcock, 1990). Similarly, George (1991) has discovered 
that context reinstatement is the easiest of all mnemonics 
for the interviewee to use consistently and, that it is the 
easiest mnemonic to administer. 
6. COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS OF THE 
INTERVIEWER 
In addition to the emphasis on cognitive mnemonics, CI 
equally emphasises the quality of communication between 
the interviewer and the interviewee, e.g., the importance of 
rapport building. Fisher and Geiselman (1992) also state 
that it is important for both the interviewer and the 
interviewee to share in their expectations of why and how 
the interview is being conducted. These suggestions appear 
in most guides to interviewing and, consequently, are not 
unique to CI (see Shepard, 1988). Nonetheless, they are 
critical suggestions and should not be underestimated: The 
fact that both participants share a common goal, have 
similar expectations, and are seen to be co-operating is one 
of the most critical features of good communication, and 
will directly influence the accuracy and quality of any 
report or account that is produced. 
Finally, other guidelines about interviewing that are 
advised by CI proponents, although they are not considered 
to be integral to the administration of CI techniques (see 
Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), include the preference of open- 
ended questions over closed questions; the care needed in 
asking questions at a rate which allows the person to 
respond; the need to use language that is compatible with 
that used by the person (in other words, do not re-describe 
something using your own terms). 
7. AREAS THAT MAY REQUIRE SOME TROUBLE 
SHOOTING 
Fisher ct al. have also provided some useful information 
about problems that seem to arise with alarming 
regularities across formal interviews, in their case police 
interviews. We wish to stress to you that these problems 
arc not restricted to police interviews, and quite regularly 
occur in most interviews, be they job interviews, interviews 
with one's doctor or interviews with witnesses to crimes. 
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Wc stress that these problems -- which reflect common 
interview practices - are noted in the most experienced of 
interviewers. So, experience does not necessarily make an 
interviewers immune to these problems. 
Three particularly common interview practices were noted 
as likely to actually inhibit witnesses from producing a 
complete and coherent account. They are a) excessive 
interruptions; b) excessive use of a question-answering 
format; and, c) inappropriate sequencing of questions. I go 
through these very briefly in turn. First of all, excessive 
interruptions. 
The act of remembering requires some concentration. Any 
interruptions will, by definition, distract the witness. Most 
experienced interviewers begin an interview by asking for a 
free narrative account. However, Fisher et al. (1989), 
noted that interviewers on average interrupted four times 
per every response given by the witness (an average of 
every 7.5 sees.). George (1991) also notes in his field 
study of English Constabularies that officers not trained in 
CI asked significantly more questions per 10 minutes of 
interview than officers trained in CI. 
The second common problem noted by Fisher et al. is the 
excessive use of specific question-answering formats. This 
is asking questions where the answer is either yes/no, or the 
choice of answers is severely restricted, such as did he do 
X or Y? Certainly, all interviews rely on a question- 
answering format. However, Fisher et al. comment that the 
format often is one where very specific questions are 
posed, rather than more general ones. Although there are 
benefits to short-answer questions, they may inhibit the 
person from remembering additional information. 
The third most common problem is the inappropriate 
sequencing of questions. This takes a number of forms. 
For example, interviewers sometimes follow a 
standardised, rather formalised, line of questioning, rather 
than tailoring the questioning for the specific person in 
question. The result is that the line of questioning appears 
to be motivated by a specified checklist, rather than 
motivated by the account produced by the person. 
Another example of inappropriate sequencing is when 
interviewers ask questions that are pertinent to information 
already given by the person, rather than pertinent to 
information currently being given, e.g., returning to a 
previous point while the person is trying to answer another 
question. This interrupts the person's train of thought. 
Certainly an interviewer may wish to clarify on a point 
mentioned earlier. But, such interruptions are often not 
timed sensitively and the interviewers merely interrupts the 
person. 
Finally, interviewers may be very unstructured in their line 
of questioning. One question may ask about a perceptual 
features of an event, then the following question will ask 
about an entirely different type of feature,    such as the 
order in which an action took place. This rapid and 
unstructured shift in topic prevents the person from 
concentrating his/her attention on producing an accurate 
and comprehensive account. 
8. RELATIVE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT 
MNEMONICS 
There have been investigations that have attempted to 
examine the relative effectiveness of the four CI 
mnemonics. Geiselman et al. (1986a) reasoned that if 
individual strategies were as effective as the complete CI 
procedure, CI could be modified or shortened, thereby 
saving considerable time for professional investigators. 
They found that context reinstatement or instructions to be 
complete were more effective than standard interview 
instructions; but, that neither were as effective as the 
combined CI procedure (see also Bekerian, Dennett, Hill & 
Hitchcock, 1990). Similarly, George (1991) has discovered 
that context reinstatement is the easiest of all mnemonics 
for the interviewee to use consistently and, that it is the 
easiest mnemonic to administer. 
9. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CI 
CI is really only effective when some specific event, or 
events, are being remembered. Thus, for remembering 
facts, like telephone numbers, CI would be completely 
inappropriate. CI may also be more effective when the 
event is relatively infrequently experienced. Thus, should 
the event in question be one that the person has 
experienced on a regular and consistent basis (such as 
returning home from work each day), it is important that 
certain steps be taken in order to facilitate the person's use 
of the mnemonics, for example reinstating as much of the 
physical environment as possible. Equally, if there had 
been a delay between the event and the time of recall, the 
person might be asked to link the event with other 
significant events that may have happened around that time 
(a procedure that is called anchoring). 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
CI is one of the most powerful interviewing tools that is 
available from the psychological literature on memory. CI 
incorporates basic principles that are known to facilitate the 
recall of specific events, and also emphasises the 
importance of communicative skills of the interviewer. In 
this way, it can be seen as an important communication aid, 
both in terms of facilitating memory, and also in terms of 
enhancing trust and rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee or crew member and debriefing officer. 
However, it is advisable that prior to the use of CI, 
interviewers are trained formally. This is primarily 
because, as is the way with all skills, CI is better 
administered by people who have had at least some 
experience in interviewing with CI. Training courses 
provide such initial experience. Fortunately, there arc 
many courses now on offer internationally that provide 
such training. So, CI is not only effective but also 
accessible. 
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Must the Human - Electronic Crewmember Team Pass the Turing Test? 
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1. SUMMARY 
"Somewhat paradoxically, machines that 
can do more, and do it faster, provide the 
basis for systems that are increasingly 
demanding of the human operator, 
particularly in terms of cognitive require- 
ments" [Howell, 1993, p.235]. 
The Human - Electronic Crew- 
member Team is designed to solve 
this paradox by having the Elec- 
tronic Crewmember support the 
pilots, thereby making their job 
easier. This support will, in turn, build 
up the pilots' trust in the Electronic 
Crewmember. However, this trust 
may not transfer to others outside 
the team who realize that one of the 
members is a machine. If the 
machine could appear to behave as 
a human - pass the Turing Test - 
then trust by outsiders may increase. 
This paper describes both the Turing 
Test and guidelines for building trust 
in human-intelligent machine sys- 
tems. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
An inherent mistrust of computers 
has been expressed by many 
people. In the development of a 
teleterminal (a computerized tele- 
phone) researchers found that 
subjects using the prototype said 
they disliked the software designers 
they called the "programming priest- 
hood", and by implication, their 
creations (Hagelbarger & Thompson, 
1983). This mistrust could easily 
extend to the Human - Electronic 
Crewmember (H-EC) Team, 
especially the electronic portion of 
the team. One could postulate that 
mistrust might be lessened if the EC 
seemed more human to those 
interacting with the H-EC Team. 
That is, would the team engender 
more trust if both members 
appeared human - if the EC could 
pass the Turing Test? 
In the 1950's Alan Turing wrote an 
article concerning the intelligence of 
machines. The issue centered on 
proving that a machine possessed 
intelligence, and Turing proposed a 
test which he hoped would settle this 
point. The essence of the test 
involved an interrogator and two 
others who were being questioned, 
none of whom could see each other. 
The interrogator sat at a computer 
terminal and sent questions to the 
other two (one female and one male) 
who were in separate room and also 
had computer terminals. The goal of 
the interrogator was to determine the 
gender of each. To make the test 
more interesting, one of people 
being questioned was told to tell the 
truth, while the other was told to give 
false or misleading answers. Let us 
say in our case the male was to lie 
and the female was to tell the truth. 
For example if the interrogator asked 
them if they were male, the female 
would say no, but the male would 
also say no. Turing further proposed 
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that if a machine were substituted for 
one of the humans being 
questioned, and the interrogator 
could not tell the difference, the 
machine would possess the qualities 
of intelligence. One could speculate 
that if the EC passed the Turing 
Test, the team would be trusted 
more by those who interact with it. 
Another major component required 
for outsiders to trust the H-EC team 
is that it consistently make correct 
decisions and execute correct 
actions (Muir, 1987). The EC's 
passing the Turing test does not 
guarantee that the EC will perform 
flawlessly. Recall that in the Turing 
Test, after the computer had been 
substituted for one of the two 
humans being questioned (say the 
one who could give false or 
misleading answers) the object of 
the interrogator was to determine 
which of the two was human and 
which was machine. Turing uses the 
example of the interrogator asking 
the two being questioned to add 
34957 and 70764. The computer 
pauses about 30 seconds and 
presents the answer 105621. Not 
only did the computer put in an 
excessively long delay (for a 
computer), but also came up with an 
incorrect answer -- 105721 is 
correct. The reason for these actions 
is because the computer was trying 
to mimic human behavior, and, in 
this case, chose behavior which 
would definitely not lead to trust by 
those outside the H-EC Team. 
If passing the Turing Test does not 
build up trust between the team and 
outsiders, then what are the means 
to   achieve this goal? Trust comes 
about when an observer sees 
consistency (and correctness) in 
behavior from an individual or a 
team. The team's consistency within 
itself is built up when the individual 
team members are themselves 
consistent and correct in their 
decisions and actions. The following 
guidelines discuss how trust can be 
built within the team, after which the 
team can then behave consistently 
to outside observers and gain their 
trust. 
3. TRUST GUIDELINES 
Guidelines for building up trust within 
the H-EC Team have been 
previously presented (Emerson and 
Reising, 1990; Reising, Emerson, & 
Munns, 1993). Two of the most 
important were the establishment of 
Prime Directives and Levels of 
Autonomy. Prime Directives are 
overall governing rules, which bound 
the behavior of the EC so that the 
pilot does not experience any 
surprises. Levels of autonomy also 
bound the behavior of the EC by 
limiting its decision authority to a 
level specified by the pilot. These, 
and other guidelines are discussed 
in more detail in the following 
sections. 
3.1 Define the EC's Prime Dir- 
ectives 
One essential feature of a successful 
team is trust in the other partner. 
This in turn implies that the partner 
behaves in a rational and reliable 
manner; one partner cannot initiate 
actions which, even though they are 
logical to it, appear to be illogical to 
the other.   In order to avoid arbitrary 
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actions, there must be some overall 
governing rules which provide the 
logical structure under which both 
members operate. As examples of 
explicitly stated governing rules, 
consider the three laws of robotics 
(Asimov, 1950). 
1. A robot may not injure a 
human being, or through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to 
harm. 
2. A robot must obey the 
orders given to it by human beings 
except where such orders would 
conflict with the first law. 
3. A robot must protect its 
own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the 
first or second law. 
These rules provide the guidance 
required to allow a robot to perform 
its job in a reasonable and 
consistent manner. If the word 
"pilot" is substituted for the word 
"human" in the above example, a 
possible basis for governing the 
behavior of the EC exists. The three 
laws stated above are only examples 
of governing rules, and they would 
require major changes to be 
applicable in a military setting. For 
instance, without modification the 
ideal robot would not allow pilots to 
take off, knowing that they were 
deliberately going in harm's way. 
The point is, however, that rules of 
this type provide the basis for 
consistent behavior by the EC and 
thereby provide a foundation of trust 
for the pilot. It is through this trust 
that an effective team can be built. 
3.2 Specify the EC's Levels of 
Autonomy 
Another means of establishing pilot 
trust in the EC is to allow the pilot to 
decide how much authority or levels 
of autonomy (LOA) to give the EC. 
"LOA defines a small set ('levels') of 
system configurations, each con- 
figuration specifying the degree of 
automation or autonomy (an 
'operational relationship') at which 
each particular subfunction per- 
forms. The pilot sets or resets the 
LOA to a particular level as a 
consequence of mission planning, 
anticipated contingencies, or inflight 
needs" (Krobusek, Boys, & Palko, 
1988, p. 124). For instance, the 
pilots could establish a "contract" 
with the EC in the pre-mission 
phase. They could, through a 
dialogue at a computer workstation, 
define what autonomy they wish the 
EC to have as a function of flight 
phase and system function. As an 
example, weapon consent would 
always remain exclusively the pilots' 
task, but reconfiguration of flight 
control surfaces to get the best flight 
performance in the event of battle 
damage would be the exclusive task 
of the EC. 
3.3 Conform to the Pilot's Mental 
Model 
The EC must not only be bounded in 
the overall authority it has, but also 
must appear to perform logically 
within those bounds. Mental models 
play an important part in the efficient 
operation of systems (Wickens, 
1992). Since direct views of the 
inner workings of a system are often 
not possible, e.g., the flow of 
electrons inside the avionics system, 
displays are a major means of 
conveying      information     on     the 
113 
Operation of a system. The closer 
the EC's display formats conform to 
the pilots' mental model, the more 
beneficial they will be. Pilots form a 
mental picture of how a system 
should work (at a top level) and base 
their trust in the system according to 
how the system conforms to this 
picture or mental model. A mental 
model is a representation formed by 
a user of a system and/or task, 
based on previous experience as 
well as current observation, which 
provides, (most if not all) of their 
subsequent system understanding 
and consequently dictates the level 
of task performance (Wilson & 
Rutherford, 1989). 
These three ideas have been 
underlined in the above definition to 
stress its key aspects: represen- 
tation, understanding and task 
performance. The pilots' representat- 
ion leads to their understanding of 
the system which in turn leads to 
their performance with the system. 
For example, if the pilots' mental 
model of a fuel system pictures the 
flow valve lever in line with the flow 
when the fuel is moving and at right 
angles when the flow is shut off, 
then that is the way it should be 
portrayed. It is not important that the 
valves are electronic and do not 
have a flow valve handle to turn. An 
example of not conforming to an 
operator's mental model is illustrated 
by the use of reverse notation on 
early calculators. To add 3 + 2 = 5 
instead of punching the keys in this 
order, the task must be performed in 
the following order 3 then 2 then +. 
Needless to say many operators had 
difficulty in using these calculators. 
3.4 Make the Interface with the EC 
Transparent 
When pilots communicate with their 
team members in aircraft such as 
the Royal Air Force's GR-1 Tornado 
or the US Air Force's F-15E Strike 
Eagle, they frequently use voice, a 
very natural means of communi- 
cations. Unfortunately, when pilots 
communicate with the aircraft's 
onboard computers, they are often 
forced to wade through numerous 
levels of indenture to reach the 
appropriate command. However, 
new interface devices have lessened 
this problem. Touch sensitive 
overlays and voice controls are two 
means to achieve easy com- 
munications. Boeing's new 777 uses 
touch sensitive cursor control 
devices so that the Captain and First 
Officer can achieve easier 
interaction with the multiple AMLCD 
displays on the flight deck. As 
another example, some recent 
experiments with a connected word 
recognizer have shown that it is 
possible to use conversational 
commands and still achieve 99% 
recognition accuracy (Barry, Solz, 
Reising, and Williamson, 1994). 
The ultimate goal of the conver- 
sational commands is to emulate the 
interaction of the GR-1 and F-15E 
crews. 
3.5 Present Summarized Infor- 
mation 
Even though an efficient means of 
communication exists between the 
pilot and the EC, it does not mean 
that information always flows in a 
clear and concise way between 
them.   In   modern   military   aircraft 
114 
cockpits, pilots very often suffer from 
data overload, and with the inclusion 
of information from off-board 
sources, this overload problem may 
get worse. The designers of the EC 
can solve this problem by allowing 
the EC to present only summarized 
information. Icon based display 
formats, supplemented by text when 
necessary, are a very efficient way to 
achieve this goal. Steiner (1989) 
presented pilots with system status 
information in both text form and 
through icons. For very simple 
displays the pilots performed equally 
well with either type of display; 
however, as the displays became 
more complex, as measured in bits, 
the icon based format was clearly 
superior. The pilots comments also 
supported the fact that icon based 
formats were easier to interpret and 
gave better situational awareness. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In order to function effectively, the 
pilot and the EC must work together 
as a close-knit team. The ideal 
relationship between pilot and EC 
can be likened to that of the good 
manager and his staff. The pilot 
manager must be sufficiently aware 
of the work of the EC to be able to 
predict problems, but not so involved 
as to do its work. In other words, the 
pilot must be involved enough to be 
able to offer assistance when called 
upon, and yet must not micro- 
manage the EC and risk becoming 
overloaded and prevented from 
making strategic decisions. The 
good manager will know which staff 
members can be relied on to act 
without supervision, just as the pilot 
will  form opinions of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the EC and 
decide when it can be given 
autonomy. As in the conventional 
management situation, the EC must 
maintain a knife-edge balance of 
providing sufficient data exchange 
without swamping the pilot system 
manager. By using the guidelines 
discussed in this paper, a good 
manager-staff relationship can be 
achieved within the H-EC Team, 
resulting in trust within the team. 
This internal trust will lead to an 
efficient and effective team. Others 
outside the team will see consistently 
correct performance, and will, in 
turn, gain trust in the team. 
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SYNOPSIS 
In this section, six papers focus on methodologies and requirements for the design of HE-C interfaces. Paper 17 concerns an 
advisory system for making human-computer interfaces more reliable; Paper 18 describes an Al-based methodology and data 
base for task analysis and synthesis; Paper 19 concerns applications of a cognitive modelling design tool for human-system 
integration; Paper 20 reports an experimental study of automation invocation procedures; Paper 21 reports the evaluation of 
aircraft H-EC interface display formats; and Paper 22 considers the need for standards and engineering methods to promote 
trustworthy HE-C teamwork. Paper 17 describes the development of the ARCHIE software kernal. The system monitors the 
operator and the environment, and provides advice about how the interface could be improved dynamically, in real-time. The aim 
is to help avoid and correct user errors, and to assist in management of operator workload. The system includes operator 
monitoring, optimisation of multi-modal inputs and controls, and plan recognition. Applications include interfaces for physically 
disabled people, as well as for ATC and cockpit environments. Paper 18 describes a Human Factors Task Database, and 
considers the roles of functional programming and expert systems in human performance analyses. An example task history is 
described for an aircraft navigation scenario. The expert system aids task analysis by generating legal task combinations, by 
analysing potential workload problems, and by recommending design changes or task allocation options. Paper 19 compares 
design concepts for integrating computers into cockpits and nuclear power plant control rooms. A NASA computer modelling 
tool (MIDAS) is described for computational modelling and prototyping of the cognitive implications of proposed interface 
designs, early enough for the latest ergonomics data to be useful. MIDAS outputs for a control room example are given. Paper 
20 reports an experimental study of the effects of different levels of pilot involvement in the procedure for automation 
invocation, i.e. the criteria for dynamic HE-C task allocation. Using the MINSTAR task battery, similar to MAT (see Paper 13), 
performance with four levels of automation was compared, ranging from complete pilot control to complete systems (i.e. EC) 
control. In the intermediate automation conditions, the shift from manual to automated status was cued by visual and aural 
warnings, or by changes in the tracking display presentation. The results are discussed in terms of the consistency of warning 
systems, fractionation of performance, and workload associated with invoked automation. Recommendations are made for 
adaptive allocation based upon a contextual model of the environmental constraints on humin control strategies. Paper 21 
reports the design of "intuitive" HE-C display formats, and of associated controls, and their evaluation in man-in-the-loop flight 
simulations, with human emulation of an EC. The experimental cockpit simulated large area, flat panel displays, with a natural 
speech EC voice control system. Recommendations are made for head-up cues, voice control. EC prompts, simplified options 
presentation, and format removal. Consistent indications are given of preferred EC role allocations during high workload, with 
EC as systems and flight path manager, and the pilot as mission manager. Paper 22 discusses the special nature of HE-C 
teamwork. By representing a knowledge system, rather than a program-level system, HE-C teamwork engenders specific 
requirements for design standards. From a review of the present state of HE-C technologies, and of associated standards, the 
author proposes that what is needed is a design process standard for HE-C systems operating at !he knowledge level. The design 
and testing of HE-C teamwork is considered against threats to trustworthiness from competing perspectives. A framework is 
proposed for considering the level of maturity of HE-C teamwork. It is concluded that while at the current early stage of 
maturity, the way forward is a checklist approach to assessing teamwork, promoted under the umbrella of safety management. 
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Summary 
With the increasing amount of computer power 
available in civilian flight decks it is becoming 
feasible to use some of this power for non-flight- 
critical systems. One area which could benefit 
greatly from some additional computer assistance 
is the pilot-machine interface. We describe the 
ARCHIE project. An investigation into making 
human-computer interfaces more robust and 
reliable. The initial target areas of this project are 
civilian glass cockpit flight decks and air traffic 
control stations. 
Introduction 
"No matter how much has been done to design a 
workplace, its equipment and the worker's shift 
patterns to keep alertness at a maximum, there is 
no guarantee that people will not fall asleep on the 
job ... Imagine a future operator seated at the 
controls of a high-tech plant in the small hours of 
the night. She is well trained in sleep and alertness 
management, but the work is monotonous that 
night and her alertness starts to wane. Unobtrusive 
infrared eye-tracking technology or a light weight 
head-mounted monitor picks up the first signs. 
Without her noticing, the brightness of the 
illumination in her glare-free room is automatically 
increased, and the layer of air at head level is 
cooled. A stimulating aroma wafts into the room, 
while the computer flashes a low-priority but 
interesting task onto her screen. Instead of slipping 
into a zombie-like state, she is restored to full 
alertness, and is once again up to the task of coping 
with an emergency, should it arise. 
...When such technology becomes a standard 
feature of 24-hour operations, our society will 
finally have reversed the tendency that leads to so 
many industrial breakdowns and disasters"! 1]. 
Our aim is to develop a transparent software kernel 
which runs in parallel with the flight software, 
monitoring the operator and the cockpit 
environment, and providing pertinent timely 
advice. There have been a few attempts at this sort 
of assistance on the flight deck before, but the 
ARCHIE approach is unique in that it is a generic 
system, not tied specifically to any one application 
(such as flight management software, air traffic 
control software, etc.). 
ARCHIE is a collaborative project with kernel 
development work being shared between Dundee 
and Computer Resources International (Denmark). 
The other partners are GEC-Marconi Avionics 
(UK), Bertin & CIE (France), Sofreavia (France) 
and the UK Civil Aviation Authority. 
The goal of the ARCHIE project is to create a 
software kernel which, when run in parallel with an 
existing application, will increase the reliability of 
the human computer interaction between the 
application and it user. The kernel monitors the 
operator, the environment and the current state of 
the application and, on the basis of this information 
offers advice about how the interface could be 
improved dynamically in real-time. It also offers 
the ability to use alternative input modalities for 
non-flight-critical functions (such as radio tuning) 
and attempts to predict (and thus help avoid) user 
errors. The system is designed to run on a 
heterogeneous distributed network of computers, 
with the application software running under the 
UNIX operating system in an X windows 
environment. Typically, the bulk of the kernel runs 
on UNIX workstations, with the additional input 
device processing being done on separate, smaller 
machines, such as IBM personal computers, all 
communicating over an Ethernet network. 
Although the environment described was used for 
the development work, the ARCHIE system is not 
tied to any specific operating system, architecture 
or windowing system. 
The kernel is purely an advisory system, offering 
advice to the application which is free to act on it 
or ignore it as it sees fit. Although little or no 
modification of the application is needed to use the 
ARCHIE kernel in its most basic way, the 
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application designer is responsible for supplying 
the software to act on the recommendations given 
by the kernel. For example, the kernel might 
suggest that a certain window should be larger and 
more prominent on the screen. The application 
would have to decide if such a change was 
appropriate at the time and, if it was, call routines 
to make the necessary changes. 
The ARCHIE system achieves its design goals via 
three main facilities of Operator Monitoring, 
Multimodality and Plan Recognition. 
Operator Monitoring 
Devices can be connected to the kernel to monitor 
the operator and the environment. These data, 
along with knowledge about the user, are used as 
the basis for recommendations about the interface 
which are sent to the application. For example, if 
the kernel decided that the operator was becoming 
overloaded (on the basis of some physiological 
measurement and knowledge about that particular 
user's thresholds), it might suggest that only 
concise messages be put on the screen until the 
workload was seen to reduce. This is a suggestion 
about the form of the output. Another type of 
suggestion deals with the mode that the output 
uses. For example, if the environmental monitors 
detected conditions which made it difficult for the 
user to see (for example, the cockpit might be filled 
with smoke), a recommendation to use a synthetic 
voice output could be made, in an effort to ensure 
that the user got the information. 
As stated previously, the application is responsible 
for dealing with these recommendations and 
additional code must be added to the application 
for this purpose. Note, however, that the existing 
code is not altered in this process. The results of 
the monitoring processes and the recommendations 
to be made are specified by the application 
developer in a language, called ADL (ARCHIE 
Definition Language), provided with the kernel. 
This is to ensure maximum flexibility with respect 
to which devices are connected and contribute to 
the recommendation process. 
The ADL compiles into a set of independent 
processes which run concurrently with the 
application. One such process is created for each 
additional input device, plus one to handle pseudo- 
input from the plan recognition module (see 
below). Each of these takes input from its own 
device (and possibly others) and performs such 
calculations as defined by the statements in the 
ADL program. 
Within the ADL program, the additional input 
devices are defined, along with the name of the 
machine to which they are attached. This allows 
the ADL compiler to know what input to expect 
and from where. Once this is established, 
statements dealing with recommendations and 
reports can be inserted. 
The recommendations which are offered to the 
application are dependent on certain conditions 
being satisfied. These conditions are defined as if 
statements in the ADL. The syntax of these (and 
indeed of the whole ADL) has a structure very 
similar to C. For example: 
if((OpDist>200)&& 
(current_win_form != 1)) 
 I 
recommend form window "large"; 
current_win_form = 1; 
} 
if((OpDist<=200)&& 
(current_win_form != 0)) 
{ 
recommend form window "small"; 
current_win_form = 0; 
} 
This would offer recommendations to the 
application about the form of the interface (in this 
case, the size of the windows on the screen) based 
on information from the device called "OpDist", 
which produces the distance between the operator's 
head and the screen. If this distance is over 200 
units, the windows should be large, otherwise they 
should be small. This would be compiled into a 
process which continually runs these checks, 
sending a recommendation whenever a condition is 
met. Similarly, recommendations about the content 
(terse, normal, verbose, etc.) can be sent. 
Another facility of the ADL is to produce periodic 
recommendations and reports on operator status 
and performance. This is done with statements such 
as the following: 
count OpDist 10, 5 
{ 
report "Head Data Report" 
OpDist.InputDataMean; 
if (OpDist.InputDataStanDev < 10) 
recommend mode output "speech"; 
} 
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This statement means that every ten seconds, the 
code in the body of the statement will be executed, 
based on the statistics for the previous five 
seconds. This code will produce a report (which is 
logged to a file) consisting of the phrase "Head 
Data Report" and the mean value of the readings 
from the device OpDist (for the last five seconds). 
Then, if the standard deviation of the readings from 
OpDist, again over the last five seconds, is 
sufficiently low (indicating a lack of head 
movement and perhaps fatigue on the part of the 
operator), a recommendation to make all output 
come from a speech synthesiser, in an attempt to 
ensure that the (possibly inattentive) operator still 
receives information from the kernel. As always, it 
is up to the application to act on this advice or to 
ignore it. 
Multimodality 
The second additional feature that an ARCHIE 
system provides is the ability to add alternative 
modes of input and control for a computer system. 
It is generally accepted that the inclusion of such 
additional modes of input increases the efficiency, 
and hence the reliability, of a human computer 
interface [2]. The ARCHIE multimodal system 
takes input from a variety of different devices (e.g. 
gesture, speech, eye gaze) and combines and 
modifies them, producing output which is sent to 
the application. This output is made to look as if it 
had come from the existing input devices, such as 
mouse and keyboard. The main advantage of this 
device independent approach is that the application 
does not have to be changed (other then the 
addition of a few lines of code) before it can be 
used with the new devices, since it still believes 
that it is receiving input only from the mouse and 
keyboard. 
The system has two parts, one dealing with the 
translation of input into internal symbols and the 
other with the generation of output from these 
symbols. This split allows the system to be easily 
ported to other windowing environments by simply 
modifying the second part, which is dependent on 
the peculiarities of the current environment. It also 
allows, by providing an intermediate stage, input 
data to be fused so that several inputs generate one 
internal symbol (such as waving and saying 
"Hello"). 
As with the monitoring system described above, 
the multimodal system is programmed by the 
application developer using a supplied language, 
the MIDL (Multimodal Interaction Definition 
Language). Programs written in this language have 
a very simple format, allowing the multimodal 
interaction to be specified quickly and intuitively 
by a non-expert. We see this as an important 
feature, allowing developers to "try it and see". 
The language essentially has three parts: the 
definition of input data, the specification of how 
inputs are mapped to internal symbols and how 
these symbols are used to generate output. A 
simple example of this is given below: 
define input Wave 75; 
define input TalkHello 45; 
define symbol WaveTalkSymbol 
{ 
device glove Wave; 
device speech TalkHello; 
check device SwitchOne 1; 
within 1500; 
} 
This defines two inputs, Wave and TalkHello, 
specifying the values (sent by the additional 
devices) which represent them. The define symbol 
statement defines the conditions for the generation 
of the internal symbol WaveTalkSymbol. These 
conditions are that it receives the input Wave from 
the device called glove and the input TalkHello 
from the device called speech within a time 
interval of no more than 1500 milliseconds 
between the first and last inputs. When these are 
received (in any order), it checks to ensure that the 
last value supplied by the device called SwitchOne 
was one. If this is so, the symbol is generated. 
Typically, several of these types of statements are 
present in a MIDL program. 
The last set of statements defines how the internal 
symbols map to the generated output. For example: 
define effect 
{ 
trigger SymbolOne then SymbolTwo 
then SymbolThree time 500; 
output click 1 to DisplayWidget; 
if (SymbolTwo[l] = = empty) 
output keysequence "hello" to 
(eye.x, eye.y); 
else 
output click 2 to DisplayWidget; 
} 
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This statement causes output to be generated when 
the symbols SymbolOne, SymbolTwo and 
SymbolThree are generated (in that order) with the 
last two being within 500 milliseconds of each 
other. When this occurs, a click on mouse button 
one is simulated on the application window called 
DisplayWidget. Then the parameters received with 
SymbolTwo are examined (these parameters are 
taken from the input which generated the symbol). 
If there are none, i.e. the first one is vacant, a 
sequence of key presses is sent to the window 
currently under the last position reported by the 
device called eye (an eye-tracker). Otherwise, 
another click, this time on button two of the mouse 
is sent to DisplayWidget. For more details of the 
MIDL see [3]. 
Plan Recognition 
Plan recognition is an adductive artificial 
intelligence technique which tries to ascertain the 
user's plans and goals based only on the actions 
(such as toggling software buttons, moving 
joysticks, etc.) which he or she is seen to perform 
and some knowledge about possible plans. This can 
be used in several ways. Firstly, it can be used to 
pre-empt the user's resource requests. By guessing 
that the user will need, for example, access to a 
certain printer in the near future, that printer can be 
made ready in anticipation of the request. This has 
the effect of reducing the user's waiting time and 
thereby increasing the efficiency of the interface. 
Another way to use plan recognition is to attempt 
to trap user errors. For example, if the user is 
thought to be performing a certain plan, then the 
system will know what the next legitimate step in 
that plan will be. If an action which is not in that 
set is observed, the system can prompt the user, 
asking if a mistake has been made. Finally, plan 
recognition can be used to automatically complete 
plans for the user. If only one plan is currently 
being followed and there is an unambiguous 
sequence of actions which are required to reach the 
goal, then the system can offer to complete these 
for the user, freeing him or her to do other things. 
When this happens, the plan recognition system 
pretends to be another input device and produces 
the appropriate data to be processed by the rest of 
the kernel. 
Plan recognition is still very much a research topic, 
especially in the case of domain independent 
systems. Many things cloud the issue; users may be 
carrying out more than one plan at a time, they may 
- know a better way to execute a plan than the 
system does (causing the system to think that the 
user is in error), the domain may not have a well 
defined set of rules which the users follow, thus 
making it difficult to specify the plans that they 
might follow and the amount of processing needed 
to implement a general-purpose system which 
works in real-time is formidable. 
The system implemented in the ARCHIE project is 
domain independent, and can be customised for a 
particular application by the use of a programming 
language, PDL (Plan Definition Language), which 
specifies possible plans and actions. The 
application developer must specify the allowable 
plans for the current application using the PDL. 
The first part of the program declares the names of 
the plans and global variables (example taken from 
[4]): 
actions 
any(agent:string, timerint), 
hunt, 
prepare-hunt, 
robbery(has-a-crim inal-record: 
bool), 
state hunting_season: bool; 
Plans can have parameters (such as the boolean 
variable associated with the robbery plan) and 
these are inherited by any sub-plans. For example, 
every plan is a descendent of the any plan (the 
plans can be thought of as being in a tree structure). 
Therefore, even though hunt has no parameters 
declared for it, it inherits the two parameters agent 
and time from any. The state variable is used by 
the application to communicate information to the 
plan recognition system about its current state (in 
this case whether it is hunting season or not). 
Next come the definitions of the actual plan 
expressions themselves. 
expressions 
end = (hunt() || robbery() 
|| cash_cheque()); 
hunt = (pre (hunting_season 
== true) prepare-hunt()); 
robbery = (if (((agent = = "Joe") 
|| (agent = = "Jack")) 
&& 
(hasacrim inal_record 
= = true)) advanced() 
beginnerQ); 
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This defines the top-level plan, called end, to 
consist of either the plan hunt, robbery or 
cash_cheque. In turn, it defines each of these plans 
to consist of their own individual sub-plans, until 
everything is reduced to atomic actions. For 
example, hunt has a precondition (which must be 
satisfied before the plan can be considered as a 
potential one the agent is following) that the 
variable hunting_season is set to true, i.e. you 
cannot hunt out of season. Assuming that this 
condition holds, the plan consists of the sub-plan 
prepare-hunt which is defined further on in the 
program. Conditional statements are allowed in 
plans, as can be seen from the robbery plan. If the 
variable agent associated with the plan is equal to 
either "Joe" or "Jack" and hasacriminalrecord 
is set to true, then the plan has a sub-plan called 
advanced otherwise it has a sub-plan beginner. 
The reduction from the top-level plan end down to 
the individual actions which are used in the 
recognition process must be completely detailed in 
the PDL program. 
In the Cockpit 
Although the ARCHIE kernel is designed to be 
generic and not tied to any one application, it must 
be used with an application in order to demonstrate 
its capabilities. We have chosen two application 
areas in which to test the kernel, the next 
generation of air traffic control station and the 
civilian glass cockpit flight deck. These were 
chosen for a number of reasons. They are both 
areas where humans interact with computers, they 
both involve significant workload and stress for the 
operators and the consequences of an operator error 
can potentially be very serious. In the remainder of 
this section we will discuss the potential benefits of 
ARCHIE in a future flight deck. 
All flight deck operations, particularly in the civil 
field, follow a rigidly defined set of procedures, 
specifying the actions to be carried out, the order of 
execution and, where applicable, any required pre- 
conditions. These instructions may be used directly 
to instantiate the plan recognition part of the 
ARCHIE kernel, which can then be used to monitor 
the pilot's action sequence, in conjunction with 
aircraft state parameters, to detect deviations from 
the permitted procedures. 
The ADL capabilities of the ARCHIE kernel would 
be of use in two respects: monitoring of the 
operator's workload/physiological status, and 
monitoring of the overall aircraft state. In the 
former case ARCHIE could detect, for example, a 
low level of pilot alertness and tailor the 
environment and/or information displays to 
counteract this. Options may be to reduce the 
cockpit temperature slightly or to invoke a visual 
or audible attention-grabber. By monitoring the 
aircraft state, the ARCHIE system will be capable 
of detecting (and providing timely warnings about) 
a range of subtle trends, not detectable by current 
central warning systems, which could lead to a 
dangerous situation. 
By monitoring the status of the cockpit 
environment, the ARCHIE kernel would be able to 
deduce the optimum means of imparting 
information to the crew - for example by adopting 
visual rather than audible warnings if the ambient 
noise level exceeds a pre-defined threshold. The 
MIDL capability of the ARCHIE kernel provides a 
means of integrating alternative command-input 
devices into existing cockpit systems. While the 
multimodal input capabilities offered by the kernel 
are not currently envisaged as being particularly 
useful in the civilian cockpit application, they may 
be of great use in a high-workload military cockpit 
environment to provide a moment-to-moment 
optimisation of aircrew command-input 
mechanisms. For example, in situations where 
manual activation of a switch is not possible (due 
to workload or g-loading) the ARCHIE system 
could provide the capability or activating the 
switch based upon the input from an eye-gaze 
sensor. 
One of the ARCHIE consortium partners (GEC- 
Marconi Avionics Ltd) is currently developing a 
demonstrator system to illustrate some of the 
concepts of ARCHIE in the civil flight deck. The 
demonstrator has been developed on commercially 
available computing equipment and provides an 
instrument display based upon that of the Boeing 
757 airliner. It incorporates an ARCHIE kernel 
which is instantiated to monitor the actions of the 
operator against the known sequence of actions 
required to complete the various flight procedures. 
The plan library developed for this purpose was 
derived directly from the procedures specified in 
the official aircraft operations manual. The 
demonstrator also makes use of the ADL facilities 
of the kernel to monitor the aircraft state for 
detection of dangerous trends and uses both audible 
and visual means of providing advice/warnings to 
the operator. 
The main scenario selected to demonstrate 
ARCHIE in the civil cockpit is the approach-to- 
land procedure (including a potential go-around). 
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The demonstrator will be used in a series of 
ARCHIE assessments commencing early in 1995. 
Although the range of facilities provided by the 
demonstrator will be limited in comparison to a 
real aircraft, the operator action sequences are 
authentic and have been specified to a level of 
detail which will allow the evaluation of the 
benefits of ARCHIE. 
It is worth noting that the concepts illustrated by 
the civil cockpit ARCHIE demonstrator are equally 
if not more applicable to the military flying 
environment because of the wide range of physical 
and cognitive disabilities which may be 
encountered during a mission. 
Conclusions 
Although we have set out a brief overview of the 
technical capabilities of an ARCHIE kernel, there 
are some other considerations when such a system 
is used in the real world. One of the most important 
of these deals with the overall safety of such a 
system. Since ARCHIE is a programmable system, 
it is especially difficult to verify that nothing will 
go wrong, since there are many interactions 
between the individual subsystems and these 
cannot all be predicted in advance. The whole of 
the kernel has been designed with this in mind and 
if it should fail while running with an application, 
it will fail safe. That is to say, other than the loss of 
the additional facilities conferred by the kernel, 
there will be no impact on the application and it 
can still be controlled as it was before the kernel 
was added. 
We see ARCHIE as being of value in many other 
areas with less stringent safety requirements, where 
the consequences of an error are not life 
threatening. In particular, in the MicroCentre at the 
University of Dundee we are particularly interested 
in applications involving physically disabled 
people. Able-bodied people in a high stress, high 
workload environment (for which ARCHIE is 
mainly designed) experience similar problems to 
those of disabled people in a normal environment 
[5] and we believe that an ARCHIE system could 
be used very effectively to improve the interaction 
between disabled people and computer systems. 
The multimodal system provides access to standard 
applications for those who cannot efficiently use a 
mouse or keyboard; plan recognition can be used to 
automatically complete tasks, reducing the time 
and effort needed to accomplish the task (which, 
depending on the input devices that the disabled 
user is constrained to use might be considerably 
more that an able-bodied operator); monitoring can 
provide suggestions about which input/output 
channels should be used, etc. 
To conclude, the main purpose of an ARCHIE 
system is not to solve catastrophic problems. 
Instead, the system is designed to help avoid and 
correct the small user errors which, if allowed to go 
unattended, can lead to larger, more critical 
problems. The essence of ARCHIE is that the 
concepts can be applied in a wide range of 
applications, including - but not limited to - civil 
and military aviation. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper summarises work which has been 
conducted at the GEC-Marconi Research Centre as 
part of a collaboration between the Human Factors 
and Knowledge Based Systems Groups. The work is 
aimed at increasing the cost effectiveness of human 
factors engineering analyses by introducing 
computer and expert systems. This work is 
particularly relevant for aircraft developments where 
human performance can have a significant impact on 
mission success. Specifically, a Human Factors 
Task Database to facilitate storage, retrieval, and 
reuse of task analysis data is described. 
Furthermore, the representation of task and scenario 
attributes in a computer readable form is discussed. 
This would facilitate the use of expert systems to 
analyze design and task allocation options in order 
to propose solutions which promote effective human 
performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mechanisms for the cost effective assessment of 
aircrew performance (including decision making) in 
complex aircraft systems can greatly enhance design 
for operational effectiveness. A key component in 
any such assessment is task analysis, because human 
performance is highly dependent on the context in 
which tasks are performed.  Unfortunately, task 
analysis is a time consuming and resource 
demanding task. In addition, subsequent human 
performance evaluation is often error prone because 
of the large number of variables which can affect 
human performance. This area is ripe for computer 
based support in the form of databases to facilitate 
storage, retrieval and reuse of task information and 
also expert systems for analyzing these task 
descriptions. 
This paper describes ongoing research at the GEC- 
Marconi Research Centre, which is a result of a 
collaboration between the Knowledge Based 
Systems and Human Factors Groups within the 
Computer Systems Division. It addresses the 
fundamental issues which are involved in precisely 
describing a task with a view to providing a basis for 
computer aided support of the task and human 
performance analyses which are performed by a 
Human Factors expert. 
The paper is presented in five sections including a 
description of the Human Factors Task Database 
(HFTD), the envisioned role of expert systems in 
human performance analyses, an explanation of 
functional programming including the task elements 
which must be defined to allow the use of expert 
systems, an example, and a conclusion. We intend 
that the basic description of task elements and 
human performance analysis which is given, 
convinces the reader that this technology provides 
the basis for a broad range of computer aided 
analyses. 
HUMAN FACTORS TASK DATABASE 
The HFTD has been developed to increase the cost 
effectiveness of task analysis, to facilitate the reuse 
of task information, and to provide a structured 
framework for data collection and analysis. Central 
to the approach are the principles of hierarchical task 
analysis, where tasks are decomposed into their 
component subtasks to facilitate analysis. [1] A 
wide variety of data can be entered into the database 
for each task. For example, descriptive information 
such as the purpose, action, potential error modes, 
information requirements, skill requirements, and 
decisions associated with a task can be entered. In 
addition, more quantitative information including 
workload, time to perform, error rates, level of 
difficulty or importance can be stored. Furthermore, 
data about the conditions under which quantitative 
data were assigned, or the reliability of data can be 
included. 
The HFTD also allows for the construction of 
scenarios from a combination of tasks or task 
hierarchies. This allows for a time sequence of tasks 
to be built up, and also for a plan under which tasks 
are performed to be specified. For example, whether 
two tasks will be performed in sequence or in 
parallel, or the conditions which must be met prior 
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to a task starting. At the scenario level, conditions 
specific to the scenario which affect task 
performance, such as fatigue, time of day, or other 
tasks which must be performed in parallel must be 
considered. The HFTD allows for a library of these 
factors, and their impact on task performance to be 
collected and utilised. 
The primary benefit of this database arrangement is 
that for a given scenario or task hierarchy, any 
combination of task data (e.g. time to perform, 
workload, information requirements) can be 
retrieved for further analysis or for a report. 
ROLE OF EXPERT SYSTEMS IN HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
A human factors expert who is faced with trying to 
predict human performance in a complex system like 
an aircraft cockpit has a difficult challenge indeed. 
Expert systems can greatly facilitate this process. 
[2] At the most basic level, they can take data from 
the HFTD in terms of the time, workload, human 
error, or human resources associated with a scenario, 
and compare them with operational requirements. 
This assessment can be taken a step farther and 
"what if questions can be asked about function 
allocation between the aircrew and the onboard 
computer systems, task allocation between 
crewmembers, and task scheduling options. 
More complex human reliability analyses including 
decision making performance could also be 
conducted. Expert systems could sort through large 
tasks and scenarios to ensure the correct information 
is available for each task, or checks could be done to 
determine if information is presented consistently 
for all common tasks. The number of steps required 
to access information could be reviewed and 
assessed against time to perform task or resources 
used. At a more complex level, the quality of 
information can be manipulated to assess changes in 
performance, or the options for sharing of 
information between crewmembers can be evaluated. 
Furthermore, decision making performance could be 
adjusted by performance shaping factors (e.g. 
fatigue, motivation, time of day) or underlying 
workload. [3] 
FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMMING 
In order to use expert systems during task and 
human performance analyses, relevant task attributes 
must be represented in a computer analyzable form. 
Of course, the specific attributes which are modelled 
will be highly dependent on the type of analysis 
being conducted. Therefore, it is important that the 
computer representation of the task is flexible 
enough to lend itself to "what if type questions and 
to the wide variety of analyses (e.g. timeline, 
workload, human reliability, decision making, etc.) 
which may be performed. For this reason, we have 
chosen functional programming because it's 
notations provide a particularly simple and concise 
representation which is amenable to varied 
mathematical analyses in addition to execution as a 
conventional programming language. [4] The 
following sections will provide some examples of 
the types of task attributes which need to be 
represented in a mathematical and/or logical 
notation to enable the use of functional 
programming in the analysis of human tasks. 
Generally, these attributes fall into three basic 
categories: attributes of the task, attributes of the 
agents (whether human or machine) that perform the 
tasks, and attributes of the scenario or the way in 
which tasks are executed. This information will be 
used by the expert system in two primary ways. 
First, in order to give meaning to the task execution 
(i.e. when constructing a computer analyzable task 
scenario), and in conducting one of a number of task 
or human performance analyses. 
Task Attributes 
The minimum information which must be provided 
to the expert system about a task is as follows: 
a) Inputs (displayed information, system state, 
etc.) 
b) Activities performed during the task (e.g. 
controls activated) 
c) Outputs (change in system state, etc.). 
In addition, depending on the type and 
sophistication of the intended analysis, more detail 
can be added. For example: 
a) Error rates (including decision making) 
b) Time to perform 
c) Information requirements (availability, 
quality, and priority of data could be 
quantified) 
d) Decisions required during the task. This 
could be expanded to describe the 
importance of the decisions, the information 
required for each decision, the quality of 
information provided, the number of steps 
required to access the information, the 
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probability that the decision will be made 
with the help of other agents (other 
crewmembers or the computer) competence 
required to make the decision, etc. 
e) Workload 
f) Skill requirements (trained performance 
standards could be specified) 
g) Equipment requirements 
h) Task Priority 
Agents 
Each task is performed by a collection of agents, in a 
flying example, the task is performed by a pilot, 
possibly in conjunction with other agents such as a 
co-pilot, a navigator, or an onboard computer 
system. Agents work concurrently to achieve a 
collection of tasks, interacting where necessary to 
achieve an overall goal. Each agent proceeds by 
observing and acting upon attributes of the task, for 
example a pilot flies the plane by moving switches, 
pushing levers, requesting information, reading head 
up displays, etc. Agents interact by sending each 
other messages, for example the pilot may request 
the next waypoint from the navigator by sending a 
"next waypoint" message which will produce the 
reply message "next waypoint atX". 
Agents also have attributes associated with them. In 
many cases, these are thresholds which define their 
performance capabilities. For example, skills they 
have acquired, their ability to perform specific tasks 
within a given time or accuracy, working memory 
capacity, information processing limits, or workload 
thresholds. In the case of workload, the expert 
system can assume that above this threshold there is 
no guarantee that the agent will successfully perform 
a requested task. At any time, an agent is 
performing 0 or more tasks. Each atomic task is 
associated with an effort value which describes how 
the task affects the agent in terms of workload. If 
any step performed by an agent would cause the 
aggregate of the effort values to exceed the workload 
limit for that agent then that step can fail. Failure of 
a task step can cause an attribute not to be updated, 
failure to request another agent to perform a task, 
failure to make a proper choice between two 
subtasks or failure to produce a requested outcome. 
Initially, at the start of scenario task execution, all 
agents are inactive. Then, as the overall task 
progresses, agents are requested (by the expert 
system) to perform individual tasks, each of which 
may initiate sub-tasks. Agents may interact and 
send each other messages in order to co-operate 
when achieving tasks. When an agent receives a 
message it will attempt to initiate the request 
immediately. Any task performed by an agent may 
be delayed, or may fail in whole or in part because 
of workload restrictions. 
A verbal specification of an agent is provided below. 
This could be expressed in a mathematical form for 
use by a functional program. 
An agent has 
a collection of attributes; and 
a workload limit; and 
a collection of named tasks to perform 
where a task is executed as either 
a choice between two subtasks; or 
a sequenced pair of subtasks; or 
a parallel pair of subtasks; or 
an attribute update; or 
a request for another agent to perform a 
named task 
Task Scenarios/Execution 
When we think of a scenario it is usual to envisage a 
series of actions which are performed, using a 
collection of tools and resources, in order to achieve 
a particular goal. For example, flying an aircraft 
along a preset course from waypoint to waypoint to 
reach a final destination. Along the way there may 
be tasks to be performed before the overall goal is 
achieved and it may not always be clear in which 
order the tasks have to be performed. For example, 
whilst flying the aircraft, the pilot is responsible for 
broadcasting the aircraft position at preset times and 
maintaining the correct altitude along with other 
tasks. Often it will not matter which order these 
tasks are performed so long as the aircraft gets to the 
intended destination at the required time. 
An expert system written in functional programming 
language can be set up to execute the tasks in a 
scenario either in a prescribed sequence, randomly, 
or according to rules such as the probability of 
performing various tasks. In fact, this execution can 
be varied to produce different properties of the task, 
or the manner in which it is accomplished, in order 
to observe the effect which these modifications have 
on performance against scenario objectives. 
Each execution of a scenario produces a task history 
which is the sequence of steps from the start of the 
scenario to the end (which may or may not achieve 
the desired goal). The task history contains all of the 
information which is used at every stage of the 
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scenario, showing, for example, messages which are 
sent between agents, the calculations which lead to 
decisions being made and actions which affect the 
task attributes. The task history for the aircraft 
example is like a perfect flight recorder which 
enables all of the steps of the flight to be played 
back in minute detail. 
Verbal Specification of a Task History 
A task history is a sequence of steps producing an 
outcome 
where examples of steps include 
initiation of one or more tasks; or 
performing a decision; or 
producing an outcome; or 
updating an attribute; or 
requesting another agent to perform a task; or 
failing to perform a task 
Task and Human Performance Analysis 
Given a task history, a Human Factors expert will be 
able to analyze the steps which were performed in 
order to identify evidence of bad task or system 
design. Specifically, this will relate to areas where 
human performance targets are not achieved. For 
example, certain targets may not be achieved 
because the pilot tries to perform too many activities 
at once. In this sense, the Human Factors expert is 
debugging the trace of a buggy task execution - the 
analysis may be performed because the overall goal 
is not achieved and the expert is trying to trace back 
to the place in the history at which the task starts to 
go wrong; alternatively, the expert may be unhappy 
about the overall performance of some of the agents 
in the scenario and wishes to analyze the task history 
in order to identify areas where the agents can be 
made to perform better. 
Furthermore, it is possible to identify task histories 
which lead to performance problems, for example, 
due to invalid information being available because 
one agent fails (because of overwork) to respond 
with up-to-date information when requested by 
another agent. Such a situation would occur when at 
least one of the task histories associated with a 
scenario can be shown to fail due to an agent being 
overworked and thereby preventing a second agent 
from receiving up-to-date information which it 
requires in order to make a decision. 
If each agent interacts with the task attributes by 
making decisions based on its understanding of the 
situation at the time. The validity of the agent's 
decisions depends (among other things) on whether 
or not the information which it uses to make the 
decision is up-to-date or not. Many of the task 
attributes will change frequently and it is important 
that all agents which make decisions based upon 
these attributes keep their knowledge of the values 
current by monitoring the attributes at frequent 
intervals. For example, if the pilot aims to fly at a 
constant altitude then it is important that the 
altimeter is monitored frequently otherwise the 
decisions which are made involving increasing or 
decreasing the altitude are likely to be invalid. 
In addition to detecting potential problems with task 
executions, expert systems allow observation of 
what happens when attributes are modified. Going a 
step further, expert systems technology, in the form 
of heuristic rules, can be used to guide a program 
through a collection of task modifiers in order to 
identify and remove the source of a problem. 
EXAMPLE SCENARIO 
We believe that the proposed task, agent, and 
scenario descriptions will allow a sophisticated 
degree of task and human performance analysis. To 
illustrate its use, we present a simple example in this 
paper based on agent workload. Given the task 
execution mechanism described above, we will show 
how this analysis can be captured by constructing a 
computer readable scenario definition which is 
inspected for optimum agent workload levels. 
Figure 1. Example Scenario 
Figure 1 portrays an example scenario of an aircraft 
flying between waypoints. There are three agent 
nodes labelled Pilot, Navigator and Cockpit, each of 
which is connected to task nodes for each of the 
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named tasks which the corresponding agent can 
perform. Each task node is connected to a collection 
of nodes which in turn are connected to task nodes 
which can be invoked in series or parallel. 
The scenario is composed of three agents, the 
cockpit, the pilot and the navigator. The cockpit 
agent is responsible for maintaining the information 
relating to the speed, altitude, direction and joystick 
position. The cockpit provides instrument readings 
for the speed and altitude which are available to the 
pilot and navigator. The cockpit also provides a task 
which is used to update the joystick position. The 
main task of the cockpit is to regularly update the 
speed, altitude and direction values using the 
position of the joystick. The workload of the cockpit 
is unlimited. 
The pilot agent is responsible for keeping the aircraft 
on course by monitoring the instrument dials and 
updating the position of the joystick through the 
cockpit agent. The pilot is also responsible for 
requesting the next waypoint from the navigator 
when the current waypoint is being approached. At 
predetermined waypoints, the pilot must broadcast 
the aircraft position. The pilot's workload limit and 
the effort for each task, are predetermined values. 
The navigator agent is responsible for maintaining 
an up to date position of the aircraft and for 
responding to the pilot's request for the next 
waypoint. 
A verbal specification of the cockpit agent which 
could be expressed in a mathematical form for an 
expert system is provided below. Since it is not a 
human resource it has unlimited workload capacity 
and maintains the attributes which describe the 
speed etc. of the aircraft. We assume that there is 
some notion of global time whereby any changes in 
the controls are implemented causing the speed etc. 
of the aircraft to be updated. The cockpit offers a 
task to update the position of the joystick, which is 
how the pilot flies the aircraft. 
A cockpit is an agent with unlimited workload 
with attributes for altitude, speed, direction and 
joystick position; and 
with tasks to perform the following 
get the current altitude; and 
get the current speed; and 
get the current direction; and 
update the position of the joystick; and 
fly the aircraft which involves a condition 
if it is time to update the displays 
then perform the following tasks in 
sequence 
update the altitude, speed and direction 
from the joystick position; then request 
the cockpit to continue to fly the aircraft 
else request the cockpit to continue to fly 
the aircraft 
Similarly, a specification of the pilot agent is 
presented below. During the flight the pilot will 
monitor the instrument displays in order to check 
whether the joystick needs moving, whether a new 
waypoint is required and whether the aircraft 
position needs to be broadcast. The pilot is a client 
to both the cockpit and the navigator. Each of the 
tasks performed by the pilot has a predetermined 
effort. 
A pilot is an agent with a maximum workload of cop 
with attributes for altitude, speed, direction and the 
current waypoint 
with tasks to perform the following 
read the cockpit displays for altitude, speed and 
direction; and 
check the current position which involves the 
following sequence of tasks 
concurrently, check all instrument dials; then 
depending on whether the aircraft is off 
course 
move the joystick accordingly; then 
continue to monitor the position; 
otherwise 
just continue to monitor the position 
depending upon whether the aircraft is 
approaching the waypoint 
request the next waypoint from the navigator; 
then 
update the joystick accordingly; then 
continue to monitor the waypoint; otherwise 
just continue to monitor the waypoint 
depending on whether the current waypoint is 
prearranged 
request the current position from the 
navigator; then 
broadcast aircraft position information; then 
continue to test whether the position should 
be broadcast; otherwise 
just continue to test whether the position 
should be broadcast 
start the flight by 
initializing the attributes; then 
throughout the flight check position, the 
waypoint and whether to broadcast position 
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The specification of the navigator agent (not shown) 
follows the same lines as the pilot and cockpit and 
provides tasks to get the current position and the next 
waypoinL The navigator is a client of the cockpit. 
In this case, the scenario definition is a collection of 
agent nodes each of which contains an agent and has 
an edge leading to a task node for each of the named 
tasks which the agent can perform. A task node 
contains the name of the task and the maximum effort 
(in terms of workload) which the task is likely to take. 
Each task node represents the possible executions of a 
task, since we are interested in workload, a task node 
is also associated with all possible combinations of 
server tasks which it can request in parallel. Each task 
node has a collection of edges, each of which leads to 
a set of task nodes. 
A particular scenario can be overloaded if, given an 
initial collection of tasks, it is possible to exceed the 
workload limit of an agent node by constructing a 
collection of paths (task executions) as follows: for 
each current task node, select a set of server task 
nodes which it activates in parallel, add these nodes to 
the current collection and repeat. The workload of an 
agent is exceeded when there is a path which activates 
enough of its tasks to cause it to potentially fail. If 
there is a path which loops through an agent's task, 
then without further information to the contrary this 
will cause the agent's workload limit to be 
automatically exceeded. 
As shown above, there is a possibility of overload 
because each of the tasks Next Waypoint, Position 
and Check Position can be performed by the pilot in 
parallel through the Start Flight task. So when 
<op<co9 where 0)9=u)6+co7+co8 there is a possibility 
that the pilot will be overloaded. 
In order to prevent overloading there must be some 
mechanism for preventing certain tasks from being 
performed in parallel. An expert system can be used 
to investigate simple extensions to scenario 
descriptions which specify the legal combinations of 
tasks. Techniques such as predicate path expressions 
can help determine which execution (task history) or 
set of executions (set of task histories) result in the 
best performance (in this case, acceptable workload 
levels). [5] A basic example of a program for this 
process is provided below. 
For a system of agents A, with attribute descriptions 
V, performing a task T: 
If T is a decision D leading to one of tasks Tj or 
T2. 
then the best execution (set of task histories) 
depends upon the result of decision D with 
respect to attributes V. 
If the decision is true then the best execution 
is defined by A, with attributes V, performing 
task T,; 
else it is A with attributes V performing task 
T2; else 
If T is a sequence of tasks T, then T2, then the 
result is the definition of A with V performing 
Tj producing new attributes V followed by the 
definition of A with V performing T2; else 
If T is a parallel combination of tasks T, and T2 
then the result is the set of definitions 
constructed by permuting all possible 
combinations of performing each atomic step of 
Tj and T2; else 
If T causes (he agent to overload then the result is 
failure of T; else 
If T is an attribute update then the result is V 
where V is the same as V except that the 
particular attribute has been updated 
If T is a request for agent A to perform a task 
named n, then the definition is the definition of 
A with attributes V performing task T 
where T is the task named n of agent A. 
This basic example could be expanded to encompass 
more complex analyses and more sophisticated 
scenario descriptions. Furthermore, this type of 
expert system, which helps predict human 
performance, can be tested against real world 
applications and modified/improved to provide 
increasingly accurate representations of areas within 
system design and task allocation which negatively 
impact human performance. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has addressed computer-based tools which 
can aid the analysis of human performance in complex 
systems. In the first instance, a Human Factors Task 
Database can greatly facilitate the storage, retrieval, 
and reuse of task analysis data. In addition, recording 
this data in an electronic medium allows for its further 
manipulation into a computer readable form which 
can be analysed by an expert system. The basis of the 
expert analysis is a precise specification of task and 
scenario attributes using a simple functional notation 
which has been extended with agent expressions. The 
resulting task notation has been given a semantics, 
defining precisely how tasks are performed. This 
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forms the basis for a Human Factors tool which can 
be used to prototype task specifications where the 
tasks are performed by interacting agents. Using 
knowledge from a Human Factors expert, the tool can 
analyze the task specifications in order to identify 
potential problems, or to recommend system design or 
task allocation options which enhance human 
performance. Functional notation provides a useful 
mechanism for representing tasks and scenarios. 
Since it is easy to manipulate and expand, it has real 
potential for and improvement based on actual 
performance data. It also lends itself to adaptation for 
many human factors analyses such as workload 
analysis, timeline analysis, assessments of human 
decision making, and human reliability analysis. 
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MIDAS IN THE CONTROL ROOM: 
APPLYING A FLIGHT DECK COGNITIVE MODELING DESIGN TOOL TO ANOTHER DOMAIN 
Douglas G. Hoecker & Emilie M. Roth 
Westinghouse Science & Technology Center 
Pittsburgh PA 15235 
hoecker@cognac.pgh.wec.com 
SUMMARY 
This paper briefly outlines the current state of design con- 
cepts for large-scale introduction of computers to advanced 
control rooms for nuclear power plants, and compares this 
with the similar technological shift that can be observed in the 
cockpit Although the two domains have some distinct differ- 
ences, the similarities in terms of implications for advanced 
human-computer interaction (HCI) are perhaps more strik- 
ing. With the similarities in mind, we have begun to adapt a 
computer modeling tool, the Man-machine Integrated De- 
sign and Analysis System (MIDAS) that was originally de- 
veloped to assist in the design of advanced cockpits. The 
adaptation effort is resulting in new functionalities to the MI- 
DAS system that will generically improve its capacity to sup- 
port the design process, for both control rooms and flight 
decks. Preliminary results from exercising one such addition, 
the real-time cognitive stack display, are presented. 
BACKGROUND 
The design challenges facing the powerplantcontrol room of 
the future should seem familiar to observers of trends in cock- 
pit automation. In many ways, the changes contemplated for 
the advanced control room are analogous to the the "glassifi- 
cation" that has already occurred in both civilian and military 
cockpits. In the overview that follows, practitioners from the 
cockpit design world will recognize some familiar issues. 
These common issues provide a basis for us to learn from to 
topics of the workshop, and to contribute our observations 
concerning design principles, including aspects of the design 
process itself. 
Figure 1 shows a notional layout for an advanced control 
room. In some versions of this concept, there will be no hard- 
wired controls, although there may well be dedicated loca- 
tions (either on the large wall display, or on the six- and 
Overview 
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"■» Reactor 
Operator 2 
Senior 
Reactor 
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Figure 1.      Conceptual Arrangement of a Computer-Based Control Room 
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eight-headed workstations) for critical, high-level overview 
displays and associated controls. From a cognitive stand- 
point, the greatest change will be the shift from large hard- 
wired control boards studded with hundreds of control and 
display devices in fixed spatial locations, to a much more 
compact control room that provides access to at leastas many 
"soft" displays and controls. The soft controls and displays 
may now be flexibly called up from a virtual information 
space and assembled to meet the demands of the task at hand. 
This flexibility is one of the important bases for considering 
themovetogreatercomputerization. Other cited advantages 
include economies that follow from a more compact control 
room, one that is more easily built, maintained and updated; 
and one where with the right form of computer assistance, 
perhaps fewer operators can safely and efficiently control the 
plant, guide effective plant response to transient or emergen- 
cy situations, and coordinate plant configurations for mainte- 
nance under both scheduled and unscheduled conditions. 
The new interface flexibilities will permit the task-relevant 
juxtaposition of controls and displays, so that operators no 
longer need to walk the boards, or communicate with each 
other across the room, in order to to observe and evaluate the 
plant's response in one location to a control action taken per- 
haps forty feet away. Additionally, the same data can be pres- 
ented in different formats to highlight specific interrelation- 
ships that may be hidden by another format. Thus, physical 
"mimic" displays are expected to improve over banks of 
dials, gauges and lights in assisting operators to relate the ef- 
fects of one component's state to another component or sub- 
system. At the same time, to address other informational re- 
quirements, functional process displays will be used to high- 
light higher-level, goal-oriented interrelationships and po- 
tential goal conflicts. 
This flexibility can come at a price1, unless design attention 
is paid to avoiding pitfalls such as "clumsy automation"2. 
The secondary tasking required to work with a clumsily com- 
puterized interface can be particularly insidious because the 
most opaque effects are felt just when operators most need 
maximum interface transparency: when the pace of opera- 
tional tasking becomes high, due to, say, invocation of emer- 
gency operating procedures. It is during fast-paced evolu- 
tions that the keyhole view of the information space requires 
the most, and most highly-skilled, navigation and screen- 
cleanup skills from the user of the interface. But this is when 
the secondary tasks of assimilating an integrated view of the 
world through the keyhole, even the relatively large keyhole 
provided by a six-headed workstation, can become formida- 
ble. 
There are numerous opportunities where design attention to 
deal with issues of this sort is needed. Several technology 
areas have been identified where scenario-driven use of rapid 
prototypes by subject matter experts early in the design pro- 
cess could provide context-sensitive insight to key and inte- 
grati ve design decisions. Such decisions concern the overall 
operational philosophy for man-machine information hand- 
ling in the control room, as well as key architectural features 
of the interface design for individual computer-based com- 
ponents. These components include: 
• Computerized Procedures. These will provide fisheye 
views ahead and behind the current step in effect, with 
additional aids for monitoring critical safety functions, 
jumping between procedures, and hypertextually 
juxtaposing actual sensed plant conditions with those 
called for in the text of the procedure. 
• Soft Controls. These will likely be displayed on CRTs, 
and will probably visually resemble todays switches, 
levers, knobs, and buttons, and be controllable via some 
form of pointing technology as well as from the key 
board. However, they will be capable of flexible 
behaviors such as context-sensitive control groupings, 
pop-up "drill-down" views on process displays, that are 
infeasibk in conventional hardwired control rooms. 
• Process Displays. These will also be displayed on CRTs. 
Some will be organized functionally, while others will 
be organizsd and presented as physical mimics at various 
levels of system definition. The combinations of soft 
controls aad process displays cover roughly the same 
interface fnnction as multifunctional displays in the 
cockpit. 
• Overview displays. These may take the form of 
dedicated real estate on individual workstations, or 
a large wzil- mounted display that can be observed, and 
accessed electronically, by all operators. In addition to 
providing a common view of plant state, the wall panel 
overview is expected to facilitate operators* situation 
awareness by allowing them a low-overhead way to 
observe what others in the crew are doing. 
• Alarm Pauls. The alarm system is to provide context- 
sensitive, hierarchical goal-oriented alerts to the crew, 
including cues for identifying goal conflicts. 
LEVELS OF AUTOMATION 
The overall level of automation contemplated in the control 
room is nowhere near as symbionic as that anticipated for the 
electronic crew member on the flight deck.3-4 But then, the 
requirements ire differem. The differences are due in part to 
the inherently shorter time constants that are typically en- 
countered in arcraft control tasks. And at least on the mili- 
tary side, there is always an overriding requirement to elicit 
new and maximal mission performance from the human- 
electronic teaa. 
In the nuclear arena, by contrast, an unchanging mission, 
combined wiÄ pressures for safety and economy, will likley 
result in different man-machine task allocations in the face 
ofopportunitkspresented by automation technology. For ex- 
ample, certain major evolutions, in particular the reactor 
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and turbine trips, are already highly automated. An automat- 
ic reactor trip leads to a rather different class of scenario 
where the first steps in an emergency procedure are to care- 
fully inventory that all the automatic functions that are sup- 
posed to have occurred on plant trip did in fact occur. In ef- 
fect, the operators catch up, over several minutes, with what 
the plant did in a few seconds or less. In the process, of 
course, they are fulfilling important reasons for having hu- 
man operators in the first place: (1) to verify automatic ac- 
tions, and perhaps more importantly given the complexity of 
the system, to be ready to employ problem-solving as well as 
procedure-following when appropriate. Thus, a second-le- 
vel but nonetheless urgent parallel goal is to diagnose the rea- 
son for the trip. Typically, following the emergency operat- 
ing procedures will lead to the steps required to configure the 
plant to a safe and stable shutdown condition. 
In the advanced control room of the future, power plant oper- 
ators will not change their power settings substantially faster, 
or otherwise "fly" their plants to new heights, than they do 
today. Thus the impetus for sybionics in the control room is 
not the same. 
THE NEED FOR INTERFACE TESTING 
Symbionics or no, there are a large number of design issues 
in human-computer interaction (HCI) that cannot be re- 
solved by appeals to handbooks, yet are too ill-understood to 
warrant risking large investments, particularly of interface 
coding effort Examples include determining the impact of 
specific interface designs for the HCI-intensive components 
listed earlier, singly and together. What are the impacts of in- 
terface form & function on: 
• situation awareness (individual and group) 
• operator-paced control vs. event-paced control 
• passive monitoring of automatic systems 
• response to alarm situations 
• control room resource management 
Such issues/topics are best adressed by testing proposed in- 
terface concepts at the individual, team, and organizational 
levels. This kind of testing requires integration of three con- 
texts: (1) the task, provided by a scenario that is sufficiently 
rich to engage (2) the cognitive context, supplied by subject- 
matter experts who will employ (3) the technological context, 
supplied by a mix of rapid prototyping and simulation sup- 
port that are both realistic and complete only to the level 
needed address the issues at hand. 
For example, to what degree does the current prototype inter- 
face for computerized procedures offload the operators from 
the drudgery and error potential involved in the use of paper 
procedures? Or does the design add secondary tasks that may 
actually increase mental workload under some circum- 
stances. If so, what are those circumstances? 
Testing of the sort just described is very costly in terms of 
both calendar time and labor. And the supply of subject mat- 
ter experts is limited. A recent human factors test (different 
from the one reported here) to investigate sensitivity to con- 
trol system lags when using soft controls, required several 
months of preparation to devise a sufficiently-rich scenario, 
prototype soft control stations, and connect these to an under- 
lying simulation of plantresponses. The actual conductof the 
test, analysis of data, and report writeup while a relatively 
small proportion of the effort, took well over a month. This 
was just one test, and a preliminary one at that, among a 
planned test series that numbers ova a dozen. In most design 
environments, whether nuclear or aircraft, the number of 
risk-reduction issues that could benefit from this kind of test- 
ing far exceed the resources normally available. 
THE NEED FOR A MODELING TOOL 
Thus, if we could computationally model the cognitive con- 
sequences of specific details of proposed interface designs, 
we could both speed and economize the injection of empiri- 
cally-obtained insights into the tradeoff process early enough 
to be useful. 
The Man-machine Integrated Design and Analysis System 
(MIDAS) is being developed by NASA5 to fill precisely this 
need in the domain of cockpit design: to provide harder ergo- 
nomic data to guide the early stages of system development 
From a life-cycle pointof view, 70-85% of system cost is de- 
termined by decisions made in the early stages of develop- 
ment4. 
Conventional systems design processes actively pursue hu- 
man factors issues late in the process. Typically, much of the 
information derived from such efforts is categorized as "nice 
to know", or "operator preference", but not often viewed as 
evidence for hard requirements. An important reason for this 
is that many design processes simply cannot afford to view 
late-arriving human factors data seriously unless the results 
suggestvery severeconsequences foroperability. Otherwise, 
the flexibility of the human is relied upon, through selection 
and training as well as intelligence, to make up for the differ- 
ences between real-world requirements and those that made 
it into the system specification. 
But if design processes cannot afford to use late-arriving 
data, it is also difficult in many program cultures to justify a 
large human factors effort "up front". This is partly due to the 
reality that the issues may be very dependent on the cognitive 
characteristics of human tasks that have never been done be- 
fore, which means that to some extent the knowledge re- 
quired for the system specification does not exist yet but 
rathermustbegeneratedaspartoftheprocess. Thisisaquali- 
tatively different approach to design than what works well in 
cases involving hardware such as bridges and circuit boards. 
Another difficulty is that the costs of such human factors pro- 
grams, while perhaps justifiable in life-cycle terms, often 
seem to loom large at design time. When man-in-the-loop 
testing is concerned, the costs may include issues identi- 
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Figure 2.     Functional Overview of MIDAS. 
fication, hopefully-rapid prototyping, finding and paying for 
qualified participants, collecting and analyzing data, and in- 
jecting the results into the design process at appropriate junc- 
tures. 
MIDAS is intended to address this situation by providing a 
rich and detailed prototyping environment based on recent re- 
search and knowledge, not yet codified into handbooks and 
standards, based on models of human performance. For MI- 
DAS to work, it must be integrated into the design process, 
including thepreparation of knowledge bases related to tasks, 
interface technology, and human capabilities, limitations, 
and assumed knowledge. Once integrated in this way, de- 
signers can afford to explore hard "what-if" issues without 
costly reliance on hardware simulators and man-in-the-loop 
studies. 
A CONTROL ROOM EXAMPLE 
We have begun exploratory work to assess MIDAS' suitabil- 
ity for application in the domain of nuclear power plant oper- 
ation. This is being done by scoping preliminary application 
of MID AS' rich functionality (see Figure 2) to selected issues 
confronting the control room designers. 
One such issue involves the use of computerized procedures. 
The use of procedures presented on a multi-window worksta- 
tion interface presents new uncertainties regarding bursts of 
operator workload under certain circumstances. While com- 
puterized procedures are designed to reduce workload, de- 
signers must also ask if the rich functionality of the interface 
may carry with it, perhaps latently, "the price of flexibility" 
referenced earlier. 
The richness of the prototype computerized procedure inter- 
face has been described at some length elsewhere.7 For the 
purposes of the workshop, it may suffice to outline a pilot 
application of MIDAS to gain insight into some uncertainties 
regarding operator workload when computerized procedures 
are used either to replace, or to supplant, paper procedures. 
From the design view, there was a need to rapidly view de- 
tailed effects of dialog features on known limitations to hu- 
mans' ability to rememember large numbers of concurrent 
and temporarily-suspended "mini-tasks". For example, a 
supervisor may not wait for an operator to find a plant param- 
eter and report it, but moves on to the next step, while having 
to remember to go back and complete the previous step and 
ensure that its results are consistent with continued progress 
downmecuiTentproceduralpath. To observe the modeled in- 
teraction of the procedure interface on this and more complex 
but momentary bursts of memory effort, a new element of 
MIDAS was constructed. This was a new data display, one 
capable of graphically displaying, in real time if necessary, 
the memory "stacking" by a supervisor as a function of fairly 
fine-grained aspects of the interface for handling procedures. 
From detailed observations of skilled operators using a full- 
scope simulator, a scenario of appropriate fidelity was con- 
structed in a form understandable by MIDAS. Two versions 
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of the scenario, one using paper-based procedures, and one 
using the computerized prototype, were run using the appro- 
priate modules from the MIDAS system (for example, an- 
thropometric and vision modules were skirted). 
Results from these comparison runs, showing the effects 
from the supervisor's point of view, are shown in Figure 3. 
These results show frozen outputs from MIDAS' new 
memory stacking display (one of many display windows 
available from MIDAS, concurrently if desired). The results 
show a small portion of the 20-minute scenario (about 50 sec- 
onds' worth), in which some temporary loading occurred due 
to the chance simultaneity of several events. These included 
one operator interrupting the supervisor to correct a prior 
misunderstanding, arrival of a new alarm signal, difficulty 
encountered by the second operator in finding an earlier da- 
tum requested by the supervisor, and finally, in the case of the 
paper procedure, a particularly infelicitous formatting deci- 
sion by the procedure designer. 
In this particular incident, many of the memory requirements 
disappeared because of the computerized procedure's addi- 
tional information. For example, the computerized procedure 
inserts current sensor-based plant parameters directly into 
the text, beside the conditional value called for in the text. 
The insert is further color coded to indicate (a) whether it rep- 
resents a violation of the condition called for in the procedure, 
and (b) the quality of the sensed data based on voting among 
redundant sensors and paths. 
The level of modeling here only shows hypothetical efforts 
to remember. It is interesting to note that in the actual scenar- 
io enacted by human operators, at this same confluence of 
events the crew proceeded down an erroneous procedure path 
for over a minute before returning to the correct path. They 
were unaware at the time that they had taken time for an align- 
ment that was neither required nor effective. 
CONCLUSION 
The modeled activities, detailed in another report,7 are per- 
haps not so significant to this workshop as the glimpse of test- 
ing productivity provided by this pilot study. To be sure, pro- 
ductivity from using this display would require prior integra- 
tion of MIDAS or a similar tool into the design process, so 
that the incremental cost of accessing or generating relevant 
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MIDAS timeline output for the same portions of the MSLB scenario. 
3a shows the modeled timelines for the paper-based scenario, while 
3b shows the timeline for the computer-aided version of the task. In 
3b, one critical incident has disappeared altogether, while the second 
incident shows far less stacking of remember-activities. 
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data would be negligible. For the moment, more work is re- 
quired in areas such as rapid input of interface characteristics, 
and in modeling multiple operators and their communica- 
tions with each other as well as with the system. 
It should be noted that while these aspects may appear fine- 
grained, eventual production use of MIDAS in this way 
would envisage even finer-grained aspects. This is because 
one of the ironic caveats of HCI design is that "the devil is in 
the details", in that detailed understanding is required to 
know how seemingly picayune interface artifacts may affect 
cognitive performance and error at a very high level. 
We find encouraging this demonstration of computer-aided 
handling of these details, which heretofore cost too much to 
examine at the task- and technology-specific level of detail 
that is necessary to be of value early in the design process. 
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• L ABSTRACT 
Adaptive automation occurs when the control 
decisions concerning the onset, the offset, and the 
degree of automation are shared between the 
human and machine. The purpose of the present 
experiment was to determine the effect of differing 
levels of pilot involvement in the the automation 
invocation procedure. Thirty-two pilots performed 
a multiple-task battery consisting of tracking, 
systems monitoring, and fuel management sub-tasks. 
Monitoring and fuel management sub-tasks were 
performed manually while the tracking sub-task 
could be performed manually but was also 
available for automation. Pilots were assigned to 
one of four automation invocation conditions. These 
ranged from complete pilot control to complete 
system control. Two intermediate conditions 
involved system-recommended automation and 
system-invoked automation, where pilots had the 
opportunity to over-ride the system. Within these 
groups there were two embedded manipulations. In 
the first, the shift from manual to automated status 
was cued by either visual, aural, or a combined 
visual/aural warning. In the second, the tracking 
display was reduced in size during automation and 
relocated either centrally or peripherally. Results 
indicated that system invoked automation 
produced less time in manual control, less time to 
initial automation and an increase in fatigue. 
Automated tracking display location also affected 
fuel management performance but this was 
contingent on the dependent measure used. Results 
are discussed in terms of consistency of warning 
signal modalities, the fractionation of performance 
in multi-task systems, and the increase in workload 
associated with system invoked automation. A 
context model for the implementation of adaptive 
automation is proposed. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional approaches to automation are founded 
on task allocation which divides tasks as under the 
control of either operator or automation [3]. This 
form of automation can insulate the operator from 
the system and can take them 'out of the control 
loop' [12]. This often strips the pilot's role of its 
meaning and satisfaction. Not surprisingly, pilots 
are somewhat concerned with automated systems, 
especially where critical flight decisions are taken 
from the pilot. McDaniel [5] has commented 
directly upon the need to retain operator consent for 
critical decisions such as the launch of weapons. 
Attaining the perceived benefits of automated 
systems while maintaining operator authority has 
consequently become increasingly problematic. 
Adaptive automation has been proposed as the 
alternative to static task allocation. In adaptive 
automation the control of the onset, the offset, and 
the form of automation is shared between the 
human and the machine [7]. Adaptive function 
allocation refers to the real-time allocation of 
function between the human operator and 
automated subsystems. In the adaptive allocation 
framework, automation is implemented 
dynamically, in response to changing task demands 
placed upon the operator. Adaptive function 
allocation tries to achieve a major goal of 
automation, i.e., workload regulation, while 
avoiding some of the drawbacks associated with 
traditional static automation. However, adaptive 
function allocation itself does not identify how the 
shift from operator control to automated control 
should occur. There are five major categories which 
to provide information to implement adaptive 
allocation. These are triggers derived from: i) pilot 
performance assessment, using behavioral 
measures; ii) psychophysiological assessment, 
using physiological measures; iii) performance 
modeling, classified broadly as performance models 
(e.g., signal detection or information-processing 
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models); iv) critical event logic, using the 
identification of an unexpected event; or finally; v) 
a combination system incorporating more than one 
of these methods [4, 8, 10, 11]. In theory, each of 
these methods executes some algorithm embedded 
in the automation system to transfer control. In 
response to one of the triggers described above, some 
task or portions of tasks, are automated. While the 
potential benefits and drawbacks of each method 
have been identified previously [4,11], there is an 
important question looming in the future. That is, 
the degree of authority that either the operator or 
the system should have over the invocation of 
automation. The present experiment evaluates the 
impact on performance and workload of several of 
these invocation procedures. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
3.1. Experimental Participants, Procedure and Task 
Thirty-two experienced pilots (thirty males, two 
females) volunteered to participate in this study. 
Their experience ranged from General Aviation 
aircraft with 100 hours flying time under Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR) to Commercial Aviation with 
16,000 hours flying time under Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR). The majority of the pilots fly under 
Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. The 
mean age of the pilots was 32.5 years. 
Each consenting pilot completed the Profile of 
Mood States procedure and engaged in task practice 
The pilot then completed six, 5-minute trials. At 
the 4:45 mark of each trial the pilot was asked a 
series of on-line questions from the Subjective 
Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT). 
Following the experimental trials, the participant 
was asked again to complete the POMS 
questionnaire. Finally, the pilot completed a 
subjective questionnaire pertaining to flight 
experience and the experiment itself. The 
procedure used the MINSTAR test battery [2], 
which is illustrated in Figure 1. This presents a 
multi-task environment in which two-dimensional 
compensatory tracking, fuel management, and 
monitoring are presented as individual sub-tasks. In 
the tracking the goal is to make corrective 
movements via the flight stick in order to bring the 
moving cursor in alignment to a fixed target at the 
center of the display. The difficulty of this task 
can be manipulated by the experiment. In fuel 
management, the pilot manually controls the on/off 
status of the fuel pumps in order to maintain a 
target level of fuel in the two outer tanks.   The 
difficulty of this task can be manipulated by 
initiating failure(s) of the fuel pumps. In 
monitoring, the pilot is required to reset the lights 
or gauges whenever they deviate from their normal 
status. 
S3 uahts 
||QQ  Gauges 
Tracking 
+ 
(Center Screen) 
Fuel Management 
Figure 1. The MINSTAR test facility showing the 
component tasks and their respective location in 
the fully manual condition. 
32. Experimental Conditions 
The present experiment consisted of a mixed design 
in which automation invocation procedure was a 
between-subject factor and warning modality and 
display re-configuration/location were within- 
subject factors. The four methods for the invocation 
of automation for the tracking sub-task were: (1) 
system-initiated automation (SIA), (2) pilot 
command by negation (PCN), (3) pilot command by 
initiation (PCI), and (4) pilot-initiated automation 
(PIA). In system-initiated automation (SIA), when 
the pilot exceeded a preset root mean square error 
(rmse) for a period of 250 milliseconds, the system 
automated the tracking task. The duration of the 
automation was 15 seconds after which manual 
control was returned. Pilot command by negation 
retained the same performance constraints, 
however, the system warned the pilot that 
automation is imminent unless negated. The pilot 
then may allow the system to automate or negate 
automation occurrence by depressing a response 
button within five seconds. For pilot command by 
initiation (PCI) the system recommended that the 
pilot automate the tracking sub-task whenever the 
preset rmse level was exceeded. The pilot may 
choose to ignore the recommendation and continue 
performing the task or the pilot may choose to 
automate by pulling the trigger on the flight stick. 
In pilot-initiated automation (PIA) pilots used 
automation at their discretion.    An automation 
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rationale was provided to all pilots which 
recommended that they use automation whenever 
they felt performance was deteriorating on the 
three sub-tasks i.e. when 2500 is not consistently 
being achieved on the fuel management, not 
responding quickly and accurately to monitoring 
deviations, and tracking performance was not 
constantly maintaining the cursor near the target. 
All methods with the exception of PIA utilized a 
constant rmse performance criterion for the tracking 
sub-task automation initiation. 
There were three warning conditions. The auditory 
warning consisted of a single computer generated 
"beep" when automation was either invoked (SIA 
and PIA), imminent unless negated (PCN), or 
recommended (PCI). A double "beep" was used to 
signify that automation had been turned off. The 
visual warning consisted of a message below the 
tracking display that "automation imminent unless 
negated" (PCN) or "automation recommended" 
(PCI). If automation was permitted to occur, the 
message read "automation on" (all methods). 
When manual control was returned to the pilot, the 
message read "automation off" (all methods). The 
multi-modal warning was a combination of the 
above two modalities. When automation was 
either recommended (PCI), warned of its impending 
occurrence (PCN), and turned on and off (all 
methods), both the visual and auditory warnings 
described above were used. 
Tracking display re-configuration/location was the 
final within-subject variable. There were two 
automated location conditions. When the tracking 
task was automated the display was reconfigured 
to a smaller size and then located either centrally 
(in the middle of the screen) or peripherally (in 
the bottom right corner of the screen). 
33. Performance Measures 
Tracking sub-task performance was assessed 
through root mean square (RMS) error. Monitoring 
sub-task performance was given by response time, 
missed signals and false alarms. Fuel management 
was scored in terms of deviation from the target 
value. Four different error derivations were used; 
absolute error, constant error, variable error and 
total variability. There were three forms of 
subjective assessment, these were the profile of 
mood states (POMS) [61, the Subjective Workload 
Assessment Technique (SWAT) [9] and an informal 
debrief questionnaire prepared by the 
experimenters. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
4.1. Tracking Performance 
Rmse for manual control portions of tracking 
performance was calculated for each subject and 
entered as data for the repeated measures 
ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect for 
automation invocation (F[3, 28] = 10.813, p<0.01). 
Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference 
between the system invoked automation procedure 
and each of the other procedures indicating that 
the SIA group outperformed all other groups. No 
main effects were found for the within-subject 
variables of automation warning modality or 
display location. The tracking analysis did reveal 
a significant three-way interaction (F[6,56] = 2.462, 
p<0.05) between all factors. 
As the procedures for tracking automation were 
manipulated as a between-subject variable it was 
not possible to equate the groups for the total time 
spent in manual control. The amount of time spent 
in manual control was calculated for each trial and 
the data was subjected to a repeated measures 
ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect for 
invocation procedure (F[3, 28] = 3364, p<0.05). 
Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference 
between SIA and PCN groups, indicating that the 
SIA group spent significantly less time in manual 
tracking control than the PCN group. The mean 
time for manual control of tracking by automation 
invocation procedure is presented in Figure 2. 
SIA pa PIA PCN 
Automation Invocation Procedure 
Figure 2. Time in Manual Control of Tracking. The 
difference in time in manual control of tracking is 
due to the structure of the invocation procedures. 
SIA automates at the time of violation of the 
performance criterion, the others allow the pilots 
to continue manual control at their discretion. 
Rmse data was then standardized according to time 
spent in manual control. The standardization 
procedure had two purposes. The first was to 
evaluate the "randomization of subjects to the 
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between-group conditions. The standardized data 
is a group measure and indicates they are 
equivalent in terms of tracking ability. The second 
was to generate a dependent measure of tracking 
performance which controlled for the between- 
group differences in the amount of time spent in 
manual tracking control. Thus, standardized data 
yield a measure of both tracking ability and 
tracking performance. Rmse data was standardized 
by taking individual tracking performance and 
dividing it by the time spent in manual control on a 
trial per trial basis. This procedure yielded a 
measure of tracking performance per unit of time for 
each trial. This standardized data was then 
entered into a repeated measures ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed no significant effects. This 
indicated that while groups were equated in terms 
of tracking ability, the effects identified in the 
rmse analysis are directly due to the different 
times spent in manual control. 
Individual trials were examined to determine the 
amount of time between the start of the trial and 
the first episode of automation. This was conceived 
as an uncontaminated measure of the between-group 
invocation procedure because the within-subject 
manipulations (warning and automated display 
location) are not presented until after automation 
occurs. Thus, the dependent measure was the time 
(in seconds) to the first automation episode. Data 
for each trial was entered into a repeated measures 
ANOVA with no within-subject factors. The 
analysis indicated a significant effect for 
invocation procedure (F[3, 181] = 6.502, p<0.01). 
Post-hoc tests revealed the SIA group was had a 
shorter elapse time than all other groups, which 
did not differ between themselves (see Figure 3). 
Invocation Procedure 
Figure 3. Time to First Episode of Automation. The 
data    indicated    that    the    system    invoked 
automation group (SIA) was exposed to an episode 
of automation much earlier than the other groups. 
4.2. Fuel Management 
The level of fuel was averaged for the two goal 
tanks for each sample of data. Fuel management 
error was then calculated as absolute error, constant 
error, variable error, and total variability. In each 
case the obtained error for each subject, for each 
condition, was entered into the repeated measures 
ANOVA. Results for absolute error and total 
variability revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions for any of the factors investigated. 
The ANOVAs for constant error and variable error 
revealed a main effect for the within-subject 
variable of automated tracking display location 
(F[l, 28] = 5.001, p<0.05) and (F[l, 28] = 5.788, p 
<0.05), respectively. 
43. Monitoring 
Response times, in seconds were obtained for each 
monitoring deviation and mean response times were 
calculated for each of the conditions. Mean 
response times for each subject were entered as data 
into a repeated measures ANOVA. Results of the 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions. The number of missed monitoring 
deviations was recorded for each trial, for each 
pilot. Again a repeated measures ANOVA was 
completed and no significant main effects or 
interactions were found. Monitoring data indicated 
that there were no false alarms. Data also 
indicated that the missed signal rate was 
approximately 12.5% per trial but this was 
artificially high because there were only eight 
possible deviations per five minute trial. 
43. Subjective Measures 
Data for subjective measures of time load, stress 
level, and mental effort were collected at the 4:45 
minute mark of each 5 minute trial for each subject. 
Data were analyzed via repeated measures 
ANOVA. The analyses revealed a main effect for 
the within-subject variable of warning modality 
(F[2,56] = 3.924, p<0.05). Post-hoc tests, using Post- 
hoc procedure revealed that the visual warning 
modality was significantly higher in time load 
then the multi-modality (combination of visual 
and auditory). Pre and post trial POMS 
questionnaires were scored for the six scales 
according to the instruction manual. A seventh 
score, reflecting total mood disturbance, was 
obtained by summing across all scales (scoring Vigor 
negatively). Pre and post trial scores for the seven 
scales  were  subjected   to  repeated  measures 
142 
ANOVA. Results indicated that Fatigue scores 
demonstrated a significant main effect for 
invocation procedure (F[3, 28] = 3.033, p<0.05) and a 
significant procedure by testing interaction (F[3, 28] 
= 3.04, p<0.05). The fatigue data for the main 
effect indicated that, in general, subjects in the 
system-invoked automation group reported more 
fatigue. The fatigue interaction data indicated 
that system-invoked automation was associated 
with an increase in fatigue in the post-trial session 
with all other groups reporting a reduction in 
fatigue. 
5. DISCUSSION 
If adaptive task allocation is posed as one solution 
to the problems of contemporary automation, the 
critical question remains as to how that automation 
transition is to occur? Tracking performance 
indicated that the system-invoked automation 
(SIA) group was significantly lower in their error 
compared to other groups. However, when tracking 
was viewed as rmse per unit of time in manual 
control, there were no significant differences 
between invocation procedures. This suggests that it 
is not capability but strategy that is changed by 
invocation differences. This was confirmed by 
examining 'the time to first automation.' This is a 
pure measure since within-subject factors warning 
and automated display relocation were not 
presented until after the first automation. Data 
indicated that the system-invoked automation 
(SIA) group were transitioned to automation much 
more quickly than the others. Thus, a fundamental 
effect associated with invocation procedures and 
the major finding here is that system-invoked 
automation is associated with less time to initial 
automation. 
Results from the fuel management task address the 
human-machine interface as it relates to the 
display of automation status. The specific 
conclusion, however, is related to the question, 
"What effects occur, in terms of performance bias, 
for component task fuel management, when primary 
task tracking is automated to display position 
either centrally or peripherally"? The answer, in 
terms of bias, is that the fuel management 
performance favors the peripheral automated 
tracking display. "What effects occur, in terms of 
performance variability, for component task fuel 
management, when primary task tracking is 
automated to display position either centrally or 
peripherally"? The answer, in terms of 
variability, is that fuel management performance 
favors a centrally located automated tracking 
display. Which conclusion is more valuable? The 
answer depends on how critical the respective 
types of errors are in the real-world. If one seeks to 
control individual variability then a central 
automated display favors better performance on 
other component sub-tasks. If, however, one seeks 
to control bias error across a group of users then a 
peripheral automated display factors better 
performance on other opponent sub-tasks. These 
conclusions are reflective of individual differences, 
primarily because variable error is computed with 
the individual performer's mean. Finally, a 
practical application of the fuel management data 
is that fuel management performance was not 
specifically related to the invocation procedures 
under examination or, more generally, to the 
concept of a continuum of authority (from fully 
manual control to fully automated control) as it 
applies to the invocation of automation. 
With respect to warning modalities, it was 
proposed to contrast modes of sensory assimilation. 
The hypothesis being that multi-modal warnings 
would be most effective. In constructing an 
ecologically valid display it was not possible to 
provide psychophysical equivalence between 
visual and auditory cues. However, results are 
informative for the practical realm. It appears 
that simplicity should guide design in invocation 
advice in terms of interface development. It was 
clear that visual, alpha-numeric communications 
were the least preferred conditions by pilots and 
that some degree warning 'horse-race' was imposed 
in an information-processing dynamic. Our 
recommendation for simplicity also argues for a 
careful evaluation of other systems placed in the 
cockpit which might signal the onset or offset of 
critical functions. 
5.1. A Context-Based Model 
After extensive investigation of the question of 
adaptive allocation, it has become clearer that 
there is no single right answer. The answer always 
depends upon the context of performance. 
Consequently, we view the adaptation process of 
automation in terms of envelopes of protection. 
What drives the system are the needs to achieve 
mission goals. What bounds the system are the 
constraints of the operator, the flight platform, 
and the flight conditions they encounter, more 
generally   the  environmental     constraints. 
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Figure 4. A context model for the implementation of adaptive automation systems. The contours represent™* 
operation which differ in the degree of operator control. The path of optima W^»*^f^ *£ 
interaction with environmental constraints may force the operator to relinquish degrees of control. Note that 
iheTTno human-centereä contour on the very right. It is unlikely that multiple exposure to ™ronmenUA 
constraints would allow the operator to maintain total control. At such junctures, consultation or emergency 
(life-threat) strategies may be initiated. 
The following model is a descriptive but dynamic 
view of adaptive allocation (see Figure 4). 
Initially, environmental constraints are not severe 
and the range of operational latitude allows each 
of three allocation strategies to be engaged. As 
environmental constraints are loosened (as for 
example in straight and level flight), operational 
latitude increases and the ability to use human- 
centered strategies is enhanced. As environmental 
constraints are tightened (as for example in pilot 
incapacitation, engine failure, or nap-of-the-earth 
flight) possible strategies are reduced. The outer 
region of operational latitude is represented as a 
life and system-threat envelope. Conditions which 
threaten to violate these bounds (e.g., flight into 
terrain), are dealt with by the system-level of 
automation initiation. This is particularly the 
case in emergency conditions such as the 
incapacitation of either pilot or some vital aircraft 
component. Embedded in this operational envelope 
is a region of consultation. This is typified by the 
interactive strategies of command by negation and 
advisories. Finally, the inner region is human- 
centered in which all automation decisions are 
initiated by the pilot. We would like to maintain 
the pilot in this region of optimal control, however, 
many environmental contingencies vary which act 
to perturb the path of progress. These perturbations 
are communicated in terms of tasks to be performed 
and hence re-configuration of the multi-task matrix 
is periodically needed.   The present descriptive 
model has the advantage of combing all forms of 
automation initiation strategy dependent upon 
context and preserving safety of operation in the 
outer envelope. 
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1. SUMMARY 
The quality of communications between a pilot and an 
electronic crewmember (EC) will help determine whether the 
EC becomes an accepted and trusted member of the pilot's 
onboard team. This paper presents McDonnell Douglas 
Aerospace (MDA) efforts relating to the design of a 
communications interface between a pilot and an aircraft with 
an EC. 
Our objective for the pilot/EC interface effort was to apply 
what is known about cognitive psychology, human factors, 
and design techniques to the design of an intuitive 
information interface for the pilot of an EC-equipped 
multi-mission fighter. After researching and interpreting 
these topics, we identified principles for interface design 
most applicable to the user population. Next, we used those 
principles to develop several pilot/EC display formats. We 
installed these formats into a simulator and used an emulated 
EC to conduct man-in-the-loop evaluation runs. We 
examined the results of the evaluation and documented the 
lessons learned. These lessons can be applied to future 
interface design efforts, not only for pilot/EC teams but for 
crewstation configurations in general. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The Advanced Crew Systems group at McDonnell Douglas 
Aerospace has conducted research since the early 1980's in 
the area of optimizing cockpit displays and controls to help 
increase aircrew situation awareness. In the last few years 
this research has expanded to include interfaces between a 
pilot and a notional avionics subsystem that can assume 
many tasks of a second crewmember. Our goal of providing 
intuitive displays and controls for the pilot armed with such 
a system was based on the philosophy that effective cockpit 
communications between the pilot and his electronic 
crewmember is one key to increasing acceptance and trust in 
a technology that is often stereotyped as intrusive or 
unnecessary. The removal of these labels is essential to 
building trust in the system, and is possible if the appropriate 
roles are established for each member of the team. The 
premise we adopted for establishing roles is that the pilot is 
always in charge, will always be held accountable for all 
decisions, and therefore must shoulder the greatest amount 
of decision-making responsibility. While this should seem 
like an obvious fact, there is always the danger of ignoring it 
and designing a system which does not work for the pilot but 
makes the pilot work for it. With the correct focus, the EC is 
simply one of many tools the pilot can exploit to 
successfully accomplish his mission. 
MDA has developed and evaluated displays and controls for 
a pilot/electronic crewmember team based on these concepts. 
Our assumptions of the electronic crewmember's 
capabilities, the principles of design we used to develop the 
interface, and the evaluation environment will be described 
in this paper. Lessons learned from multiple simulation runs 
with experienced fighter pilots will be related. 
3. ELECTRONIC CREWMEMBER FUNCTIONALITY 
To adequately evaluate pilot/EC interface designs, we 
estimated what capabilities a future EC-like system would 
realistically be expected to have. To establish the foundation 
of our interface designs, a number of initial guidelines for EC 
capability were developed around our philosophy of the EC as 
an intelligent subordinate to the pilot. Specifically, the EC: 
• could not act on its own; 
• could make recommendations; 
• could take action based on pilot direction; 
• could take action based on interpreting pilot intent; 
• could fly the aircraft tactically on autopilot; 
• could deal with ambiguities in human speech in the 
context of the mission; 
• could diagnose malfunctions, identify 
miscommunications, and determine the correct 
response. 
Our goal was for the EC to provide consistently correct 
information and aid the pilot's decision making by helping to 
manage workload, reduce confusion, and simplify tasks. 
The first of these traits requires the EC to be virtually 
error-free. With an actual electronic crewmember, 
confidence leading to trust can only be achieved after 
continued success at providing assistance that is both logical 
and expected by the human, and is correct all the time. 
Depending on the situation one error by the system may 
strongly bias pilots against using it at all, since pilots are 
much less forgiving of systems errors in flight environments 
filled with critical mission phases and timing constraints. 
The electronic crewmember also must not contribute to pilot 
workload, but should help him manage what he already has. 
This may not reduce workload, but high workload is not the 
main problem because pilots generally prefer to stay 
involved in operating their own aircraft. This helps keep 
their concentration level up, allowing them to "stay ahead of 
the jet". The real problem is task saturation, where low 
situation awareness or strict time limits may cause the pilot 
to get behind and not know exactly how to catch up. Task 
saturation tends to follow a snowball effect that at best 
causes the pilot to fall even further behind, and at worst may 
cause him to "freeze up". To combat this problem, pilots 
strive to gain the knowledge and experience needed to know 
what is going on and what to do next in the most probable 
extensions of the current situation. An electronic 
crewmember that can consistently demonstrate the ability to 
help the pilot stay ahead of his jet while ensuring he stays in 
the loop as mission manager will be readily accepted and 
trusted. 
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4. INTERFACE DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Once the capabilities of our electronic crewmember were 
agreed upon, the design team began the process of 
developing the display and control designs we would 
evaluate in simulation. Our design team consisted of both 
experienced fighter pilots and human factors engineers, 
allowing us to keep an operational perspective while 
ensuring that we considered known cognitive psychology 
and human factors design techniques. In the initial stages of 
the process, these techniques were developed into the 
principles for design we would use on the pilot/EC interface. 
These principles were based on cognitive characteristics 
unique to the fighter pilot population in order to make the 
designs user-friendly and "intuitive". In the context of 
fighter displays and controls, an interface that is intuitive is 
easy for aircrews to use and quick to learn, where the 
required actions are obvious, implications of those actions 
are clear, and user expectations of performance are met. 
Similar principles were grouped together so that three main 
categories emerged, dealing with spatial representation, 
perception and cognitive tasks, and itegration of data. 
Within each group were several general principles we found 
most useful for the pilot/EC interface designs: 
4.1 Spatial Representation 
• Represent information consistent with the spatial 
environment. In the cockpit, the environment is 
from the pilot's point of view inside-out and is 
scaled. 
• Display current location in the mission as an 
indication of position within the sequence of tasks. 
Pilots tend to separate missions into distinct 
segments, each with special groups of functions to 
be performed. 
• Represent the complexity of the environment, 
including all data relevant to the pilot's 
decision-making process. Attempts to simplify the 
interface by arbitrarily limiting the data which 
reaches the pilot runs the risk of lowering situation 
awareness. 
4.2 Perception and Cognitive Tasks 
• Present information graphically for holistic 
processing. Pilots can assimilate the "big picture" 
more rapidly through the use of graphics in a 
crew-centered design. 
• Use alphanumeric information to facilitate detailed, 
analytic processing. Discrete use of textual data will 
enhance the quality of the graphical information. 
• Use comparative, not absolute, judgments to aid 
rapid decision-making in time critical missions. 
• Use specialized displays for specialized tasks. 
• Use color as a redundant code to facilitate rapid 
processing. 
• Display important information in consistent 
locations, lessening the time required to look for the 
data. 
• Automate tedious, repetitive tasks. 
43 Integration of Data 
• Combine related data into a representation that 
groups the information into meaningful units. Data 
scattered about a display without regard to how it 
relates to other pieces of information increases 
workload and crosscheck time unnecessarily. 
• Reduce visual clutter and minimize the number of 
items to be searched in a display. Gestalt principles 
can be used to ensure all relevant data is provided in 
the most efficient and uncluttered way. 
• Highlight important information or information 
contrary to the norm, and call attention to neglected 
items. 
• Provide feedback for control inputs. 
5. MANNED SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
Before we applied these principles to actual display and 
control design, a mission was chosen for the simulation 
evaluation with events such as a low level ingress to an 
air-to-ground attack, enroute threat engagements, systems 
malfunctions, and retargetting tasks. Due to time constraints 
we chose not to model an entire mission with every 
contingency, but concentrate on segments most interesting to 
a study of the pilot/EC team. Our approach was to design 
the mission and script the probable dialogue between the 
pilot and EC, referencing our assumed EC capabilities, in 
order to determine which specific displays to focus our 
design effort toward. By scripting the mission we were able 
to bound the evaluation within reasonable limits and avoid 
problems with pilots venturing off into areas we hadn't 
designed an EC interface for. 
We based our electronic crewmember emulation on the 
trade-off between the cost of developing a real electronic 
crewmember and the need to simulate a realistic, useful, and 
trustworthy system. We found that the best way to meet all 
these requirements was to use experienced fighter pilots 
playing the role of the electronic crewmember, which gave 
the system instant credibility since all pilots who participated 
in the simulation were confident the "electronic 
crewmember" would meet their expectations of 
performance. This has been necessary in order to focus on 
designing the interface rather than worrying about the 
operations of the EC, since our goal has been to develop an 
easy to use and understand interface allowing two-way 
communication with the electronic crewmember. 
To gain insight into the intuitiveness of our display or control 
designs, we evaluated them in the proper environment with a 
cross-section of experienced users. For a pilot/electronic 
crewmember team, this was a manned simulation of a high 
workload mission with many opportunities for the team 
members to interact. System malfunctions, threat attacks, 
mission replannig, and coordination with higher authorities 
were all elements that we included to stimulate the 
communication between the pilot and the electronic 
crewmember. Even normal mission events such as low level 
flight, sensor operations, target area attack, and egress were 
areas where the communication seemed to naturally occur as 
the pilot worked to gain the knowledge to build his situation 
awareness and reduce task saturation. 
6.0 DISPLAY AND CONTROL DESIGN 
Once the A/G attack mission segments were selected and 
scripted, the design principles were used to guide the 
development of several display formats which the EC would 
use to communicate information and recommendations to the 
pilot. The principles were also used to help determine the 
optimum controls for the pilot to command the EC. 
6.1 Interface configuration 
Several of the following cockpit enabling technologies were 
considered for our pilot/EC interface designs, based on their 
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ability to improve pilots' situation awareness and reduce task 
saturation: 
• Large head down displays 
• Helmet mounted displays 
• Full color capability 
• Display windowing 
• Graphical display capability 
• Voice control 
• Touch control 
• Hands-On Throttle and Stick (HOTAS} control 
6.2 "Cockpit 2001" 
The flexibility and large display space of the McDonnell 
Douglas Cockpit 2001 concept provided important benefits 
to our pilot/EC interface. As shown in the following figure, 
Cockpit 2001 features two 10 inch by 10 inch flat panel 
displays mounted side by side on the main instrument panel. 
This results in more than twice the programmable display 
space available in current fighters such as the F-15E or 
F/A-18. With windowing capability the pilot can select 
several display formats simultaneously if desired, or he can 
select a large, global "panoramic" display of the mission 
environment. Hands-on "macro mode" control allows him 
to select format configurations tailored to each mission 
phase. For our primary EC control interface we simulated a 
Figure 1. Cockpit 2001 Display Configuration 
voice control system with natural speech capability to 
provide a degree of familiarity and personality to the team. 
We also simulated HOTAS, touch control and standard 
pushbutton/switches as alternate methods of allowing the 
pilot to communicate with the EC. 
6.3 Pilot/Electronic Crewmember Interface Designs 
With Cockpit 2001 as the basis, we began to apply the 
design principles both to a general EC interface structure and 
to several specialized formats for communicating the 
appropriate information on scripted mission events. To 
satisfy the basic principle of consistent location of important 
information, we dedicated a central message location on the 
Up Front Control for initial EC communications and 
prompting. We also color-coded formats and 
recommendations generated by the EC, to differentiate from 
normal systems data. This was intended to reduce the 
amount of time the pilot needed to search his displays to 
communicate with the EC. Magenta (light purple) was 
selected, since it is used sparingly on current displays, and 
would not cause conflicts by being devoted to the EC. 
Figure 2 shows the Up Front Control with prompting 
"RETARTETING . . .READY" displayed inside the magenta 
EC message window. A redundant voice message 
accompanied all UFC messages, helping to let the pilot 
know there was data he needed to look at. 
Figure 2. Up Front Control Message Window 
If an EC message appeared on the UFC that had 
accompanying detailed data for the pilot to view, the pilot 
could select an EC window on one of his large displays to 
examine the information. These windows also featured a 
magenta border, and any EC-unique data or 
recommendations were also displayed in magenta. 
The next few paragraphs summarize a typical mission script 
and illustrate the EC interface formats the pilot used to deal 
with the various mission events. 
During the initial low level ingress segment, the EC detected 
a system malfunction and alerted the pilot through a warning 
on the Up Front Control EC message line. While the EC 
diagnosed the problem and determined the best course of 
action, the pilot was presented with status information and 
was asked permission prior to any change in system 
configuration. By applying the principles dealing with 
holistic graphics, specialized displays, and highlighting data 
out of the norm the three formats in the following figure 
were generated. The display in the lower left was the first 
offered by the EC and shows a left generator failure. The 
EC asked permission to recycle generator power in an 
attempt to restore normal operation. The next format in the 
lower right depicts the diagnosis of a fuel leak which also 
imposes limits on maneuvering and afterburner usage. In the 
third, upper left format the EC offered additional details 
about the problem, including the specific location of the fuel 
leak, rate of fuel loss, and a recommendation to set idle 
power to reduce the loss rate. The pilot selected each of 
these formats whenever he was ready for the information, 
and the EC kept them in sequence to guide the pilot through 
the problem. 
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Figure 3. System Malfunction Formats 
In a later segment of the mission, the EC received inputs 
from the simulated onboard sensor integration system that 
enemy aircraft had been detected and were on an intercept 
course to the friendly strike package. The lower left format 
in Figure 4 relates the detected enemy formation, speed, and 
altitude, and the EC resolution of aircraft type and probable 
weapons carriage. In the mission script, the mission 
commander in a different aircraft decided that "blue" flight, 
which was ahead of ownship, should engage the enemy 
while the rest of the package continued the mission, so the 
EC related this to the pilot through the UFC message 
window. The mission commander also wanted to know if 
ownship could retarget to "blue" flight's target, and the EC 
displayed the information necessary for the pilot to make this 
decision in two additional formats. In the lower right the EC 
presented the target environment graphically, and 
highlighted blue flight's target to the pilot. In the upper left, 
the EC showed the pilot that fuel, weapons, and time on 
target criteria were OK for retargeting, and asked the pilot to 
confirm or refuse the retargeting request from the mission 
commander. In the figure, the pilot has accepted the new 
assignment, so the "Retargeting OK" bar has changed to 
solid green from a magenta outline. 
While approaching the final run-in to the target area, the EC 
calculated the two best attack axes taking into account threat 
positions, terrain, sun angle, and other tactical 
considerations. In the lower left format of Figure 5 the pilot 
has already selected the zone which allows three targets to be 
attacked in rapid sequence using a multiple target attack 
algorithm. The integration of graphic and alphanumeric 
displays of the attack plan allowed the pilot to quickly 
assimilate the required information (number of targets, 
inbound attack heading boundaries, orientation to the target 
area) and make a timely decision. The lower right format 
shows the pilot how his final attack run-in appears so that he 
could orient himself early, and know what to look for to 
positively identify the target. The format also shows 
Figure 4. Retargeting Formats 
Figure 5. Multi-Target Attack Formats 
through color coding when his heading was within the 
proper limits for the algorithm to release against all three 
targets. The upper right format is a combination of SAR 
imagery of the target area, overlaid with the three targets 
recommended by the EC and selected by the pilot for attack. 
7. LESSONS LEARNED 
We determined three roles in the pilot/electronic 
crewmember team from observations of the subjects: 
mission manager, systems manager, and flight path manager. 
Every pilot we tested gave the flight path manager role to his 
electronic counterpart as soon as workload began to increase 
and decisions had to be made. Since the pilots trusted the 
aircraft to be flown tactically, they turned their attention to 
mission management tasks. The EC was even allowed to fly 
the attack in the target area in order to release weapons 
against multiple targets. The systems manager role tended to 
be split, with the electronic crewmember diagnosing 
problems and recommending fixes, while the pilot reserved 
the right to give permission to actually change system 
configuration if required. Thus, we learned the systems 
manager and flight path manager's roles can be 
accomplished by the electronic crewmember while still 
being dependent on decisions from the human mission 
manager. 
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Five levels of pilot/EC interaction may be desired, tailorable 
by mission phase, systems involved, and threat expected. 
We have found pilots differ as to how much they want the 
EC to be able to do on its own. The five levels are: 
• Fully automatic EC with no feedback to the pilot 
• Fully automatic with feedback on status 
• Semi-automatic EC (tells pilot what will happen and 
asks permission to proceed) 
• Manual (provides information only; pilot is expected 
to perform all tasks with no assistance) 
• No EC involvement 
The pilots commented that the interface must facilitate rapid 
review and acceptance or tailoring of these options, to be 
useable in time-critical situations. 
More head up cues are desired. Pilots typically don't stare 
down into the cockpit, and don't want to have to monitor and 
control an EC that way. Pilots' desires to remain head up 
during a low level tactical air-to-ground mission plays a 
signficant role in CVI design, including EC interfaces. 
Voice control, helmet mounted or HUD cues, or an up front 
control, all allow varying amounts of the desired head 
up/head forward operation. 
Voice was the control of choice, due to a combination of 
limited training, ease of use, and flexibility of the emulated 
EC. In a typical simulation mission lasting 10 minutes, 600 
exchanges between the human pilot and the electronic 
crewmember took place, of which 500 were through the 
emulated voice control system. At times during the mission 
the EC had relatively large amounts of data to communicate 
to the crew, so that certain display formats were crowded. 
The pilots typically spent little time trying to interpret these 
cluttered displays, and instead fell back on the voice control 
capability to ask for the most important data and 
recommendations. The pilots appeared to function more 
easily with multiple simple formats showing specific pieces 
of data, easily requested and exited using voice control. 
In a fast-paced, workload intensive scenario, prompting from 
the EC was very helpful in keeping the pilot thinking ahead, 
thus helping to prevent task saturation. The key element 
here is helping the pilot make the mission decisions in a 
timely manner. To reduce crosscheck requirements, an ideal 
alerting system would provide a maximum of immediately 
useful information in as little time or space as possible. 
Options or alternatives were generally understood when 
offered together for comparison. If the options or their 
method of display was complex, they were often overlooked, 
not noticed or misunderstood unless studied extensively 
which the pilots did not want to do because of the danger of 
getting behind. A pilot that trusts his EC will seldom 
examine the alternatives to the primary recommendation, 
thus reducing time spent making decisions. Lack of trust 
will force examination of the options, decreasing the benefits 
of workload management afforded by an EC. Lack of trust 
can lead to a counterproductive and potentially dangerous 
situation as the crew runs out of time to do all the tasks, 
causing task saturation. 
Pilots often had multiple EC formats displayed at once on 
the Cockpit 2001 displays. They would tell the EC which 
formats they wanted to keep and which could be removed, 
and in this way keep situation awareness high for each 
mission phase. One important aspect of the pilot/EC 
interface is the desire to have an easy way to remove specific 
EC data when it has been assimilated and is no longer 
needed. We found this to be a non-trivial task, especially 
when combined with the concept of multiple, simple formats 
displayed at once. The selection of an EC format was easier, 
since the formats were queued and selected in order as the 
pilot was ready to receive them. The problem with removing 
formats is that the pilot needs an easy way to tell the EC 
which particular format he doesn't want anymore. Any CVI 
design for pilot/EC must make this a priority. 
Human emulation of an EC is an acceptable method to study 
the interface, as long as the people playing the EC are a part 
of the same user population as the test subjects, so that there 
is credibility and expectations of performance are generally 
met In this way, the EC will be able to interpret ambiguous 
pilot communications and make its response unambiguous, 
and also realize when misunderstandings have occurred and 
correct them. 
8. CONCLUSION 
A human/electronic crewmember team can be trusted to 
successfully accomplish the mission, assuming the 
appropriate roles are assigned to each team member, the EC 
is dependable, and a user-friendly and intuitive interface 
between the two exists to allow smooth communications in 
time-critical, workload-intensive situations. Graphical 
displays, prompting, highlighting, interactive voice control, 
and specialized formats have all been shown to be very 
effective features of a pilot/EC interface. While futuristic, 
large display configurations enhanced the usability of the EC 
interface formats in our evaluations, the same design 
principles identified in our work can be used to develop 
formats intuitive to pilots of current day aircraft. Designers 
must also remain aware of our findings of the pilot's desire 
to be the overall mission manager while allowing the EC to 
be the systems and flight path manager. Although based on 
an emulation of an advanced, "intelligent" EC, these results 
should nonetheless provide guidance to future design efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the need for standards for 
trustworthy Human-Electronic Crew (H/E Crew) 
teamwork, and the feasibility of setting and 
implementing such standards; what do we need to do 
before we can deliver H/E Crew systems with 
confidence? The paper is based on the belief that the 
H/E Crew is "special" - the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts - and that additions to existing 
standards and engineering methods will be needed to 
deliver trustworthy H/E Crew teamwork. The 
author's experience is that there is now significant 
customer pull for intelligent support systems (under 
a variety of names) and an expectation that such 
systems can be delivered at affordable risk and cost. 
WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE H/E CREW? 
Human-electronic systems operating at the cognitive 
level are different to systems that operate at the 
physical and physiological level. Hollnagel and 
Woods (1) proposed that such systems are something 
"special" over ten years ago. 
A cognitive system (Woods, 2) is goal directed; it uses 
knowledge about itself and its environment to 
monitor, plan, and modify its actions in the pursuit 
of goals; it is both data-driven and concept-driven. 
More significant than any changes in technology, 
what is being proposed is a step up in the level of 
description to a knowledge system (Newell, 3), rather 
than a program-level system. 
It is proposed that progress in developing H/E 
teamwork can be compared with progress in 
understanding flying qualities. Vincenti (4) has 
described the learning process (over a quarter of a 
century) by which an ill-defined problem with a large 
subjective human element was translated into an 
objective well-defined problem for the designer. One 
of the striking parallels was the move from an open- 
system viewpoint - which saw the pilot as an external 
agent - to a closed-loop system which saw the pilot 
and aircraft as a single system. Although there is a 
community of engineers and researchers who assume 
the closed-loop total-system approach, it is in the 
minority. Further, within that community, the 
potential problems raised by Woods (2) eight years 
ago are perhaps better understood, but they are not 
necessarily nearer resolution. 
THE NEED FOR STANDARDS 
If we are to conduct engineering at the level of 
knowledge systems, then we need to develop 
appropriate standards just as a matter of good practice 
("everybody needs standards"). However, knowledge 
level systems have their own requirements, and 
these pose specific demands on the engineering 
process. This is not equivalent to any specific 
technology such as "KBS", and to some extent, it 
could be argued that the failure of many current 
computer systems is due to a failure to recognize the 
knowledge level (the long history of failure in 
'decision aids' is a case in point). Perhaps the 'H/E 
team' is more widespread than we think. 
The specific requirements of the H/E team include 
the following; dialogue about shared goals and 
values, handling of uncertain and conflicting data, 
shared data interpretation and decision making, 
shared error recovery (to include 'mistakes' as well as 
data entry 'slips'), the need to interpret and accept 
machine decisions, the ability to distinguish plausible 
wrong answers, and joint adaptation or evolution as 
part of organizational 'self design'. A key ingredient 
of interest to this audience is real-time operation, e.g. 
on-line plan repair rather than off-line planning. 
PRESENT STATE OF H/E CREW TECHNOLOGIES 
There have been major advances in the (necessary 
but not sufficient) technologies that support H/E 
Crew teamwork. This section gives a thumb nail 
sketch of where relevant advances have been made, 
and where we still have a way to go before building 
H/E teams can be considered a regulated process. 
Human Factors, HCI 
Human Factors in general, and UK Military HF in 
particular, has become much more regulated and 
standardised. The integration of HF with the rest of 
systems engineering is less well-defined. The specific 
area of Human computer Interaction (HCI) has 
become much more standardised (e.g. 5). Some parts 
of ISO 9241 (5) have an oblique relevance to the H/E 
Crew, but no particular consideration is given to any 
form of intelligent support. 
Software Engineering, Cognitive Science 
The dominant paradigms in both cognitive science 
and software engineering arc particularly unhelpful 
to the development of H/E teams: 
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Software engineering still takes little account of the 
user as part of a total system, and most work on 
safety-critical systems (where one might expect 
trustworthiness) is focussed entirely on the machine 
element, and to some extent the role of the operator 
as fall guy for design inadequacies is becoming 
formally recognized. 
If the Newell approach to cognitive science (3) is 
taken as representing the dominant paradigm, then 
the H/E Crew would appear to be impossible; the 
social band operates on a timescale of days to months. 
'There is no way for a social group to act as a single 
body of knowledge. This restriction applies to goals as 
well. Whatever advantages may be found in 
reconciling opposed or discordant goals, the limited 
means of communicating about goals and why they 
exist is sufficient to keep the organization from ever 
arriving at a single common basic goal structure." 
(Newell, 3). This is greatly at variance with the 
findings of the High Reliability ' Organization 
programme (6, 7) and most people who have studied 
well-formed teams. The Knowledge system is 
portrayed in just the open-system manner that early 
work on flying qualities portrayed aircraft stability. 
The cognitive science paradigm also gives no separate 
credence to affect, emotion or the priorities of 
survival (motivated by the autonomic nervous 
system in the human element), and hence to the 
'prime directives' or defaults proposed by Reising and 
Emmerson (8) (based on Asimov's laws of robotics). 
Human teamwork, decision making 
The human side of the team has been more 
promising; The last few years has seen the continuing 
application of Cockpit Resource Management and an 
increased research interest in understanding 
command teams and how they work (e.g. Sherwood 
Jones 9, 10, and other papers in this symposium). The 
key message at this stage is to stress how much more 
is required for effective teamwork than just 
procedural information processing. The other major 
development on the human side has been the huge 
change in our understanding of human decision 
making brought about by the Naturalistic Decision 
Making school (the work of Gary Klein and others). 
System Engineering, Safety Management 
There are two developments of relevance as regards 
the overall approach to systems engineering. 
(Important knowledge engineering developments, 
such as the increasing practicality of KADS are not 
relevant to this discussion, since they are largely at 
the program-level (3) rather than the knowledge- 
level). 
The first topic is a non-development; there is still 
very little progress as regards designing systems for 
quality of decision making (rather than speed of 
response or 'workload'). 
The second development is much more helpful. 
This is the increased application of hazard-driven 
design approaches under a safety management 
framework (Def Stan 00-56 (11), Carr et al, 12). 
Coupled with this is the increased recognition being 
paid   to   organizational   issues   in   system   safety. 
Consideration of the Individual, the Job and the 
Organization is now a necessary part of producing a 
safety case in the UK, and the Management of Health 
and Safety at Work Regulations mandate such a 
safety case where there is a hazard to users or other 
people affected by the system. It is considered that the 
best way to make progress at the moment is to 
develop H/E Crew-specific hazard checklists for use 
in support of a safety case (e.g. to supplement the 
Hazard Identification Checklist and assist Operating 
and Support Hazard Analysis under 11). One of the 
prerequisites for a High Reliability Organization (6) is 
redundancy in decision making capacity, and the 
Electronic Crewmember may be the way of achieving 
this redundancy. 
STANDARDS NEEDED 
The aim of a design process standard such as the one 
proposed is to provide developers with a systematic 
process for identifying potential teamwork hazards 
and eliminating them through design. The standard 
would constitute a statement of "best practice." If 
developers can demonstrate that they have followed 
the best available design methods, it will follow that 
they have given appropriate attention to safety. 
The first step would be to eliminate from further 
consideration, those systems that do not operate at 
the knowledge level (and which therefore do not 
raise teamwork or trust issues). This involves 
examining the activity to be undertaken by the H/E 
team, (probably being currently performed by 
humans). If questions such as the following are 
answered "yes", then the system needs to be 
considered at the knowledge level. 
Are operational goals represented or implied? 
Would the behaviour or output be expected to vary if 
operational priorities change? 
Are uncertain or conflicting data reconciled, and 
action taken? Is additional data sought to resolve 
data inadequacies? 
Are reports or explanations given to account for 
actions taken? 
Are experienced users/teams better than ones straight 
out of training? Has the method of operating 
changed in the last year? Do operating practices vary 
from place to place? 
It may also be useful to add the traditional Expert 
Systems questions about whether the problem is 
normally considered to be a demanding human task, 
but this is unclear at the time of writing. 
THREATS TO TRUSTWORTHY TEAMWORK 
Having identified that the human-electronic system 
needs to be considered at the knowledge level, then 
the design and test of the teamwork needs to be 
considered against a number of threats to 
trustworthiness. The tentative presentation of 
threats below is based on the Competing Values 
Approach to teamwork of John Rohrbaugh (13, 14) 
which is based on sound theoretical foundations and 
wide-ranging empirical refinement and validation. 
The decision making process (rather than outcome) is 
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assessed. Effective teamwork needs satisfactory 
performance when judged from four perspectives 
(reflecting the different Competing Values). The 
perspectives are summarised below, with a few of the 
H/E Crew specific points added. 
The rational perspective (or rational goal model) is 
concerned with on-line information processing 
under conditions of high volumes of data. Here we 
need to check a) Is the process sufficiently goal- 
centred? Are goals clear and understood? Is there a 
logical framework for evaluating courses of action? b) 
Is the process efficient enough to cope with the 
volumes of data in the time available? Is the cost of 
arriving at a course of action too high? It is here that 
the inadequacies of our understanding of human 
decision making show up; we do not have an ordered 
set of decision models and when to use them, or how 
to support them. Some progress on how to handle 
specific types of human error has been made 
(Silverman 15). Protocols for eliciting probabilities 
have reached a level of maturity whereby the major 
threats can be countered (16). The most frequent 
failure (in the author's experience) is the use of point 
values rather than distributions. The technical 
performance must be predictable enough to be 
trustworthy. 
The empirical perspective (or internal process model) 
is concerned with information management, or 
planning and control processes, including the 
dynamic allocation of function to achieve a sense of 
order and smooth functioning. Here we need to 
check a) Does the team have adequate access to the 
evidence it needs for decisions, is information 
distribution timely, are there adequate information 
management procedures? b) Is the decision process 
traceable and accountable, can it be reported, justified 
and explained? How an Electronic Crewmember can 
be held accountable is a long-standing concern. A 
software 'functional' engineering approach can easily 
miss user information needs and thereby prevent 
effective action (17). A common design failing is 
consider a system as an isolated platform, rather than 
as part of an operational setting. Providing 
explanations that meet the various needs of different 
levels of the command chain may turn out to be a 
major design driver (17). The H/E team must be 
dependable enough for the development of trust. 
The consensual perspective (or human relations 
model) is concerned with coordination processes to 
achieve a skilled, cohesive team with high morale. 
Here we need to check a) Is the decision process 
sufficiently participatory, do all members of the team 
get their say, are their interests represented? b) Is 
consensus achieved, are outcomes supported? Cood 
information processing does not necessarily lead to 
user acceptance. Letting both human and electronic 
team members to have their say and be happy with 
the result places great demands on the interface. The 
problems of supervisory control are well established, 
but there is still a 'functional' tendency to create 
monitoring jobs. The consensus-building must be 
good enough to develop trustedness. 
The political perspective (or open systems model) is 
concerned with the management processes of flexible 
adaptation to a changing environment, including 
drawing on additional resources when needed. Here 
we need to check a) Is the process sufficiently 
adaptable, can procedures be altered, handle changes 
in the situation (i.e. provide requisite variety) b) Does 
the process take account of the interests and concerns 
of external groups, follow ROE's, fit in with 
command priorities? Are proposed actions 
considered from the enemy, ally, neutral viewpoints? 
Is the survival of comrades properly considered and 
weighed? This is where the all-pervading defaults 
and prime directives (8) come in. These are not 
'rational', 'cognitive' goals, but are concerned with 
fight and flight - they are affective (18). Respect for 
fiduciary obligations is necessary for trustworthiness. 
PRESENT LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING 
Vincenti (4) described a number of interacting 
elements associated with the improvement in 
understanding flying qualities. These elements seem 
an appropriate framework in which to describe the 
extent to which H/E teamwork is a fully mature 
engineering process. This section lists the key 
elements (with very slight adaptation) together with 
the author's impression of the maturity. 
1) Familiarization with H/E team and recognition of 
the problem; there is a body of literature on the 
potential problem (e.g. Woods, 2), and the beginnings 
of a literature on experience of the problem as 
experienced on demonstrator or experimental 
systems (Sloane, 19, Sherwood Jones et al, 17) but 
mostly on systems that were not implementations of 
the teamwork concept. The body of this experience is 
likely to grow rapidly over the next few years. 
2) Identification of basic variables and derivation of 
analytical concepts and criteria. We are still at the 
early stages of this. The parameters of human 
teamwork are beginning to be understood, the 
parameters of HCI are largely understood, but the key 
variables for effective H/E teamwork are not yet 
described as analytical criteria. Some parameters of 
trust have been identified (Muir, 20). 
3) Development of instruments and piloting 
techniques for measurements in flight, and a 
deliberate practical scheme for research. Some work 
has been done on measuring Teamwork (Sherwood 
Jones et al (17), the work of Taylor, and the High 
Reliability Organization programme (6, 7)), but there 
are no programmes to the author's knowledge that 
arc expressly addressing the instrumentation needs of 
H/E team design and assessment. 
4) Crowth and refinement of pilot/operator opinion 
regarding desirable qualities. The limited exposure 
that operators have had has been fragmented, and no 
pool of user opinion has been allowed to build up. 
5) Measurement of characteristics and assessment of 
results for a cross section of applications. This has still 
to get under way. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Vincenti (4) divided the process of maturing 
understanding into two stages; the establishment of 
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basic analytical understanding and practical capability, 
and putting this understanding and practical 
capability to work to establish concrete workable 
specifications. From the above sketch, it would 
appear that the H/E Crew is still in the first stage of 
maturity and in need of collective empirical 
experience. 
There has been considerable change in the context 
(since 8, 21) in which standards for H/E teamwork 
need to be set. The most promising way forward at 
this time is to develop a checklist approach to 
designing and assessing teamwork under a safety 
management umbrella. This paper has outlines a 
framework that could be developed to form a 
checklist for design guidance and for test and 
evaluation of knowledge systems with human- 
electronic components. 
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SYNOPSIS 
The final section reports lessons learnt from evaluations of HE-C concepts in relatively mature programmes. The papers provide 
updates on National projects reported at previous HE-C meetings. Paper 23 reports the status of the German Cockpit Assistant 
System, CASSY; Paper 24 reports the evaluation of the British Mission Management Aid (MMA); Papers 25 and 26 develop 
ideas from the USAF Pilot's Associate (PA) programmes; Paper 27 reports the latest phase of the French "Copilote Electronique" 
project Paper 23 provides a description of the role and functioning of CASSY, a knowledge-based pilot support or assistant 
system. CASSY has recently been integrated into the cockpit of a test aircraft, where it has undergone 11 hours of flight testing. 
CASSY comprises a dialogue manager for controlling the interface information flow, including speech input/output. Other KBS 
modules include automatic flight planning, piloting, pilot intent error recognition, monitoring flight status, environment and 
systems, and execution aiding. Test flights with two pilots, and additional airline pilot observers, included operating through 
high density air traffic at major German airports. The flight tests successfully proved CASSY's functioning. Speech control was 
used for complex inputs. The autonomous flight plan functions compared favourably with current flight management systems. 
CASSY warnings and prompts were generally considered to be justified, and frequently initiated appropriate corrective action. 
Aiding situation assessment is judged to be the key benefit of KBS. Paper 24 describes the development of the man-machine 
interface of the UK MMA demonstrator, which uses KBS for some limited functions. Key activities for the MMA were identified 
as management of position, time, fuel, and EW. Functional assessments were undertaken by nine aircrew in a simulation of a 
ground attack mission. The paper reports the level of crew acceptance of the MMA tasks, levels of authority and display formats. 
Concern was expressed about MMA performance of some critical tasks (defensive options, automatic weapon aiming), and about 
MMA responsibility for position and EW management High integrity sensor information would be needed for the MMA 
decision processes to be considered valid. Paper 25 characterises the "associate relationship" as a mixed initiative approach to 
collaborative problem solving. The authors describe how lessons learnt from the PA program have led to the development of 
machine learning tools, re-using associate knowledge bases, and associate applications in novel domains, including supporting 
multiple operators. In the Rotary Pilot's Associate programme, it has been found that aiding helicopter operations involves 
decreased sequential behaviour, compared with fixed wing missions, and hence more difficulty in providing context sensitive 
plans. Research on how and when humans will decide to use an associate indicates that workload does not affect automation 
reliance, whereas task complexity, automation reliability and fatigue are important factors. Trust and automation state 
uncertainty contribute to automation use decisions. The wide range of individual differences in automation use strategies leads to 
different under- and over-use tendencies. Commercial pilots are strongly biased to automation use, even through failure periods. 
The effects of inappropriate reliance on system safety need to be better understood before systems are fielded. Paper 26 
describes the development of principles of interaction, equivalent to prime directives, under which intelligent systems are given 
authority to take actions. The principles need to be based on measurements that can be estimated concurrently with, or predicted 
in advance of, the exercise of the authority, such as workload. Global principles for EC functioning include: ultimate human 
control and over-ride authority; always following the human's lead; monitoring and supporting the human and not the opposite; 
never seizing control; behaviour always being predictable; always being able to be turned off. Specific authorisations are derived 
from global principles by iteratively incorporating contextual details within the rules. A hazard monitoring system is discussed as 
a specific application of this rule derivation process. The authors consider that provision of a human factors of systems 
functionality would be a major step towards predictable, consistent and trustworthy HE-C systems. Paper 27 relates the status of 
the Copilote Electronique project, at the start of an exploratory development aimed at non real-time simulation of Rafale SU2 
missions. Design difficulties are reviewed, and a functional analysis of KBS is presented as a model for pilot assistance. 
Situation assessment, plan management, co-ordination, and plan generation are considered to be the main KBS domains. The 
authors summarise a set of user-oriented ergonomics rules intended to guard against KBS applications failure. A rapid 
prototyping life-time model is proposed, with iterating, evolutionary characteristics for integration of ergonomics compliance. 
Pilot meta-knowledge is identified as the key to mission planning and reflex actions. Conventional KA techniques are inadequate 
for eliciting this knowledge, and new methods have had to be developed. Providing an exchange language for common plans and 
goals, and intent recognition planning, are particularly difficult technical areas. 
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1. SUMMARY 
This paper describes the knowledge-based Cock- 
pit Assistant System CASSY and its functions as 
an example of human-centered automation. The 
paper reminds of the requirements for human-cen- 
tered automation in terms of the two basic require- 
ments which the numerous known requirements 
can be boiled down to easing the task of technical 
mechanization. These requirements are the basis 
for the CASSY-design. Finally, the results of CAS- 
SY are given. 
2. PREFACE 
Despite the introduction of many new technologies 
in modern aircraft cockpits, pilot error is still the 
major cause of aircraft accidents today. Investiga- 
tions show that approximately 75% of aircraft acci- 
dents are due to human error. In most cases the 
pilots were overburdened with a situation which 
they could not cope with because of their natural 
human limitations and weaknesses. Typical limita- 
tions are the constrained capacity of human short 
term memory and a confined information gathering 
process. Even human capabilities which usually 
exhibit extraordinary performance may also be the 
reason for human failure. The usual experience of 
success in pattern recognition may mislead to un- 
critical behaviour and result in human error since 
crucial cues may be ignored. In aircraft accidents 
these limitations resulted in faulty situation aware- 
ness and interpretation also leading to unsufficient 
planning and decision-making. The problem of a 
lack of situational awareness and its possible fatal 
consequences is pointed out in [Endsley, 92]. 
Automation was considered to be a promising ap- 
proach to solve the problem. In order to reduce 
workload and to overcome human weaknesses a 
number of tasks have been taken over by the 
machine. Those functions were assigned to the 
machine which could technically be automated, the 
others remained with the pilots. Therefore, current 
automatic flight guidance systems like autopilots or 
flight management systems support on the skill-ba- 
sed or only partly on the rule-based level of cogni- 
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tive human operator behaviour. Automation on the 
high level of knowledge-based behaviour appea- 
red to be too difficult to be realized. Unfortunately, 
technical aspects have been the major driving 
factors of automation instead of the pilots' needs 
[Hollnagel,93]. 
Today's task distribution in aircraft cockpits, in 
particular transport aircraft, is depicted in figure 1. 
Electronic support covers the fields of sensorics, 
flight plan calculations, and functions for flight plan 
execution. As the systems do not have the 
knowledge to understand the underlying situation, 
extensive communication effort is needed to inform 
the system of the situation knowledge (thick arrow 
in figure 1). Modern flight management systems, 
for instance, require both data collection and situa- 
tion assessment by the pilot and a difficult man- 
machine interface to ensure that the system uses 
the appropriate data. 
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As a result of the level of cockpit automation, the 
interaction between the crew and the machine has 
become more and more complex. The pilots are 
not always sure of the current state of their systems 
[Wiener, 89; Dycke, 93]. This led to new forms of 
pilot error [Chambers, 85]. 
3. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATION 
Human-centered automation [Billings, 91] is a new 
approach to achieve a better design of man-machi- 
ne systems. Design criteria were established which 
aim at a cooperative function distribution between 
man and machine like that of two partners [Reising, 
93]. Both man and machine are active at the same 
time, in contrast with today, and assist and control 
each other while heading for the same goals. 
As far as flight safety is concerned, successful 
automation should be designed to avoid situations 
in which the crew is overburdened, i. e. crew de- 
mands and workload should be kept on a normal 
level for any situation and its corresponding tasks 
like situation assessment, planning, and plan 
execution. Derived from this demand on automat- 
ion an electronic pilot support system should com- 
ply with two basic requirements [Onken,93; Onken, 
94]: 
• 1.) Within the presentation of the entire flight 
situation the system must ensure to guide the 
attention of the cockpit crew towards the ob- 
jectively most urgent task or subtask. 
• 2.) If the aforementioned requirement is met, 
and if there (still) occurs a situation in which the 
cockpit crew is overburdened then the situation 
has to be transformed - by use of technical 
means - into a situation which can be handled 
normally by the cockpit crew. 
The first of the two requirements is concerned with 
the aspect of keeping up the pilots' situational 
awareness. But it also implies that the support 
system itself performs a correct situation evaluati- 
on which is necessary to provide intelligent auto- 
mated functions. If the system is not able to under- 
stand the underlying situation its functions might 
work on the basis of wrong assumptions. To date, 
this is the reason why functions of flight deck 
automation operate in unsufficiently intelligent and 
sometimes dangerous manner. As there was no 
technology available for situation assessment by 
machine, automation was limited to the second half 
of the second requirement and the other aspects 
were ignored. 
Improvements can be expected from new techno- 
logies and methods in knowledge processing and 
artificial intelligence. Examples of knowledge-ba- 
sed computer systems show that these technolo- 
gies mature. 
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A real partnership between pilot and electronic 
copilot in the sense of the two basic requirements 
is established when the support system is de- 
ployed in a situation-dependent and versatile task 
distribution as proposed in figure 2. Compared with 
figure 1 the interactions and activities of the two 
partners take place on more and different levels of 
cooperation. High level functions are added to the 
machine which enable it to understand flight situa- 
tions and to consider goals, subgoals and plans on 
its own.The functional capabilites are implemented 
in the system in parallel to the cockpit crew. Like a 
cooperative crew the two influence each other but 
are also able to work independently. As long as the 
crew is fully responsible for the flight the decisions 
and in-flight selection of goals are assigned to the 
pilots. At the time being, the knowledge based 
assistant system is far from holding any final deci- 
sion authority. Its merit is that it takes all amenable 
information into account to interpret a given situa- 
tion whereas pilots decide on fragmental excerpts 
of situational information due to limited sensing and 
processing capacity. Computer support systems 
analyze a situation on fixed strategies which they 
will repeat exactly if the situation recurs exactly and 
which might fail in unforeseen situations. 
Especially those situations could possibly be ma- 
stered by the human pilot because of his broader 
learning horizon. 
The interaction on the different levels of cooperati- 
on puts new demands on man-machine dialogue. 
The complexity and versatility of data to be trans- 
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mitted increases with the integration of high level 
functions. The first basic requirement calls for a 
communication design in which crew resources are 
considered to select an appropriate means, and to 
focus the crew's attention on the right task. It must 
be sure that the crew percieves all relevant infor- 
mation. This can only be achieved if the information 
flow to the pilot is managed in a centralized way 
taking into account all knowledge of the current 
situation. The use of natural communication forms 
like speech seems to be a good approach to impro- 
ve human-computer dialogue. 
4. THE COCKPIT ASSISTANT SYSTEM CASSY 
With the following description of the Cockpit Assi- 
stant System CASSY, we would like to present an 
example how to design to comply with the 
discussed ideas. CASSY was developed and flight 
tested at the Universität der Bundeswehr München 
(UniBwM) in cooperation with DASA-Dornier. 
In the previous chapter the important part of 
electronic situation understanding for successful 
machine support was pointed out. A system can 
only understand a situation if it has the appropriate 
knowledge of the problem space it works in. Since 
CASSY is limited to civil aviation, its knowledge 
base comprises the elements of figure 3. This 
knowledge base is characterized by static 
knowledge, e.g. a normative model of cockpit crew 
behaviour or knowledge of the used aircraft, and 
dynamic knowledge referring to in-flight changing 
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circumstances caused by instructions from air traf- 
fic control (ATC) or environmental influences. Sto- 
red in a central situation representation, this 
knowledge serves as a picture of the current situa- 
tion. 
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In order to gather dynamic knowledge and to trans- 
mit its conclusions the assistant system is placed 
in the flight deck as indicated in figure 4. CASSY 
has interfaces to the flight crew, to the aircraft, and 
to ATC. The interfaces ensure that all knowledge 
sources are available for the task specific modules 
of the system which are shown on the left column 
of figure 5. 
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/"CASSYN 
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The Automatic Flight Planning module (AFP) 
generates a complete global flight plan [Prevot, 
93]. On the basis of its knowledge of mission goal, 
ATC instructions, aircraft systems status, and en- 
vironmental data an optimized 3D/4D trajectory 
flight plan is calculated. The flight plan, or several 
plans, is presented as a proposal which the crew 
accepts or modifies. Once a flight plan is chosen it 
serves as a knowledge source for other CASSY 
modules. The AFP recognizes conflicts which may 
occur during the flight, e.g. due to changing envi- 
ronmental conditions or system failure, and appro- 
priate replanning is initiated. If necessary, this re- 
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planning process includes the evaluation and se- 
lection of alternate airports. Since the module has 
access to ATC instructions, radar vectors are in- 
corporated in the flight plan autonomously and the 
system estimates the probable flight path ahead. 
The presentation of the resulting situation-depend- 
ent flight plan to the crew serves directly the rea- 
lization of the first requirement discussed in chap- 
ter 3 because the consequences of the valid flight 
plan is obvious to the crew. The extensive aid in 
decision-making and time consuming flight plan 
calculations supports the second requirement, too. 
The Module Piloting Expert (PE) uses the valid 
flight plan to generate necessary crew actions. It is 
responsible for processing a crew model on nor- 
mative and individual crew behaviour [Ruckde- 
schel, 94]. The normative model describes the 
deterministic pilot behaviour as it is published in 
pilot handbooks and air traffic regulations. The 
model refers to flight guidance procedures concer- 
ning altitude, speed, course and heading, but also 
to aircraft systems management. Given the flight 
plan and a pointer on the current leg, provided by 
the Monitor of Flight Status, the system determines 
the appropriate normative values and tolerances 
on aircraft systems and flight status data. Using the 
individual model, determined from an adaptive 
component, these data are adjusted to individual 
preferences. 
The crew model as used to generate necessary 
crew actions, is absolutely vital to meet require- 
ment 1. It enables the system to identify the most 
important actions on the basis of the underlying 
situation and to interpret the observed crew beha- 
viour. 
The expected crew actions are compared with the 
shown behaviour of the crew in the module Pilot 
Intent and Error Recognition (PIER) [Wittig, 93]. 
The crew actions are derived indirectly by interpre- 
ting the aircraft data. If given tolerances are viola- 
ted, the crew will be informed by hints and warnings 
and the detected mistake is pointed out to the 
pilots. In the case the crew deviates intentionally 
from the flight plan, the module checks if the shown 
behaviour fits to a given set of intent hypotheses 
which are also part of the crew model. These 
hypotheses represent behaviour patterns of pilots 
in certain cases, e.g. tasks to be done when com- 
mencing a missed approach procedure or to devia- 
te from the flight plan to avoid a thunderstorm 
ahead. When an intentional flight plan deviation 
and the respective hypothesis is recognized, ap- 
propriate support, e. g. replanning, is initiated. 
The monitoring of the pilots' actions and the distin- 
ction between error and intentional behaviour in 
extraordinary situations serves both basic require- 
ment 1 and 2. 
Additional monitoring modules are needed to en- 
able the system to recognize and interprete current 
situations. The Monitor of Flight Status provides 
the present flight state and progress. It is also able 
to report the achievements of subgoals of the flight. 
The Monitor of Environment gathers information 
of the surrounding traffic, e.g. from TCAS and of 
weather conditions, and incorporates a detailed 
navigational data base of the surrounding area. 
The health status of aircraft systems are monitored 
by the Monitor of Systems like a diagnosis sy- 
stem. 
Obviously, the monitoring systems are essential to 
meet the first requirement as their outputs are an 
important part of the full picture of the present 
situation. Since their output is also used to adjust 
the flight plan to the situation, they contribute to 
meet the second requirement, too. Additionally, the 
continous observation of flight progress, environ- 
ment, and aircraft systems supports the crew on 
tedious tasks. 
Communication plays an important role in CASSY. 
The kind of information to be transmitted in either 
direction varies with respect to the different modu- 
les (figure 6). The information flow from CASSY to 
the crew and vice versa is controlled by the module 
Dialogue Manager [Gerlach, 93]. The many diffe- 
rent kinds of messages require a processing in 
order to use an appropriate display device and to 
present the message at the right time. As output 
devices both a graphic/alphanumeric colour dis- 
play and a speech synthesizer are used. Short 
warnings and hints are used to make the crew 
aware of a necessary and expected action and are 
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transmitted verbally using the speech synthesizer. 
An additional alphanumeric line is fixed on the 
graphic display to facilitate perception of difficult 
verbal messages. More complex information, e. g. 
the valid flight plan, is depicted on a moving map 
on the graphic display. 
Another important feature of the DM is that since 
the tolerances and danger boundaries are given in 
the crew model and the necessary actions are 
inferred, a priority ranking of the output message is 
evaluated and the most important message is is- 
sued with priority. 
The input information flow is established by use of 
speech recognition in addition to conventional in- 
put mechanisms. In order to improve speech re- 
cognition performance, almost the complete 
knowledge of CASSY is used to provide situation 
depending syntaxes. Thus, the complexity of the 
overall language model is reduced significantly. 
Not only the pilot's inputs must be considered but 
also the inputs from ATC. The data link, indicated 
in figure 6, is not available to date. Discrimination 
of ATC instruction from pilot input is achieved by 
picking up the pilot's verbal acknowledgement of 
the ATC controller's instructions. 
The use of speech input and output devices also 
reflects the idea of a human-electronic crew and of 
cooperation of partners. 
In figures 6 and 7 an additional module is shown 
which is called Execution Aid (EA). In this module 
several functions are realized which can be called 
by the crew. Aircraft settings, navigational calcula- 
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tions and data base inquiries are carried out. These 
functions are similar to available automated functi- 
ons in today's aircrafts and are mainly designed to 
meet requirement 2. For the pilots, the main diffe- 
rence is the use of speech input which facilitates 
the use of these services. 
The integrated system, its modules, and its control 
flow is given in figure 7. 
5. RESULTS OF THE FLIGHT TESTS 
In June 94, CASSY has undergone an eleven 
hours flight test campaign in Braunschweig, Ger- 
many. 
The modules of CASSY have been implemented 
on an off-the-shelf available Silcon Graphics Indigo 
workstation using the programming language C. A 
Marconi MR8 PC card was used as speaker de- 
pendent, continous speech recognition system. A 
DECTalk speech synthesizer served as speech 
output device using three different voices enabling 
the pilot to discriminate between the various mes- 
sages. The components were connected using 
serial lines and ethernet. 
The system was integrated into the test aircraft 
>47T4S (Advanced Technologies and Testing Air- 
craft) of the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luft- 
und Raumfahrt (DLR) in Braunschweig. The air- 
craft is well equipped for flight guidance experi- 
ments as it is possible to operate the aircraft via a 
single seat, experimental cockpit located in the 
cabin. An ethernet connection to the CASSY work- 
station was used to simulate an avionic bus system 
as aircraft interface in either direction. As ATC 
interface both approaches were tested a simulated 
ATC data link and the pilot's acknowledgement of 
ATC instructions. 
The test flights comprised instrument flights from 
the regional airport Braunschweig to the internatio- 
nal airports of Frankfurt, Hamburg and Hannover 
at which a missed approach procedure was con- 
ducted before returning back to Braunschweig. 
The experiments proved CASSY's functions from 
take-off to landing throughout the complete flight. 
Speech recognition performed well in the aircraft 
as the surrounding noise was primarily engine 
noise which did not change much during flight. The 
recognition rates were similar to those achieved in 
the more quiet simulator environment at the Uni- 
versity in Munich where CASSY was developped 
and tested before. 
One important aspect of the tests was to prove the 
system in the high density air traffic control of 
German airports which could not be tested in the 
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scope of simulator test runs. During the campaign, 
any given ATC instruction could be processed and 
integrated into the flight plan by CASSY. Compa- 
red to available flight management systems the 
autonomous integration of ATC radar vectors pro- 
ved to be faster and did not lead to distracting 
information input. 
On the basis of the flight plan the correct expected 
pilot actions were generated and pilot errors, pro- 
voked or non-provoked, were detected and the 
appropriate warnings were issued. Wrong war- 
nings occured infrequently and were uncritical in 
any case. 
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MODELLING THE INFORMATION FLOW - DEVELOPMENT OF A 
MISSION MANAGEMENT AID FOR FUTURE OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT 
By 
J.M Davies 
British Aerospace Defence Ltd 
Military Aircraft Division 
Farnborough, Hants, UK 
SUMMARY 
The trend towards more complex avionics systems integrated into high performance 
aircraft, coupled with an uncertain threat environment, presents a potentially 
intolerable workload situation for the Pilot in the next generation single seat cockpit. 
To address the information 'battlefield'a 5 year collaborative programme between 
the 4 major UK Military industrial organisations (British Aerospace, Ferranti, GEC 
Avionics, GEC Sensors and Smiths Industries) and the MOD RAE (now Defence 
Research Agency) was set up in 1988. 
The Primary objectives were to investigate the concept of an intelligent Mission 
Management Aid (MMA) and to develop a set of functional requirements. The four 
main functional areas selected for examination were Sensor Fusion, Situation 
Assessment, Dynamic Planning and the Man-Machine Interface. 
This paper describes the development of the Man-Machine Interface with particular 
emphasis on the cognitive interface. The approach taken was to consider the teaming 
aspect of the man and the machine in the execution of various on-board management 
functions. 
The initial on-board management functions chosen were Position Management, Fuel 
Management, Time Management and EW Management. Each management function 
was decomposed into a series of tasks and task modelling was undertaken within the 
MMA in order to establish the decision processes and allocation of responsibilities 
associated with the execution of these tasks. 
A Proof of Concept Simulation (PCS) rig was developed in order to evaluate the 
MMA functionality and nine aircrew with a wide range of platform experience 
participated in a final assessment immediately prior to the closure of the project. 
There was a fairly consistent response on the operational utility of the integrated 
MMA and their comments are included in this paper. 
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1. MMI DESIGN APPROACH 
In order to achieve a high level of Human 
Machine Integration in the development of the 
Mission Management Aid (MMA) a different 
approach to the standard allocation of function 
phase was adopted. 
The approach taken was to consider the teaming 
aspect of the man and machine in the execution 
of the various on-board management functions. 
In order to achieve this there were several key 
steps which are described in this paper: 
- Identification of key management 
activities 
- Development of model mission 
- Development of detailed task 
models 
- Integration into Proof of Concept 
Rig 
- Aircrew Assessments 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY 
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
The key management activities were identified 
through a fairly intensive knowledge elicitation 
exercise which involved discussions with SAOEU 
Boscombe Down, Flight Operations BAe Warton, 
RAF Marham and RAF Coltishall. It was evident 
from the descriptions of the tasks carried out that 
there was an executive set of management 
functions associated with prosecuting the mission. 
The management functions identified initially 
were: 
- Position Management 
- Time Management 
- Fuel Management 
- EW Management 
Whilst there is a strong interdependency between 
these management functions the aim of the 
exercise was to identify the tasks relating to the 
functions in isolation and examine die decision 
process and likely allocation of responsibilities 
between the team members (man and the 
machine). 
POSITION MANAGEMENT 
terrain features (natural and man-made), threat 
situation and NO-GO zones is required. 
The MMA needed to address the following 
issues: 
- When is a re-route situation 
imminent 
- How to assess possible re-route 
solutions 
- How to communicate with the Pilot 
in regard to re-route situations 
TIME MANAGEMENT 
Time Management broadly entails ensuring 
accurate Time On Target (TOT) and waypoints 
and currentiy includes time related tasks such as 
manual IFF updates. The key issues for this 
function were as follows: 
- To identify the type and level of 
information relating to time 
management tasks 
- To identify the situations where 
time related tasks are carried out 
(e.g. dealing with revised time on 
target, updating IFF codes) 
- Ensuring accurate Time on Target 
FUEL MANAGEMENT 
Fuel Management broadly entails ensuring that 
there is adequate fuel, that it is sequencing 
correctly at the appropriate rate and taking the 
corrective action where necessary. The issues to 
be dealt with for this management function were: 
- To determine whether there is 
sufficient fuel to complete the 
mission and land with the 
predetermined fuel load 
- Determine how to deal with a low 
fuel situation (optimum flight 
profile, in-flight re-fuelling 
- Dealing with information 
requirements - bingo fuel 
(predicted fuel usage) 
combat fuel (continguency fuel) 
chicken fuel ( Get-you-home fuel) 
EW MANAGEMENT 
Position Management broadly entails knowing 
where you are, where you want to get to and how 
to get there. In knowing how to get there a 
knowledge of the external world in terms of 
Electronic Warfare Management broadly entails 
monitoring the threat situation (air and ground) 
and taking the necessary counter actions. The key 
issues for EW management were: 
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- To identify the level and 
prioritisation of information 
required to interpret the threat 
situation 
- To identify the dialogue 
requirements associated with 
interrogating the threat 
information 
- To determine what evasive actions 
to take 
3. MODEL MISSION 
A ground attack model mission was developed to 
exercise the embodied functionality. It contained 
a series of canned events covering internal system 
failures, re-tasking, and unexpected hostile 
activity. 
The mission profile was centred about the central 
European arena with Munster as the home base. 
A Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), Fire 
Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL) and IFF line 
were used in conjunction with Air Co-Ordination 
Order (ACO) corridors in friendly territory. The 
target was a power station in the Hartz mountains 
and an initial route was planned using the best 
terrain and designed to avoid known SAM sites. 
This baseline route with waypoints, speeds and 
intelligence data was provided to the MMA. A 
description of the scenario is given in Section 5. 
4. TASK MODELLING 
Prior to defining the task models, each of the 
management tasks were analysed in terms of the 
questions relating to the management activities 
for which answers are required. In this way the 
machine should be able to anticipate the need for 
information or action. 
A task may be described in simple terms by: 
- The stimulus to perform the task 
- The information required 
- The decision process within the task 
- The task output 
Thus the tasks were identified in terms of their 
goals, stimulus, decision-base, actions and output 
All tasks were deterministic, rule based and event 
driven. 
An example of a typical task is 
ACHIEVEMENTJ)F_TIME_AT 
WAYPOINT. 
The task goal is to determine whether the time at 
next waypoint is achievable within the speed and 
fuel constraints. 
The information required to perform task - 
DEMANDED_SPEED, 
SPEED_CONTSTRAINT, 
PREDICTED_FUEL_RATE will be output from 
other tasks. 
The decision process will determine whether the 
speed constraints is satisfied - if 
DEMANDED.SPEED > SPEED 
CONSTRAINT then a warning to the pilot will be 
activated together with the 
ADVISEJSTEXTWAYPOINT task. 
If the speed constraint is not violated then 
PREDICTED_FUEL task will be activated 
substituting DEMANDED_SPEED for the 
current planed speed value. 
If COMBATFUEL <0 then a warning to Pilot is 
activated and ADVISE_ NEXT_ WAYPOINT 
task is activated. 
This decision process mirrors the mentally 
intensive process currently used by Aircrew. This 
particular example covers Time, Position and 
Fuel Management tasks. 
5. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
The following scenario was used during the 
assessments: 
The aircraft took off from Munster airfield and 
transited out of Base Defence Zone. 
Whilst transiting between waypoint 3 and 4 two 
system problems were identified and 
communicated to the Pilot; the first related to a 
Fuel transfer failure and the second related to a 
degradation in the Terrain Referenced Navigation 
system. In the case of the second problem the 
MMA suggested a change of Set Clearance 
Height (SCH) to 1000ft which was accepted. 
Whilst still within the friendly ingress phase a 3 
minute delay to TOT was received and the MMA 
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offered an orbit solution to lose the time . There 
are several other options including abort mission 
but the orbit solution was chosen. 
Shortly after completing the orbit the TRN 
system was fully functional again and the MMA 
recommended descending to the planned height. 
As the Aircraft crossed the defined IFF line into 
hostile territory the IFF was automatically 
switched to standby. 
A dynamic threat assessment module advised on 
the feasibility of the planned route based upon a 
prediction of the SAM launch opportunities. It 
was possible to evaluate the effect of aircraft 
height changes upon the SAM engagement zones 
and thus assist in the position management task. 
During the hostile ingress phase there were 
several instances of re-route due to acquisition by 
SAMs. As the aircraft approached the IP the 
weapons were automatically armed. 
Within the attack phase the aircraft was acquired 
by a SA13 but re-routing was not possible due to 
time constraints. Defensive options were 
automatically employed with the dispensing of 
chaff and flares. 
As the aircraft egressed through the hostile 
territory there were several occasions where the 
aircraft is acquired by ZSU 23/4 and 
communicated to the Pilot. The necessary evasive 
action was taken. 
As the aircraft transited the FLOT a low fuel 
warning is declared and alternate airfield located 
within fuel range. An alternative option is to carry 
out in-flight re-fuelling 
and route to tanker was also available. 
6. PROOF OF CONCEPT RIG 
DESCRIPTION 
The rig was configured as shown in figure 1. The 
majority of the MMA functionality was contained 
within the Symbolics and Sun work stations 
whilst the displays management was controlled 
within a Silicon Graphics environment. 
There were two display surfaces containing a 
Pilot Awareness display and Aircraft Status 
displays 
Pilot Awareness Display 
The Pilot Awareness display (see figure 2) 
comprised various optional views of the external 
scene including a two dimensional digital map, 
perspective view and a Gods Eye view. 
It was possible to add, move or delete waypoints 
as required and the MMA could keep track of the 
changing scenario advising on feasibility of the 
route in terms of time, fuel and threat constraints. 
The multiple threat picture based upon fused 
information from the sensor fusion module was 
overlaid on the map and the least risk route 
calculated by the tactical planner module 
displayed as a route vector line approximately 10 
kilometres in length. The predicted missile 
engagement zones were depicted in red on the 
route line for areas of high threat 
A cross-sectional view of the route was provided 
to allow assessment of the vertical clearance the 
aircraft had when flying under a threat zone. 
This display also contained an MMA status 
display containing the various options that the 
MMA had to communicate to the Pilot. Different 
classes of messages were included within the 
scenario: 
- Warning of high threat and advise 
re-route (re-route options on main 
display with step function to allow 
access to different re-route solutions 
- Information messages (IFF set to 
Standby/on, Bingo Fuel States) 
- Warning of system problem plus 
advised action (TRN degraded - 
SCH 1000 ft) 
- Advisory message of in-cockpit task 
completed ( EW Function check 
complete) 
The routing options could be accepted or rejected 
as appropriate. It should be emphasised that this 
type of display would not be appropriate for an 
airborne application but merely served as a 
communication channel for demonstration 
purposes. DVI and DVO would be a more 
suitable implementation for this type of cockpit 
function. 
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Status Display 
The second display contained various aircraft 
status information (Fuel, Weapon, Radar Warning 
Display and Missile Approach Warner) and a 
standard Fast Jet HUD Display (see figure 3). 
The Fuel displays allowed the information from 
the fuel management module to be displayed and 
included predicted fuel to complete mission 
(based upon the pre-planned route), combat fuel, 
bingo fuel states, dynamic chicken fuel state and 
fuel to tanker.(see figure 4). If combat fuel 
reached zero then tanking or diversion options 
were presented on the MMA dialogue display. 
The status display also contained a risk display 
which was intended to provide the machine's 
interpretation of the threat situation. 
7. ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
Nine aircrew participated in the assessment which 
was more accurately a demonstration of the 
MMA functionality within a work-station 
environment They were briefed on the objectives 
of the session which were as follows: 
- To examine the operational utility 
of the MMA functionality 
- To determine whether they were in 
agreement with the solutions that 
the MMA had identified and 
whether the MMA decision process 
mapped onto their own 
- To identify the level of dialogue 
with the MMA that would be 
considered necessary and the 
consequential level of authority that 
the MMA should be given 
- To investigate the information 
requirement - is it in the right form 
at the right time to assist the 
decision process 
After the assessment/demonstration the crews 
completed individual questionnaires 
followed by a discussion of the broad conceptual 
issues. The concept of task allocation based upon 
existing aircrew activities was explained and they 
were asked to comment upon this allocation 
against three criteria: 
- Is it a suitable machine task - Do 
you feel comfortable with the MMA 
performing diat task 
- Was the task performed satisfactorily 
- What level of authority should be given 
to the machine 
1) = Do it and do not inform 
2) = Do it and provide feedback 
3) = Don't do it until instructed. 
Summary of Results 
1. In general the majority of the aircrew 
considered that the tasks were suitable for the 
machine to perform. There was concern by three 
of the aircrew on the defensive options tasks and 
by two on the automatic weapon arming. 
2. Most of the tasks were completed satisfactorily 
although mere was some concern regarding the 
decision processes associated with the defence 
options. Two of the aircrew expressed concern 
about the re-routing in that it did not take account 
or have access to all the factors that they would 
normally use (e.g. weather). 
3. The level of authority for all the basic 
monitoring tasks were seen as level 1. Eight crew 
concurred that auto re-routing was a level 3 task 
and one of the crew thought that both the attack 
option and defensive options should be on 
selection only (level 3). The rest of the tasks 
were identified as level 2. 
4. In terms of the information content on the 
displays the crews had the following observations 
to make: 
- The intervisibility display had high 
operational utility especially when used in 
conjunction with the 2 D slice display 
- The predicted missile engagement zone 
on the route line also had high utility 
value 
- The perspective displays with the 3D threat 
envelopes were considered to have limited 
value 
- The Gods Eye View display was considered to 
be a useful display for ground based mission 
planning use but was considered unsuitable for an 
airborne environment 
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- The risk display was considered to be open to 
interpretation and ambiguous and therefore was 
seen as having low utility value. 
- When questioned about the categorisation of the 
threat into type specific (SA8.SA11 etc.), short, 
medium or long range, or Radar/IR guided all 
aircrew thought that radar/IR guided was the most 
useful categorisation 
- All crews felt that there was adequate 
information displayed to assess the 
threat situation and choose a re-route option. 
However they were of the opinion mat it would 
be preferable to manually change the route and 
for the MMA to dynamically assess the route 
using time, fuel and threat costs. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the comments related to the presentation 
of the information and it will be the ability of die 
crew to rapidly interpret and react to the intent of 
the MMA that will be the key to the successful 
integration of this type of system. 
The attempt to create a communication channel 
display for the MMA on the demonstration, 
whilst being contrived, did serve to demonstrate 
the danger of overloading the man with interrupts. 
Man is essentially a single channel processor and 
it was evident from the assessment mat further 
work was required to prioritise the interrupts and 
protect him from the system, particularly at 
crucial phases of the mission. 
There was immediate crew acceptance for the 
machine to take responsibility for fuel and time 
management tasks but fairly unanimous resistance 
to the same level of responsibility being delegated 
for the position management and EW 
management tasks. 
Many of the aircrew voiced concern about the 
high integrity of the sensor information required 
to enable the decision processing used by the 
MMA to be totally valid. This is coloured to a 
certain extent by their current experience of 
RWRs but clearly the technology will need to 
provide consistent credible data in order to 
achieve aircrew acceptance. 
It should be emphasised that the results contained 
in this paper were from a hands-off preview of an 
integrated MMA within a canned scenario.and it 
was not possible to examine performance 
measures associated with the allocation of MMA 
functions within a realistic, uncertain operational 
environment 
The MMA was still in a fairly embryonic form 
and the concept of task modelling was at an early 
stage but the1 man machine team' approach 
certainly showed some promise as a method of 
developing an intelligent machine component 
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Achieving the Associate Relationship; 
Lessons Learned from 10 Years of Research and Design 
Christopher  A.  Miller  and  Victor  Rlley 
Honeywell Technology Center 
3660 Technology Dr. 
Minneapolis, MN 55418   U.S.A. 
1. SUMMARY 
The "associate relationship" is characterized by a 
mixed-initiative approach to collaborative problem 
solving between one or more human actors and a 
subordinate but semi-autonomous computer system 
with sufficient depth and range of intelligence and 
capabilities to encompass a full task domain. The 
associate relationship was first realized in a work- 
ing system by the USAF Pilot's Associate (PA) pro- 
grams. For nearly ten years, Honeywell has been 
leveraging lessons learned in the PA programs to 
extend the utility, effectiveness and achievability of 
the associate relationship. In this paper, we de- 
scribe our work on seven recent programs which are 
extending the associate relationship by developing 
machine learning tools for associate knowledge 
base development or revision, by pioneering meth- 
ods for reusing associate knowledge bases, by push- 
ing associate applications in novel domains and for 
increasingly large numbers of users, and by per- 
forming basic research to understand when and how 
humans will decide to use an associate. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The completion of the U.S. Air Force's Pilot's Asso- 
ciate (PA) programs in 1991 and 1992 resulted in, 
for the first time, the concrete existence of a new 
form of human-computer interaction: the associate 
system. The "associate relationship" is character- 
ized by a mixed-initiative approach to collaborative 
problem solving between one or more human actors 
and a subordinate but semi-autonomous computer 
system with sufficient depth and range of intelli- 
gence and capabilities to encompass a full task do- 
main (1). The associate relationship had been hy- 
pothesized in fiction for at least 40 years (Asimov's 
Robot books) and in serious interface design litera- 
ture for at least ten years prior to the beginning of 
the PA programs, but the PA demonstrations were, 
we claim, the first time such systems had ever been 
seen in action. 
As a result of the PA programs, we now know how to 
build one kind of associate system. What remains, 
therefore, is to expand and refine that knowledge; to 
learn how to make associate systems usable and use- 
ful in an expanded variety of real world settings. 
Since the later phases of the PA programs, much of 
the research and development work on associate 
technology has taken that emphasis. The U.S. 
Navy's work on principles of adaptive aiding (2), 
Wright Laboratories continuing PA research, 
NASA's investigations of adaptive information 
management in the commercial flight domain (e.g., 
3), and Onken's work on assistant systems for au- 
tomobile drivers and general aviation pilots (e.g., 
4) are examples of this trend, from among many 
others. 
Much of our work over the past ten years also en- 
deavors to improve the variety and utility of the as- 
sociate relationship by increasing the breadth of 
domains for which an associate can be constructed, 
increasing the number of users it interacts with, de- 
veloping tools to facilitate associate construction, 
or developing novel ways in which to leverage the 
utility of associate systems once constructed. The 
remainder of this paper will present brief accounts 
of seven associate technology programs at Honey- 
well, each of which leverages, and yet pushes the 
boundaries of, the USAF's Pilot's Associate pro- 
grams. At the end of the paper, we draw general 
conclusions from this work for the future develop- 
ment of associate systems. 
3. AUTOMATING KNOWLEDGE ACQUISI- 
TION FOR ASSOCIATES 
3.1 Problem 
By the mid-point of the PA programs it was clear 
that the quantity of knowledge required for a full as- 
sociate system would be very large. Knowledge en- 
gineering was perhaps the largest problem for de- 
veloping and, especially, for fielding an associate. 
Among the reasons for this were (1) the fact that the 
distributed, modular nature of the associate architec- 
ture made it necessary to have multiple, yet tightly 
coordinated, representations of the same knowledge 
(e.g., separate plan representations for a Tactics 
Planner, for a Pilot-Vehicle Interface, etc.), (2) the 
fact that PA knowledge engineering required multi- 
ple knowledge engineers working collaboratively, 
and (3) that the domain knowledge for a PA neces- 
sarily grows and changes over time as new tactics 
and equipment alter the utility of plans. Each of 
these factors contributes to the need for automated 
tools to support the initial acquisition of PA knowl- 
edge and its revision and maintenance over time. 
3.2 Program 
The Learning Systems for Pilot Aiding (LSPA) pro- 
gram was a 3.5 year effort, sponsored by Wright 
Laboratories, to address these questions by develop- 
ing machine learning techniques to facilitate the ac- 
quisition or revision of the knowledge bases of an 
associate system. We used pilot behavior in simula- 
tion to provide learning examples: instances where 
a known goal was accomplished, but no plan known 
to the PA was used to accomplish it. We fed mission 
data captured by the simulator into an Explanation- 
Based Learning approach (5) to "explain" how pilot 
actions interacted with world states to accomplish 
the goal. This explanation was then generalized for 
use in future, similar instances, and then trans- 
formed, via a "smart translator," into the appropri- 
ate syntax for the PA Tactics Planner. The same ex- 
planation also served as input to a secondary "smart 
translator"   which   used   a   rule-based   approach 
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(including knowledge about pilot-level actions for 
plan performance and the relationship between pi- 
lot-behavior and the way in which information is 
needed to support that behavior) to reason about the 
set of pilot information requirements for performing 
the new plan. The output of this second translator 
was an information requirements knowledge struc- 
ture which was input into the Pilot-Vehicle Interface 
and used in the PA's information management rea- 
soning whenever the new plan was activated. 
3.3 Results 
The LSPA program successfully learned both novel 
Tactics Planner plans and their associated Pilot-Ve- 
hicle Interface information requirements lists by 
observing pilot behavior. We developed knowledge 
sufficient to flesh out a branch of PA behavior 
(primarily concerned with defeating SAM sites) 
which had not previously been incorporated into the 
PA. Our approach reduced the time for developing 
novel tactical plans from approximately one week 
to about an hour, and human raters consistently 
judged LSPA's information requirements lists to be 
as accurate and more complete and consistent than 
those produced by human knowledge engineers. 
3.4 Lessons   Learned 
LSPA showed that learning from pilot actions is en- 
tirely possible. Furthermore, the representation of 
causal knowledge in LSPA's learning system made it 
possible to more directly control, interact with and 
refine the knowledge bases of an associate. The de- 
velopment of explicit, causal knowledge in hierar- 
chical form, along with smart translators for trans- 
forming changes in the causal knowledge base into 
changes in all other run-time knowledge bases, pro- 
vides a good basis for exploring changes to the be- 
havior of the associate. Knowledge can be input or 
modified directly at this level, and the higher-level, 
abstracted quality of the knowledge provides a good 
basis for mission rehearsal, training and other types 
of knowledge reuse. 
The development of the translators for a LSPA-like 
system requires formalization of many aspects of PA 
design which were otherwise haphazard or intuitive. 
This formalization facilitates design accuracy and 
consistency and, to a larger degree, the ability to 
inspect and modify the design by later knowledge 
engineers. It can also be used to "deepen" explana- 
tions for why the PA behaves as it does since it ac- 
counts for why the knowledge by which the PA op- 
erates is the way it is. 
Finally, the availability of such an automated 
knowledge engineering tool would greatly increase 
the completeness and flexibility of a fielded PA by 
enabling rapid modifications and additions to the 
knowledge bases upon which the PA operates. Our 
belief in the need for this capability has only grown 
in recent years as we have learned more about the in- 
dividual differences and preferences between pilots 
and other operators, and about the standard operat- 
ing procedures which differ from place to place and 
team to team within virtually all domains. It is be- 
coming increasingly clear that it will be impossible 
to Field a "generalized" associate with substantial 
aiding capabilities. Differences between individual 
operators are too great.   Any Fielded associate sys- 
tem will need to be easily modifiable if it is to be 
accepted and useful. 
While LSPA is a partial solution to the knowledge 
base development and maintenance problem for as- 
sociate systems, more work is needed. Tools for the 
development, visualization, exploration, and rapid 
modification of associate knowledge are important 
and are under development in many places. Perhaps 
more important for the Fielding of associates is the 
development of conFiguration and truth mainte- 
nance-type tools which will be capable of inspect- 
ing the knowledge bases of the associate and deter- 
mining where discrepancies and inefficiencies exist, 
and then of suggesting methods for repairing them. 
For more information about the LSPA program, see 
(6). and its references. 
4. REUSING ASSOCIATE KNOWLEDGE 
BASES 
4.1 Problem 
The cost of acquiring, representing and revising 
knowledge for an associate is extremely large. Even 
though the use of a LSPA-like system holds promise 
for reducing that cost, knowledge acquisition for 
such a system is non-trivial in its own right. Meth- 
ods for either increasing the speed and accuracy of 
knowledge acquisition or for leveraging associate 
knowledge once captured would both serve to allevi- 
ate this problem. 
4.2 Programs 
We have pursued both of these approaches in two re- 
cent programs. First, in a one-year follow-on to the 
baseline LSPA effort, we investigated the opportu- 
nities for acquiring LSPA domain knowledge di- 
rectly from models (in the VHSIC Hardware Descrip- 
tion Language--VHDL) of the structure and behavior 
of the electronic components of an aircraft. Work 
on this program centered on identifying the types of 
LSPA-relevant knowledge which were available in 
VHDL models, on developing methods for acquiring 
that knowledge from VHDL models and incorporat- 
ing it into the causal knowledge of the LSPA domain 
theory, and finally, on attempting to quantify the 
time savings and accuracy increases available 
through such an approach. 
A second, internally-funded effort has explored 
methods for using existing associate knowledge 
bases to leverage the design or redesign of future 
aircraft systems—specifically, the design of display 
formats. Since PA knowledge bases encode the mis- 
sion-level goals and activities of the aircraft, along 
with speciFic behaviors required of aircraft subsys- 
tems to achieve the goals, they provide a ready re- 
source for generating and evaluating system design 
requirements. In this effort, we examined the poten- 
tial to optimize the set of plan-based information 
requirements and available display formats, repre- 
sented in quantitative formats in the knowledge 
bases of the Pilot-Vehicle Interface, by applying a 
matrix analysis technique (Singular Value Decom- 
position) to determine the utility of each format and 
the information "coverage" of each task. A similar 
approach could be taken to rapidly analyze the im- 
pact of proposed novel formats. 
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4.3 Results 
In the LSPA follow-on program, we successfully 
demonstrated the ability to acquire a variety of 
cockpit display-related information (e.g., latency 
values, control channels, pixel resolution, etc.) di- 
rectly from VHDL models of the display hardware 
and to incorporate it into relevant portions of the 
information requirements logic of LSPA. Perhaps 
more importantly, we developed knowledge repre- 
sentations, based on Functional Reasoning (7), for 
linking the very low-level, hardware-based repre- 
sentations of the VHDL equipment models with the 
very high-level, largely human intentional state 
models used by LSPA and the PA modules. This, in 
turn, gave us the ability to reason in two directions: 
about the impact of equipment changes on the goals 
and plans of the human-aircraft system, and about 
the impact of the goals and plans intended for the 
aircraft on the low level hardware capabilities 
needed to enable those goals. 
In the display format optimization program, we 
demonstrated the ability to analyze a matrix of dis- 
play formats and their information requirements via 
the singular value decomposition approach— and to 
provide useful, detailed, comprehensive feedback to 
format designers in minutes rather than the hours or 
days such feedback requires when done by hand. 
This approach proved particularly effective in pro- 
viding data about the overall set of display formats 
and plans—a problem too large to be handled effec- 
tively by human engineers without such aids. 
4.4 Lessons   Learned 
In the LSPA follow on effort, we learned that to rea- 
son about the capabilities of the low-level systems 
on the aircraft implied a dramatic broadening of the 
scope of knowledge needed for an associate. Instead 
of needing to know only the rough range of a FLIR, 
we now needed to know how a FLIR works at a very 
low level and how a host of world conditions inter- 
act to determine its range. While this is more than a 
PA needs to know, it is nevertheless exactly the set 
of concerns that must be taken into account in de- 
signing systems in the first place. Thus, while this 
approach is more than is necessary for knowledge 
acquisition for LSPA and PA, it points the way to- 
ward future, integrated design environments in 
which the design of aircraft hardware, of plans and 
goals for the aircraft itself, and of intelligent aids to 
assist in achieving those goals could go on simul- 
taneously and leverage off of each other. 
A common design environment, utilizing principles 
of knowledge sharing (cf. 8) should sew all these 
threads together, facilitating knowledge transfer in 
both directions: a proposed new system should draw 
its requirements from associate models of vehicle 
missions and functionality, reasoning about the 
impact of a new system on the vehicle should be 
done in conjunction with the knowledge resident in 
the associate, and finally, the capabilities and re- 
quirements of the new system should be incorpo- 
rated directly from the system model into the 
knowledge bases of the associate, updating appro- 
priate plans and actions as it goes. 
Finally, this program has shown us that while the 
quantity of knowledge required for a full associate is 
extensive and difficult to acquire, it is also a valu- 
able commodity in its own right. Our work on dis- 
play format optimization techniques shows that ex- 
isting PA knowledge bases can provide useful data 
for the design or redesign of display formats. The 
plan- and goal-related knowledge of the associate 
should be useful for the development and evaluation 
of other aircraft equipment, and for training, tactics 
development and evaluation, etc. 
For more information about the LSPA follow on, 
see (9), and its references. For more information 
about the Singular Value Decomposition approach 
to display optimization, see (10), and its references. 
5. NEXT-GENERATION ASSOCIATE 
The largest associate system development effort un- 
derway in the U.S. today is the U.S. Army's Rotor- 
craft Pilot's Associate (RPA). RPA's goal is to de- 
velop, extensively evaluate and field test an associ- 
ate system for use in a two crewmember advanced at- 
tack/scout helicopter. We are participating in the 
development of the Cockpit Information Manager 
with emphasis on the design of Information Man- 
agement, Task Allocation and Taskload Estimation 
approaches for two crewmembers. Below, we single 
out two aspects of the RPA program which are ex- 
tending our understanding of associate design and 
leveraging, extending, or applying lessons learned 
from prior associate programs. 
5.1 Less Sequential Domain 
The helicopter domain is generally less sequential 
than the fighter aircraft domain. The ability to 
slow, stop, and hover vastly increases the range of 
options about when and in what order tasks must be 
performed. Furthermore, helicopter operations Und 
to be less "scripted" and more susceptible to radical 
redirects than are fighter operations—and this is 
likely to increase as battlefields becomes more digi- 
tized. 
One manifestation of this difference in initial RPA 
design is an increased emphasis on the representa- 
tion of crew goals and intents, rather than straight- 
forward scripting of tasks. Representations for 
goals and their importance stem from lessons 
learned in the PA programs (e.g., 11). Three rea- 
sons for this, and their implications for associate 
design, are described below. 
First, the decreased sequentiality of behavior in the 
helicopter domain may make it more difficult for the 
associate to accurately track pilot intent and 
plans—and, therefore, more difficult to provide con- 
text-sensitive aiding. Since goals precede plans, 
both causally and in terms of generality, an explicit 
tracking of crew goals should be easier than know- 
ing the particular plan being enacted. Knowing 
which goals are active will enable some accurate, 
goal-based aiding even when active plans cannot be 
determined. 
Second, decreased sequentiality may make it more 
important for the crew to be able to communicate 
their intent directly to the associate. The associate 
should never require this input, but the benefit may 
justify minor increases in crew workload.   In these 
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circumstances, we believe that a goal-based vocabu- 
lary of "intents" will provide the best mix of do- 
main-validity, pilot-familiarity and usability by the 
associate. This will enable the crew to declare their 
goals and to set goals for the associate, below 
which it is capable and authorized to determine and 
enact courses of action. 
Third, although many plans and goals may be "en- 
abled" at a time (meaning that conditions are satis- 
fied for them to be enacted), human resource con- 
straints will continue to limit the number of plans 
which are actively being worked on. This distinc- 
tion may be used to control information overload. 
Leveraging lessons learned in LSPA program, we 
will to support different types of information re- 
quirements for tasks which are enabled, versus those 
which are active. For example, an enabled but not 
active plan implies the need for information about 
success or failure conditions of the plan and about 
its temporal criticality. An active plan, on the 
other hand, implies the need for information perti- 
nent to plan execution. 
5.2 Aiding for Two Crewmembers 
RPA is not the first associate program to examine 
aiding for multiple crewmembers, but it is certainly 
the most extensive. The fact that RPA's two 
crewmembers can and do trade tasks and responsibil- 
ities makes for both problems and opportunities. 
Problems stem from increasing the complexity of 
intent inferencing, information management, error 
detection, and adaptive aiding due to increased diffi- 
culty of knowing which task is being performed by 
which crewmember. Opportunities stem from the 
ability to use the associate to facilitate crew coordi- 
nation through tracking the progress of task per- 
formance and through dynamically allocating some 
tasks between crewmembers to maintain acceptable 
taskloading and improve performance. When se- 
quential dependencies exist between tasks being 
performed by separate crewmembers, the associate 
should be able to track task performance by both 
crewmembers and notify or aid them when the de- 
pendencies are in danger of being violated. 
An additional question arises for the dual-crew con- 
text: how should an associate behave in the hierar- 
chy of "command" for multiple crewmembers? In 
the single-pilot fighter domain, it was clear that the 
associate relationship required subordination to the 
human and consideration of that human's goals as 
paramount. In the multi-operator domain, however, 
in order to aid one crewmember it may be necessary 
for the associate to "command" the second and to 
prioritize one crewmember's goals over the others. 
It may be necessary to redefine the associate rela- 
tionship as subordinate to each operator within his 
or her sphere of authorization. The associate will 
serve each crewmember only to the extent that it can 
do so without violating the plans of the other. 
Where conflicts exist, the associate has a duty to 
behave according to the established chain of com- 
mand. One initial implication of this issue is the 
need for the associate to explicitly distinguish be- 
tween when it is relaying (or acting on) a command 
from a superior crewmember to a subordinate versus 
when it is making a suggestion of its own to the 
subordinate. 
6. ASSOCIATES FOR MANY OPERATORS 
6.1 Problem 
While RPA is developing an associate for 2 
crewmembers with a common goal and command 
structure, the associate concept clearly holds poten- 
tial for larger groups of people, whether they are 
engaged in a common goal or not There are signif- 
icant obstacles to overcome in defining associates 
to support multiple, potentially conflicting human 
actors. Geddes (12) has shown that plan-goal archi- 
tectures developed for the single-operator PA can be 
extended to perform intent interpretation for multi- 
ple, conflicting human actors, but significant work 
remains to be done to define the overall behavior of 
an associate in multiple actor environments. 
Among the open issues are the role of the associate 
in a chain of command, the behavior of an associate 
for multiple actors with shared goals and beliefs, 
and the behavior of associate(s) for multiple actors 
with conflicting goals and beliefs. 
6.2 Programs 
We are beginning work on two programs which de- 
fine associate behavior for large groups of human 
actors. The first is an associate-like aid to the detec- 
tion and management of abnormal situations in 
large-scale industrial processing plants such as oil 
refineries or paper mills. In this domain, the activi- 
ties of 30 or more human operators, distributed over 
a few square miles, must be coordinated to achieve 
the common goal of maximizing production while 
maintaining safety. While these individuals share a 
common goal, chain of command, and general be- 
liefs about appropriate procedures and conflict reso- 
lution strategies, specific resolution strategies must 
be chosen and coordinated over large areas where the 
simple location and movement of individuals and 
resources represents a significant challenge. 
The second program involves an associate-like sys- 
tem to facilitate information access and manage- 
ment for all of the stakeholders in a medical do- 
main—doctors, nurses, technicians, clerks, staff, 
patients, etc. The breadth of this domain is such 
that the assumption of a common goal, beliefs or an 
agreed-upon chain of command is no longer tenable. 
Resource conflicts are inevitable, but it is doubtful 
that an associate could implement a resolution strat- 
egy which would be acceptable to all parties. Fur- 
thermore, the number, range, and distribution of po- 
tential users of such a system make it unlikely that a 
single associate could store or access sufficient co- 
ordinated information to meet all needs. 
6.3 Issues   and   Approaches 
For the industrial processing plant application, ini- 
tial studies indicate that a more or less standard as- 
sociate system approach will be feasible because all 
of the human actors share a common goal and be- 
liefs about the chain of command and the appropri- 
ate plans to consider in various circumstances. The 
associate will be designed to provide specific but 
subordinate assistance for all of the human agents 
within their area of responsibility, but in its capac- 
ity of serving all, it may be required to issue instruc- 
tions and commands to some. For example, in ful- 
filling the associate role for the plant supervisor, it 
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may well be required to give orders (with the super- 
visor's authority) to underlings. 
For the medical information domain the situation 
differs, however. Here, stakeholders share no com- 
mon goal or set of beliefs about the chain of com- 
mand or the appropriate method for resolving prob- 
lems. It seems untenable in this domain for a single 
associate to fulfill the associate role for all of the 
stakeholders. Instead, we are proposing to develop 
an architecture of a large number of associate-like 
systems, each implemented as a well-defined society 
of interacting agents and each serving an individual, 
a tightly coordinated group of individuals, or per- 
haps a general hospital function (such as an emer- 
gency room). Each individual's 'Interaction Soci- 
ety™" will fill the associate role individually for 
him or her, but among the society's duties will be 
the negotiation of priorities, duties, and resource 
access with other agent societies in the medical do- 
main. Not all negotiations will go smoothly, and 
some problems will have to be passed to the human 
operator (or to even higher authorities) for arbitra- 
tion, but these should be few in number. General 
hospital goals may be looked after by a hospital- 
level agent society, but of course, these goals will 
not be the same as the goals of any given doctor, 
technician or patient. We believe that our interact- 
ing society of associate-like agents is the only way 
to provide systems which fulfill the associate role 
for all of the participants in a domain this broad and 
heterogeneous. 
6.4  Implications   and   Lessons   Learned 
The strongest implication for adapting associate 
systems to interact with larger groups of human ac- 
tors is that the associate relationship may need to 
be subtly redefined. It appears impossible for the 
associate to be subservient to all in the same way 
that it is subservient to a single operator. In orga- 
nizations where there are shared beliefs about goals, 
the chain of command, and appropriate methods, it 
may be possible for a single associate to play an 
omnipresent role, interacting with all humans, sub- 
servient to each within his or her purview, but capa- 
ble of relaying commands and instructions to some 
in its capacity as an associate for their superiors. In 
less well-defined and homogenous domains, it may 
be necessary to abandon the concept of a single as- 
sociate which maintains an associate relationship 
with all human actors, and instead emphasize the 
development of multiple associates (perhaps one for 
each human actor) which maintain a full associate 
relationship with their human counterparts, but 
which must negotiate relationships and resolve con- 
flicts with other humans (and their associates) dy- 
namically as they evolve. 
7. WILL AN ASSOCIATE BE USED? 
7.1   Problem 
No matter how capable an associate is, its develop- 
ment will be wasted if the intended users choose not 
to use it. An associate system is a type of automa- 
tion, and because no associate has received exten- 
sive enough usage to serve as a test case, we must 
look to operators' use of other forms of automation 
to estimate how operators will use associates. 
Although recent work has focused on user trust in au- 
tomation (e.g., 13), there are many factors that may 
affect an operator's decision whether to use automa- 
tion. Some of these are: workload, task complex- 
ity, risk, automation reliability, individual differ- 
ences (biases due to attitudes toward automation, 
training, or experience), and fatigue. 
The large number of factors and the potentially 
complex and dynamic interdependencies between 
them make it challenging to anticipate whether op- 
erators will use an automated system. Of greater im- 
portance, however, is the need to anticipate the 
conditions under which an operator may use the au- 
tomation inappropriately, such as relying on it 
when it is unreliable, or defeating it when the opera- 
tor is unreliable. 
7.2 Program 
We have carried out an extensive series of experi- 
ments to investigate the influences of all the factors 
cited above on operator decisions to use or not use 
automation. The experiments used a simple com- 
puter game with two tasks that the operator had to 
perform simultaneously. One task could be auto- 
mated at the subject's discretion, and the design of 
the tasks permitted independent manipulations of 
automation reliability over time, subject workload, 
task complexity, and the consequences of errors, to 
estimate the effects of risk on automation use. Mea- 
surements included levels of automation use across 
and within subjects, subject attitudes toward automa- 
tion, subject confidence in own ability, actual sub- 
ject accuracy at manual performance, and subject 
risk taking propensity. 
Two of the experiments used university students as 
subjects and two used commercial airline pilots to 
determine whether difference in training and experi- 
ence with automation might bias automation use. Li 
Experiment 1, workload, task uncertainty, and au- 
tomation reliability were manipulated indepen- 
dently and in combination to estimate how much ef- 
fect each factor had on the automation use of univer- 
sity students. In Experiment 2, subjects' prior 
knowledge about automation behaviors was manipu- 
lated to untangle the relative contributions of uncer- 
tainty about automation accuracy states and future 
behaviors (or trust) to automation use. Of particular 
interest was how trust in automation developed dur- 
ing the initial experience and how it was affected by 
apparent automation failures and recoveries. In Ex- 
periment 3, the procedure of Experiment 1 was re- 
peated with commercial transport pilots to estimate 
how differences in training and experience with au- 
tomation in real systems might affect use of the au- 
tomation in the study. In Experiment 4, the possi- 
ble consequences of errors were increased to inves- 
tigate the effects of risk on pilot automation use. 
All subjects were offered a cash award for whomever 
posted the highest score in each condition in order 
to promote attentiveness and to provide something 
of value that might be at risk. 
7.3 Results 
All experiments showed that workload did not affect 
automation reliance. Although this seems counter- 
intuitive, it agrees with the work of other investiga- 
tors (e.g., 14).   All experiments also showed that 
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task complexity and automation reliability had 
highly significant effects, and that fatigue and 
learning also played prominent roles. 
Experiment 2 successfully untangled the contribu- 
tions of automation state uncertainty and trust in au- 
tomation and found that both contributed to automa- 
tion use decisions, but did so differently in the ini- 
tial, failure, and recovery responses. Experiment 3 
demonstrated that commercial transport pilots were 
strongly biased in favor of automation use, with 
over a third of the pilots continuing to use the au- 
tomation throughout failure periods. This was in 
contrast to the students who favored manual control 
and quickly stopped using the automation when it 
failed. Experiment 4 showed that higher levels of 
risk inhibited automation reliance after the second 
automation failure. 
One highly consistent feature of all the results was 
the wide range of individual differences and strate- 
gies. It appears that individuals employ relatively 
simple automation use strategies that are influenced 
by small numbers of factors, but different people are 
influenced by different factors. 
7.4     Lessons  Learned 
The results of these studies suggest that an associate 
system will be used in different ways by different 
people, and that individual differences may lead to 
different tendencies of over- and under-reliance on 
the system. When an associate system has a fairly 
high level of responsibility or authority, inappro- 
priate reliance on the system can have important 
consequences, and the effects of these behaviors on 
system safety must be explored thoroughly before 
the system is fielded. 
This work is described in detail in (15). 
8.  CONCLUSION 
The past ten years have seen dramatic steps toward 
realizing the associate relationship. The USAF PA 
brought about a working associate system for a sin- 
gle operator. Our recent work is extending and 
leveraging associate research in a variety of direc- 
tions. The development of associates in novel do- 
mains and for multiple operators (by ourselves and 
others) is encouraging in that it shows that a great 
deal of the PA concepts and architectures are rele- 
vant, but it is also teaching us about the similarities 
and differences as each new domain is tackled. Si- 
multaneously, approaches are being developed to 
make associates easier and more profitable to build. 
While significant challenges remain on this front, 
it is encouraging to see that associate knowledge 
bases appear to have extensive utility outside of the 
associate system itself. Finally, as the develop- 
ment and fielding of associate systems proceeds, 
significant basic research remains to be done to es- 
tablish when and how associates will be most use- 
ful—and most appropriately used. 
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1. SUMMARY 
Aircraft manufacturers, both commercial and 
military, are building automated systems of ever- 
increasing complexity and authority. There are 
several driving forces behind this trend: operating 
cost reductions, safety improvements, and 
performance optimizations. The increasing power 
of automation is redefining the role of the pilot and 
greatly complicating the pattern of interactions 
between the pilot and the aircraft systems. 
Concern about enigmatic automation has been 
raised in both the operational and technical 
communities. Previous research has investigated 
the issue of operator trust in automated systems, 
identifying such key behaviors as predictability 
and repeatability. This paper addresses principles 
of interaction and their correlates, specific 
authorizations, as mechanisms for defining and 
implementing these expected behaviors. The 
process for deriving specific authorizations from 
global principles is one of iteratively incorporating 
contextual detail within the rules, achieving 
greater specificity with each successive pass. The 
design of a prototype Hazard Monitoring system is 
discussed as a specific application of this rule 
derivation process. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The modern flight deck continues to become more 
dominated by automation of increasingly higher 
levels of authority; particularly in the area of flight 
management. Aircraft now operate more 
efficiently, but at the cost of distancing pilots from 
the flight control process. The flight crew spends 
a significant portion of its time and attention 
managing the automation rather than directly 
controlling the aircraft.  As the complexity of 
these automated systems has increased, so too have 
the intricacies and interdependencies of their 
behavior. 
Unfortunately, this continued expansion of 
automation throughout the flight deck has been 
accompanied by relatively little feedback about the 
specific behaviors and "intentions" of automation. 
In the absence of provisions for communicating 
their internal state, system behaviors inevitably 
diverge from the pilot's expectations, causing 
surprising and potentially dangerous behavior.1 
Each time the system surprises the pilot, he/she 
tries to understand how his/her model and the 
intentions derived from it differ from the actual 
states of the automation. This leads to the 
commonly expressed sentiment among pilots, 
"What is the system doing to me now?" 
Additionally, the actions themselves frequently 
have consequences that conflict with the pilot's 
intentions. The result is that high-authority, 
automated systems often exhibit enigmatic 
behavior that surprises the crew, undermines trust, 
increases system monitoring and mental workload, 
and decreases the margin of safety as pilots' own 
behaviors become correspondingly reactive. 
Flight Management Systems (FMSs), descendants 
of early Inertial Navigation Systems (INSs) and 
auto-pilot couplings/are one of the most pervasive 
high-authority, automated systems in today's flight 
decks. The flight management system itself is 
divided into three functional areas: navigation, 
thrust/performance management, and guidance. 
Each system can operate independently or be 
coupled with one or both of the other systems to 
manage aircraft control. Figure 1 below shows 
these components and their connections. 
The pilot can independently disengage any of the 
subsystems, leaving the automation only partially 
in control of the aircraft. Indication that the 
systems are coupled appears as simple enunciator 
lights on the primary flight display (PFD) and the 
absence or presence of certain information on the 
mode control panel (MCP). System engagement is 
direct; the pilot presses the appropriate MCP 
buttons. Disengagement, in contrast, is subtle; it 
occurs whenever the pilot manipulates an MCP 
control which overrides another FMS mode or 
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Figure 1. Typical flight management automation 
architecture. 
when a previously set MCP control threshold is 
met. Additionally, the behavior of the system is 
dependent on the data previously entered by the 
flight crew. In general, the interrelations between 
the flight management, auto-thrust, and auto-flight 
systems are complex, subtle, and often poorly 
communicated. Such cryptic behavior from a 
human team member would be unacceptable. 
3. BACKGROUND 
Concerns that unpredictable automation will result 
in crew distrust, thus reducing any potential 
benefits, are driving a growing interest in the 
nature of high-reliability systems. Air traffic 
control towers and flight deck environments are 
working examples of complex systems or teams 
that have remarkably low rates of failure. In each 
case, the human teams have developed patterns of 
interaction that effectively keep the team informed 
about task allocation, state changes, and critical 
events without the need for verbose exchanges of 
information. The teams work to keep the task load 
even and manageable, the level of authority 
appropriate to the task, and the current team goal 
apparent to everyone.2 The team interactions 
promote trust and learning by being both reliable 
and error tolerant. 
Just as a crew member must have trust in the crew, 
a significant factor in the usability and 
acceptability of automation is the operator's trust 
in the system. Trust, as described by Muir, 
develops in three stages.3 Initially, trust is based 
on predictability of individual behaviors. 
Secondly, trust is based on dependability, which 
can be thought of as a measure of the degree of 
system reliability in any situation. Finally, the 
user develops faith that the system will continue to 
be dependable in the future, possibly because of its 
ability to improve itself or its robustness. As such, 
specific authorizations derived from the 
appropriate principles of interaction will foster 
trust in the system, which in the case of current 
cockpit automation, is sorely lacking. 
While high operator trust is an important goal for 
successful system implementation, the 
quintessential objective of high authority 
automation is still to optimize operator-system task 
performance. In a study expanding upon Muir's 
original work, Lee and Moray investigated 
operator performance in response to various 
automated system behaviors.4 They discovered 
that operator performance measures describe a 
remarkably similar curve to that of operator trust 
given equivalent behavior of an automated system 
over time. Specifically, both trust and 
performance exhibit gradual, but steady, increases 
as an operator interacts with a system that exhibits 
reliable, predictable behaviors. Additionally, both 
measures show marked drops in response to 
transient, anomalous system behaviors and a 
significantly suppressed 're-learning* curve in 
response to more permanent anomalous 
conditions. Therefore, in addition to fostering 
trust in the human-system interrelationship, 
automated functions based on consistent, well- 
defined, well-communicated principles of 
interaction should also result in better, more stable 
performance. 
4. RULES OF INTERACTION 
Flight crew members communicate in a well- 
defined format in order to share information, 
establish expectations (both commitments and 
responsibilities) for task performance, and 
negotiate the division of work. The goal of their 
task-oriented communication is to develop a 
shared situation awareness and to ensure 
predictable, consistent team behavior. If conflicts 
arise between the goals of the crew and the current 
intentions of the pilot (e.g., he tells them to 
navigate toward an unknown waypoint), they 
clearly state the problem and ask for confirmation. 
Creating an environment of shared understanding, 
trust, and commitment and then acting within it 
leads to efficient and highly reliable team 
performance. How a crew member decides if he or 
she is authorized to communicate or act is 
predicated in protocols that guide flight deck 
behavior. These protocols, and the mechanisms 
used to maintain them, can be embodied in simple 
rules of interaction. These rules can then be used 
to restructure and improve the pattern of 
interactions between humans and machines. 
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4.1 Communication Protocol 
Our interest in this problem arose from our work 
on the Pilot's Associate (PA), an intelligent, high- 
authority system for aiding the pilot of a single- 
seat tactical aircraft. The purpose of the program 
was to explore how artificial intelligence might aid 
the pilot if given authority to automatically 
reconfigure displays, monitor for pilot error, 
propose plans of action, and execute virtually any 
action or procedure on his/her behalf.5 
Our observations of, and conversations with, 
tactical pilots suggested that a relatively 
sophisticated model would be required to 
sufficiently identify conditions where PA was 
authorized to act One form of evidence for this 
was the relatively infrequent communication (e.g., 
once every 10-15 seconds) between experienced 
crews in two-seat tactical aircraft The minimal 
need for communication suggested that each crew 
member has some type of model that permits 
considerable action with minimal explicit 
communication. A similar kind of model and level 
of performance would be required to enable an 
electronic crew member to function as well as a 
human crew member. 
One approach to solving this problem is to provide 
the intelligent automation with psychological 
models of the pilot Work in psychology suggests 
that it should be possible to compute the pilot's 
intentions, workload, and focus of attention then 
use this information to make the automation's 
actions more comprehensible. However, our 
experience indicated that these models are not 
effective. First, they are based upon inaccessible 
information (i.e., mental and neural states of the 
pilot) and implicit intuition and judgment that the 
machine is, as yet, unable to provide. And second, 
pilot interviews indicated they would more readily 
accept the aiding if the decision were based on 
situational aspects that are more salient and 
observable. 
The issue then, was to formulate a set of rules 
governing system interaction based on tangible 
measurements that can be ascertained concurrently 
with, or predicted in advance of, the exercise of 
authority. 
4.2 Human-Human Rules 
Initially, it would appear that a reasonable set of 
rules identified from crew interaction could serve 
as a basis for a similar set of rules for an 
intelligent interface. However, the intelligent 
interface is not human and, therefore, the rules 
used by humans may be only partially suitable for 
it. For example, pilots may never be willing to 
delegate as much authority to automation (however 
intelligent) as to other human crew members. 
Still, identification of the rules used by humans is 
an important first step to a set of rules for 
intelligent interfaces. These rules of interaction 
would govern some of the most visible and 
significant behavior of the intelligent system, 
especially that aspect to which crew members are 
most sensitive. 
Our initial pilot interviews during the PA effort 
revealed an abundance of proposed principles for 
defining human-automation interaction. A 
representative sample follows. 
• The human has ultimate control and can 
override the associate system at any time. 
• The associate system must follow the lead of 
the human operator. The associate monitors 
and supports the human, not the other way 
around. 
• The system must never seize control from the 
pilot. 
• The operator should have the option of 
turning off part or all of the associate system. 
For example, error monitoring may be turned 
off when the operator is involved in 
innovative, unconventional behavior. 
Significantly, a number of these principles were 
relatively global in nature, relying on abstract 
judgments and devoid of contextual information. 
For example, principles tended to refer to "high 
pilot mental workload," "stress" or "innovation." 
The result is a set of universally accepted global 
principles, but no specific, well-defined 
authorizations for automation behavior. 
There are several solutions to this problem. One 
solution is simply to discard these rules. A second 
is to make the rules more specific. For example, 
the rule might incorporate notions of whether the 
pilot is entering an atypically dense volume of 
airspace or experiencing a particularly busy 
portion of the flight. Of course, such clauses are 
only an approximation of the condition in the 
original rule. A third solution is to situate the 
rule.6 The idea here is that in a more specific 
situation, it is possible for a rule to be less 
ambiguous. For example, instead of "reduce 
workload," the system should use rules like "on 
final approach, landing gear should be fully 
extended." In this case, final approach conditions 
can be determined unambiguously without the 
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need for encoding intuition or judgment. Then, if 
the gear are not extended at the appropriate time, 
the pilot can be alerted to the unsafe condition, 
regardless of the reason for his/her inactivity. 
Therefore, even if the pilot's general state or intent 
is unknown, well-defined rules of authorization 
can be used to respond to specific situations of 
interest. 
43 Rule Refinement 
The process for deriving these situated 
authorizations is to iteratively incorporate greater 
contextual detail into the initial global principles. 
For example, consider the principle, "The system 
must never seize control from the pilot." While ■ 
the spirit of this principle is well understood, by its 
abstract nature the definition of the principle is 
inherently incomplete. A more accurate definition 
would be, "The system must never seize flight 
control from the pilot, except to save the pilot's 
life." However, it too lacks sufficient situational 
context to support implementation. Continuing 
the example, 'The system must never seize thrust 
and/or flight management control from the pilot 
unless ground impact is imminent and recovery is 
beyond the capability of the pilot." Additional 
iterations would be required to more clearly define 
the concepts of "imminent ground impact" and 
"pilot capability." The final step in this process is 
to rephrase the principle as a specific system 
authorization: "In the event of imminent ground 
impact, based on current trajectory and aircraft 
configuration, where recovery requires thrust and 
control surface inputs exceeding the physical and 
cognitive abilities of the pilot, the automation is 
authorized to institute recovery and maintain 
straight and level flight." The result is a domain- 
based rule which defines clear, predictable, and 
implementable automation behavior. 
5. THE HAZARD MONITOR 
A key technology, conceived during the initial 
Pilot's Associate effort (continued through the 
sponsorship of NASA Langley), that has taken 
advantage of our various lessons learned regarding 
principles and authorizations for automation 
behavior is the Hazard Monitor (HM). The 
primary goal of the HM module is to unobtrusively 
track the various activities of the flight crew and to 
notify them of any aberrant or unexpected 
behaviors before such actions result in negative 
consequences 7.8 
Specific HM monitoring behaviors are guided by 
rules of interaction ascertained through knowledge 
acquisition with commercial pilots. An important 
consideration here is that HM does not employ a 
rule-based technology to perform its functions. 
HM's behavioral protocol is embodied in a series 
of monitoring networks. Each network, in turn, is 
composed of related expectations of flight crew 
behavior. A well-defined set of initiators and 
terminators ensures that only the appropriate types 
of monitoring occur at any point during the flight. 
Expectations of pilot behavior and appropriate 
automation responses (i.e., continued monitoring, 
remedial directives, or control actions) are situated 
throughout the monitoring process by discrete 
temporal- and state-based events. 
A detailed example of HM's implementation may 
help clarify this point. Consider the principle that 
HM is to aid the pilot in managing significant 
altitude changes. Altitude monitoring is to occur 
at all times during flight. "In-flight" is later 
defined as from weight-off-wheels (i.e., airborne) 
to weight-on-wheels (i.e., "on the ground" 
condition). These two criteria are incorporated as 
the initiator and terminator of the altitude 
monitoring network. Specifically, HM is to 
monitor for expected standard and local altimeter 
settings on climb and descent. Climb and descent 
are then more precisely defined as transition 
altitude (i.e., 18,000' in the USA and 6,000' in 
some parts of Europe). Since HM can vary its 
level of response (e.g., monitor, enhance, warn, 
etc.), pre- and post-threshold events (i.e., 500' 
above and below transition altitude) are chosen as 
opportunities for HM intervention. The result is a 
monitoring network that exhibits clear, consistent 
behavior based on a defined set of rules which 
govern effective flight deck interaction. Figure 2 
shows the structure of an HM monitoring network 
for this principle. 
Weight-Off-Wheels 
(Airborne) 
Welght-On-Wheels 
(Taxiing) 
Figure 2. Example Hazard Monitor Net. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The trend in modern flight deck design is clearly 
to increase automation and its authority in aircraft. 
With the cost of each transport aircraft now 
exceeding $100 million, the cost of litigation 
resulting from a crash, and the non-quantifiable 
cost of human life lost, the significance of the need 
to understand the relationship between pilots and 
automated systems cannot be overestimated. As 
such, the problem of appropriate automation is a 
concern to the scientific community. Bemoaning 
this irreversible trend is simply an inappropriate 
response. It is our responsibility to shape 
technology in useful ways. Some have advocated 
that more attention be given to human factors 
design of automation. While human factors goals 
apply to the functionality of automation, its 
methods and accumulated knowledge are more 
appropriate to displays and controls. What is 
needed is a complementary "human factors of 
functionality" that is concerned with the behavior 
of systems. This can be done best by developing 
specific guidance on appropriate behavior for 
automation. The process of identifying principles 
of interaction and the subsequent derivation and 
implementation of specific authorizations is an 
initial, yet definitive, step toward the creation of 
predictable, consistent and trustworthy automated 
systems. 
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1. SUMMARY In spite of great benefits expected, 
Knowledge Based System (KBS) approaches are not so easy 
to apply in the pilot assistance field. This paper presents 
first lessons learnt as a new phase of the French project 
"Copilote Electronique" has started in 1994, under the form 
of an exploratory development, advantages and drawbacks 
of existing methodologies have been compared. As a result, 
emphasis has been put on ergonomics design rules and on a 
project life cycle adaptation aiming at insuring better 
responses to pilots demands and fears ... and so preparing, 
we hope, successful operational evaluations. 
Key words : Pilot Assistance, Knowledge Based Systems, 
Software Engineering, Life Cycle, "Copilote Electronique", 
Electronic Crew Member, Ergonomics Rules. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will present actual status of an Electronic Crew 
Member System project, called in French "COPILOTE 
ELECTRONIQUE". 
Chapter 2 describes general goals and characteristics of the 
project "COPILOTE ELECTRONIQUE". 
Chapter 3 first recalls design difficulties encountered in 
such projects : symbolic programming is not magic, 
knowledge acquisition is not so easy, process automation 
has to keep user or pilot in the loop, internal and external 
co-ordination problems arise and specific ergonomics rules 
are to be applied. 
Chapter 4 proposes a discussion on rapid prototyping life- 
cycle model; its advantages and known drawbacks and 
possible solution from classical software engineering field. 
The knowledge acquisition and software engineering life 
cycle chosen for "COPILOTE ELECTRONIQUE" is 
illustrated by   the inverse V-modcI. 
Chapter 5 summarises first lessons learnt during the 
preparation of the project launching and the first six month 
of the new development phase. 
3. THE «COPILOTE ELECTRONIQUE" PROJECT 
[Air   &   Cosmos] 
System and software design methods that have been used for 
current generation fighters are facing more and more difficult 
challenges and may encounter their own limits within ten or 
twenty years from now. 
Various embedded functions, such as navigation, piloting, 
aircraft status, weapons system management, and in some 
extension sensors management have been successfully 
automated by classical software engineering methods, but 
the addition of such separate and independent automated 
functions become more and more difficult to control in real 
time situations by human pilots. 
Nevertheless, as critical decisions are to be taken on 
uncertain or tactical aspects of mission, aircraft designers 
often rely, and this is currently required by Air Forces, on 
pilots judgement. 
But as automated functions are intended to increase in 
number and complexity, in the foreseen tactical context 
tactical characterised by a great number of various possible 
threats, with electronic war systems and new sophisticated 
weapons, we may think that future pilots will have some 
difficulties with this combinatory explosion of information 
sources unless being assisted in their reasoning tasks. 
An expert assistance system, as the "COPILOTE 
ELECTRONIQUE" will have to absorb high rates of raw 
information, select and highlight the more crucial ones, 
before initiating dialogue, in a manner adapted to current 
situation and mental load of the pilot. As we say, such a 
system should only present pertinent information and offers 
a restricted actions choice to the pilot, on which, after 
selection by the pilot, it will have to examine all 
consequences before execution. 
The "COPILOTE ELECTRONIQUE", initialised in 1986 by 
the French DGA ( "Delegation GiSneYalc dc l'Armcmcnt"), 
aims at introducing, within a 2010 horizon, expert or 
knowledge based systems in combat aircrafts. Far from 
replacing   human   pilots    in   the   cockpits,   such    an 
sophisticated electronic crew member should be considered 
as a very high level dialogue function between man and 
machine. 
In fact, this project took a new acceleration in 1994 spring, 
when the Technical Service for Aeronautical 
Telecommunication and Equipments of French DGA (STTE) 
decided the funding of an exploratory development for 
RAFALE standard SU2, which is the Rafale standard that will 
enter French Air Forces in 2004. SU2 standard will benefits 
of all radar modes, counter measures and a front infrared 
detection and tracking system; besides pilot will use helmet 
mounted displays. 
The goal of this new phase, launched for a three years 
duration, is a ground simulation, without hard real time 
constraints, to demonstrate the "COPILOTE 
ELECTRONIQUE" of Rafale SU2 in situation of strike and 
escort missions, with low altitude penetration constraints. 
4. DIFFICULTIES FOR PILOT ASSISTANCE 
SYSTEM DESIGN 
The complexity of problems in the aeronautic field led some 
designers to propose KBS methods as an easier and more 
comfortable programming solution than "classical 
laborious and error prone" software development. With 
those symbolic software, developers quickly produced 
promising  prototypes   in  view  of production  systems 
delivery. But as no specific software engineering 
methodologies were generally applied, it became obvious 
that desirable high quality and maintainable systems were 
not reachable. Since then a relative disillusion is felt in the 
aeronautic community. 
To understand KBS interest and complexity of development, 
one has to take into account the importance of human 
expertise in the design process. Human experts need to be 
considered as full members of the project team involved at 
each stage of the development : early description of the 
problem domain, requirements definition, design, 
description of performed tasks, ideas of new man-machine 
dialogue, validation, end-use,... This central role influences 
the developing environment and suggests the modification 
of the infrastructure. We can also mention that KBS pretends 
to level up the knowledge representations so that the human 
specialists can understand what is in the machine. It requires 
new concepts like objects, plans, heuristics, agents... The 
expert may even want to flip from one representation to 
another. So that, knowledge engineers have to walk their 
way through a very large set of representation schemes Pilot 
Assistance systems must present specific characteristics : 
they must be real-time systems (involving most of the time 
some temporal reasoning), embedded on-board aircrafts 
(satisfying CPU, memory, ... restrictions), most frequently 
multi-expert, deeply integrated into their environment and 
keeping the end-user in-the-loop. 
In [AGARD 1993], a functional analysis of Knowledge 
Based Systems in Guidance and Control (G+C) field is stated 
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(figure 1) and seems quite adapted to pilot's assistance 
field. In particular, the classification in three main 
engineering domain is quite pertinent : situation assessment 
(monitoring, diagnosis), plan management (plan selection 
and execution), co-ordination (external and internal) and 
central node plan generation and is a good summary of 
problems encountered. 
A more detailed discussion on specific difficulties for 
intelligent assistance design in G+C field can be found in 
[Salläl993 ]. 
Non respect of ergonomics rules is the most current 
explanation for KBS applications failures, in the field of 
industrial processing assistance. So IMASSA (Centre for 
Medical Studies and Research in Aerospace) was in charge to 
define "user oriented rules" that has to be used from the 
design phase [Amalberti et al 1990 ]. 
Those rules can be summarised as follows : 
• pilot anticipates and needs anticipation assistance 
on contrary of "classical engineer designed" assistance 
which are often too reactive, 
• pilot's decisions reflect often compromises 
between mental load and ideal response to the situation, so 
pure optimality is not to be researched if pilot has no 
sufficient time to understand, 
• following their own personal skills, different 
pilots may organise work differently, assistance must be 
adapted to these skills, 
• assistance must be homogeneous, and it will be 
preferable to rely on specialised expert for each operational 
domain (e.g. STRIKE or AIR DEFENSE expertise) so 
resulting assistance will produce constant understanding 
interpretation model that will avoid surprises for pilot 
• assistance must know and respect its own limits 
• system design may use "what if approach to be 
less reactive 
• dialogue must be adapted to context, pilot intents 
and pilot load 
• dialogue must be space oriented and interactive, 
better use vocal media than written, but avoid saturation, 
• respect logic of pilot understanding, that means 
rely on the understanding model designed with expert pilots. 
5.    DISCUSSION    ABOUT 
CYCLE IN KBS METHODS 
SOFTWARE    LIFE 
Abstraction 
level 
Mapping Frontier 
The use of rapid prototyping to build a complete system, 
using one of the many software packages available on the 
market, has been a frequent technique in the early studies of 
"COPILOTE ELECTRONIQUE" project. This method also 
known as "evolutionary prototyping" or "iterating 
prototyping" was deduced from experimental approaches to 
KBS development. 
It consists in iterating the cycle : 
• knowledge acquisition, 
• implementation : knowledge modelling 
& coding, 
• validation, 
• test with the experts), until there is no 
more knowledge to capture. 
Detailed discussion on obvious advantages but also on 
subtle drawbacks of this life-cycle methodology can be 
found in [SalU1993 ]. In summary, let's say that this rapid 
prototyping methodology is not relevant for complex and 
embedded systems for which a good architectural design is 
needed. 
As a consequence of risks encountered in final system 
integration phase, when rapid prototyping method is 
followed, alternate methods were looked for the project. 
Some theoretical studies tend to consider the KBS as an 
ordinary software production problem with its overall 
analysis prior to any implementation. KADS is the leader of 
this new way of design [Hickman et al 1989], MOISE 
[Ermine 1992] is another example. 
Based on a model driven-approach, these methodologies 
have much in common with conventional software 
development methodologies : they prescribe phases, stages 
and activities, models, documents and deliverables (see 
figure 2). 
To maintain the benefits of dialogue with experts, a KBS 
approach iterating design illustrated by the spiral model 
(figure 3) was introduced [Hickman et al 1989]. This model 
may be considered as a overall life-cycle model and may be 
inserted at the top of the V-model depicted in figure 2.  We 
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use this spiral model to show all efforts made in the early 
phase of "Copilote Electronique", before actual project 
launching (see chapter 5.) 
Current knowledge engineering practices heavily depends 
on interview techniques and the collection and analysis of 
notes. The process, although valuable, is slow and 
frequently paces the development activity. 
There is general agreement that considerable gains in speed 
and efficiency can be achieved by improving both tools and 
methods. But additional efforts, for software designers, in 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge elicitation from 
expert pilots are not to be minimised, we think, as it is the 
main benefit of KBS oriented pilot assistance design. This 
can be illustrated by the climbing branch of figure 2 inverse 
V-model (following some ideas from [Dieng 1990]), this 
climbing branch being more important than in classical V- 
cycle, where existence of a clear specification is always the 
starting point of process and future disappointments. 
6.LESSONS LEARNT IN "COPILOTE 
ELECTRONIQUE" PROJECT 
At the phase of problem understanding and needs 
definition of the     "Copilote Electronique" program (see 
figure 3), three main risks were identified: 
• Is it possible to capture enough expertise to 
create a real assistance for pilot reasoning ? 
• Is the KBS technology mature enough for a real 
development ? 
• Is the French Aerospace community able to 
integrate such a new concept in a current 
avionics system design ? 
A survey of existing efforts (national as well as 
international) was initiated to give answers to these 
questions. An extensive work sponsored by DRET (French 
Defence Advanced Research Agency) and realised by 
IMASSA (Centre for Medical Studies and Research in 
Aerospace), with Mirage Fl Recce pilots, gave a lot of clues 
resulting in the identification of various pilots behaviour 
correlated with pilots profile. It brought to the front scene 
the pilot's "meta-knowledge" (specialised technical 
education) which influences mission planning as well as 
reflex reactions. A joint work with Dassault allowed to map 
pilots intuitive aspiration for new assistance with the 
reality of Mirage 2000 and Rafale advanced design. 
In the five companies participating to the project, team was 
selected among people having experimented KBS methods, 
various references can be found in following list: [Aubry et 
al 1988 ], [Brunessaux et al 1992 ], [Champigneux et al 
1989 ], [Desard et al 1991 ], [Joubert et al 1990 ], 
[Lementec et all991 ], [Morillon et al 1988 ], [Salle et al 
1989 ]. All these studies gave a strong background to 
investigate the cognitive aspects related to the various areas 
of expertise associated with decision aid, and the computer 
science aspects relative to the implementation of artificial 
intelligence techniques in real time airborne systems. They 
were studied to better plan the future development of the 
"Copilote Electronique". 
Another task was to allocate assistance modules 
development between different companies (for the modular 
architecture see the "pyramid" figure 5). 
This allocation process happened to be difficult and risky : 
• difficult because the concept being still fuzzy 
and. each company having a large scope of 
competencies the limit of each assistance 
domain were controversial; 
• risky because each partner had its own goals, 
culture, and methods and the system design could 
have resulted in a collection of nice but 
incoherent functionalities. 
The rule chosen was that the company must possess high 
motivation for the specific assistance field chosen, but this 
must not be considered as a definitive allocation for future 
industrialisation. 
Problem understanding & 
needs identification: 
DRET-CERMA: 
Requirement capture 
Synthesis & risk analysis 
Aerospace companies 
• Collegial work 
Planning, specification: 
DRET-Dassault 
E. project definition 
study 
Review: 
Lockheed 
Dassault: 
Technical 
exchange 
Development 
Implementation : 
S.T.T.E. D.E. 
Copilote 
Electronique 
Figure 3 :   Spiral Model applied to Copilote Electronique 
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PILOT 
DECISION LEVEL 
Relevant 
Information 
Management 
System    I Tactical 
Managemen/Management 
aiic inwmaii1 
REFLEXION 
LEVEL 
Systems 
Assessment! 
Tactical 
Situation 
Assessment 
uaia 
Sensors 
EQUIPMENTS 
Calculators Mass Memory 
PILOT ENVIRONMENT AIRCRAFT 
Figure 4 : Copilote Electronique architecture: the pyramid 
• System Status Assessment and Management -> SAGEM 
• Mission Conditions Assessment 
and Mission Management -> SEXTANT AVIONIQUE 
• Tactical Situation Assessment and Management 
(Air threat and offensive Weapons) -> MATRA DEFENSE 
• Tactical Situation Assessment and Management 
(Ground threat and defensive Counter Measures) -> DASSAULTELECTRONIQUE 
• Pilot Assessment, 
action plans assessment, 
relevant information management 
and man machine interface -> DASSAULT AVIATION 
• Ergonomics rules and knowledge acquisition 
methods and verification tasks -> IMASSA 
Figure 5 : Final 
Several actions were initiated to reduce foreseen difficulties. 
An international do-operation was carried by Dassault with 
Lockheed in order to confront the French approach with the 
US team experience and avoid traps experimented in 
previous experiments [Smith et al 1988 ], [ Rouse 1991 ]. 
Our experience in the development of the Copilote 
Electronique as well as the technical exchanges with 
Lockheed Pilot's Associate team, led to the fact that 
conventional knowledge engineering techniques using 
questionnaires and interviews are not sufficient to provide 
implemenlable and secured knowledge for Pilot aids. The 
investigated knowledge engineering techniques, in order to 
tackle the problem of such a complex AI system 
development, should be used for expertise initial design, 
then supplemented by extensive knowledge evaluation and 
correction in simulator. With IMASSA, a specific method 
for eliciting and formalising pilot's expert knowledge was 
studied and is used. 
allocation  is the  following  : 
all specific assistance modules, and great efforts are to be 
made to maintain this common message glossary. 
Finally, a unifying technical principle was adopted to 
facilitate the architecture design via the intent planning 
paradigm. This principle is essential to fulfil general 
ergonomics constraints of chapter 3.3 : assistance must not 
participate to the signalled existing overloading factors. 
Intent recognition is a challenging but promising direction 
and can be made easier by extended preparation mission 
plans and procedures (for each pilot activity) that will be 
perhaps the new "automated and personalised" check lists 
version of the future. 
Another very important   technical issue is the definition of 
a common "plans and   goals" exchange language between 
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8. CONCLUSION1 
The  technology  is   available  today  to  provide  viable 
knowledge system solutions to well-chosen and well 
defined problems. It can be expected to see more and more 
successful projects on such on-board applications,   as both 
the research,  the technology and engineering skills of 
application developers improve. 
But this process may be slower than was though. Main 
reason is that knowledge acquisition tasks and user oriented 
ergonomics rules compliance must be integrated in the 
overall engineering cycle, as we try to show it in the V- 
cycle diagram. 
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GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Group Discussions were convened during the final two days 
of the meeting for the purposes of identifying, and of 
developing understanding on, new issues. Participants were 
divided into multi-disciplinary groups, each with a 
designated leader, and with a set of pre-selected issues to 
consider and to evaluate. This section summarises the 
reports of the group leaders to the final plenary session of the 
meeting. 
2. PROCEDURE 
The programme sought to make the workshop productive by 
developing and sharing understanding on new issues. 
Accordingly, the aim of the Group Discussions was to enable 
the emergent issues to be addressed in a systematic, and yet 
informal manner, with the widest participation from all 
attendees. In order to facilitate this process, all participants 
were invited to accept ownership of a specific key issue for 
the duration of the meeting, for discussion with others, and 
for reporting to the Group Discussions. 
2.1 Issues Identification 
Participants were directed to address areas of uncertainty, or 
problems requiring resolution. They were encouraged to 
present issues in the form of questions using the simple 
imperatives Why? What? Which? How? Who? Where? and 
When) The meeting call notice identified a series of issues 
relevant to Human-Electronic Crew teamwork. These issues, 
and others that emerged during the paper presentations, in 
particular those arising from the keynote, were collated and 
displayed for the participants consideration. Participants 
were encouraged to add further issues to this list as the 
meeting proceeded. A total of 43 issues was identified in this 
manner. 
2.2 Initial List of Issues 
A list of these 43 initial issues is shown below . This is not 
an exhaustive list of all the issues arising at the meeting. 
There were insufficient resources to capture all the issues 
raised by the papers, as they were presented. The list is 
merely intended to be indicative of the process followed by 
the meeting participants. 
2.2.1 Call Notice Issues: 
(1). Do current development activities address the teaming 
issues? 
(2).  Are there some types or categories of decisions or 
actions that the Human-Electronic Team should never be 
trusted with? 
(3). What oversight checks should be placed on the Team? 
(4).  How  does  the Team  communicate with  the  higher 
authorities? 
(5). Are there other issues besides teaming which are crucial 
to the operational application of the Electronic Crewmember 
concept? 
2.2.2 Keynote Issues: 
(6). Who should be the team leader - the mission computer or 
the human? 
(7). What types of teams should the system emulate? 
(8). How do we ensure that the team samples we experiment 
on are representative? 
(9). What human characteristics should we allow for in our 
team? 
(10). How many humans should there be in the aircraft? 
(11). How much should the team members trust each other? 
2.2.3 Emergent Issues: 
(12). How do we distinguish reliably between true intentional 
and error behaviour? 
(13). How do we get the pilot back in the loop? 
(14). How do we inform the pilot about risk? 
(15). What advice should not be given to the pilot in a given 
situation? 
(16). Interoperability - How much? 
(17). Co-ordination - How essential? 
(18). Does machine advice promote habits or competence? 
(19). How may the trust between the pilot and the decision 
aid be enhanced? 
(20). How does one ensure that information of the highest 
priority is delivered to the pilot soon enough to make a 
difference to mission effectiveness and survivability? 
(21). EC will require extensive data and software integration 
- what (im)possibilities for certification? 
(22). For the near term, if we do have intelligent automation 
capable of successfully dealing with the caution, warning, 
advisory function, have we not captured the heart of the 
information processing architecture of the weapon system? 
(23). Is it appropriate to reduce reliance on human decision 
making? 
(24). How do we make uncertainty management effective? 
(25). How do we elicit valued knowledge and eliminate 
reluctance to share knowledge? 
(26).  How do  we validate knowledge about prospective 
systems, not yet in flight operation? 
(27). Do we agree on the principles underlying case-based 
reasoning? 
(28). How do we measure and predict fault size? 
(29). How do we make human consent part of the decision 
criteria? 
(30).  What are the  important differences  in  inferencing 
mechanisms for determining a decision? 
(31). What can we do about people not having a common 
language for understanding events? 
(32). Once decisions are arrived at, how should the decision 
be presented to the operator?  As decision data with  an 
associated   probability   or   as   a   conclusion   with   action 
directions? Or, by the computer effecting (carrying out) the 
decision? 
(33). Is "Trust" in the electronic crew enhanceable through 
training? Are some training techniques more effective in 
instilling trust than others? 
(34). Human teams have a "power distance" (ranking). Who 
will be bold enough to shut down a triple redundant EC? 
(35). Electronic member or 2-membcr crew, or electronic 
tools of a 1 -member crew? 
(36). Though getting the EC to "think like the pilot does" is 
one way to earn trust, this may lead to two heads making the 
same mistakes. Wouldn't 2 parallel but different (and co- 
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ordinated) problem solving approaches be more effective? If 
so, what are the parameters of co-ordination? 
(37). Short of actually taking the pilot out of the cockpit, 
there will be a (hopefully increasing) number of tasks the EC 
can do better than the pilot. How can policy makers (pilots 
and above) make correct and optimal decisions about when to 
give a task to automation, when to the human, and when to 
mix? How can they implement/enforce those decisions? 
(38). Do human crews have any relevance to human- 
electronic teams? 
(39). How do we de-brief the EC? Will "his" explanations 
increase trust? How will he cope with the argument in the 
pub afterwards? 
(40). Is trust between the EC and the operator being 
overemphasised as an issue? 
(41). How do we ensure that the EC remains useful when the 
platform is used outside its designed role? 
(42). When are we going to decide what we are trying to 
build and stop re-inventing the EC wheel? 
2.3 Issue Assignment 
Towards the end of the paper presentations, each participant 
was invited to select or accept ownership of an issue for the 
remainder of the meeting. The list of initial issues was 
offered as a guide, from which individual selections could be 
made. Alternatively, individuals were encouraged to take up 
a different issue of their personal choosing. This approach 
was aimed in part to accommodate individuals who wished to 
pursue a favourite or "pet" issue. The main purpose was for 
the owner to develop understanding of an emerging issue 
through informal discussion with others, particularly with 
participants who had indicated knowledge of the topic, or 
who held different views. Approximately half the attendees 
undertook ownership of an issue, in this way.   Forms were 
provided for recording information on the assigned issue. A 
worked example was demonstrated. This form requested 
information on the following: 
(1) A statement of the issue. 
(2) Implications for Human-Electronic Crew teamwork 
including AI technology, and the cockpit. 
(3) Factors influencing the issue (AI & Cockpit). 
(4) Other related issues (AI & Cockpit). 
(5) Relevant knowledge, including lessons learnt, current 
practice, methods and techniques (AI & Cockpit). 
(6) Potential directions, i.e. R&D requirements, alternatives, 
choices, priorities and cost/benefits (AI & Cockpit). 
2.4 Group Assignment 
After the paper presentations, the participants were divided 
into six multi-disciplinary groups, selected to enable a wide 
ranging discussion of the issues arising. The majority of the 
participants contributed to the group discussions. The aim of 
the discussion groups was to consider the assigned issues 
brought to the groups by the individuals, and any other 
issues, as the groups saw fit. In particular, the groups were 
directed to agree the priority of issues, and to provide 
justification for their decisions. A leader was assigned to 
each group, to manage the proceedings in accordance with 
the plan, and to record and to report on the group's 
deliberations. Forms were provided to structure the record of 
the decisions concerning issue priority and justification. 
These forms are illustrated in Figure 1 below. After group 
discussions, group leaders presented their conclusions during 
short 10 minute briefings in the plenary session of the 
meeting, with the aid of transparencies of the priority and 
justification forms. 
ISSUE STATEMENT PRIORITY 
L/M/H 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE 
ISSUE STATEMENT: 
Implications of 
the issue for 
Human-Electronic 
Crew Teamwork 
Factors 
influencing 
the issue 
Other relevant 
issues 
Relevant 
knowledge.I.e. 
lessons learnt, 
current practice, 
methods and 
techniques 
Potential 
directions, i.e. 
requirements, 
alternatives, 
choices.priorities 
.Least/benefits 
Figure 1   Forms used for reporting priority issues. 
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3. GROUP DISCUSSION REPORTS 
3.1 Group 1 
3.1.1 Membership 
Tom Aldem (Issue: How do we debrief the EC?) 
George Brander (Issue: If we have not agreed models of 
human decision-making, how can we hope to build a PA 
which needs to know not only what the pilot needs but how he 
is thinking?) 
Charles Holly (Issue: Where is the boundary between good 
human-computer interface design and technology?) 
Ian Ricketts (Issue: Why is the technology not being shared 
with special needs research?) 
Tim Southam Leader/Recorder (Issue: To implement an EC, 
shouldn't  we  adopt  a  stepped  approach,   with  aircrew 
involvement,    to    improve    current    and    new    cockpit 
modalities?) 
3.1.2 Priority 
Four issue statements were generated by the group. These 
were then given a priority of low, medium or high. Three of 
the issue statements were given high priority, namely: To 
implement an EC, should we not adopt a stepped approach to 
improve existing / new cockpit modalities?; Can we justify 
not sharing technology? (N.B. PA = Pensioner's Associate!); 
Without models of human decision making can we build 
adaptive, intelligent systems? The group gave a low priority 
to the following issue statement: How do we debrief the EC 
to improve H-EC communication trust (trust is built up over 
years!) ? 
3.1.3 Justification 
a. Stepped Approach (High Priority Issue): It was agreed that 
implementing an EC should adopt a stepped approach to 
improve existing and new cockpit modalities. Improved data 
handling, improved modality, sensor fusion, high resolution 
displays, Head-Mounted Displays (HMD's), Head-Up 
Displays (HUD's), and Head-Down Displays (HDD's) were 
all discussed as having implications for H-EC teamwork. 
Factors which were identified by the group as influencing the 
issue included data requirements, system latencies, Man 
Machine Interface (MMI) input/output systems, and crew 
performance. It was agreed crew have the final say. Other 
issues highlighted as relevant to the present were technology, 
risk reduction, and simulation, particularly the need to 
replicate real world bad weather operations. On relevant 
knowledge, it was felt that progress should be made with 
what we know already. There was a need to define sensible 
specifications. Simulations should involve aircraft 
performing current tasks. In implementing an EC, increasing 
assistance as a stepped function, was seen as an important 
way forward incorporating new large HDD's and HMD's . 
b. Sharing Technology (High Priority Issue): The issue of 
justifying not sharing technology, in particular with reference 
to special needs research, was addressed by the group. The 
implications for HE-C teamwork of sharing technology 
included multiplying your investment, access to practical 
solutions, access to experience, and access to tested novel 
approaches. Influencing the issue was risk i.e. it has worked 
before, and self interest (you will be old, and we will have 
quicker solutions). Other relevant issues included security (it 
has been handled!), the influence of teachers and graduates, 
and the need to visit the special needs group at Dundee. It 
was agreed that industry (e.g. AT&T, GEC, DEC) obviously 
use the relevant knowledge, but there was uncertainty about 
the use made within MoD, DoD, BAe etc. Potential 
directions included test projects, and a plea for the next 
project to involve Dundee (only 2.5 hours from London, 3.5 
hours from Europe, 9 hours from America!). 
c. Inadequate Models (High Priority Issue): The group 
considered that without agreed and understood models of 
human decision making, we cannot hope to build intelligent, 
adaptive systems. Humans can change strategies, but we do 
not know how. Therefore, how can make a 
Machine/Computer adapt to a human? Keeping knowledge 
simple results in keeping the Machine/Computer function 
fixed. Relevant factors included the lack of relevant 
cognitive models, and the continuing disagreement between 
classical decision-making theory and naturalistic approaches. 
A related issue was that we do not yet know whether the 
computer should think "like a human", or merely 
communicate in a "human-like" manner. Cognitive 
psychology and computer modelling were sources of relevant 
knowledge. Agreed and understood models of human 
decision making were seen to be needed for the 
implementation of an intelligent adaptive system. The group 
proposed further cognitive research as a way forward. They 
identified a need to field more prototypes, with further 
research thought to be needed on teams, perhaps using 
command cells and operations rooms (N=30) as analogues. 
d. Debriefing (Low Priority). Consideration of debriefing the 
EC to achieve team co-ordination, and to build team trust, 
lead the group to questioning whether or not EC should be 
held to a higher performance standard than humans. 
Improvements in crew co-ordination between humans are 
achieved over years. It was questioned whether or not it was 
reasonable to expect EC to perform in an ideal fashion when 
humans would still make mistakes? Related to this issue 
were the problems of verification and validation of mission 
critical software. Also, for debriefing, it would be necessary 
to identify traceable actions from EC that can be recorded 
and reviewed post-mission. The Pilot's Associate programme 
was identified as a source of relevant knowledge, as well as 
experience gained with mission support tools. It was 
considered that we must provide a post-mission method to 
explain EC actions. Trust and confidence in human-human 
co-ordination improves over many missions, and Human-EC 
team co-ordination should be no different. 
3.2 Group 2 
3.2.1 Membership 
Edmund Brugger 
Jeremy Clare Leader/Recorder 
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Doug Hoecker 
Chris Miller (Issue: What authority structures I EC role in 
multi-user environment?) 
Gordon Semple:  (Issue:  Electronic member of 2-member 
crew, or electronic tools of a l-member crew?) 
Brian Sherwood-Jones: (Issue: How do we provide guidelines 
on design and test procedures for the team as a unit?) 
3.2.2 Priority 
The group identified the need to demonstrate the benefits of 
the Electronic Crew as a high priority issue. Other high 
priority issues were questions concerning the ability to 
measure and predict success of tools and EC systems, the 
required authority structure and EC role in the multi-use 
case, and how to provide design and test procedures 
guidance? Issues considered to have lower priority were as 
follows: Whether EC should replace or assist?; How safety 
is ensured?; How do we justify EC to society? 
3.2.3 Justification 
a. Demonstrable Benefits (High Priority Issue): It was agreed 
that there was a need to demonstrate as a community the 
benefits of EC. The implications of failing to demonstrate 
the benefits were that it would prevent the community ever 
building one. Factors influencing this issue were identified 
as being user requirements and technology capabilities. The 
group agreed that key problem areas for EC benefits were 
inadequacies in knowledge of the operational context and of 
human capabilities. Analysis of cost/benefits and options 
were potential ways forward. 
b. Authority Structure(//ig/i Priority Issue): The implications 
of misunderstanding the issues of authority structures in a 
multi-user environment were that we would build the wrong 
system. For AI technology this was considered to have 
implications for task tracking, intent inferencing, planning, 
information management, task allocation and adaptive aiding. 
In the cockpit, the aim should be to provide each human with 
associate-like aiding, whilst facilitating co-ordination and 
minimising conflict There was a need to understand 
authority in roles more widely. This included consideration 
of the "chain of command", the "definedness" of authority 
spheres, belief structures and practices in the domain, 
organisation, and individual crews, and trust between humans 
and machines. Social psychology and human 
communication, including Crew Resources Management 
(CRM), teamwork studies, and management practices, were 
identified as areas where relevant knowledge may be gained. 
Function/task analyses were also relevant, including tools 
and procedures such as CREWCUT, MIDAS, and the GEC 
Human Factors Task Data Base reported at the meeting. The 
conference paper on CASSY described a good working 
example. For the future, prototypes of multi-user systems 
should be developed in order to understand EC roles. 
c. Measurement of Success (High Priority Issue): The 
question of how EC success was measured / predicted had 
implications for the design of decision aids, and for 
salesmanship.   Factors influencing the issue were identified 
as EC role, behaviour, authority structure and supporting 
technologies. Knowledge of system performance and CRM 
evaluations was relevant. Research was needed to evaluate 
various EC designs and role structures against multiple 
success measures, using novel evaluation approaches. 
d. Design and Test Procedures. (High Priority Issue): 
Provision of guidance on design and test procedures for the 
team as a unit would mean that we would know how to have 
a design process that will end up with teamwork, and that we 
would know how to measure teamwork. Currently, we do not 
have methods for designing and testing HE-C cognitive 
systems. We need to develop and test design guidelines, trial 
procedures, and measuring instruments for HE-C teamwork 
as a whole. (N.B. This issue was submitted, but not 
discussed). 
3.3 Group 3 
3.3.1 Membership 
Richard Bickerton (Issue: How do we ensure the human- 
computer team functions when faced with unpredicted 
scenarios?) 
Peter Jorna Leader/Recorder (Issue: Mode awareness or what 
will the thing be doing? Adaptive versus adaptable working 
environments?) 
Doug Hall 
Tim Hughes 
Taff Morgan ( Issue: If your task analysis is of the wrong 
task, how can you use it to build up an EC to do the right 
task?) 
John Zenyuh (Issue: What are the implications of moving EC 
technology towards a commercial environment?) 
3.3.2 Priority 
Three issues of high priority and three of medium priority 
were identified by the group. Issues given high priority 
included: The study of operational persons in mission 
context; Design framework and the role of man; The need to 
cover the unexpected mission. Medium priority issues 
included: Moving EC technology into the commercial sector; 
EC and crew selection; Weapon deployment aid; Transfer to 
"full stereo". 
3.3.1 Justification 
a. Lack of Pilot-Vehicle Interface (PVI) Design Framework 
(High Priority Issue): It was considered that the principle 
requirement of crews is for 'information systems'. This did 
not automatically imply an EC. EC was only one way of 
presenting information to the crew, and not necessarily the 
most effective way, as shown by the video's on PA and 
CASSY. Research should be more focused on three aspects: 
(1) The information needs of the crew 
(2) The assignment strategy for functions and tasks 
(3) The most effective human interface concept 
These conclusions applied to any type of 'advanced 
automation' application e.g. air traffic management. There 
was insufficient emphasis at the meeting on providing an 
effective framework for the human interface design. Effort 
was needed in defining a basic design philosophy, with the 
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goal of preventing fragmented efforts within development 
programs that lacked funding for the crewstation. As a result 
of the lack of a framework, pilots and others have to cope 
with complex confusing designs and inconsistencies. These 
problems will become critical as demands increase arising 
from new missions. Advancement of the 'pilot vehicle 
interface' was needed to accommodate the opportunities 
provided by modern sensors and systems. Human factors had 
not kept pace because human factors knowledge was not 
integrated with knowledge of systems and operational 
requirements. Commercial organisation lacked the right 
combination of resources (versatile specialists and system 
oriented human factors group) to fill the gap. As a result, 
cockpit designs were driven by hardware and software and 
not by usability, and by the liveware. A project on 'Advanced 
PVT was needed with the goal of providing a framework for 
design and evaluation, with a generic specification for a crew 
station to be customised by any manufacturer to their 
particular needs without leaving the basic validated concept. 
b. In-Flight Studies (High Priority Issue): The group stressed 
a need for more detailed and structured 'in-flight' studies of 
pilot behaviour and task strategies in order to tailor the 
human interfaces. A design frame work requires studying 
basic concepts like 'adaptive' automation (system assumes 
tasks) versus 'adaptable' automation (pilot assigns tasks). 
c. New missions (High Priority Issue): Future missions will 
be highly unpredictable. Thus, tailoring according to limited 
mission context will be out of date. The ability to adopt new 
mission capabilities should be a major design aim. 
d. Weapon Deployment Aid (Medium Priority Issue): A first 
candidate for a pilot support system could be a function that 
provides feedback on the hit probability of specific target(s), 
depending on the characteristics of the weapon concerned. 
Not all weapons behave similarly, so there is no consistency 
for the pilot, and no predictability. 
e. Commercial Technology Transfer (Medium Priority Issue) 
Moving EC technology into the commercial environment will 
require that there is appropriate Input/Output technology for 
EC in existing flight decks. For AI technology this will be 
influenced by market exposure, and by the risk perceived by 
both the public and the validation authorities. It will be 
influenced also by the opportunities for cockpit upgrades and 
for new systems. Other relevant issues include the 
extendibility of knowledge bases, and the construction of 
comprehensive knowledge bases. To achieve this will 
require knowledge of real-time AI techniques, and the ability 
to integrate with current D/C architectures. We will need to 
implement EC functionality with certified software languages 
and techniques. Also, we need to present legitimate 
cost/benefit arguments to the relevant decision-makers. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
TRANSLATOR/ 
INTERPRETER 
USER FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 2. Implementation framework for user functional requirements. 
3.4 Group 4 
3.4.1 Membership 
Jim James 
Richard Lynch (Issue: What are the barriers to our problems 
with designing an effective pilot/EC interface, and how do we 
get around them?) 
Rick Magaldi 
Tom Metzler Leader/Recorder 
Michael Reinecke 
Annette Simpson (Issue: Is trust an important issue?) 
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3.4.2 Priority 
The need was recognised for a better understanding and 
knowledge of the barriers to, or problems with, designing an 
effective pilot / EC interface, along with solutions. However, 
the problem of identifying barriers to achieving effective PVI 
implementation was considered to raise a number of 
fundamental questions. In order of priority, a number of key 
issues were identified by the group. The highest priority 
question asked 'Where are we going?' Other questions, in 
reducing priority, were as follows: What are the stages?; 
What is the standard?; How much inter-operability? 
Consideration of the role of aiding in systems design, and of 
effective PVI implementation, followed from these issues. 
3.4.3 Justification 
a. Identification of Barriers {High Priority Issue) The need 
to identify the barriers to designing an effective pilot/EC 
interface, and how to get around them, was considered to 
have implications for the specification and prediction of EC 
capability, and the anticipated role of AI. In the cockpit, this 
issue has implications for the exploitation of avionics 
technology (flat panels, voice, pointing mechanisms). 
Influencing factors from AI technology included 
disagreements in philosophy concerning EC roles and 
functions, and reliance on metrics for determining 
requirements. In the cockpit, barriers included the use of 
limited symbol sets, graphics processor capability, transport 
delays, and the constraints of existing architectures. Other 
relevant issues were the general priority of AI development 
in Defence budgets, and negative press opinions of the PA 
programme. Related operational considerations included 
improvements in mission effectiveness and survivability, and 
improved flexibility, such as through mission replanning. 
Relevant knowledge for designing an effective interface 
should be derived from principles for intuitive design, from 
information requirements based on mission and segment 
analyses, and from the results of relevant studies, such as 
PCADS, ICAAS etc. 
b. Where are we going, etc? (High Priority Issues) The 
justification for more fundamental issues was provided with 
reference to the diagram shown in Figure 2 above. It was 
considered that if the answer to the question "Where are we 
going?" was "to achieve implementation of the Pilot Vehicle 
Interface (with total AI end capability, and with resolution of 
the question of is the pilot or PA in charge)", then this needs 
to be defined now. This should be done by asking "What is 
the required design standard?". This will provide an aiming 
point. Then we need to ask "What is affordable for 
retrofitting (over 5/10/20 years), with reference to cost, risk 
and reliability?". Achieving interoperability and commonalty 
will require staged processes, including interfacing (between 
equipment particularly sensors, command elements, different 
systems and airframes), a common interface platform 
(translator / interpreter function), and a modular systems 
architecture. The role of aiding concepts in the design of 
systems needs to be defined to determine appropriate 
operator functions for successful PVI implementation. 
3.5 Group 5 
3.5.1 Membership 
Steve Boehmer Leader!Recorder 
Robert Ellis (Issue: How can we close the gap between the 
operator and system situation assessment?) 
Ian Burrett (Issue: How do we select representative samples 
of humans for use in HE Crew research, and as the model on 
which to build systems?) 
Steve Selcon (Issue: Why no progress in EC development in 
the last 4 years?) 
Mike Busbridge (Issue: Just as trust is built up over time 
should the PA be taken a step at a time with perhaps only the 
system's health expert initially incorporated?) 
3.5.2 Priority 
Three high priority issues were discussed. The group 
considered as important the question of whether 
implementation should start slowly and incrementally. Also, 
concern was expressed about the apparent lack of progress in 
developing an EC in the last four years. A further issue of 
high priority concerned the question of selecting 
representative samples of humans for use in H-EC research 
and as a model on which to build a system. Other issues 
raised included: the gap between operator and system 
situation assessment; the need for EC requirements and 
specifications to be influenced by the user; and the 
importance and meaning of trust. 
3.5.3 Justification 
a. Lack of Progress (High Priority Issue). The apparent lack 
of progress in developing an EC in the last four years implied 
that there was still no coherent approach, philosophy, or 
design aims to apply to H-EC teamwork. Factors influencing 
the issue were identified in a lack of relevant basic 
psychology. The discussion prompted the group to reason 
there is a lack of continuity in research, and a lack of 
operator definition. The group felt that there was much 
reinventing of the wheel as far as relevant knowledge in 
progressing the development of an EC. If building the whole 
system was what was desired, then this should be the clear 
aim. But if this was not a practical option, then a less 
ambitious, and more pragmatic approach should be adopted. 
b. Incremental Approach (High Priority Issue). The need to 
start building EC slowly and to proceed incrementally was 
important in order to build up trust slowly. This approach 
was necessary because a full EC was not yet technically 
possible, and because the concept was a source of anxiety for 
pilots. Also, the high cost of financing the necessary work 
made full EC unaffordable. The first step of this incremental 
approach probably should be to build a systems health expert. 
Cartoons are provided below, in Figure 3, to illustrate this 
argument (courtesy of Mike Busbridge). 
c. Representative Samples (High Priority Issue). Selecting 
the right crews for teamwork research was important because 
of the danger of optimising for the wrong model. A wide 
range of performance might be achieved  with such close 
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interaction. The teamwork model should exploit human 
strengths, and accommodate weaknesses, and perform in a 
predictable manner. Trained aircrew subjects, with 
appropriate experience in certification test and evaluation, 
have limited availability, but they can provide important 
"non-parochial" feedback. Data was needed on the range of 
human performance achieved, coupled with objective and 
subjective workload measures. This would enable banding of 
the range of human characteristics that work effectively as an 
H-EC, which could be fed into aircrew selection and training. 
d. Situation Assessment (Medium Priority Issue). The 
existence of a gap between operator and system situational 
awareness meant that if the situation representation was poor 
in the system, then incorrect decisions could be made, or 
correct decisions arrived at for the wrong reasons. Mismatch 
between operator and system assessment would reduce trust 
in system actions. Relevant AI factors included knowledge 
acquisition, informal interfaces, estimating operator intent, 
and knowledge representation. Input/output technology for 
airborne environments was considered to influence situation 
assessment in the cockpit. Cognitive interviewing techniques 
(e.g. critical incident methods) provided useful data. 
Prototypes could be used as platforms for knowledge 
acquisition. Focus was needed on operator-system 
integration. Integration was necessary for both situation 
assessment and planning activities. These should be thought 
of as shared rather than divided tasks. The dual aim should be 
to reduce workload and improve effectiveness. Input/output 
technology could be as influential as automation technology, 
in determining the outcome. 
' I'm going ^"""^^^"N 
into Al    I       ^ 
INTELUGENTDECISIONS 
Figure 3. Cartoons illustrating the justification for an incremental approach. 
3.6 Group 6 
3.6.1 Membership 
Peter Crosby (Issue: Without an achievable goal there is a 
danger of going around in circles. The line between limited 
information displayed to the pilot and a fully automated RPV 
is an experimental curve in terms of time and content. Where 
on the curve do we want to aim for?) 
Hansjorg Hertweck 
Peter Raeth Leader/Recorder (Issue: How does one ensure 
that information of the highest priority is delivered to the 
pilot   soon   enough   to   make   a   difference   to   mission 
effectiveness and survivability?) 
Jerry   Seem an   (Issue:   Should   EC   provide   options   or 
directions?) 
Iain Macleod (Issue: Does machine advice promote habits or 
competence?) 
3.6.2 Priority 
The individual issues were all considered important, but 
through discussion a different set of issues emerged, with 
some consensus on priorities. Three high priority, three 
medium priority and two low priority issues were identified 
by the group. High priority issues included concerns about 
the lack of rigorous team definitions? The group thought it 
important to consider objective design and development 
criteria, and how an EC could be flight and combat certified? 
Questions about EC training, ensuring that EC works fast 
enough, and EC debriefing, were considered to be of medium 
importance.   Issues given a lower priority included the level 
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of detailed information that a human uses effectively, and 
how to prevent the human from getting out of the loop? 
3.6.3 Justification 
a. HE-C Definitions, Criteria and Certification (High Priority 
Issues). Resolution of the high priority issues of providing 
rigorous H-EC team definitions, objective H-EC design and 
development criteria, and valid EC certification methods, 
will have implications for the structure and direction of 
research. It will exert a major influence on systems 
integration, and provide criteria and metrics for evaluation. 
Crew acceptance, funding and timing, and both hardware and 
software technology will influence H-EC implementation. 
Greater integration of the research community was required 
than at present, and appropriate evaluation methods needed to 
be made available. Areas of relevant knowledge include 
decision aid technology, human factors and psychology, 
validation and verification, and knowledge acquisition. 
Future directions will require the use of full parallel, 
concurrent and co-processing. Verification and validation 
methods will need to be extended. Dynamic function 
allocation will need to be provided to make sure that the crew 
stays involved. Event logging and analysis will be needed 
for EC systems. Specification methods will need to be 
developed for EC systems. 
b. Information Delivery (High Priority Issue) It was 
considered important to ensure that information of the 
highest priority will be delivered to the pilot soon enough to 
make a difference to mission effectiveness and survivability. 
If such information could not be implemented so that it was 
fast enough to make a difference, AI technology would be 
abandoned. It was necessary to overcome the 'toy problems 
only' reputation. AI technology needed to be linked to the 
needs of operational crews. Modern cockpit tasks were 
complex with rapid response rate requirements. The result 
was task overload for reduced crews. AI technology could 
solve this problem but only if it was fast enough to make a 
difference. The task overload barrier was waiting to be 
breached. AI technology had the potential to be successful 
but it needed to be linked to the needs of operational aircrew. 
Relevant AI factors included the following: processor speed; 
data bus speed; software and hard-ware architectures; 
scaleable implementations; parallel, concurrent and co- 
processing; knowledge and example acquisition; validation 
and verification. Cockpit factors influencing this issue were 
as follows: pilot control of EC; provision of the appropriate 
level and volume of information; sufficiently high screen 
resolution and refresh rate; pilot trust in EC; failure rate and 
accuracy of EC. Other relevant issues included co-ordination 
of on-board with off-board information, and in the cockpit, 
the sunlight readability of colours and screens, and laser 
protection. It was considered essential to employ appropriate 
computer programming languages from the start, and not use 
methods which require "black magic" for successful 
implementation. Current practice should be employed in the 
areas of neural nets; network, rule, matrix-based expert 
systems; fuzzy logic.   Trust will not be easily recovered in 
high complexity, high risk environments when EC was 
known to fail or to be inaccurate. For the future, work should 
seek to merge neural nets, expert systems and fuzzy logic 
since the math was similar and appeared to be easily 
implemented via optics. As regards the cockpit, work should 
pursue objective studies of trust. Dynamic function allocation 
should be applied to obtain the appropriate human workload. 
c. Options or Directions (Medium Priority Issue) The 
question of whether EC should provide options or directions 
was considered to have implications for the generation of 
probabilistic calculations, and for the provision of directional 
displays in the cockpit. The issue was thought to be 
influenced by the data sources available, data validity, and 
the availability of crucial data. In the cockpit, influencing 
factors would be the acceptance of risk by the operator, and 
the changing risk over the course of the mission. Other 
relevant issues included the debate about data or information 
provision, and the necessity of providing explanations to the 
operator. Relevant knowledge identified included soft 
computing methods, and hybrid "soft" and binary systems. 
In future, work should consider how to combine 
computational systems for useful outputs, and how to address 
the development of effective display formats. 
c. Complacency (Medium Priority Issue) The question of 
whether machine advice promotes habits or competence was 
considered to be of low priority for systems that are properly 
designed, with the pilot in control of EC, and with EC in an 
assistant function. But in poorly designed systems, with the 
pilot in a supervisory role, machine advice could lead to 
complacency, and to inflexible non-adaptive behaviour. Since 
it seemed generally accepted that "pilot in control" was the 
intended design aim, then complacency ought not to be a 
major problem. A schematic diagram was used to illustrate 
the intended "pilot in control", as shown below in Figure 4 
FUGHT CONTROL & OTHER 
. SIMILAR OPERATIONS 
AUTOMATIC 
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ATTACK/DEFENCE 
CRITERIA SADWCE 
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Rate and 
Summary 
Detail 
ONBAND t OFF-BAND INFORMATION 
FUGHT £ SYSTEM CONTROL COMMANDS 
Figure 4. "Pilot in Control" Model 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
If there is a simple answer to the question "Can we trust the 
team?" then it may be "Yes, providing we sort out these 
issues". A list of the issues considered by the Discussion 
Groups is shown below in Table 1. The issues are arranged 
in order of the priorities assigned by the Discussion Groups, 
beginning with the high priority issues. The number of the 
Discussion Group addressing the issue is indicated to 
facilitate cross-reference to the preceding text. 
Some general points arise from this analysis. 
Understandably, the process was biased towards identifying 
high rather than low priority issues. Groups 1, 2, 3 and 5 
mostly evaluated and prioritised the issues brought along by 
the individual group members. Groups 4 and 6 sought more 
to present an integrated overview, moving on from the 
individual issues. The framework provided by Group 4 
seems particularly helpful. Group 6 identified a key working 
assumption, governing the outcome of many issues, i.e. that 
the pilot needs to be, and will be, in control. Some of the 
issues given high priority reflected particular interests of 
influential individuals, and these may have reduced 
consensual validity as a result But most were relevant to the 
proceedings, and directly associated with the aims of the 
meeting. Assessments of issues with a either high 
cockpit/crewstation AI content, and/or important 
cockpit/crewstation AI implications, probably have the 
greatest consensual validity. 
Generally, the groups seemed concerned to highlight 
strategic issues and governing processes, rather than specific, 
detailed technical issues. Most groups emphasised the issues 
with a major bearing on the implementation of H-EC 
concepts and requirements. Examples include the definition 
and setting of objectives; establishment of design 
frameworks, guidelines, standards and criteria; incremental 
development strategies; and measures of effectiveness and 
operational  validity.     This   may  be   because  the  multi- 
disciplinary nature of the groups resisted conscensus on 
priorities between technical areas. Also, since the individual 
papers dealt with technical issues in depth, it may have been 
appropriate to highlight the "big issues" at this point in the 
proceedings. 
Some "big" technical issues were highlighted, such as the 
inadequacies of human decision-making models, the need to 
establish appropriate role and authority structures, principles 
for selecting experimental samples, valid certification 
procedures, and achieving effective functioning for the 
unpredicted mission. None of the above could be regarded 
by all as an entirely new issue, in the sense of being novel, 
and unfamiliar. They could be more appropriately 
characterised as the burning issues of the day. Entirely novel 
issues are perhaps to be found embedded in the texts of the 
technical papers, and as yet largely unrecognised, except 
presumably by the authors. 
During the wash-up session, the UK user representatives 
stated that a more effective combination would be achieved 
by retaining, not replacing, the inherent aircrew capabilities, 
and by combining with the AI technology to produce more 
effective systems. It was also suggested that better 
communication was required between the research 
community and the user community to increase awareness of 
the potential of AI technology. It was then pointed out that, 
in the UK at least, the surface, sub-surface, and airborne 
Navy were already pursuing ambitious programmes in 
exploiting AI technology, and so this awareness had already 
been achieved by one branch of the UK armed forces. 
Understanding trust, perhaps not surprisingly, since it 
received such close attention in many of the technical papers, 
was not such a burning issue by the end of the meeting. 
Could this be a measure of the meeting's success? 
ISSUE STATEMENT GROUP PRIORITY 
1 To implement an EC, shouldn't we adopt a stepped approach to improve 
existing and new cockpit modalities? 1 
High 
2 Can we justify not sharing technology? 1 High 
3 Without models of human decision making, can we build adaptive intelligent systems? 1 
High 
4 What authority structures and EC roles should there be in a multi-user 
environment? 2 
High 
5 How do we measure and predict success? 2 High 
6 How do we, as a community, demonstrate the benefits of EC? 2 High 
7 How do we provide guidelines on design and test procedures for the team 
as a unit? 2 High 
8 How do we provide a design framework to include the role of the 
operator? 3 
High 
9 How do we ensure (hat the H-EC team functions when faced with the 
unpredicted mission? 3 
High 
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10 
How do we that the design is based on the right operational tasks and 
context? 
3 High 
11 
What are the barriers to our problems with designing an effective pilot/EC 
interface, and how do we get around them? 
4 High 
12 
Where are we going? 4 High 
13 
What are the stages? 4 High 
14 
What is the standard? 4 High 
15 
How much interoperability? 4 High 
16 
How do we employ aiding in design? 4 High 
17 
How do we achieve effective PVI implementation? 4 High 
18 
Should we start slowly and incrementally? 5 High 
19 
Why has there been no development in EC in the last 4 years? 5 High 
20 
How do we select representative samples of humans for use in H-E crew 
research and as a model on which to build systems? 
5 High 
21 
What are the teams and their rigorous definitions? 6 High 
22 
What are the objective design and development criteria? 6 High 
23 
How would an EC be flight and combat certified? 6 High 
24 
How does one ensure that information of the highest priority is delivered 
to the pilot soon enough to make a difference to mission effectiveness and 
survivability? 
6 High 
25 
Should EC replace or assist? 2 Medium 
26 
How do we ensure safety? 2 Medium 
27 
How do we justify EC to society? 2 Medium 
28 
Why not first build a weapon deployment aid? 2 Medium 
29 
Why not transfer to "full stereo"? 2 Medium 
30 
How do we do EC and crew selection? 3 Medium 
31 
How do  we close the gap  between  operator  and system  situation 
assessment? 
5 Medium 
32 
How do we make EC requirements specifications more influenced by the 
"user". 
5 Medium 
33 
Is trust an important issue and what do we mean by trust? 5 Medium 
34 
Should EC provide options or directions? 6 Medium 
35 
Does machine advice promote habits or competence? 6 Medium 
36 
How is an EC to be trained? 6 Medium 
37 
How do we ensure that an EC works fast enough 6 Medium 
38 
How does an EC get debriefed post-mission? 6 Medium 
39 
How do we debrief EC to improve Human-EC communication and trust? 1 
Low 
40 
What level of detail can a human effectively use? 6 Low 
41 
How do we keep the human from getting out of the loop? 6 Low 
Table 1. Final List of Issues. 
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